Opinion
A92A1463, A92A1464.
DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 1992. RECONSIDERATION DENIED OCTOBER 14, 1992.
Drug violation. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Bishop.
John G. Cicala, Jr., George L. Kimel, for appellant.
Thomas C. Lawler III, District Attorney, Debra K. Turner, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. In Case No. A92A1463, he appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the trial court on the jury's guilty verdict. In Case No. A92A1464, he appeals from the denial of his motion for appeal bond.
Case No. A92A1463
1. Appellant enumerates as error only the denial of his motion to suppress the marijuana which was seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant.
The warrant had been sought on the basis of information supplied by an otherwise unidentified "concerned citizen." At the hearing on appellant's motion, it was shown that the affidavit submitted to the magistrate may have contained "embellishments" as to the extent of the information supplied to the affiant by the concerned citizen. However, these embellishments certainly cannot be characterized as deliberate falsehoods and, when these embellishments are eliminated from consideration, the affidavit contains the following unchallenged information: The concerned citizen had seen at least two pounds of marijuana in appellant's residence on several occasions in the last three months. The concerned citizen confirmed information already obtained by police regarding appellant's relationship with a suspected drug supplier and a suspiciously high volume of vehicular and pedestrian traffic at his residence. The affiant determined that the concerned citizen had no criminal record himself and he assessed the concerned citizen to be intelligent, mature, sober, and coherent.
It would appear that the affidavit meets even the abandoned two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test. See Hardy v. State, 162 Ga. App. 797, 798-799 (2) ( 292 S.E.2d 902) (1982); Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 638 (5, 6) ( 277 S.E.2d 729) (1981). Moreover, this more stringent test has now been replaced by the less rigorous "totality of the circumstances" test. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527) (1983); State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 184 ( 311 S.E.2d 823) (1984). See also Peacock v. State, 170 Ga. App. 309, 310 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 864) (1984); Bromley v. State, 259 Ga. 377, 379 (3) ( 380 S.E.2d 694) (1989). This test has been met in the instant case, in that the information set forth in the affidavit provided a substantial basis from which the magistrate could determine that marijuana was currently being stored at appellant's house. See Bell v. State, 204 Ga. App. 528 (1) ( 419 S.E.2d 729) (1992); McQueen v. State, 189 Ga. App. 743, 744 ( 377 S.E.2d 682) (1988); Hunter v. State, 198 Ga. App. 41, 42 (1) ( 400 S.E.2d 641) (1990).
"At the hearing on the motion to suppress, there was no evidence that the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued contained deliberate falsehoods or had been made with reckless disregard for the truth or that the affiant had consciously omitted material information which, if it had been included in the affidavit, would have been indicative of the absence of probable cause. [Cits.]" Dale v. State, 198 Ga. App. 479, 480 (4) ( 402 S.E.2d 90) (1991). See also State v. Thomas, 203 Ga. App. 623, 624 ( 417 S.E.2d 328) (1992); Ledbetter v. State, 190 Ga. App. 843, 844 (1) ( 380 S.E.2d 313) (1989); McQueen v. State, supra at 744; Hunter v. State, supra at 42-43 (1). "In the absence of such evidence, the presumption of validity of an affidavit executed in support of a search warrant must stand. [Cit.]" Hayes v. State, 182 Ga. App. 319, 320 (1) ( 355 S.E.2d 700) (1987). Even if the statements alleged to have been embellished are "excised from the affidavit, the remaining information is sufficient to show probable cause; therefore, the search warrant is valid. [Cit.]" State v. Thomas, supra at 624. See also Rimmer v. State, 197 Ga. App. 294, 295 (1) ( 398 S.E.2d 282) (1990).
Moreover, "[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, we find the law enforcement officials acted in objective good faith, within the meaning of [ United States v.] Leon [, 468 U.S. 897 (104 SC 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677) (1984)], in . . . obtaining . . . the search warrant and that any deficiency in the warrant or its affidavit would not result in the invocation of the exclusionary rule. The correct decision of a trial court will not be reversed regardless of the reason ascribed thereto. [Cit.] The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress." Talley v. State, 204 Ga. App. 442, 445 (3d) ( 408 S.E.2d 463) (1991). See also Taylor v. State, 204 Ga. App. 236, 237 (2) ( 419 S.E.2d 56) (1992); Davis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 310 (1) ( 401 S.E.2d 326)
Case No. A92A1464
2. "Appellant contends that . . . the trial court's denial [of his motion for a post-conviction supersedeas bond] should be reversed and a bond granted during the pendency of the appeal process. However, `"the issue is moot because we affirm the conviction." [Cit.]' [Cit.]" Griffin v. State, 199 Ga. App. 646, 649 (4) ( 405 S.E.2d 877) (1991). See also Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 885, 891 (11) ( 311 S.E.2d 427) (1984); Harris v. State, 196 Ga. App. 304, 307 (6) ( 396 S.E.2d 288) (1990).
Judgment affirmed in Case No. A92A1463. Appeal dismissed in Case No. A92A1464. Pope and Johnson, JJ., concur.