Opinion
No. 849, September Term, 2001
Filed: March 4, 2002
Davis, Hollander, Barbera, JJ.
Appellee Bethel A.M.E. Church purchased approximately 255 acres upon which it intended to construct a church complex in the Granite community of Baltimore County. Because the proposed site had previously been zoned for churches and similar buildings for religious worship, appellee was only required to have a development plan reviewed and approved through the development review and approval process, as outlined in the Baltimore County Code (B.C.C.)(1988, 2001 Supp.) §§ 26-201 through 26-220 (Development Regulations). Pursuant to the Development Regulations, the Zoning Commissioner, in his or her capacity as Hearing Officer, was to determine whether the "concept plan" submitted by the applicant, conformed with applicable regulations and laws.
On August 28, 2000, a public hearing regarding appellee's development plan was conducted before Baltimore County Hearing Officer Larry Schmidt. Appellant Greater Patapsco Community Association, Inc. (the Association), appeared as a protestant to the plan. The Hearing Officer heard testimony and evidence on September 6-8, 15, and 19, 2000. In lieu of oral closing arguments, the parties submitted written memoranda on or before October 13, 2000 and, on October 30, 2000, the Hearing Officer issued an interlocutory order, which stated, in relevant part:
Initially, the Association was the sole protestant to appellee's development plan. As explained later in the opinion, however, Paul Dorsey, Rosalyn Roddy, Kathleen Skullney, Susan Meekins, James and Jean Higgs, Celia Lange, Dana B. Marvel, and Joseph Tatarewicz, all members of the Association, filed an Amended Petition for Judicial Review, thereby joining them as individual parties to the present appeal. We decide their status as appellants, infra, in our discussion of standing.
. . . [A] fair review of the record of this case could support a finding that Old Court Road and the surrounding road network are adequate to carry anticipated traffic volumes from the Bethel Church. . . . [T]he undersigned Hearing Officer recognizes the significant traffic volumes on Sunday morning that will be generated by this project. Given the anticipated volumes, I feel compelled to require further investigation and analysis of the three issues identified above before I reach those conclusions and approve this plan. Although not persuaded to deny or condition the plan based on the record thus far, I am not willing to grant unconditional approval either, until such time as an investigation and analysis of the capacity of Old Court Road on Sunday is completed. . . .
Therefore, I will reconvene the Hearing Officer's Hearing to consider this analysis when completed. . . . Thus, the Order that follows hereinafter is interlocutory in nature, and any final Order, either denying or approving with conditions the development plan, will be issued upon completion of those further proceedings and consistent herewith. It bears noting that these additional proceedings shall be limited to this traffic issue, only. . . .
IT IS ORDERED by this Zoning Commissioner/Hearing Officer for Baltimore County this 30th day of October, 2000, that within ninety . . . days of the date of this Order, the Developer shall submit the requisite traffic analysis described hereinabove; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall thereafter be scheduled for further proceedings before this Hearing Officer.
Disputing the legality of the Hearing Officer's interlocutory order, appellant noted its timely appeal with the Baltimore County Board of Appeals (Board) on November 27, 2000. On December 28, 2000, a hearing was conducted during which appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the Hearing Officer had not taken final action on the development plan and, therefore, appellants' appeal was not ripe. The Board issued a written opinion on January 12, 2001, granting appellee's motion to dismiss, as the interlocutory order was "not a final decision on the subject development plan, and therefore, [was] not ripe for appeal." The Board noted that judicial review of an interlocutory order is provided for in Md. Code (1999 Repl. Vol.), State Gov't (S.G.) § 10-222(2)(b):
Review of interlocutory order. Where the presiding officer has final decision-making authority, a person in a contested case who is aggrieved by an interlocutory order is entitled to judicial review if:
. . .
(2) the interlocutory order:
determines the rights and liabilities, and
(ii) has immediate legal consequences; and postponement of judicial review would result in irreparable harm.
In light of the relevant statute, the Board concluded that "neither side [was] harmed by [the] interlocutory order, and . . . each has preserved the right to appeal the ultimate final opinion and order by the Hearing Officer . . . without prejudice."
Appellants filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on February 12, 2001. On March 26, 2001, an Amended Petition for Judicial Review was filed by the Association, Paul Dorsey, Rosalyn Roddy, Kathleen Skullney, Susan Meekins, James and Jean Higgs, Celia Lange, Dana B. Marvel, and Joseph Tatarewicz. Appellee filed a Preliminary Motion to Dismiss Appeal on March 12, 2001, on the grounds that the appeal was not ripe. On May 21, 2001, after hearing argument from both sides, the trial judge granted appellee's motion to dismiss and, as a result, invalidated the proposed amendments.
Appellants additionally filed a Motion for Stay of County Board of Appeals for Baltimore County Proceedings on February 27, 2001, which was denied on March 6, 2001.
Appellants noted this timely appeal on June 19, 2001, wherein they presented one question for review, which we rephrase for clarity as follows:
Did the trial court err in dismissing appellants' Petition for Judicial Review without a hearing on the merits?
In addition, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, contending that none of appellants have standing.
Appellee's counsel appeared for oral argument; appellants' counsel submitted on brief.
We grant appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal with regard to Paul Dorsey, Rosalyn Roddy, Kathleen Skullney, Susan Meekins, James and Jean Higgs, Celia Lange, Dana B. Marvel, and Joseph Tatarewicz, but deny its motion with regard to the Association. We answer appellants' question in the affirmative and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, an appellate court is to determine whether it was legally correct in its decision. See Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Center, Inc., 93 Md. App. 772 (1992).
LEGAL ANALYSIS I
As a decision to grant appellee's motion to dismiss would obviate the need to address the merits of appellants' question presented, we consider the motion to dismiss first.
Appellee contends that none of the parties to this appeal have standing and, as a result, their appeal should be dismissed. Apparently conceding that the Association is a proper party to this appeal, appellee points out that "[t]he only individuals who spoke clearly did so in their capacity as representatives for the Association," noting that "Ros[a]yln Roddy spoke as `President of the Greater Patapsco Community Association,' and Kathleen Skullney spoke as `a member of the Public Affairs Committee designated by the Board of Directors of the Greater Patapsco Community Association to speak on its behalf on certain issues.'" Acknowledging that, regardless of appellee's failure to raise the issue at the circuit court level, we have the authority to consider the issue of standing, appellant responds by arguing that, "[o]nce the appeal is properly noted, nothing in the rules prevents anyone . . . from being recognized as a party to the appeal." We consider this to be an overly broad statement of Maryland law.
Appellants direct us to Sugarloaf Citizens' Ass'n. v. Dep't. of Environment, 344 Md. 271 (1996), as a roadmap to the issue of standing in administrative appeals. There, the Court recognized a distinction between standing to be a party to an administrative proceeding and standing to request judicial review of an administrative order in court. Id. at 286. Although the distinction has been the subject of much discussion in Maryland appellate courts, the rule can easily be summed up: "In order to be entitled to judicial review in a contested case, one must both be a `party' to the administrative proceedings and be `aggrieved' by the final decision of the agency." Medical Waste Ass'n. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc., 327 Md. 596, 611 (1992). As established by the Court of Appeals, one must satisfy two elements in order to appeal from the board of appeals to the circuit court; however, as appellee does not take issue with the second condition, we limit our analysis to determine whether appellants, as delineated in Medical Waste, supra, constitute parties to the action.
Sugarloaf, 344 Md. 271 (1996); Medical Waste Assoc., Inc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc., 327 Md. 596 (1992); Hitzrot v. County Board of Appeals of Baltimore County, 262 Md. 297 (1971); Shore Acres Improvement Assoc., Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals, 251 Md. 310 (1968); Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137 (1967); Hertelendy v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 554 (1967); and Dubay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180 (1965).
Clearly, the Association was a "party" to the proceedings at the administrative level. As further explained in Medical Waste:
Bearing in mind that the format for proceedings before administrative agencies is intentionally designed to be informal so as to encourage citizen participation, we think that absent a reasonable agency or other regulation providing for a more formal method of becoming a party, anyone clearly identifying himself to the agency for the record as having an interest in the outcome of a matter being considered by the agency, thereby becomes a party to the proceedings.
Id. (citing Morris v. Howard Res. Dev. Corp., 278 Md. 417, 423 (1976)). From the record it is apparent that the Association represented itself to the Board as having an interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Indeed, the Association appealed the order of the Zoning Commission on its letterhead. See, e.g., Hitzrot v. County Board of Appeals of Baltimore County, 262 Md. 297, 298-99 (1971) (noting appeal to the board of appeals constitutes a party to the proceeding).
The individuals listed on the Amended Petition for Judicial Review, on the other hand, failed to represent their individual interests to the Board. As noted by appellee, all involvement by Roddy was in her capacity as President of the Association, including her signature on the above-referenced Notice of Appeal. See, e.g., Shore Acres Improvement Assoc., Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals, 251 Md. 310 (1968) (upholding lower court ruling that party lacked standing because his signature only appeared in the proceedings in his capacity as president of the association). Similarly, Skullney's involvement was solely in her capacity as a "member of the Public Affairs Committee designated by the Board of Directors of the Greater Patapsco Community Association to speak on its behalf," as noted in the transcript of the Board's proceedings. Although Roddy and Skullney actually appeared before the Board — albeit in a representative role — Dorsey, Meekins, the Higgses, Lange, Marvel, and Tatarewicz were not named in the transcript until the Amended Petition was filed on February 12, 2001. In light of the dearth of any reference to these individuals, we decline to denominate them as parties to the underlying administrative hearing. We, therefore, concur with appellee with respect to the individuals and strike them from this appeal.
II
Appellant contends that the trial judge erred in its dismissal of appellant's appeal without a hearing, as the decision of the Board constituted a final order, triggering its statutory right to review at the circuit court level. Appellee counters that the interlocutory nature of the Hearing Officer's order caused any appeal taken therefrom to be premature. The appeal, concludes appellee, was, therefore, properly dismissed. For the reasons expressed infra, we agree with appellant.
Here, and through the end of the opinion, we refer to appellant in the singular, as we concluded in Section I that Paul Dorsey, Rosalyn Roddy, Kathleen Skullney, Susan Meekins, James and Jean Higgs, Celia Lange, Dana B. Marvel, and Joseph Tatarewicz do not have standing on appeal.
Due to the confusing nature of the proceedings leading to the instant appeal, we deem it helpful, if not indispensable, to rely on the following time line:
10/30/00 — Hearing Officer issues interlocutory order
12/28/00 — Hearing before Board on propriety of Hearing Officer's actions; upon appellee's preliminary motion to dismiss the appeal as unripe, Board dismisses; in addition, Board declares Hearing Officer's decision proper
2/12/01 — Appellant files Petition for Judicial Review in Circuit Court for Baltimore County; appellee again moves for preliminary dismissal of action as premature
5/21/01 — Trial court dismisses, concluding that only an appeal from a final development plan order could be heard
Appellee points out that, during the period of time summarized above, appellee submitted a revised traffic report to the Hearing Officer pursuant to the interlocutory order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer reconvened the hearing on March 6, 2001. The hearing continued on March 9 and concluded on March 29, 2001. The Hearing Officer issued a final decision approving the development plan with conditions on May 10, 2001. That decision was appealed to the Board of Appeals by appellants, including the issue of the Hearing Officer's authority to reconvene the original hearing and that appeal is pending. Had the circuit court affirmed the Board's dismissal rather than granting appellee's motion to dismiss, the result would have been that the parties would be in the same position they now find themselves in the proceedings below — awaiting the Board's decision regarding the approval of the development plan with conditions. As stated above, however, we must merely determine the propriety of the trial court's decision to dismiss appellant's appeal on grounds of ripeness.
Generally, an action for judicial review of an administrative order must stem from a final administrative order. Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County Human Relations Commission, 315 Md. 390, 395 (1989). To constitute a final judgment, the ruling of a lower court or similar entity "must be so final as either to determine and conclude the rights involved or to deny the appellant the means of further prosecuting or defending his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding." Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 42 (1989). An administrative order is final if it determines rights and liabilities or has legal consequences and leaves nothing further for the agency to do. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., 296 Md. 46, 52 (1983). Because a dismissal of a party's claim "puts the plaintiff out of court and terminates the particular action," it constitutes an appealable order under the final judgment rule. Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 432 (1993).
The Board, in the case sub judice, clearly dismissed appellant's appeal and remanded the case to the Hearing Officer "for findings in accordance with his interlocutory order." That appellant "would have the right to appeal, in full, to [the] Board, on all issues of the subject Development Plan," had no effect on the appealability of the decision. See id. (opining that dismissals with and without prejudice constitute final orders). As stated by the Court of Appeals:
[T]he action of an administrative agency, like the order of a court, is final if it determines or concludes the rights of the parties, or if it denies the parties means of further prosecuting or defending their rights and interests in the subject matter in proceedings before the agency, thus leaving nothing further for the agency to do.
Md. Comm'n, 296 Md. at 56. The dismissal of appellant's claim by the Board constituted a final judgment, as there was nothing further for it to adjudicate. Indeed, the Board's decision could not have been more final.
Contrary to appellee's arguments, the issue before the trial judge in the case sub judice was not whether the Hearing Officer's interlocutory order was proper under the relevant B.C.C. section; rather, it was whether the Board properly dismissed appellant's appeal of that order as premature. As stated above, the grant of a motion to dismiss constitutes a final order. Presented with the task of reviewing the propriety of the Board's dismissal, therefore, the trial court had only two choices. If it concluded that the Board correctly determined the Hearing Officer's order to be interlocutory and, therefore, not ripe, it could have affirmed the dismissal. Or, in the event he determined that the Board had incorrectly dismissed appellant's claim, the trial judge could have reversed the decision of the Board. The trial judge chose neither of these options before him, electing instead to dismiss appellant's appeal. In analyzing the ripeness of appellant's appeal to the Board, the trial court engaged in clear error, as it essentially ignored the ruling of the Board. As established in Hope v. Baltimore County, 44 Md. App. 481 (1980), the decision of the Board was the only decision before it for judicial review.
Moreover, dismissal without review of the Board's decision constituted clear error:
A court ordinarily should not . . . remand an administrative proceeding before initiating any review whatsoever. Where an administrative decision is final and is subject to judicial review, the party aggrieved by the decision is entitled to review. Remanding a case without any review is tantamount to denying review. If remand is permitted at this point, a circuit court could effectively render meaningless the aggrieved party's right.
Holiday Spas, 315 Md. at 400. In light of the above analysis, we remand to the circuit court to address the merits of appellant's appeal regarding the Board's order.
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED WITH REGARD TO PAUL DORSEY, ROSALYN RODDY, KATHLEEN SKULLNEY, SUSAN MEEKINS, JAMES HIGGS, JEAN HIGGS, CELIA LANGE, DANA B. MARVEL, AND JOSEPH TATAREWICZ.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY REVERSED; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID ONE-THIRD BY APPELLANT ASSOCIATION, ONE-THIRD BY INDIVIDUAL PROTESTANTS AND ONE-THIRD BY APPELLEE.