Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-241 SECTION "T"(3)
July 9, 2001
Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, to Transfer the above captioned action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406 filed on behalf of the Defendants. This cause came for hearing on June 27, 2001, without oral argument. The Plaintiffs have not opposed said motion. The Court, having studied the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted by the Defendants, the record, and the applicable law, is fully advised on the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
The above-captioned actions arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on Interstate 10 near Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, on December 27, 1999. The Plaintiffs filed this wrongful death and survival action in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, on December 27, 2000. On January 26, 2001, the Defendants timely filed a Notice of Removal with this Court. The Defendants asserted that federal jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity of citizenship.
The Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, claiming that this Court should dismiss the above-captioned action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406 because venue is improper. Alternatively, the Defendants request that this Court transfer the above-captioned action to the Southern District of Mississippi, the appropriate venue for such action. The Plaintiffs have failed to file an opposition to the instant motion.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the manner in which defenses and objections to the pleadings are to be brought by defendants in federal civil actions. Rule 12(b)(3) requires that a defendant file a Motion to Dismiss the action if venue is improper. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). In the present case, the Defendants argue that the Eastern District of Louisiana is an improper venue for the above-captioned action because all of the defendants do not reside in the Eastern District of Louisiana and because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the above-captioned action did not occur in this district. Accordingly, the Defendants seek to have this action dismissed, or in the alternative, transferred to the proper venue.
B. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue:
In order to determine the proper venue for a civil action, litigants must typically look to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. That statute reads in pertinent part:
[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
In the instant motion, the Defendants argue that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), the Eastern District of Louisiana is an improper venue for the above-captioned action because Defendant Jack does not reside in Louisiana for venue purposes, nor did a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiffs' claims occur in Louisiana. Accordingly, the Defendants argue that this Court should dismiss said action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for improper venue, or, in the alternative, transfer said action to a district in which venue is proper.
The Defendants go to great lengths to prove to this Court that Defendant Jack is a domiciliary and resident of North Carolina, not Louisiana, for purposes of determining proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). However, such arguments are arguably moot in light of the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) is not the proper venue statute to apply in the instant case. While Defendant Jack's domicile / residence is not determinative of the instant motion to dismiss, it is relevant as to whether or not this case was properly removed to this Court.
Under the removal statute, a civil action cannot be removed to federal court if there is a "local" defendant in the action.See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Therefore, the issue of Jack's domicile/residence is not entirely moot in this case. After reviewing the evidence presented by the Defendants with respect to Jack's domicile/residence, this Court finds that the preponderance of such evidence shows that Jack did not intend to change his domicile from North Carolina to Louisiana by attending Tulane University. Rather, this Court finds that the evidence presented and the case law precedent cited by Jack support the notion that Jack intended to remain a domiciliary of North Carolina and to return to that state upon competing his studies in Louisiana. Accordingly, removal of said action to this Court was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because Jack is not a local defendant.
While the Defendants' arguments concerning proper venue are correct with respect to most cases, the Defendants have overlooked a key fact that makes the instant action different from most cases with respect to venue, in the instant case, the Plaintiffs originally filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, and the Defendants voluntarily removed the case to this Court. Consequently, the general venue statutes, including 28 U.S.C. § 1391, do not apply in this case because they do not apply to cases that are removed from state court to federal court. See Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 665-66, 73 S.Ct. 900, 902-03 (1953); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D.Miss. 1989). Rather, venue of removed actions is governed by the removal statute itself, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See id.
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, specifically provides that the proper venue of a removed action is "the district of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Since the Eastern District of Louisiana is the district embracing the Parish of Orleans, the place where this action was originally pending, then this District is the proper venue for the above-captioned case. As stated by the court in Hartford:
[a] defendant's voluntary application for removal confers venue over him. See Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago. RI. P. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 363, 367, 46 S.Ct. 247, 248, 70 L.Ed. 633(1926). It is therefore immaterial that this forum would obviously have been an improper venue had this action been brought here originally. Nevertheless, though their removal precludes a challenge to venue as improper, defendants may still attack this venue as inconvenient. 14 A C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3726(1985).Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. at 320. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be denied.
C. Motion to Transfer Venue:
In the alternative to dismissal, the Defendants move this Court to transfer the instant case to the Southern District of Mississippi and place it on the docket of that court. A district court may transfer any civil action to any other district in which it might have been brought for the convenience of the parties and witnesses or if such transfer is found to be in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether to transfer venue in a particular case, "the court must exercise its discretion in light of the particular circumstances of the case." Hanby v. Shell Oil Co., Civ. A. 1:00CV331, 2001 WL 640639, at * 3 (E.D.Tex. March 5, 2001) (citing Radio Santa FE v. Sena, 687 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D.Tex. 1988)). In doing so, the court must balance two categories of interests: 1) the so-called private interests, which take into account the convenience of the litigants, and 2) the public interests, which take into account the fair and efficient administration of justice. See Hanby, 2001 WL 640639, at *3 (citingRobertson v. Kiamichi RR Co., L.L.C., 42 F. Supp.2d 651, 655 (E.D.Tex. 1999)).
In balancing the aforementioned categories of interests, courts are to consider the following factors:
Convenience factors, [which] include: (1) plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) convenience of parties and witnesses; (3) place of the alleged wrong; (4) location of counsel; (5) cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses; (6) accessibility and location of sources of proof; and (7) possibility of delay and prejudice if transfer is granted.
Public interest factors, [which] include: (1) administrative difficulties caused by court congestion; (2) local interest in adjudicating local disputes; (3) unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty; and (4) avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws.Hanby, 2001 WL 640639, at *3 (quoting Robertson v. Kiamichi RR Co., L.L.C., 42 F. Supp.2d 651, 655 (E.D.Tex. 1999)); see also Willis v. Parrot, Civ.A. No. 96-691, 1996 WL 337241, at * 4 (E.D.La. June 17, 1996).
Furthermore, it is important to note that typically, unless these factors balance heavily in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. See Willis, 1996 WL 337241, at * 4 (citing Schexnider v. McDermott Intern., Inc., 817 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 488, 98 L.Ed.2d 486(1987); Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935, 110 S.Ct. 328, 107 L.Ed.2d 318(1989)). However, when the plaintiff's choice of forum has no factual nexus to the case or when the plaintiff has chosen a district other than the district in which he or she resides, then courts are to give that choice of forum little weight. See Robertson, 42 F. Supp.2d at 656; Paul v. International Metals Corp, 613 F. Supp. 174, 179 (S.D.Miss. 1985); 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3848(1986).
D. Application of the Factors to the Case at Hand:
In applying the aforementioned factors to the case at hand, it is apparent that this Court should give minimal deference to the Plaintiffs' choice of forum. First, the Plaintiffs do not reside in this District; rather, they are residents of Mobile, Alabama. Second, there is no identifiable nexus of activity within this District. The automobile accident that is the subject matter of this litigation occurred in Hancock County, Mississippi, not in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Thus, this Court should give little deference to the Plaintiffs' choice of forum. Furthermore, because only one party actually "lives" in Louisiana, there is no evidence indicating that this forum is the most convenient forum for all parties and witnesses involved in this litigation. In fact, it seems that most witnesses and parties are to be found outside of the Eastern District of Louisiana. These factors weigh in favor of a transfer to the Southern District of Mississippi.
See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively to Transfer, Doc. 4, Exhibit "A."
As mentioned above, this Court determined that Defendant Jack is a domiciliary and resident of North Carolina for purposes of venue; however, Jack currently lives in New Orleans, Louisiana, as he is a student at Tulane University.
Next, the Court must consider the location of counsel as a convenience factor. However, this factor is to be given little weight as compared to the other convenience factors. See Robertson, 42 F. Supp.2d at 658 (citing Reed v. Fina Oil and Chemical Co., 995 F. Supp. 705; 715 (E.D.Tex. 1998)). In the present case, the Plaintiffs' counsel is located in New Orleans, Louisiana, and counsel for Defendants are located in both Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Gulf Port, Mississippi. Therefore, neither the current venue nor the proposed venue "would be particularly convenient or inconvenient for both counsel." Id. Accordingly, this factor weighs neither in favor of nor against transfer of venue.
In addition to those convenience factors that weigh in favor of transfer to the Southern District of Mississippi, several of the public interest factors weigh in favor of transfer. First, with regard to any administrative difficulties caused by court congestion, it can be argued that all courts are overly crowded with cases. However, it is significant that the Plaintiffs filed this action a mere six months ago because it can hardly be said to have been pending before this Court for such an extensive period of time to warrant it remaining in this District. Furthermore, this Court's involvement in the litigation to date has been nominal. While courts have held that the "speed of disposition of lawsuits" without any connection to the forum District "is not a valid reason for forum shopping," filing cases without any rational nexus to the forum district could create congestion beyond that district's resources. See Hanby, 2001 WL 640639, at *5; Rock Bit Internat'l, Inc. v. Smith internat'l. Inc., 957 F. Supp. 843, 844 (E.D.Tex. 1997). This Court is of the opinion that "the courts of this district should not be required to expend judicial resources on matters that have little relationship to this district." Varnado v. Danek Medical. Inc., No.Civ.A. 95-1802, 1998 WL 524896, at * 3 (E.D.La. August 19, 1998). Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of a transfer to the Southern District of Mississippi.
Second, since the automobile accident that gave rise to this lawsuit occurred in Hancock County, Mississippi, there is a close nexus between that accident and the Southern District of Mississippi. Additionally, Mississippi law will apply in the instant case. Accordingly, the citizens of the Southern District of Mississippi have a strong local interest in resolving this controversy. Furthermore, there is no corresponding local interest in the Eastern District of Louisiana. This factor, too, clearly weighs in favor of transferring venue to the Southern District of Mississippi. See Robertson, 42 F. Supp.2d at 659.
With respect to the burdens of jury duty, because the accident that gave rise to this lawsuit occurred in Mississippi and because Mississippi law will be applied in this case, the citizens of this District should not be burdened with jury duty in this case. Rather, it seems most fair and just that the citizens of the Southern District of Mississippi be called upon to decide disputed facts in this case. "Under these circumstances, the waste of judicial resources and imposition upon the citizens of this state are manifest." Hartford, 725 F. Supp. at 322. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a transfer.
III. CONCLUSION:
Given the minimal weight afforded the Plaintiffs' choice of forum in this case, wherein there is no factual nexus to this District and the Plaintiffs do not reside in this District, the relative weight of the remaining factors leads this Court to the conclusion that this action more properly belongs in the Southern District of Mississippi. This Court is satisfied that the majority of both the convenience and public interest factors weigh in favor of such a transfer. Furthermore, this court finds that the interests of justice would be best served by transferring this case. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Transfer be, and the same is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned action be, and the same is hereby, transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.