Summary
In Boudreaux v. Culver, No. 01-03-01247-CV, 2005 WL 1111237 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 5, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.), this Court reversed a judgment after a jury verdict that had both granted a permanent injunction to a landowner and awarded the landowner damages to remedy permanent water damage to the landowner's property.
Summary of this case from TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Techs., LLCOpinion
No. 01-03-01247-CV
Opinion Issued May 5, 2005.
On Appeal from the 212th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 01-CV-0566.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices HIGLEY and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee Douglas Culver sued appellants Everett Boudreaux and Alfretta Boudreaux for flooding his property, alleging negligence and a violation of the Texas Water Code. A jury found: (1) the Boudreauxs diverted the natural flow of surface water in a manner that damaged Culver's property; (2) the Boudreauxs were seventy percent negligent and Culver was thirty percent negligent for the flooding of Culver's property; and (3) the Boudreauxs continue to threaten irreparable injury to Culver's property. The jury awarded Culver $13,797 for the cost of repairs due to the flooding, and $5,000 for a loss of market value. The trial court granted Culver's motion to disregard the jury findings with respect to the issue of Culver's own negligence, and awarded him a total of $18,708 in damages. The trial court's final judgment also adopts a drainage plan that Culver attached to a post-trial motion, and orders the Boudreauxs to implement the plan.
In this appeal, the Boudreauxs contend: (1) they are entitled to a take-nothing judgment; (2) the trial court erred in its definition of "surface water"; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding the jury's findings with respect to Culver's contributory negligence; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in granting Culver damages for both temporary and permanent injuries; and (5) the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction. We reverse the judgment and remand the cause.
The Facts
Culver owns a one-half acre tract of land in Texas City, Galveston County, Texas, that he purchased in 1978. From 1979 until 1998, Culver made improvements to his property, including additions and renovations to the existing building. He also created additional parking lots, and moved his business onto the property. In 1997, the Boudreauxs purchased a rectangular seven-acre tract of land adjacent to Culver's property, on Culver's southern boundary.
Before, surface water naturally drained in a southwesterly direction across the Culver's property to the Boudreaux's property. From November 2000 through July 2001, the Boudreauxs added landfill dirt to their entire tract, raising it two to three feet in areas, and shaping the entire tract to resemble a crown. As a result of the fill dirt, most of the surface water no longer drained in a southwesterly direction, but instead flowed onto Culver's property.
In June 2000, during tropical storm Allison, five to seven inches of rain fell in Texas City. The rainfall flooded Culver's property, and between eight and fourteen inches of water sloshed inside his building. As a consequence, Culver sued the Boudreauxs, seeking to recover repair costs, loss of market value, and permanent injunctive relief.
Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence
In their first issue, the Boudreauxs claim that they are entitled to a take-nothing judgment as a matter of law, and as such, we should reverse and render judgment in their favor. We construe this as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding of negligence. Culver responds that the Boudreauxs failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal, and it is therefore waived.
An attack based on the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting a jury finding may be preserved for appeal in any of five ways: (1) an objection to the charge; (2) a motion for directed verdict; (3) a motion to disregard the finding; (4) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; or (5) a motion for new trial. Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991) (citing Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. 1985)). The Boudreauxs failed to properly preserve their no-evidence complaint for appeal. They did not object to the jury submission on the basis that no evidence exists to support the submission, nor did they file a motion for directed verdict, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion to disregard the jury's findings, or a motion for new trial. We therefore conclude that the Boudreauxs waived any legal sufficiency complaint.
Definition of Surface Water in the Jury Charge
The Boudreauxs contend that the trial court erred in overruling their objection to the definition of surface water in the jury charge. The trial court instructed the jury: "`Surface water' means water which is spread over the ground from falling rains, and continues to be such until it reaches some bed or channel in which water is accustomed to flow." The Boudreauxs contend that this definition should have included further language that Culver's estate was not required "to receive those waters, except in a natural condition untouched by human hands." Culver responds that the Boudreauxs waived their complaint by refusing to submit their desired instruction in writing to the trial court as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 278.
Rule 278 is not applicable to these facts. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 278. Rule 278 governs the failure to submit a requested definition, while this case involves an included, but allegedly defective definition. Id. It is Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 274 that governs this case.
Under Rule 274, to preserve error that a given definition is defective, the party who is not relying upon the definition need only object specifically — the rule does not require a party to tender substantially correct language. Tex. R. Civ. P. 274; see First Valley Bank of Los Fresnos v. Martin, 144 S.W.3d 466, 475 (Tex. 2004) (Wainwright, J., concurring); see also Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994); Angelina Cas. Co. v. Holt, 362 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1962) ("[W]here the court gives a definition which is defective, an objection by the opposite party is sufficient to preserve his rights, and it is not necessary for him to tender a correct definition."). A party objecting to the charge must point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds for the objection. Tex. R. Civ. P. 274.
Here, the record indicates that the Boudreauxs properly objected to the definition, and verbally requested that the trial court include the "untouched by human hands" language to the definition of surface water, and that the trial court overruled their objection. The Boudreauxs therefore properly preserved their complaint for this appeal.
Customarily, we would next determine whether the definition of surface water included in the jury's instructions is in fact defective, and, if so, whether such error is harmful. In their brief, however, the Boudreauxs expressly waive any relief that would require us to remand this case for a new trial. If legally sufficient evidence supports the submission of a cause of action, then the proper relief for a defective jury charge is a new trial. See Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157 (holding that if trial court submits defective instruction as to theory of liability, remedy is new trial as opposed to judgment notwithstanding verdict, if legally sufficient evidence supports new trial). As the Boudreauxs waive any complaint as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reach the jury instruction issue because any finding of error only could afford a new trial — relief that the Boudreauxs expressly disavow in their briefing to this Court.
Disregarding the Jury's Findings
The Boudreauxs further contend that the trial court erred in granting Culver's motion to disregard the jury's findings with respect to his contributory negligence of thirty percent. In answers to submitted questions two and three, the jury found the flooding of Culver's property "was proximately caused" by the negligence of both Culver and the Boudreauxs. The jury assessed negligence at thirty percent to Culver and seventy percent to the Boudreauxs. Culver moved to disregard the jury's findings that he was proportionately responsible for the flooding to his property. The trial court granted Culver's motion and incorporated its order into a final judgment. To sustain the trial court's action in granting a motion to disregard the jury's answer to a specific question, an appeals court must determine that no evidence exists upon which the jury could have made the finding. Harris County v. McFerren, 788 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); see also Brown v. Bank of Galveston, 963 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex. 1998); Williams v. Briscoe, 137 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In acting on a motion to disregard a jury answer, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the jury's answers. Briscoe, 137 S.W.3d at 124 (citing Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex. 1990)). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is sought, and we indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in that party's favor. See id.; see also New Process Steel Corp. v. Steel Corp of Tex., 703 S.W.2d 209, 216 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
A trial court may disregard a jury finding on a question only if it has no support in the evidence, or if it is rendered immaterial by other findings. Tex. R. Civ. P. 301; see also McFerrren, 788 S.W.2d at 78. If more than a scintilla of competent evidence exists to support a jury's findings, then this court should reverse the judgment disregarding the jury's answer. Briscoe, 137 S.W.3d at 124.
To support their position, the Boudreauxs refer to Culver's testimony and that of their own expert, Norman Lee Cooper. Culver responds that no evidence exists to demonstrate that his own improvements contributed to the flooding of his property. Culver testified that he made improvements, including the addition of a building and a concrete parking lot. He further testified that the city supervised this work and informed him of the type of drainage he needed for the new parking lot. Pursuant to the city's recommendations, he added drains to the concrete culverts and shaped the land to ensure proper drainage away from the front door of his building. Culver concedes that he did not consult with anyone else but the city about potential drainage problems associated with the new building and concrete parking lot.
Cooper, a civil engineer, testified that Culver's additions and improvements greatly increased the impermeable area on his property. As a result, the ground could not absorb as much water, and the water flows at a higher rate of speed. He also testified that Culver's actions altered the normal flow of water from his land.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Boudreauxs, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have inferred that Culver's improvements contributed somewhat to the flooding of his property, and thus, the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's findings with respect to Culver's negligence.
Monetary Damages
The Boudreauxs also allege that the judgment gives Culver a double recovery in awarding monetary damages for both temporary and permanent injuries. They contend that Culver should not receive compensation for both the cost of repair and the diminution in the market value of their property, and therefore we should disallow one of the recoveries. Culver responds that the Boudreauxs failed to properly preserve this complaint for appeal.
We agree that the Boudreauxs' complaint regarding monetary damages is not properly preserved. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require that, in order for an issue to be preserved for appeal, there must be a timely and specific objection. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a). The Boudreauxs failed to file a motion for new trial or bring forth any objection to the jury's award of damages for both cost of repair and loss of market value. The only post-judgment motion the Boudreauxs filed was a response to Culver's motion to disregard the jury's findings and to enter a permanent injunction. In that response, the Boudreauxs objected to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to Culver's negligence and to the issuance of a permanent injunction, but they did not raise the double recovery issue. We conclude that the Boudreauxs failed to preserve for appeal this complaint about the damages awarded. We therefore overrule their issue.
Permanent Injunction
In their final issue, the Boudreauxs claim that the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction because the judgment awards monetary relief for temporary and permanent injuries. We agree.
A permanent injunction issues only if a party does not have an adequate remedy at law. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 284 (Tex. 2004); see also Town of Palm Valley v. Johnson, 87 S.W.3d 110, 111 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). If a legal remedy exists — normally monetary damages — then a party cannot also obtain an injunction addressing the same harm. Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 284. Accordingly, awarding both an injunction and damages as to future effects constitutes a double recovery. Id. Texas law does not permit double recovery. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 441 (Tex. 1995); see also S. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. First Bank Trust, 750 S.W.2d 170, 173-74 (Tex. 1988).
Here, the trial court awarded monetary damages for the repair costs and future diminution in market value in accord with the jury's findings. The jury granted Culver's requested legal remedy for damages attributable to the flooding, and thus he cannot also receive a permanent injunction, because it also addresses the injury due to the flooding, by requiring a drainage control plan. See Parkway Co., 901 S.W.2d at 441. Thus, the money damages and the injunction address the same injury. The two remedies together, under these facts, constitute a double recovery.
In addition, no evidence exists to support the permanent injunction, and Culver did not seek jury findings in support of an injunction beyond a finding of threat of irreparable injury. The record indicates that Culver never introduced the drainage plan into evidence, either at trial or at the post-trial injunction hearing. Instead, after the trial court granted his motion for a permanent injunction, Culver sent a copy of a proposed drainage plan to the Boudreauxs for their approval. After rejecting the plan, the Boudreauxs filed a motion requesting an injunction hearing, in which they attached Culver's proposed plan. Further, the trial court did not allow post-trial testimony by Culver's expert regarding his proposed drainage plan. The trial court thus had no evidentiary basis for the issuance of a permanent injunction ordering the implementation of Culver's proposed drainage plan that was never introduced into evidence. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 533, 538-39 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that testimony from earlier temporary injunction hearing, not offered at default judgment hearing, must be offered into evidence to be considered as evidence in support of final affirmative relief).
Conclusion
We hold that: (1) the Boudreauxs failed to preserve their legal sufficiency and damages issues for appeal; (2) given legally sufficient evidence, a new trial is the remedy for a materially defective jury definition, and the Boudreauxs affirmatively waived this form of relief in their appellate briefing; (3) the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's finding that Culver was thirty percent responsible for the flooding; and (4) the trial court erred in granting Culver both a permanent injunction and monetary damages, because they address the same injury, and the record contains legally insufficient evidence to support the injunction that the trial court granted. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for the limited purpose of entering monetary judgment on the jury's verdict.