Opinion
Civil Action 4:19-CV-1789
08-30-2023
DARNELL DOSS, Plaintiff v. BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants
RAMBO, D.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
WILLIAM I. ARBUCKLE, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal inmate Darnell Doss (“Plaintiff”) claims that numerous Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employees engaged in conduct that substantially burdened Plaintiff's ability to practice his religion. In his lengthy complaint, he discusses numerous incidents that occurred over a span of years at two different institutions. Only three Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) claims against individual BOP employees remain.
Currently before the Court is Defendants' second motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the reasons explained herein, it will be recommended that Defendants' motion be granted and that this case be closed.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 17, 2019, Plaintiff lodged a pro se civil action alleging a series of claims that his right to practice his religion was burdened while he was confined in FCI Allenwood and FCI McKean. The claims, set forth in Plaintiff's over fifty-page complaint, included constitutional claims under Bivens, and claims under the RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Plaintiff named the following Defendants:
(1) Bureau of Prisons;
(2) Chaplain Cieslukowski at FCI Allenwood;
(3) Chaplain Moore at FCI Allenwood;
(4) Chaplain Kim at FCI Allenwood;
(5) Chaplain Glogau at FCI McKean;
(6) Unit Manager Nicholas at FCI Allenwood;
(7) Counselor Seagraves at FCI Allenwood;
(8) Warden Spartan (later identified as Warden Spaulding) at FCI Allenwood;
(9) Warden Lane at FCI Allenwood;
(10) Assistant Warden Washington at FCI Allenwood;
(11) Officer Brown, an administrative remedy coordinator at FCI Allenwood;
(12) Jane Doe 1, administrative remedy coordinator at FCI Allenwood;
(13) SIS Lieutenant Ready at FCI Allenwood;
(14) SIS Lieutenant Pretezer at FCI Allenwood;
(15) SIS Lieutenant Kane at FCI Allenwood;
(16) Lieutenant O'Connor at FCI Allenwood (who has not been identified or located);
(17) Lieutenant Munchler at FCI Allenwood;
(18) John Doe 2, Lieutenant at FCI Allenwood;
(19) John Doe 3, Lieutenant at FCI Allenwood;
(20) John Doe 4, Lieutenant at FCI Allenwood;
(21) D. Wolover, Property Officer at FCI Allenwood;
(22) John Doe 5, Property Officer at FCI Allenwood;
(23) John Doe 6, Mail Room Officer at FCI Allenwood;
(24) Six Unknown Correction Officers at FCI Allenwood;
(25) Medical Staff, Ms. Wright at FCI McKean; and
(26) Medical Staff, Asp at FCI McKean.
Plaintiff alleges that he is a Hebrew Israelite Nazarene. His complaint, in large part, concerns restriction placed on his exercise of that religion in violation of the law. As Defendants aptly note in their brief, the complaint contains a meandering array of claims which are, at times, difficult to decipher. Since its inception, both Defendants, and this Court, have labored to address Plaintiff's many claims.
Plaintiff lodged his complaint without paying the filing fee or requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. After receiving specific direction to do so, Plaintiff submitted an application requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff's motion was granted, and service was ordered on all named Defendants. However, due to a clerical error, one Defendant (Defendant Asp) was not served.
All references to the electronically filed documents from the Court's CM/ECF system cite first to the document number. Any reference to a specific page number corresponds to the number assigned by the CM/ECF system that appears on the header of the document.
Once they received notice of this lawsuit, Defendants attempted to identify each person named. They ran into difficulty with two named Defendants- “Lieutenant O'Connor” and “Warden Spartan.” Plaintiff and Defendants collaborated over a period of four months to determine the identity of the individuals Plaintiff intended to name, but despite their best efforts were only partially successful. The individual named as “Warden Spartan” was identified as Warden Spaulding. (Doc. 23). Lieutenant O'Connor, a corrections officer at FCI Allenwood, remains unidentified. Id. There are also twelve John and Jane Doe Defendants, all of them employees at FCI Allenwood, that remain unidentified.
On May 18, 2020, Defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal and summary judgment as to all claims in this case. (Doc. 25). On June 1, 2020, Defendants filed a brief in support, statement of facts and exhibits. (Docs. 26, 27, 27-1). Plaintiff was directed to respond. (Doc. 28). Plaintiff sought, and was granted multiple extensions of time. (Docs. 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39). He also requested the appointment of counsel. (Doc. 38). His motion was granted on the condition that the Court could locate counsel willing to represent Plaintiff. (Doc. 39). The case was stayed for sixty days, and was referred to the Pro Bono Committee of the Federal Bar Association. Id. On June 10, 2021, the Court was notified by the Pro Bono Committee that no counsel could be located. (Doc. 40). The stay in Plaintiff's case was lifted, and Plaintiff was advised that he would be required to proceed without the assistance of counsel. (Doc. 41). The Court then issued an order directing Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' motion on or before July 12, 2021. (Doc. 42). The Court received no response or request for additional time.
On October 8, 2021, the undersigned Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending that Plaintiff's case be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff did not file a brief in opposition to Defendants' motion despite receiving specific direction to do so. (Doc. 43). In the alternative, the Court recommended that summary judgment be granted as to all but three of Plaintiff's RFRA claims, and that all of Plaintiff's claims against the BOP be dismissed. Id.
Defendants did not object to the Report and Recommendation. Rather than filing objections, Plaintiff filed a notice indicating that he had no intention to abandon this lawsuit. (Doc. 44). In that notice, Plaintiff requested an additional sixty days to respond to Defendants' June 2020 motion. Id. Defendants objected to Plaintiff's request for additional time. (Doc. 45).
On November 10, 2021, United States District Judge Sylvia H. Rambo issued a memorandum and an order adopting the Report and Recommendation in part. The recommendation to dismiss this entire case under Rule 41(b) was not adopted, because Plaintiff notified the Court he did not intend to abandon this lawsuit. (Doc. 46). The alternative recommendation, to grant the motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment as to all claims except three RFRA claims, and to dismiss all claims against Defendant BOP, was adopted. (Docs. 46, 47).
The Report & Recommendation was adopted with the exception of the recommendation of dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). (Doc. 43, 46, 47). We acknowledge that the recommendation section of our report did not include language that the Bureau of Prisons be terminated as a party to this case. It did, however, address the dismissal of all claims against the BOP in the Analysis section of the Report. (Doc. 43, p. 64). There are no allegations concerning Defendant Bureau of Prisons in any of Plaintiff's remaining RFRA claims. Our reading of Judge Rambo's order, and of the complaint, is that no claim against Defendant Bureau of Prisons remains. Even if our understanding of Judge Rambo's order is incorrect, it is recommended that any remaining claim against Defendant Bureau of Prisons be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the same reasons stated in the October 8, 2021, recommendation. Should any party disagree they may raise this issue in their objections to this report.
When the case was referred back to the undersigned Magistrate Judge, Defendant Asp was served. After being granted an extension of time, the named Defendants filed a motion requesting dismissal and summary judgment as to the remaining three RFRA claims. That motion is now fully briefed, and ready to review. (Docs. 58, 59, 60, 68, 69, 73).
In their brief, Defendants request that, in the event this motion is denied, that the first phase of discovery be limited to the issue of PLRA exhaustion. They also reserve the right to raise PLRA exhaustion in a dispositive motion after that phase of discovery. (Doc. 60, p. 8 n.2). Plaintiff disagrees, and argues that exhaustion should be addressed now, and that allowing a third dispositive motion would unduly delay the resolution of this case. (Doc. 69, p. 2, ¶ 12). Plaintiff also submitted a 72-page document he described as evidence that shows he was unable to exhaust the administrative remedy process at FCI Allenwood. (Doc. 70). This submission includes a letter addressed to the BOP's central office, and copies of various requests for administrative remedy. Id. We will not consider the issue of PLRA exhaustion to resolve this motion. If this report is adopted in full, no claims will remain and no further proceedings will be necessary. Continental Cas. Co. v. Dominick D'Andrea, 150 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that a report and recommendation does not have the force of law unless and until the district judge enters and order accepting or rejecting it). If, however, any claims remain after this report has been reviewed by the assigned District Judge, the issue of bifurcated discovery will be addressed by separate order.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
We will begin our analysis by discussing the familiar standards for reviewing motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Then, we will discuss the legal standards relevant to the specific arguments raised in this case.
A. Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to seek dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To assess the sufficiency of a complaint when dismissal is sought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court should: (1) take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of a legal claim.
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011).
In order for his or her allegations to be taken as true, a plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Thus, courts “need not credit a claimant's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss.” The court also need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that he or she has not alleged.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient ‘factual matter' to render them ‘plausible on [their] face.'” The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement.
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010).
Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alternations in original).
Id. at 347.
B. Motions for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56
Defendants request summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to this rule:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.
Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present “a genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and for which trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. For a dispute to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.”
Id. (emphasis added).
Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
Haybarger v. Laurence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49).
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004).
Berckeley Inv. Grp. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Id. at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
A party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. “[O]nly evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials. ” Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Furthermore, an adverse party “cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.”
Countryside Oil Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995).
Thimons v. PNC Bank, N.A., 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark N.J. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982).
Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969).
Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility. The court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the non-movant on the evidence presented. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363.
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.
Id.
In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.
C. RFRA Claims, Generally
Under the RFRA, the federal “government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion” unless “application of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling government interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.” The United States Supreme Court recognized that the RFRA authorizes a cause of action and the recovery of money damages against government officials.
Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S.Ct. 486, 489-93 (2020).
D. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects public officials who have violated a plaintiff's rights if that plaintiff's rights were not clearly established when violation occurred.“Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” “While qualified immunity is more commonly addressed as an affirmative defense to constitutional claims, several courts of appeals have held that it is also properly raised as a defense to federal statutory claims under the RFRA.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244-45 (2009).
Id. at 231.
Hasbajrami v. Glogau, No. 1:20-CV-84, 2022 WL 4652337, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2022) (citing Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 557 (4th Cir. 2012); Weinberger v. Grimes, No. 07-6461, 2009 WL 331632, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 757, 768-69 (9th Cir. 2012); Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1209-12 (11th Cir. 2015); Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The defense of qualified immunity applies not only to constitutional claim, but also to claims brought for alleged violations of RFRA.”); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 533 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding, in the alternative, federal officials were entitled to qualified immunity against claims brought for violating RFRA); and Tanzin, 141 S.Ct. at 492 (noting in dicta, “Both the Government and respondents agree that government officials are entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense when sued in their individual capacities for money damages under RFRA.”)).
The availability of qualified immunity turns on two separate but related issues: (1) whether a federal right has been violated; and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. When conducting this two-part inquiry, a court may “exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand.”
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014).
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
With respect to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis:
“A Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear' that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.'” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “This inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.' ” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S.Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in this case, the Court may not define the right in broad terms, such as “a right not to have one's religious exercise substantially burdened.” “Rather, the right at issue must be framed ‘in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense.” Estep v. Mackey, 639 Fed.Appx. 870, 873 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 638 (3d Cir. 2015)); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (the court must first identify the right “at the appropriate level of specificity”). In other words, the right must be defined based on the facts and circumstances faced by the government official as alleged by the plaintiff. See Rivas-Villegas, 142 S.Ct. at 8; al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742; Estep, 639 Fed.Appx. at 873.
Once the court has identified the asserted right at the appropriate level of specificity, it then looks first to Supreme Court decisions to determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. See Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Protection and Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016). Absent factually similar Supreme Court precedent, a court may rely on a “‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority' in the Court[s] of Appeals.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 826 (2015) (per curiam). Because district court decisions are “not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case,” they are generally insufficient to support a clearly established right in the qualified immunity context. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 708 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 134.02[1] [d], p. 134-26 (3d ed. 2011)); Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 n.1 (4th Cir. 2017).
Hasbajrami, 2022 WL 4652337, at *9-10.
IV. DISCUSSION
In their brief, Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed, or that summary judgment should be entered, for the following reasons:
(1) Most of the Defendants were not personally involved in the remaining RFRA claims.
(2) Plaintiff is not entitled to money damages because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
(3) Plaintiff does not allege that the specific actions of any individual Defendant imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion.
(4) Defendant Wright has statutory immunity.
In his brief, Plaintiff argues that permitting a second dispositive motion is not appropriate. Thus, we will begin by addressing the threshold issue of whether Defendants should be permitted to file a second dispositive motion, and then will address the merits of Defendants' arguments.
We decline to address the issue of whether statutory immunity also bars the claims against Defendant Wright or whether Plaintiff adequately alleged that the actions of any individual Defendant substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion.
A. Defendants Should be Permitted to File A Second Dispositive Motion
In their supporting brief, Defendants acknowledge that, for most Defendants, this is the second dispositive motion they have filed. (Doc. 60, p. 6 n.1). Defendants explain that they filed this motion in lieu of an answer to address a Supreme Court decision issued after their initial motion was filed, which clarified that the RFRA permits litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. Id. They argue that, in light of this decision, the RFRA Defendants can now advance qualified immunity as a complete defense to Plaintiff's claims for money damages.
Due to a clerical error, Defendant Asp was not served until after the first dispositive motion was resolved. This is Defendant Asp's first motion.
In his brief in opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants should not be permitted to file a second motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 69, p. 2, ¶ 10). He argues that Defendants could have raised qualified immunity before, and that allowing this motion to proceed would delay the resolution of this lawsuit. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that district courts are vested with inherent powers to “manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Among those inherent powers, is the authority to manage its docket with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.
Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016) (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
Dietz, 579 U.S. at 47; see e.g. Brown v. Sprenkle, 827 Fed.Appx. 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding that a district court properly allowed Defendants to file a second motion for summary judgment to address a PLRA exhaustion, because it was a threshold issue that must be addressed before the merits of a prisoner's complaint).
The United States Supreme Court has observed that immunity questions should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage of litigation.” When Defendants' first dispositive motion was filed, it was not clear that the RFRA permitted litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacity, or whether qualified immunity could be raised as a defense. These legal issues have since been clarified. Under these circumstances, permitting Defendants the opportunity to address the issue of qualified immunity in a second motion for summary judgment is entirely appropriate. Allowing Defendants to file a second dispositive motion, even if it results in some delay, is the most orderly and efficient way to resolve these issues. Therefore, it should be permitted.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
Although the resolution of this motion may result in some delay, Plaintiff himself has already caused significant delays in this case. When Defendants filed their first dispositive motion, Plaintiff requested, and was granted, five extensions of time to respond and this action was stayed for a period of time while the Court (unsuccessfully) attempted to locate volunteer counsel to represent Plaintiff. With these extensions, Plaintiff was afforded more than one year to respond to the first dispositive motion, and never did. (Docs. 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39). This action was permitted to proceed based on Plaintiff's assertion that it was not his intention to abandon this action.
B. Most Defendants Were Not Personally Involved in the Remaining RFRA Claims
Defendants argue that the majority of the individual Defendants should be dismissed as parties to this action because nothing in the complaint suggests they were involved in the conduct underlying Plaintiff's remaining RFRA claims. (Doc. 60, pp. 20-21). We agree.
Regarding the chapel accommodations at FCI Allenwood, in the paragraph of Plaintiff's complaint discussing the presence of other religious artifacts in the chapel, only Defendants Cieslukowski, Moore, and Kim are mentioned. (Doc. 1, pp. 12-14, ¶ 7).
When he addresses the issue of the chapel accommodations at FCI Allenwood in his brief, Plaintiff only mentions Defendants Cieslukowski and Moore. (Doc. 69, pp. 7-8, ¶¶ 39-43). This further underscores that the other named Defendants were not involved in this particular claim.
Regarding the denial of Plaintiff's request for his preferred religious headwear, only Defendants Cieslukowski, O'Connor (as yet unidentified), and Spaulding are mentioned in the complaint. (Doc. 1, pp. 14-16, ¶ 8).
When he addresses the issue of his religious head covering in his brief, Plaintiff only mentions Defendants Cieslukowski, O'Connor, and Spaulding. (Doc. 69, pp. 3-4, ¶¶ 16-23). This further underscores that no other named Defendant was involved in this particular claim.
Regarding Plaintiff's objection to annual PPD testing, only Defendants Wright and Asp are mentioned in the complaint. (Doc. 1, pp. 19-21, ¶ 21).
When he addresses the issue of PPD testing at FCI McKean in his brief, Plaintiff mentions only Defendants Wright and Asp. (Doc. 69, pp. 8-9, ¶¶ 44-48). This further underscores that the other named Defendants were not involved in this particular claim. Plaintiff also reports that he had another PPD test at FCI Edgefield in 2020. This test occurred after Plaintiff filed his complaint, and does not appear to involve any remaining Defendant named in this case. Plaintiff is advised that he cannot amend or add claims to his complaint in a brief. (Doc. 69, p. 9, ¶ 49). Plaintiff also requests a preliminary injunction in his brief. Preliminary injunctions are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This type of request must be brought by separate motion, and must comply with the requirements of Rule 65.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains that a complaint must contain, “a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Plaintiff's complaint should include allegations that demonstrate his entitlement to that relief as to each named Defendant. The complaint does not include sufficient allegations to suggest that the following Defendants were involved in any of the remaining claims:
(1) Chaplain Glogau at FCI McKean;
(2) Unit Manager Nicholas at FCI Allenwood;
(3) Counselor Seagraves at FCI Allenwood;
(4) Warden Lane at FCI Allenwood;
(5) Assistant Warden Washington at FCI Allenwood;
(6) Officer Brown, an administrative remedy coordinator at FCI Allenwood;
(7) Jane Doe 1, administrative remedy coordinator at FCI Allenwood;
(8) SIS Lieutenant Ready at FCI Allenwood;
(9) SIS Lieutenant Pretezer of FCI Allenwood;
(10) SIS Lieutenant Kane of FCI Allenwood;
(11) Lieutenant Munchler of FCI Allenwood;
(12) John Doe 2, Lieutenant of FCI Allenwood;
(13) John Doe 3, Lieutenant of FCI Allenwood;
(14) John Doe 4, Lieutenant of FCI Allenwood;
(15) D. Wolover, Property Officer of FCI Allenwood;
(16) John Doe 5, Property Officer of FCI Allenwood;
(17) John Doe 6, Mail Room Officer at FCI Allenwood; and
(18) Six Unknown Correction Officers of FCI Allenwood.
Although Defendants do not seek dismissal of the claims the John and Jane Does, we recommend, pursuant to the Court's authority to dismiss claims sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), that the John and Jane Doe Defendants also be dismissed as parties to this lawsuit for the same reason.
These Defendants should be dismissed as parties to this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the complaint does not include any allegation that they were involved in any of the three remaining RFRA claims.
C. Plaintiff Cannot Recover Money Damages Because The Individual Defendants Are Entitled To Qualified Immunity
In their current motion, Defendants argue that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of the alleged violation, it was not clearly established that the individual Defendants' conduct violated Plaintiff's rights. We will address this argument as it applies to each of Plaintiff's remaining claims.
1. Plaintiff Had No Clearly Established Right to Worship In A Space Free From Other Religious Artifacts
It is undisputed in this case that there is only one chapel at FCI Allenwood. (Doc. 59, ¶ 7); (Doc. 68, ¶ 7); (Doc. 59-2, p. 2, ¶ 7) (“the institution has only one chapel”). The catholic stations of the cross are hung on the chapel walls. (Doc. 592, ¶ 8); (Doc. 59, ¶ 10). The stations of the cross can be covered with shutters. (Doc. 59-2, ¶ 8). In a sworn statement, Defendant Cieslukowski reported that the stations of the cross are covered when not in use. Id. The statement implies that the stations would have been covered when Plaintiff's group worshiped in the chapel. Plaintiff disputes this and suggests that there were also other uncovered artifacts, including a stained glass window. (Doc. 68, ¶ 10). He does not, however, cite to any evidence in support of his position.
Although Defendants take the position that no right under RFRA was violated, they argue that even if the Court were to find that this right exists and was violated by their conduct, the right to a special chapel or place of worship was not clearly established in 2018 or 2019. (Doc. 60, pp. 12-13) (“even if Doss could establish that the chapel accommodations amounted to a ‘substantial burden' on Doss's free exercise (which Defendants do not concede), this precedent shows that this particular ‘violation'-that is, having to worship in a common chapel space that contains religious artifacts of other faiths-was not so clearly established that it was ‘beyond debate.'”).
Defendants' argument that Plaintiff does not meet the second qualified immunity inquiry is persuasive. We begin our analysis of whether the “right” at issue was clearly established by defining that right. Defendants frame the right at issue as the right to worship in a space free of artifacts from other religions. (Doc. 60, p. 13). Defendants have accurately defined the right at issue with appropriate specificity and we will adopt it in our analysis.
Next, we look to existing precedent to decide whether a reasonable BOP employee would understand that Plaintiff was entitled to worship in a space free of artifacts from other religions. In support of their position that this right was not clearly established at the time it was violated, Defendants cite to two cases: Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) and Garaway v. Lappin, 490 Fed.Appx. 440, 445 (3d Cir. 2012). They argue that these cases establish that an inmate is not entitled to a special chapel or place of worship. Defendants also argue that a reasonable BOP employee would not have known that their conduct, providing a room for Plaintiff to worship that contained artifacts of other faiths, violated Plaintiff's rights under the RFRA. They report, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the stations of the cross have been hanging on the wall in that chapel space since before Defendant Cieslukowski began working at the facility, the presence of the stations of the cross images was never raised as an issue during the program review process, and Defendant Cieslukowski does not recall any prior complaints made about the presence of the stations of the cross in the chapel. (Doc. 59-2, p. 2, ¶¶ 8-10); (Doc. 59, ¶¶ 10-13); (Doc. 68, ¶¶ 10-13).
In Cruz, a Buddhist state inmate asserted that his first amendment right to free exercise of his religion was violated because he was not allowed to use the prison chapel. 405 U.S. at 319-324. He also alleged that the prison encouraged inmates to participate in other religions, and awarded “points of good merit” for attending Catholic, Jewish and Protestant services. Id. Those good merit points enhanced a prisoner's eligibility for desirable job assignments and early parole consideration. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the district and appellate court decisions dismissing Mr. Cruz's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that if Mr. Cruz's allegations were true, the prison violated his rights. Id. In a footnote, however, the Court clarified that it did not suggest that “every religious sect or group within a prison-however few in number-must have identical facilities or personnel. A special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand. But reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment without fear of penalty.” Id. at 322 n.2. In Garraway, a federal inmate filed constitutional and statutory claims that his ability to practice his Muslim faith was unduly burdened because the prison had limited opportunities for group prayer, did not provide a full-time Sunni Muslim chaplain, did not provide a Halal Diet, limited the number of books that could be kept in an inmate's cell, and because Islamic ceremonial items were sold in the commissary with marked-up prices. 490 Fed.Appx. at 442-447. In Garraway, the Third Circuit found that the Plaintiff did not allege facts demonstrating that the lack of a full-time Sunni Muslim chaplain burdened the exercise of his religion, and affirmed the District Court's decision dismissing Plaintiff's claim. Id. at 445. In doing so, it observed, citing Cruz, that a special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith, and a special chaplain need not be provided without regard to the extent of the demand. Id.
In his response Plaintiff cites to several cases. None of these cases, however, involve the right to worship in a space free of other religious artifacts.
We agree with Defendants that, even assuming this right exists and was violated, in 2018 and 2019, the right to worship in a chapel free of artifacts of other religions was not clearly established. Therefore, the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
2. Plaintiff Had No Clearly Established Right to Wear Colored and/or Embroidered Religious Headwear Throughout FCI Allenwood
The BOP has a policy limiting the types of religious headwear inmates are permitted to wear. (Doc. 59, ¶ 14); (Doc. 68, ¶ 14). That policy addresses two types of headwear; “religious headwear” (can be worn at all times throughout the institution) and “ceremonial headwear” (can be worn only in the chapel). (Doc. 593, pp. 16-17).
Regarding religious headwear, the policy permits inmates to wear certain styles that are black or white, and allows Rastafarians to wear a multicolored crown described as “red, yellow, green threads running through a black cap.” Id. The policy expressly prohibits wearing religious headwear with graphics or writing. Id.
Regarding “ceremonial headwear,” the policy permits certain colored head coverings with embroidered runes (a red fez, and a brown hlath embroidered with runes). (Doc. 59-3, p. 17).
The policy provides a process for inmates to request headwear not otherwise permitted by completing a “New or Unfamiliar Religious Components Questionnaire” form. (Doc. 59-3, pp. 13, 16).
Plaintiff's claim concerns religious headwear to wear at all times throughout the institution. (Doc. 1, p. 15) (alleging that he was wearing his religious headwear in the microwave room when it was confiscated). He describes his religious headwear as purple and gold colored, similar to the size of a “Rasta Crown,” and embroidered with ancient Hebrew symbols. (Doc. 1, p. 15). To wear that headwear, he would need to avail himself to the administrative process in place to address new or unfamiliar religious practices. He never received permission to wear his nonconforming religious headwear, but did so anyway. (Doc. 1, p. 16) (alleging that he never got approval). He alleges that his rights under RFRA were violated when Defendant O'Connor (identity unknown) confiscated his religious headwear, and again when Defendants Cieslukowski and Spaulding did not later give him permission to wear his preferred religious headwear.
Although Defendants take the position that no such right under RFRA existed or was violated, they argue that even if RFRA was violated, there the right to wear colored and embroidered religious headwear was not clearly established in 2018 and 2019. (Doc. 60, pp. 13-15).
Defendants' argument that Plaintiff does not meet the second qualified immunity inquiry is persuasive. We begin our analysis of whether the right at issue was clearly established by defining that right. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants define this right in their briefs. For the purposes of this motion, we will define it as the right to wear colored and embroidered religious headwear throughout the institution.
Next, we look to existing precedent to decide whether this right was clearly established in 2018 and 2019. In support of their position that this right was not clearly established, Defendants cite to two cases: Muslim v. Frame, 897 F.Supp. 215, 221 (E.D. Pa. 1995), and Jefferson v. Gonzalez, No. 05-442 (GK), 2006 WL 1305224 (D.D.C. May 10, 2006).
In Muslim v. Frame, a Muslim inmate in a county prison alleged that a rule prohibiting all hats in common areas violated his rights. 897 F.Supp. at 215-16. As observed by Defendants, this case involved conduct that preceded RFRA's enactment. Id. at 220-21. Defendants argued they were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. In its analysis, the Court applying the “pre-RFRA” reasonableness standard, and concluded that reasonable prison officials would not have believed that the prohibition on hats was unconstitutional. Id. In Jefferson v. Gonzales, a Muslim inmate in a federal prison was denied permission to wear a turban after availing himself to the appropriate process to request an exception. 2006 WL 1305224 at *1. The BOP policy in place at the time only permitted Sikh inmates to wear turbans. Id. Defendants did not challenge that their policy substantially burdened the inmate's sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. at 2. Applying the compelling interest test, the Court found that the Muslim inmate's rights were not violated because Defendants met their burden of demonstrating a compelling security interest in limiting the number of inmates permitted to wear turbans, and that the current policy was the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. Id. at 3-4
In his response Plaintiff cites to several cases. None of these cases, however, involve the right to wear colored and embroidered religious headwear throughout a federal prison.
We agree with Defendants that, in 2018 and 2019, the right to wear colored and embroidered religious headwear around the institution was not clearly established. Therefore, the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
3. Plaintiff Had No Clearly Established Right to Refuse a PPD Test on Religious Grounds
The BOP has a policy to manage infectious diseases, which includes testing. (Doc. 59-3, p. 28). The policy requires that an inmate be screened for tuberculosis within two calendar days of initial incarceration, and then on an annual basis. (Doc. 59-3, pp. 34-35). That screening includes assessment by a healthcare professional and a tuberculin skin test with the PPD (purified protein derivative) skin test. Id. Under the policy, “[a]n inmate may not request to substitute a chest radiograph for a screening tuberculin skin test.” Id. “The only exception is when there is a medical contraindication to tuberculin skin testing or in instances where involuntary testing may cause significant injury to the staff or inmate.” Id. According to the policy, an inmate who refuses the skin test will be tested involuntarily, and may be subject to an incident report for refusing to obey an order. (Doc. 59-3, p. 36).
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the PPD test violates his faith because his religion requires that he not defile his body with disease. (Doc. 1, p. 20). Plaintiff alleges that he submitted to the tests in 2018 and 2019 “under duress,” because to do otherwise would risk punishment. (Doc. 1, p. 20). No force was used to administer the tests. Id.
Although Defendants take the position that no right under RFRA was violated, they argue that even if RFRA was violated, Plaintiff's right to refuse a PPD test on religious grounds was not clearly established in 2018 or 2019.
They note that at least one other court reached this conclusion, finding that a test could substantially burden the exercise of religion, but (relying on evidence in the summary judgment record) the government has a strong interest “in responding to the threat of any contagious disease by diagnosing and treating its inmates.”56 The summary judgment record in Karolis also included evidence to support the conclusion that the test was the least restrictive means to carry out that compelling interest. The record in this case does not include any evidentiary support related to this aspect of the RFRA analysis, nor does it need to for a qualified immunity analysis. Therefore, we do not reach the issue of whether a right under RFRA was violated in this case.
Defendants' argument that Plaintiff does not meet the second qualified immunity inquiry is persuasive. We begin our analysis of whether the right at issue was clearly established by defining that right. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants defined this right in their briefs. We will frame it as the right to religious exemption from an annual PPD testing.
Next, we look to existing precedent to decide whether this right was clearly established in 2018 and 2019. In support of their position that this right was not clearly established at the time it was violated, Defendants cite to Karolis v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 935 F.Supp. 523, 526-27 (D.N.J. 1996).
In Karolis, a Christian Scientist inmate in state custody alleged that his punishment for refusing to submit to tuberculosis screening violated his rights under RFRA. In that case, the Court reasoned that administering the test substantially burdened the inmate's rights, but that the involuntary administration of the test was justified as the least restrictive means to further the state's compelling interest in preventing the spread of tuberculosis in its prisons. 935 F.Supp. at 526-29. When resolving Defendants' prior motion in this case, like in Karolis, we concluded that administering a PPD test substantially burdened Plaintiff's rights. As Defendants acknowledge in their brief, their prior motion did not argue that the administration of the test was justified by a compelling state interest or whether qualified immunity was applicable. Regarding Plaintiff's argument that these issues have already been decided, he is incorrect. The issues of whether a compelling state interest exists, or whether a reasonable BOP employee would believe that Plaintiff had a right to refuse the PPD test are completely separate issues.
In his response Plaintiff cites to several cases. None of these cases, however, involve the right to religious exemption from annual PPD tests.
We agree with Defendants that, in 2018 and 2019, the right to religious exemption from annual PPD testing was not clearly established. Therefore, the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
D. Plaintiff's Remaining Requests for Injunctive Relief Are Moot
Plaintiff's complaint includes a series of broad requests for prospective injunctive relief, most of which concern nation-wide BOP policies. (Doc. 1, pp. 4954). Based on our reading of the complaint, all of these requests are directed at the BOP. All claims against the BOP were dismissed, and thus so were the corresponding requests for injunctive relief.
Even assuming that the Court were to construe these broad requests for injunctive relief as directed at the remaining individual Defendants, and their actions at the facilities where they are employed, Plaintiff's requests would be moot. Once a prisoner who is complaining of his conditions of confinement is transferred from the prison about which he is complaining, the court cannot grant him meaningful prospective relief because he would not benefit from it. In April 2023, Plaintiff was transferred to a residential re-entry center. (Doc. 74). Therefore, all of Plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief as to the individual Defendants are moot.
Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003).
V. RECOMMENDATION
It is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Defendants' Motion (Doc. 58) requesting Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment as to all remaining claims be GRANTED;
(2) All claims against the John and Jane Doe Defendants, and Defendant O'Connor be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(2); and
(3) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.