Opinion
No. 2-12-0375
04-24-2013
KEVIN T. DOUGHERTY and JAN DOUGHERTY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J.B. SULLIVAN, INC., d/b/a Sullivan's Foods, Inc., and KIM R. LAWFER, Defendants-Appellees.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Winnebago County.
No. 10-L-224
Honorable
Eugene G. Doherty,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's grant of defendants' motion to transfer venue based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens was affirmed where the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the relevant factors strongly favored transfer. ¶ 2 Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's grant of defendants' motion to transfer venue under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187 (eff. Aug. 1, 1986), based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On August 25, 2010, plaintiffs, Kevin and Jan Dougherty, filed their first amended complaint in Winnebago County. The six-count complaint included a claim of negligence, a claim of loss of consortium, and a claim under the Family Expense Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2010)), against each of the defendants, J.B. Sullivan, Inc., d/b/a Sullivan's Foods, Inc. (Sullivan), and Kim R. Lawfer. Plaintiffs alleged the following. Kevin was an American citizen living in Germany for his work as a foreign war correspondent with the Stars and Stripes Newspaper. On April 28, 2010, he was engaged in a walk across America. Kevin was walking westbound on the south shoulder of Route 64 in Carroll County, Illinois, when he was struck by a 2009 Dodge Grand Caravan driven by Lawfer. Lawfer, acting within the scope of his employment with Sullivan, was driving westbound on Route 64 when he crossed over the eastbound lane, and onto the south shoulder, striking Kevin. Kevin was taken by helicopter to the trauma center at OSF St. Anthony Medical Center, in Rockford, Winnebago County, Illinois. Kevin subsequently received additional treatment for his injuries at Van Matre HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital in Rockford and was, at the time of filing the complaint, residing at East Bank Center rehabilitation facility in Loves Park, Winnebago County, Illinois. ¶ 5 In their answer to plaintiffs' complaint, defendants admitted Kevin was a westbound pedestrian on the south shoulder of Route 64 and that Lawfer was acting within the scope of his employment with Sullivan while driving its van westbound on Route 64. They also admitted that the van crossed over the eastbound lane, onto the south shoulder, and struck Kevin. However, defendants denied any acts of negligence. ¶ 6 In a deposition, Lawfer testified that he worked as a pricing coordinator for Sullivan. On April 27, 2010, the day before the accident, Lawfer had been preparing the register systems for grand openings of Sullivan's grocery stores in Oregon and Mount Morris, Illinois (both in Ogle County), the next day. Lawfer said that he went to sleep at about 3 a.m. on April 28, 2010, on the cash office floor of the Mount Morris store and woke up 2½ hours later at 5:30 a.m. to begin work again. Lawfer drove Sullivan's van to the Oregon store, where he worked until 2 p.m. He then drove back to the Mount Morris store, where he worked for about 20 minutes. After that, Lawfer headed to Sullivan's office in Savanna, Carroll County, Illinois. About an hour later, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Lawfer was westbound on Route 64 when he fell asleep at the wheel. Lawfer said that he awoke to the sound of gravel and noticed that he had drifted from the westbound lane into the eastbound lane. He saw Kevin trying to run from the van immediately before it struck him. Lawfer said Kevin "went airborne." The van came to a stop in the ditch. Lawfer called 911 from his cell phone and told the dispatcher that he had fallen asleep and hit a pedestrian. ¶ 7 On September 10, 2010, defendants filed a forum non conveniens motion to transfer venue from Winnebago County to Carroll County. Defendants alleged the following. Plaintiffs were not residents of Winnebago County. The accident, all subsequent investigation of it, and all witnesses to it, were located in Carroll County. Carroll County's court docket was substantially less congested than that of Winnebago County. Defendant Sullivan's corporate headquarters and principal place of business, as well as defendant Lawfer's residence, were in Savanna, Carroll County, Illinois. Defendants contended that all of these facts strongly favored Carroll County as the "proper venue." Defendants did not file a supporting memorandum of law or any supporting documentation with their motion. ¶ 8 Plaintiffs filed a response in which they asserted that defendants failed to identify any exceptional circumstances that would warrant disturbing plaintiffs' choice of forum. Plaintiffs explained that, although they did not reside in Winnebago County (they resided in Germany due to Kevin's work for the United States Department of Defense), Kevin had been living in rehabilitation hospitals in Winnebago County for several months at the time the complaint was filed. ¶ 9 Plaintiffs further asserted that defendants did not dispute that Lawfer "negligently struck" Kevin. Thus, according to plaintiffs, the trial would be focused on Kevin's medical care, treatment, and damages. Plaintiffs pointed out that nearly all of Kevin's $572,758.14 worth of medical care was incurred in Winnebago County over the course of several months from over 160 providers (they attached summaries of Kevin's providers and medical bills). Plaintiffs specifically identified seven physicians from Winnebago County whom they expected to testify at trial. They further identified as a potential damages witness Daniel Augustine, a Carroll County resident, who testified in his deposition (which plaintiffs attached to their response) that it would not inconvenience him to travel to Winnebago County for trial. Plaintiffs refuted defendants' assertion that all of the accident investigators and occurrence witnesses were located in Carroll County by attaching the Illinois Traffic Crash Report from the accident. The report listed as witnesses, Terry Bouray, who resided in Winnebago County, and Becky Coon, who resided in Stephenson County. Plaintiffs also attached the deposition testimony of Sergeant Troy Layne of the Illinois State Police—the collision reconstructionist—who said it would not be inconvenient for him to travel to Winnebago County to testify at trial, as he often did so for depositions. According to plaintiffs, therefore, the overwhelming majority of witnesses and evidence was in Winnebago County. ¶ 10 Plaintiffs additionally contended that, because Sullivan transacted substantial business in Winnebago County, including a grocery store with an Ace Hardware store operated as a department therein, defendants could not establish that Winnebago County was an inconvenient forum for them. In a similar vein, plaintiffs argued that defendants' transaction of business and use of the roads in Winnebago County gave the residents a substantial interest in the case, and further noted that Sullivan maintained a registered agent there. ¶ 11 Defendants filed a reply in support of their forum non conveniens motion, in which they argued repeatedly that Carroll County was the "more appropriate forum." Defendants pointed out that, although they admitted that Lawfer hit Kevin while driving Sullivan's van, they expressly denied negligence. They relatedly argued that a jury visit to the accident site could be warranted as it was disputed whether Kevin had been walking in an appropriate place or had assumed a risk of danger. Defendants also contended that their doing business in Winnebago County was irrelevant to a forum non conveniens analysis. Defendants asserted that none of their witnesses was in Winnebago County and that, to the extent that Kevin's medical records were located in Winnebago County, those documents already had been secured by subpoena. According to defendants, because the suit was brought against Carroll County residents, based on an accident in Carroll County, for which Carroll County resources were expended, it was a "wholly localized" controversy in which Winnebago County had no justifiable interest. ¶ 12 On March 2, 2012, the trial court heard argument on defendants' forum non conveniens motion. In making its ruling, the court acknowledged the deference generally due to a plaintiff's choice of forum but noted that plaintiffs here were entitled to less deference because their chosen forum was neither their residence nor the site of the accident. The court then addressed the private interest factors of the parties and found that, if the only issue were liability, Carroll County "would be the better place." The court further stated that, if only damages were at issue, "clearly Winnebago County would probably be the better place." The court concluded that, since liability had not been admitted, the private interest factors were "fairly well balanced." ¶ 13 The court next addressed the relative congestion of the court dockets in Winnebago and Carroll counties. The court found that, in 2010, the number of cases filed per 1,000 persons in the seventeenth circuit (comprised of Winnebago and Boone counties) was 312, while in the fifteenth circuit (comprised of Carroll, Ogle, Stephenson, Lee, and Jo Daviess counties) it was 256. The court explained that the issue was really more a question of each circuit's resources to handle its cases and indicated that there were 4,752 cases filed per judge in the seventeenth circuit and only 2,808 per judge in the fifteenth circuit. The court further reasoned that it was misleading to compare the fifteenth and seventeenth circuits because the seventeenth circuit was comprised mostly of Winnebago County while in the fifteenth circuit, Carroll County accounted for only two percent of the cases filed. The court found that the entire number of cases filed in Carroll County in 2010 was 1,300 less than the number of cases filed per judge in Winnebago County. ¶ 14 The trial court next considered whether Winnebago County had a sufficient connection to the case to justify imposing the trial expense and burden of jury duty on its residents. The court found that the "only real connection" to Winnebago County, other than Sullivan's doing business there (which was "enough to establish venue *** but not a strong case for venue"), was that Kevin received medical care in Winnebago County. Regarding that connection, the court reasoned:
"That's a factor that we have to be somewhat careful of.The court concluded that, giving plaintiffs' choice of forum "substantial weight," the factors "sufficiently outweigh[ed]" it to justify transfer. The court entered an order granting defendants' forum non conveniens motion and transferring the case to Carroll County. ¶ 15 Plaintiffs filed a petition for leave to appeal from this interlocutory order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (eff. Feb. 16, 2011), which we granted. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental record, which we took with the case and now grant.
Whenever someone is injured, they go to an area where there's Level 1 or tertiary care centers. I don't think that along with that comes the responsibility for that county to adjudicate all of the accidents that may have led to those injuries. Certainly if there's medical malpractice, you're going to bring those cases here because that's where the care happened, but just because the care happened here in a case where the injury occurred far away is really a poor reason to justify the case being on our docket."
The original complaint was filed on June 25, 2010.
Winnebago County and Carroll County are not adjacent; Winnebago County is one county northeast of Carroll County. The Winnebago County courthouse is located almost 59 miles from the Carroll County courthouse.
Plaintiffs indicated that they expected Augustine to testify about Kevin's mental, physical, and emotional condition before and after the accident.
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants forum non conveniens motion to transfer venue. The Illinois venue statute provides: "[E]very action must be commenced (1) in the county of residence of any defendant who is joined in good faith and with probable cause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against him or her and not solely for the purpose of fixing venue in that county, or (2) in the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action 8arose." 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2012). Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine that permits a trial court to decline jurisdiction and transfer an action when "trial in another forum 'would better serve the ends of justice.' " Langenhorst v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 219 Ill. 2d 430, 441 (2006) (quoting Vinson v. Allstate, 144 Ill. 2d 306, 310 (1991)). The trial court has "considerable discretion" in deciding a forum non conveniens motion. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 441. We will reverse a trial court's forum non conveniens decision only upon an abuse of discretion, meaning that no reasonable person would take the view of the trial court. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 442. However, our supreme court has stated repeatedly that this "discretionary power *** should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances when the interests of justice require a trial in a more convenient forum." (Emphasis in original.) Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 442. ¶ 18 The factors to be considered by the trial court in deciding a forum non conveniens motion include the private interest factors affecting the litigants and the public interest factors affecting court administration. Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 172 (2003). The private interest factors include: "(1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the relative ease of access to sources of testimonial, documentary, and real evidence; and (3) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive." (Internal quotations omitted.) Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 443. The public interest factors include: "(1) the interest in deciding controversies locally; (2) the unfairness of imposing trial expense and the burden of jury duty on residents of a forum that has little connection to the litigation; and (3) the administrative difficulties presented by adding litigation to already congested court dockets." Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 443-44. In balancing all of the private and public interest factors, the court should view each case as unique on its facts and avoid 9 emphasizing any single factor. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 443. ¶ 19 Additionally, in what is referred to as the "unequal balancing test," the court is to give deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. " 'The plaintiff has a substantial interest in choosing the forum where his rights will be vindicated, and the plaintiff's forum choice should rarely be disturbed unless the other factors strongly favor transfer.' " Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 442 (quoting First American Bank v. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d 511, 517 (2002)). However, where the plaintiff's forum choice is neither his or her residence nor the site of the accident or injury giving rise to the suit, the court should accord "somewhat less deference" to the plaintiff's choice. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 442-43. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the relevant factors "strongly favor the defendant's choice of forum to warrant disturbing the plaintiff's choice." (Internal quotations omitted.) Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 444. "The defendant must show that the plaintiff's chosen forum is inconvenient to the defendant and that another forum is more convenient to all parties." Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 444. ¶ 20 Here, the trial court considered the factors and concluded that they "sufficiently outweigh[ed]" the "substantial weight" accorded plaintiffs' choice of forum such that transfer of the case was justified. We cannot say that no reasonable person could adopt that view. ¶ 21 At the outset of its discussion, the trial court acknowledged the deference to be accorded to plaintiffs' choice of forum. The court further correctly noted that plaintiffs' choice should receive less deference since plaintiffs' choice was neither their residence nor the accident site. ¶ 22 The court's consideration of the relevant private interest factors consisted of a comparison of the fora in light of whether liability or damages were at issue. The court found that, if only liability were at issue, then Carroll County "would be the better place" and that, if only damages 10 were at issue, "clearly Winnebago County would probably be the better place." The court concluded that, since liability had not been admitted, the private interest factors were "fairly well balanced." ¶ 23 While it is helpful for trial courts to be explicit in explaining their reasoning (see Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 520 (urging trial courts to leave a better record of their forum non conveniens analyses)), the court's discussion here implicitly encompassed each of the relevant private interest factors—convenience of the parties, relative ease of access to evidence sources, and all other practical problems that make trial easy and efficient. Especially given the parties' presentation of the case—with plaintiffs' asserting that liability was really not at issue and focusing on damages witnesses, and defendants' highlighting the site of the accident—we cannot say that the trial court's approach was unreasonable. ¶ 24 Nor can we say that it was unreasonable to find that the private interest factors were fairly well balanced between Winnebago and Carroll counties. Carroll County, as the location of Sullivan's corporate headquarters and its principal place of business, as well as Lawfer's residence, is presumably more convenient for defendants. Plaintiffs' chosen forum, Winnebago County, presumably is more convenient for them (see Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 444 (stating that a defendant may not argue that the plaintiff's choice is inconvenient for the plaintiff)), though the presumption was somewhat diminished because it was not their place of residence or the site of the accident (see Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 442-43). Regarding the relative ease of access to evidence, most of the evidence and witnesses on damages were in Winnebago County, while most of the liability evidence and witnesses were in Carroll County, including the first responders to the accident. Furthermore, the site of the accident being in Carroll County weighs in favor of transfer due to the possibility of a jury view of the site. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 179 (stating that "it would be irrational" to force 11 jurors from one county to travel even to an adjacent county to view an accident site). On the whole, the private interest factors were, as the trial court found, fairly well balanced. ¶ 25 With respect to the public interest factors, the trial court found them sufficient to outweigh plaintiffs' choice of forum. The court addressed the interest in deciding controversies locally, as well as the unfairness of imposing the burden of a trial on Winnebago County residents, properly noting that the fact that Sullivan did business in Winnebago County was merely minimally sufficient to establish venue there. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 182 ("A forum non conveniens motion causes a court to look beyond the criteria of venue when it considers the relative convenience of a forum."). The court found that Winnebago County's "only real connection" to the litigation was that Kevin was treated there. The court explained that "just because the care happened here in a case where the injury occurred far away is really a poor reason to justify the case being on our docket." We cannot say that the court's conclusion was unreasonable. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 183 (stating that "the fact that the accident occurred in [the alternative forum] gives the action a local interest"). Moreover, regarding the final public interest factor—court congestion—the court's finding that the docket of the Winnebago County courts was more congested than that of Carroll County was supported by the supreme court's statistics. The court even considered the resources of the respective courts. Especially given that the accident occurred in Carroll County with alleged 12 negligence by Carroll County residents, and that plaintiffs were not Winnebago County residents, Carroll County had a predominant connection to the litigation, and the court's conclusion that the public interest factors favored transfer was not unreasonable. ¶ 26 Overall, on the record before us, a rational person could conclude that the relevant factors strongly weighed in favor of transfer. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants' forum non conveniens motion to transfer venue. ¶ 27 Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the trial court was misled by defendants, who repeatedly asserted that Carroll County was a "more appropriate forum." In their reply filed in support of their transfer motion, defendants cited Evans v. MD Con, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 292 (1995). In Evans, the First District of our appellate court stated: "[The defendant] need not have shown that [the plaintiff's chosen forum] would be an inconvenient forum in which to litigate this action but only that [the alternative forum] would be a substantially more appropriate forum, in light of the private and public interest factors, regardless of whether trial of this action in [the plaintiff's chosen forum] would result in any inconvenience whatsoever." Evans, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Not only was the First District's conclusion unsupported by citation of any prior case law whatsoever, but it is also diametrically inconsistent with the law as later elucidated by our supreme court. See Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 453 ("We recognize that the dissent would prefer to replace 'the convenience of the parties' as the 'touchstone' of forum non conveniens analysis to focusing on 'the more appropriate forum' based on 'where the cause of action arose.' This shift is clearly not warranted and would result in obliteration of the venue statute."). Accordingly, to the extent that defendants' position in the trial court was based on a "more appropriate forum" analysis, we 13 conclude that it was misguided. ¶ 28 However, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court was misled. The court addressed the deference due to plaintiffs' choice of forum and considered the relevant private and public interest factors. As discussed above, the trial court's conclusion that the relevant factors strongly weighed in favor of transfer was not unreasonable. On this record, we are confident that the court was aware of the applicable law. ¶ 29 Plaintiffs further argue that, despite defendants' formal denial of negligence, realistically there is no genuine issue about liability in this case. They point out that it is undisputed that Lawfer, a Sullivan's employee acting within the scope of his employment, fell asleep at the wheel and struck Kevin, who was walking on the shoulder of the highway. Despite these undisputed facts, defendants contend that it is still not clear whether Kevin "was as far over on the shoulder as practicable under the circumstances." While liability does not appear to be an issue in this case, defendants still may plead contributory negligence if further facts come to light in discovery. See Hobart v. Shin, 185 Ill. 2d 283, 292 (1998) (stating that a trial court has broad discretion to allow additional defenses any time before final judgment). Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court's conclusion that both liability and damages were at issue was unreasonable. ¶ 30 Plaintiffs next contend that, even if liability is still an issue, the private interest factors "do not reasonably support transfer." Plaintiffs observe that defendants have changed attorneys so that now all of the parties' attorneys are located in Chicago, which is closer to Winnebago County than to Carroll County. To the extent that plaintiffs did not raise this argument in the trial court, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in not considering it. In any event, the attorneys' location is entitled to little weight in the forum non conveniens analysis. Boner v. Peabody Coal Co., 14 142 Ill. 2d 523, 534 (1991). ¶ 31 Plaintiffs further urge that defendants failed to demonstrate the inconvenience of Winnebago County with respect to the testimony of Sergeant Layne, the accident reconstructionist, and damages witness Daniel Augustine, who each testified that Winnebago County was not an inconvenient forum. They also point to occurrence witnesses Terry Bouray and Becky Coon, of Winnebago County and Stephenson County, respectively. While we agree that, for these witnesses, it does not appear that Winnebago County would be inconvenient, we cannot say that, on the record as a whole, no rational person could have concluded that the private interest factors were fairly well balanced. ¶ 32 Plaintiffs additionally maintain that even if the private interest factors were fairly well balanced, the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants' motion. Although plaintiffs correctly observe that transfer is warranted only where the factors strongly favor it and not where they are merely evenly balanced, the trial court's finding that the private factors were evenly balanced did not preclude it from finding that the public interest factors strongly favored transfer. See Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518 (explaining that the trial court is not to weigh the private interest factors against the public interest factors but should "evaluate the total circumstances of the case"). This is especially true in light of plaintiffs' choice of forum receiving less deference because it was not their residence or the site of the accident. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 442-43. ¶ 33 Plaintiffs next argue that the public interest factors "do not reasonably support transfer." In particular, they contend that the trial court ignored Sullivan's "very substantial presence" as a "major commercial player in Winnebago County's economy." Plaintiffs argue that this case "is not merely about bad driving, it is about bad and unreasonable business practices" requiring employees to work through the night and work the next day on two hours of sleep. Thus, according to plaintiffs, 15 Winnebago County's residents have an interest in the litigation. We note that plaintiffs did not make this specific argument in the court below; rather, they argued generally that Winnebago County residents had an interest in the safety of their local roads. However, given that the general argument was raised, and that forfeiture is a limitation on the parties only (In re Tamera W., 2012 IL App (2d) 111131, ¶ 30), we will address it. ¶ 34 The mere fact that a corporate defendant does business in the plaintiff's chosen forum, while sufficient to establish venue, is not relevant in a forum non conveniens analysis. However, the extent and type of the defendant's business are appropriate considerations. Boner, 142 Ill. 2d at 540. In the court below, plaintiffs pointed out that, in operating its grocery store with an Ace Hardware store therein, Sullivan targeted Winnebago County residents in its advertising, employed 200 of the residents over a period of 4 years, and engaged in business with Winnebago County vendors. Plaintiffs also noted that Sullivan's registered agent was in Winnebago County and that Lawfer was the pricing coordinator for all of Sullivan's grocery stores, including the one in Winnebago County. The trial court found that defendants' business in Winnebago County was merely sufficient to establish proper venue. This was not an unreasonable conclusion. Whenever a defendant maintains a store in a forum, one would expect that the defendant would advertise there, employ some of the residents, and use the roads there. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 182 (stating that, if a defendant's conduct of business in the plaintiff's chosen forum were dispositive, the forum non conveniens doctrine would be vitiated); but cf. Boner, 142 Ill. 2d at 540 (stating that the defendant's maintaining offices and conducting active coal mining in the plaintiff's chosen forum were "by no means marginal" activities). Regardless of whether bad business practices, or merely bad driving, is at issue, a reasonable person could conclude that Sullivan's business activity in Winnebago County did 16 not give its residents an interest in the litigation. ¶ 35 Plaintiffs further contend that the trial court overemphasized the court-congestion factor. Although court congestion is to be given relatively little weight in a forum non conveniens analysis, it is still properly considered. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181 ("[T]his court has repeatedly recognized that it is appropriate to consider the congested conditions of the docket in the plaintiff's chosen forum."). We note that plaintiffs do not take issue with the conclusions reached by the court's "number crunching." Among other things, the court found it misleading simply to compare the fifteenth and seventeenth circuits. Given that the seventeenth circuit caseload is comprised primarily of Winnebago County cases and that the fifteenth circuit includes cases from five counties, of which, Carroll County cases comprise a small percentage, the court's finding was not unreasonable. Thus, that the court analyzed the details of the statistics simply demonstrates that it was thoughtfully considering what the numbers reflected. We cannot say that the court's discussion indicates an overemphasis of this factor. ¶ 36 In their reply brief, plaintiffs contend that the trial court "harbored strong feelings" about its congested docket and "expressly made its decision" on this single factor. In support of their position, plaintiffs point to the court's statement that "just because the care happened here in a case where the injury occurred far away is really a poor reason to justify the case being on our docket." We read the court's discussion about Kevin's medical care as distinct from its discussion of court congestion. After addressing its congested docket, the court indicated it was changing topics, stating, "I think there's a more significant factor. And that is, the connection of the case to the county and the imposition of the responsibility." Moreover, although the public interest factors—deciding controversies locally, not unfairly burdening residents with litigation to which they are unconnected, 17 and relative court congestion—arguably overlap each other, nothing indicates an overemphasis by the court on any single factor. The court simply concluded that Winnebago County's only connection to the case, that Kevin's medical care occurred there, did not create enough of an interest to justify imposing the burden of trial on its residents. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' insistence that the trial court failed to give enough weight to Kevin's "extensive" medical treatment in Winnebago County, the record reflects that the court balanced all of the private and public interest factors and nothing indicates that it abused its discretion in doing so. ¶ 37 Plaintiffs next argue that their choice of forum should not have received less deference because, in their unusual situation of being domiciled in Germany, they filed suit in the closest thing they had to a home forum in Illinois—Winnebago County—where Kevin resided for several months during his treatment. We are not persuaded. The reason for the deference accorded a plaintiff's choice of his home forum is the presumption of its convenience; however, "[w]hen the plaintiff is foreign, ***, this assumption is much less reasonable." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. Even assuming without deciding that Winnebago County could have been considered Kevin's temporary home at the time he filed his complaint, since he no longer resides in Winnebago County, the litigation no longer has the "aspect of being decided at home" that underlies the presumption of convenience. (Internal quotations omitted.) Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518. ¶ 38 Finally, plaintiffs rely on Guerine and Langenhorst in support of their position that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendants' transfer motion. As in the present case, in both Guerine and Langenhorst, the plaintiffs filed suit in a county that was neither their home nor the accident site, and the defendants filed forum non conveniens motions to transfer venue to the county where the accident occurred. In Guerine, the trial court granted the motion, and the supreme court 18 reversed (Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 514); in Langenhorst, the trial court denied the motion, and the supreme court affirmed (Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 433). Thus, in both cases, our supreme court held in favor of the plaintiffs' choice of forum. However, plaintiffs' reliance on these cases is misplaced as both are distinguishable on their facts from the present case. ¶ 39 In Guerine, Kane County plaintiffs filed suit in Cook County following a motor vehicle accident in De Kalb County. The plaintiffs alleged wrongful death against the defendant driver and defective design and manufacture against the defendant manufacturer of the boat trailer that had come loose from the defendant driver's vehicle. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 512-13. The defendant driver was a Cook County resident, and the defendant manufacturer was an Indiana corporation. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 512. Witnesses were located in Cook, Kane, De Kalb, Du Page, and Winnebago counties. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 524-25. The supreme court reversed the trial court's grant of the defendants' motion to transfer, holding: "[A] trial court abuses its discretion in granting an intrastate forum non conveniens motion to transfer venue where, as here, the potential trial witnesses are scattered among several counties, including the plaintiff's chosen forum, and no single county enjoys a predominant connection to the litigation." Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 526. ¶ 40 Unlike the instant case, where both defendants are located in their proposed alternative forum, in Guerine, the defendant driver resided in the plaintiffs' chosen forum. Moreover, in Guerine, only one defendant, the out-of-state manufacturer, filed a motion to transfer, which the defendant driver did not join. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 524. The supreme court in Guerine reasoned that the defendant manufacturer would have to travel from Indiana through the chosen forum (Cook County) to reach the alternative forum (De Kalb County) anyway. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 524. 19 Additionally, in Guerine, the cause of action against the filing out-of-state defendant was for product liability, which was "less localized" than the negligence action against the driver. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 525. Here, in contrast, both defendants face negligence claims, which have a "local flavor." Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 525. Thus, the trial court's grant of defendants' transfer motion in the instant case is not inconsistent with the holding in Guerine because, here, one county—Carroll County—does have a predominant connection to the litigation, even though the witnesses are located in several counties. ¶ 41 In Langenhorst, the Clinton County plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in St. Clair County following a train-motor vehicle accident in Clinton County, near the St. Clair County line. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 433-34. Defendants were Norfolk Southern Railway Company, a Virginia corporation, with a registered agent in St. Clair County; two of its employees, who were Indiana residents; and one of its division engineers, a Macon County resident. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 434. Witnesses were scattered throughout several counties, including St. Clair County. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 447-48. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion to transfer, concluding that no single county enjoyed a predominant connection to the litigation and the witnesses were scattered among several counties. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 453. ¶ 42 Unlike the present case, in Langenhorst, the chosen forum and the alternative forum were adjacent counties, and the court could discern no inconvenience to the defendants from the minimal travel distance, stating that it was a "battle over the minutiae." (Internal quotations omitted.) Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 450. Here, Winnebago County and Carroll County are not adjacent. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Winnebago County courthouse in Rockford is located almost 20 59 miles from the Carroll County courthouse in Mt. Carroll, which is not an insignificant difference. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177 (proper to take judicial notice of the distances between locations). Additionally, the trial court in Langenhorst said it would have no problem trying the case expeditiously (Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 437), while here, the trial court found its docket much more congested than Carroll County's. Moreover, Langenhorst was unusual in that a jury view of the accident site would not have been appropriate because the site had been "substantially changed" (Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 448-49 (a noncompliant crossbuck had been replaced and weeds in the railroad's right of way had been cut back significantly)), a situation not at play here. ¶ 43 Also significant is the procedural posture of Langenhorst, where the trial court denied the transfer motion and the supreme court affirmed. Here, the trial court granted the transfer motion, and plaintiffs ask us to reverse. Although both the affirmance of a trial court's denial (Langenhorst)and the reversal of a trial court's grant (as plaintiffs urge here) have the ultimate result of deferring to a plaintiff's choice of forum, the abuse-of-discretion standard of review makes the difference in deciding whether plaintiffs' choice of forum should prevail here. While we might determine theoretically, if in the trial court's position, that we would have denied a transfer motion, we cannot say that no reasonable person would have granted the motion. ¶ 44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County. ¶ 45 Affirmed.