Opinion
Civil Action No. PJM-01-1449
April 2, 2003
Richard W. Black, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld LLP., Washington, DC., Attorneys for defendant HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the Court's March 27, 2003 Opinion and Order, granting defendant Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. ("Home Depot") leave to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff Saunders V. Dorsey, Home Depot moves this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), to enter summary judgment in favor of Home Depot on the claims asserted by plaintiff Dorsey in his Complaint.
As shown in the accompanying memorandum, Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment because, based on the undisputed record evidence, plaintiff cannot establish the required elements of a claim of intentional interference with contract. Plaintiff cannot establish these elements because Home Depot requested and received from each employee with whom it settled a statement that he or she was not represented by plaintiff Dorsey. Further, there is no evidence, or even any allegation, that Home Depot engaged in the types of "wrongful" conduct necessary for a claim of intentional interference with contract.
Accordingly, Home Depot respectfully requests that the Court grant this supplemental motion for summary judgment.
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTIONOn March 27, 2003, the Court entered an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying without prejudice in part defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.'s ("Home Depot") Motion for Summary Judgment, denying plaintiffs' Counterclaim for Summary Judgment, and dismissing plaintiff Martin from the case. See Opinion and Order, Dorsey, et al. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., Civil No. PJM-01-1449 (Mar. 27, 2003). The Court found, inter alia, that there was sufficient evidence in the record to show that Home Depot at least suspected plaintiff Dorsey represented employees with whom Home Depot reached settlements and, thus, Home Depot could not show as a matter of law that plaintiff could not satisfy the "knowledge" prong of the test set forth in Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d 794 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), for a claim of intentional interference with contract. However, the Court stated that it was questionable whether plaintiff had even stated a claim for intentional interference with contract, or adduced sufficient evidence to support such a claim, because the pleadings suggested his suit relied merely on the fact that Home Depot settled directly potential claims of its employees, rather than Home Depot having engaged in the kind of "wrongful" conduct required for such a claim. Opinion and Order at 6. The Court concluded that if Home Depot's "employees voluntarily executed declarations of non-representation, [plaintiff] Dorsey's claim would be fatally undermined," and invited Home Depot to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment regarding those issues. Id. at 8.
Home Depot assumes for purposes of this supplemental motion only that it had knowledge of plaintiff Dorsey's representation at the time it settled the claims of its employees.
As the undisputed record evidence shows, summary judgment is appropriate because Home Depot requested and received from each employee with whom it settled a statement that he or she was not represented by plaintiff Dorsey. Further, there is no evidence, or even any allegation, that Home Depot engaged in the types of "wrongful" conduct necessary for a claim of intentional interference with contract. Accordingly, as explained more fully below, the Court should enter summary judgment for Home Depot and dismiss plaintiff Dorsey's claim.
Home Depot incorporates by reference herein the declaration of M. Faye Wilson and other documentary evidence, including the signed statements from employees disavowing representation by Dorsey, that were submitted with its original Motion for Summary Judgment.
1. Home Depot has an Open Door policy to resolve the workplace grievances of associates. The Open Door policy encourages associates and managers to work together to resolve associate grievances informally. Declaration of M. Faye Wilson ("Wilson Decl.") ¶ 3, and Ex. A.
Home Depot restates only those facts from its original summary judgment motion that are pertinent to the issues in the instant motion.
2. Although plaintiff's complaint exhibit A lists 18 associates, plaintiff identified in discovery just 13 associates who he allegedly represented: Ted Neale, Rudolph Nichols, James Felix, James Snowden, Roger Burwell, Craig Johnson, Charles Dues, III, Eric Moore, Phillip G. Dickerson, Arnie Porter, Wallace M. Jones, Walter Royster, and Herb Campbell ("the 13 associates"). Declaration of Roxane S. Marenberg, Ex. D.
3. The 13 associates, without the assistance of plaintiff, used the Open Door policy to attempt to resolve workplace grievances with Home Depot. Wilson Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 9, 11, 12. This is the act that plaintiff alleges constituted intentional inference with contractual relationships. Compl. ¶¶ 13-16, 24-26.
4. Home Depot requires its managers, including members of senior management, to regularly conduct store walks to maintain and demonstrate management accessibility to Home Depot associates, and to address workplace concerns that might be raised by associates. Wilson Decl. at ¶ 4.
5. In or about February 2001, Home Depot's then-Senior Vice President, M. Faye Wilson, conducted a random store walk in a Home Depot store in College Park, Maryland. Id. at ¶ 5. During this store walk, while communicating with associates, Ms. Wilson learned that some associates had concerns about race discrimination. Id. at ¶ 6. Wilson is not a lawyer. Id. at ¶ 2.
6. During February and March 2001, Wilson met with associates to discuss their concerns about race discrimination. Id. at ¶ 6. She listened to, evaluated, and attempted to resolve their grievances. Id.
7. By letter to Wilson dated April 16, 2001, plaintiff demanded that Wilson not meet with the 13 associates "should such a meeting involve resolution of their EEOC claims." Id. at ¶ 8, and Ex. C. As of the receipt of plaintiffs letter, however, Home Depot had not received notice that any of the 13 associates had filed a charge with the EEOC. Wilson Decl. ¶ 8. In fact, none of the 13 associates had filed EEOC charges at that time. Id. at ¶ 13, and Ex. F.
8. When Wilson received the April 16, 2001 letter from plaintiff, she (and in some instances her subordinates) contacted these persons and asked them if they were represented by an attorney. Id. at ¶ 9. The 13 associates stated that they were not. Id. Out of an abundance of caution, Home Depot asked them to sign statements confirming that they were not represented by a lawyer. Id., and Ex. D. Each of the 13 associates agreed and signed a separate statement representing to Home Depot that he or she was not represented by counsel. Id., and Ex. D. Home Depot associate Daniel Goicochea said that he was represented by an attorney. Id.
9. On May 3, 2001, a Home Depot attorney wrote to plaintiff that Home Depot would follow Dorsey's request and not meet and negotiate grievances with any associate who told Home Depot that Dorsey was his or her lawyer. Id. at ¶ 10, and Ex. E. And, Mr. Goicochea was told that Home Depot would discuss his concerns with his attorney. Id. at ¶ 9.
10. Wilson continued to try to resolve the grievances of the 13 associates, among others. By May 18, 2001, 12 of the 13 associates and Home Depot had reached agreements that settled the associates' grievances. Id. at ¶ 12.
III. HOME DEPOT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
To avoid duplication for the Court, Home Depot relies on the same standard for granting summary judgment that was set forth in its original motion.
To establish a claim of intentional interference with contract, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) the existence of a valid contract between plaintiffs and a third party, (2) Home Depot's knowledge of that contract, (3) Home Depot's intentional interference with that contract, (4) breach of that contract by the 13 associates, and (5) resulting damages to plaintiffs. Fowler, 598 A.2d at 802. Defendant assumes for purposes of this motion that plaintiff can satisfy the first two prongs. Plaintiff's claim fails, however, on the third prong.
The Court found that it is not improper per se for a defendant employer (as opposed to the defendant's counsel) to communicate with a potential claimant-employee even though that employee is represented by counsel. Opinion and Order at 6. Nor is it improper for the employer and employee to settle in good faith the employee's claim, without consulting or advising the employee's counsel. Id. at 6-7. Rather, the Court reasoned, "[i]f a third party can settle with a represented party without advising known counsel, a fortiori the third party can have no obligation to look beyond a client's express affirmation that he is not represented by counsel." Id. at 8. Thus, the Court concluded, if Home Depot's "employees voluntarily executed declarations of non-representation, [plaintiff] Dorsey's claim would be fatally undermined." Id.; see also Barnes v. Quigley, 49 A.2d 467, 467-48 (D.C. 1946).
In Barnes, the court rejected a claim of intentional interference where the defendant insurance company's claim representative asked a claimant if he was represented by the plaintiff, the claimant said no, and he signed statement to that effect. When the claim representative met with the claimant, the claimant mentioned that he had "talked about the case to a lawyer" (the plaintiff), and the claim representative unsuccessfully attempted to phone the plaintiff. The claim representative then asked if the claimant was represented by an attorney, but the claimant responded that he was not (even though he had already met with his attorney and paid a retainer). "Nevertheless, defendant drew up a statement which [the claimant] signed, to the effect that he had not employed any lawyer to represent him in the claim, and particularly not [the plaintiff]." 49 A.2d at 467-68. The court held that "this is plainly not . . . a case" where the defendant's conduct constituted "unlawful interference." Id. at 468.
Defendant attempted once unsuccessfully to settle with the claimant before he talked to an attorney.
Barnes and the Court's conclusion regarding statements from employees control this case. Wilson met with the 13 associates to attempt to resolve their grievances. Because she had received a letter from plaintiff claiming that he represented these associates, she asked them whether they were represented. Each stated that he or she was not represented. Out of an abundance of caution, Wilson asked those associates to sign a statement to that effect, and they did so. Wilson had "no obligation to look beyond [the associate's] express affirmation that he [or she] [wa]s not represented by counsel." Opinion and Order at 8; accord Barnes, 49 A.2d at 468; see also Johnson, 125 A. 697, 698 (Md. 1924) (client has right to settle claim directly with defendant without attorney's knowledge or consent); Goldberg v. Whitehead, 713 A.2d 204, 206-07 (R.I. 1998). Thus, plaintiffs claim is "fatally undermined" and Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment. Opinion and Order at 8; Barnes, 49 A.2d at 468.
Indeed, plaintiff has not even stated a cognizable claim for tortious interference with contract. As the Court explained, a cause of action for tortious interference with contract requires allegation of some "wrongful" conduct by a defendant more egregious than simply settling claims directly with its employees without consulting their counsel. Opinion and Order at 6 (discussing Sharrow v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 492 (Md. 1986) (defendant encouraged plaintiff's client to make a false statement and took advantage of client's dire financial condition); Studdard v. Evans, 135 S.E.2d (Ga.App. 1964) (conspiring with claimant to make false statement that he had never hired attorney or consented to sue the defendant); Gordon v. Mankoff, 148 Misc. 258, 261 N.Y.S. 888 (1931) (attorney suing former client and company with whom client settled; false statement from former client to his attorney that the claim lacked merit)); see also Fowler, 598 A.2d at 804 (conduct must be "wrongful"); cf. The Golden Star, 82 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1936) (no claim absent evidence of fraud or collusion between claimant and defendant to defraud plaintiff attorney of his fees).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges, in pertinent part, that Home Depot intentionally interfered with his contractual relationships with the 13 associates because Faye Wilson met with those associates and reached settlements resolving 12 of their claims without plaintiff being present. Compl. 24-25. As the Court noted, "the Complaint implies that any contact between the corporate representatives of Home Depot and the employees would be improper and therefore actionable." Opinion and Order at 6.
"But that is not so." Id. Rather, Home Depot must have engaged in "wrongful" behavior of the type in the cases discussed by the Court. Id. at 6. For example, in Studdard, the court denied a demurrer because the complaint alleged that the defendant and the attorney's client had conspired "to claim falsely that [the client] had never employed the attorney" and in writing a letter repudiating the attorney's employment. 135 S.E.2d at 64. And, defendant had, with the client's assistance, filed a motion falsely alleging that the client had never hired the attorney or authorized suit. Id. Similarly, in Gordon, the client settled his claim with defendant and then he told the plaintiff attorney that there was no basis for the claim. 146 Misc. at 258-59. In Sharrow, the court denied a demurrer because of allegations that the defendant had (1) taken advantage of the claimant's dire financial condition and (2) instructed the claimant to prepare a false statement that the claimant had previously advised his attorney that he would be negotiating directly with defendant. 511 A.2d at 500. Even under the liberal demurrer standard applied in Sharrow, the court found that plaintiff's claim was "barely adequate" and survived dismissal only "by a thin hair." Id. at 500-01. Here, however, plaintiffs complaint alleges no similarly egregious conduct and, thus, fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for intentional interference with contract.
Alternatively, even if plaintiff's complaint could be construed to allege facts sufficient to state a cognizable claim, there is no evidence in the record that Home Depot engaged in the kind of conduct at issue in Studdard, Gordon, or Sharrow, and, thus, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of intentional interference with contract. Rather, plaintiff's claims are "fatally undermined" by the undisputed fact that Home Depot's Wilson requested and received a statement from the 13 associates that they were not represented. See Barnes, 49 A.2d at 468; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (summary judgment appropriate where party opposing summary judgment fails to present evidence of specific facts from which the fact finder could reasonably find for him); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (same). Home Depot did nothing more than it was entitled to do; namely, settle employees claims in good faith "without advising known counsel." Opinion and Order at 8; see also Boyd, 125 A. at 698. Further, the good faith of Home Depot is bolstered by the fact that, when associate Goicochea stated that he was represented, Home Depot required that he negotiate through his counsel. Thus, plaintiffs claims should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Home Depot respectfully requests that the Court grant its supplemental motion for summary judgment, and dismiss plaintiff's action in its entirety.
[Proposed] ORDER
Upon consideration of defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.'s supplemental motion for summary judgment and all materials offered in support thereof as well as any opposition thereto, and reply in support thereof, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion is GRANTED. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendant against plaintiff Saunders Dorsey.