Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG04144177
Ruvolo, P. J.
I.
Introduction
Appellant Michael Dougherty (Dougherty), special administrator of the estate of Alberta Perry (Estate), filed the present lawsuit against respondents Donald R. White, Alameda County Treasurer-Tax Collector (Tax Collector), and the County of Alameda (collectively, the County), as well as numerous other individuals who are not parties to this appeal. Dougherty alleges that the property tax bills for real estate owned by the Estate were not forwarded to him, although he had submitted a change of address form to a local United States Postal Service facility substituting his address for that of the deceased immediately following his appointment as special administrator. The County’s sale of the tax-defaulted property without Dougherty’s knowledge precipitated this lawsuit in which he claims the County failed to take reasonable steps to notify him of the impending sale.
On July 22, 2004, the trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend to all of the causes of action where it was named as a defendant, except only the cause of action for quiet title. After a trial on stipulated facts and other documentary evidence, on November 6, 2006, the court found in favor of the County on the remaining quiet title cause of action after determining that the Estate had no right, title, or interest, legal or equitable, in the real property. The court also determined a cause of action for declaratory relief in favor of other defendants named in the case who are not parties to this appeal. We affirm.
II.
Factual and Procedural History
On August 16, 2000, the Alameda County Superior Court appointed Dougherty special administrator of the Estate. The Estate owned real property at 1966 41st Street, Oakland, California, designated by Assessor’s Parcel No. 32-2079-1 (the property). It is undisputed that Dougherty had not notified the Alameda County Assessor or Recorder of the change of ownership of the property as a result of Perry’s death, as Revenue and Taxation Code section 480, subdivision (b) required him to do. Instead, immediately following his appointment as special administrator, Dougherty submitted a change of address statement to a local United States Postal Service facility, substituting his business address for that of the deceased. The Postal Service failed to forward the property tax bills for the property to Dougherty, and eventually the taxes on the property became delinquent.
The “Notice of Impending Tax Collector’s Power to Sell Property,” as well as other sale notices, was mailed to the residence address of the decedent, Alberta Perry, prior to the sale. They were returned to the Tax Collector marked “Returned to Sender/FOE [forwarding order expired].”
On or about March 19, 2003, the Tax Collector sold the property at auction to recover delinquent taxes. Dougherty did not have actual knowledge that the sale was going to take place. Dougherty, on behalf of the Estate, received $289,076.31 as a result of the sale, which Dougherty claims is “substantially less than the fair market value of the property.” The purchaser of the property subsequently resold it to a third party. After learning of the sale, Dougherty spoke several times with the County’s supervisor for tax defaulted sales, Elvia Quiroga (Quiroga). Dougherty claims that Quiroga admitted that the Tax Collector did not check the forwarding address at the post office before selling the property. Dougherty also claims Quiroga told him that she did not check the superior court’s register of actions for probate estates to determine if the property owner was deceased. Moreover, Dougherty claims that Quiroga admitted that she did not check with any local utility company to determine the billing address of the owner of the property, although the utility bills had been sent to Dougherty’s address since January 2002.
On March 4, 2004, Dougherty filed the original complaint on behalf of the Estate, naming only the County as defendants. The complaint requested damages due to negligence and breach of statutory duty, for injunctive relief rescinding the sale of the property, and for a declaratory judgment that Dougherty, as special administrator of the Estate, was the sole owner of the property. Basically, Dougherty claimed the County failed to act reasonably in ascertaining who might have an interest in the property before selling it, causing the Estate to be deprived of a valuable asset. The County demurred, and the superior court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend “to assert, if possible, any cognizable cause . . . or causes of action.”
On June 7, 2004, Dougherty filed a first amended complaint (FAC) on behalf of the Estate, which is the operative complaint for our purposes. The FAC essentially repeated the original complaint verbatim but added additional causes of action, including a request to quiet title to the property. The FAC also named other individuals as defendants, including the purchasers and present owners of the property, who might potentially have an interest in the property.
Only Dougherty as special administrator and the County are parties to this appeal. Because the individual defendants named in the FAC are not parties to this appeal, we omit all nonpertinent facts pertaining to Dougherty’s claims against them.
Once again, the County demurred, this time to all causes of action except the cause of action to quiet title. The County argued that the Estate could not overcome the absolute immunity conferred upon the County pursuant to Government Code section 860.2 for any claim of damages arising from the collection of a tax. That section provides that a public entity is not “liable for an injury” caused by “[i]nstituting any judicial or administrative proceeding or action for or incidental to the assessment or collection of a tax” or “[a]n act or omission in the interpretation or application of any law relating to a tax.” The County also pointed out that in “an identical situation,” the court held that Government Code section 860.2 bars suits for damages and Dougherty’s sole remedy was an action to quiet title. (See Nadon v. City of Los Angeles (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 487, 490 [City’s immunity for damages for sale of tax-defaulted property without notice to the owner was unambiguously established by Government Code section 860.2, and the sole remedy available was an action to quiet title]; see also Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Board (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1133, 1136-1137 [Government Code section 860.2 provides absolute immunity for discretionary and nondiscretionary acts].)
On July 22, 2004, the court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend. The case then proceeded to trial on the quiet title cause of action. Although the County’s demurrer was sustained as to the Estate’s declaratory relief cause of action, the rights of the other named defendants had not been adjudicated, so that cause of action also proceeded to trial against them. The case was tried on stipulated facts as well as other documentary evidence.
On November 6, 2006, the trial court decided in favor of the County and against the Estate on the sole cause of action remaining against it for quiet title. The court’s order states in pertinent part: “Though it appears that [Dougherty] did not receive actual notice of the Tax Default Sale prior to the sale, there is . . . an insufficient showing of Negligence and/or a Breach of Statutory Duty by the County of Alameda Tax Collector. The Notice of Impending Tax Collector’s Power to Sell Property (as well as other sale notices) was mailed to 247 Sequoyah View Road, Oakland, California (the residence address of the decedent, Alberta Perry) prior to the sale. Subsequent mailed Notices of Sale were returned to the County of Alameda Tax Collector marked ‘Returned to Sender/FOE.’ [Dougherty] did not file a Change of Address form with the County Assessors Office, but had submitted a Change of Address form for his business address to the United States Postal Service.” The court quieted title in accordance with the County’s tax default sale in which the property was sold and then resold to bona fide purchasers for value. This appeal followed.
III.
Discussion
In his opening brief, Dougherty purports to appeal not only from the court’s ruling after trial on the quiet title cause of action but also from “a judgment entered after the trial court sustained [the County’s] Demurrer by Defendant to First Amended Complaint.” Specifically, Dougherty states that he seeks to overturn the court’s decision rendered on July 22, 2004, “as to the First (Negligence), Second (Breach of Statutory Duty), Third (Injunctive Relief), Fourth (Declaratory Relief), and Sixth (Violation of Civil Rights) Causes of Action of Appellant’s First Amended Complaint.”
The County argues that the Estate is foreclosed from challenging the court’s ruling on demurrer because of the narrow scope of the notice of appeal, which was taken only “from the judgment entered on November 6, 2006.” The November 6, 2006 “Ruling and Judgment of the Court” was entered after trial and it only refers to the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief tried against other defendants who are not parties to this appeal and the fifth causes of action to quiet title to the property. The County claims we cannot review appellant’s arguments as to any of the other causes of action dismissed on demurrer because the ruling on the demurrer to the FAC was made on July 22, 2004, and that ruling is nowhere mentioned in the court’s November 6, 2006 judgment.
We have discretion to amend a judgment to preserve appellate jurisdiction when “ ‘the trial court’s failure to dispose of all causes of action results from inadvertence or mistake rather than an intention to retain the remaining causes of action for trial[.]’. . .” (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 308, citing Tenhet v. Boswell (1976) 18 Cal.3d 150, 154.) Since it appears that the trial court’s failure to render a final judgment disposing of this entire action was merely the result of inadvertence or mistake and not an intention to retain any of the causes of action for another trial, we amend the judgment to reflect the trial court’s presumed intent. The judgment thus amended disposes of all of the causes of action pending before the court in Dougherty’s complaint and constitutes an appealable judgment.
In his opening brief, Dougherty indicates that he will ask this court to allow him to augment the record with an “Amended Ruling and Judgment” that was filed in the superior court after the appeal was taken that states that the November 6, 2006 ruling was intended to include the order sustaining the County’s demurrer to the first amended complaint for the first through fourth and sixth causes of action. At oral argument, Dougherty explained that such an amended ruling was impossible to obtain because the superior court was divested of jurisdiction once the appeal was filed.
In addressing the merits of this appeal, we first consider the County’s position that Dougherty is precluded from challenging the court’s resolution of his quiet title claim because he failed to bring all the necessary parties into this appeal. As noted, in its November 6, 2006 ruling, the court quieted title in accordance with the County’s tax default sale in which the property was sold and then resold to bona fide purchasers for value. In doing so, the trial court found the Estate had no right, title, or interest, legal or equitable, in the property because there was insufficient evidence to prove negligence or breach of statutory duty on the part of the County.
While Dougherty has appealed from the court’s judgment quieting title, he has only appealed against the County and has expressly disavowed any intention of appealing against the other individuals named as defendants in his quiet title cause of action. The County makes the argument that “[b]y failing to appeal against the other parties, Dougherty has acquiesced in that judgment of the trial court . . . .” We agree.
A “quiet title” action is maintained to establish or “quiet” title to or an interest in real property as between adverse claimants. (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a).) “A quiet title action seeks to declare the rights of the parties in realty. . . . ‘ “The object of the action is to finally settle and determine, as between the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to.” ’ [Citations.]” (Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 278, 305; see Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 24 [quiet title action “akin” to declaratory relief action].) The quiet title statute required appellant to name as defendants all persons having adverse claims to the property that are of record or who are known to him. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 762.010; 762.020; 762.060, subd. (b).)
The FAC named as individual defendants Jayan Elle LLC, who took title to the property as a result of the tax sale, and Judy Ma and Sandi Wan Ming Ma, who purchased the property from Jayan Elle LLC. Although the quiet title cause of action was tried against other named defendants besides the County with a potential interest in the property, Dougherty has brought this appeal naming only the County a party. It seems obvious that no appeal from the court’s ruling on the Estate’s claim for quiet title can be made effectual unless all the named defendants with an interest in the property are made parties to the appeal, because a potential reversal of the court’s ruling would injuriously affect their interests. Because the other named defendants are necessary parties to any disposition of the quiet title cause of action, and they have not been made parties to this appeal, we conclude Dougherty cannot prosecute the Estate’s appeal of the quiet title cause of action. (See Machado v. Superior Court (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 81, 83 [because all the parties to an action concerning partitioned property will be affected by reversal or modification of the judgment, an appeal must be against all the defendants and not just from that part of the judgment that concerns only appellant’s rights to the partitioned property].)
As the County correctly posits, under these circumstances, Dougherty is precluded from relitigating any of the issues decided against him in the quiet title cause of action, including the specified issues of the County’s alleged negligence and breach of statutory duty in failing to take reasonable steps to notify him of the impending sale. (See Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1563.)
We find that the conclusive effect of the quiet title cause of action effectively disposes of all of the other causes of action alleged in Dougherty’s FAC in the County’s favor, rendering moot Dougherty’s assertion that the lower court erred in sustaining demurrers to those causes of action. The FAC states five other causes of action against the County: negligence (first cause of action); breach of statutory duty (second cause of action); injunctive relief (third cause of action); declaratory relief (fourth cause of action); and violation of Dougherty’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (sixth cause of action). The FAC bases all of its causes of action on the same allegation of wrongdoing by the County that it “failed to make a reasonable effort to obtain the name and last known mailing address of parties of interest. [Dougherty’s] address was, at all relevant times, easily ascertainable. Where, as in this matter, the tax collector’s efforts were not reasonable, then the sale may be set aside or an action for damages may be maintained.”
It is abundantly clear that Dougherty believes the County failed to make a reasonable effort to notify him of the pending sale of the tax-delinquent property and that he has been illegally deprived of his interest in the property. However, it is also equally clear that Dougherty previously made these identical assertions in the action to quiet title, and they were rejected by the trial court. He now makes the assertions again in his arguments seeking to overturn the court’s demurrer to his FAC. The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of claims already litigated. (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 182 [“Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an issue of ultimate fact that a court already has adjudicated. It deals with the finality of judgment on factual matters that were fully considered and decided.”].) “In the absence of such a limitation, a party could relitigate an issue simply by framing a new theory to attack the prior determination. [Citation.] The policy of repose, which is the basis for the doctrine of preclusion, would thereby be frustrated.” (Carroll v. Puritan Leasing Co. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 481, 490.) Applying collateral estoppel principles, we hold that the judgment in the quiet title action precludes Dougherty from claiming that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to his FAC.
IV.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to the County.
We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.