Opinion
Civ. No. AMD 97-4253.
August 24, 1999.
MEMORANDUM
Ronald Donoway ("Donoway") has brought this action against Freight Drivers and Helpers Local Union, No. 557 ("Union"), and his former employer, Roadway Express, Inc. ("Roadway"), alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation and constructive discharge. Both Roadway and the Union have moved for summary judgment. I have thoroughly reviewed the parties' submissions and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons discussed below, I will grant the motions for summary judgment.
Donoway's amended complaint also alleged a claim against the union under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412, and against two union stewards for assault. These claims have been voluntarily dismissed. In addition, Donoway concedes that his common law claim for negligent retention and supervision against Roadway is preempted by the Maryland Worker's Compensation Act. See Demby v. Preston Trucking Co., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 873, 881 (D. Md. 1997).
I. FACTS
The material facts will be set forth in the light most favorable to Donoway. Although the record is replete with factual disputes, these discrepancies do not generate a genuine issue of material fact.
Donoway was employed as a combination driver and dock worker for Roadway at its Laurel terminal, continuously from February 1995 to November 1997. He was a member of the Union and was covered by the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") that was in place since April 1994. Donoway was an active and vocal employee. Thus, although he was not an elected union steward, he often counseled other employees about their grievances and assisted in the drafting of such complaints.
According to the CBA, union stewards had the responsibility of investigating and presenting grievances, collecting dues and acting as a front line liaison to the company.
Donoway had twice written letters to the CEO of Roadway complaining about the terminal work environment.
In June 1997, after Donoway spoke with another employee who had a grievance, one of the stewards, John McGronan, approached Donoway. According to Donoway, McGronan began yelling at him and threatened to kill him; McGronan was allegedly yelling about Donoway's frequent intermeddling with other employees' grievances. McGronan denies threatening Donoway; in fact, he alleges that it was Donoway who threatened him. McGronan, however, does admit to engaging in a verbal confrontation with Donoway. He told Donoway to stop telling other employees that they had valid grievances when in fact they did not. As a result of this incident, Donoway filed criminal charges of assault against McGronan.
The assault charges were not pressed in 1997.
Thereafter, according to Donoway, McGronan and the other union steward, Tim Connelly, began to harass and threaten him. Donaway contends that Connelly approached him and told him that filing charges against McGronan was an "assholish" thing to do, and that decades ago, members of the union would have "pushed [Donoway] into a trailer with somebody, pulled the door down and waited five minutes and opened the door up." Connelly Dep. at 49. Connelly claims that he told Donoway not to take this as a threat; Donoway denies hearing such a disclaimer. Donoway reported both incidents to his manager, Dacheux, but neither steward was disciplined.
Dacheux testified that he warned McGronan that his behavior was unacceptable.
Donoway alleges that on July 1, 1997, he was injured when struck in the back of the neck by a two by four piece of wood; he alleges that an employee threw the two by four. Donoway reported the incident to his supervisor, Scott Cameau, and went to the hospital. Donoway was treated for his injuries and released. Roadway denies that Donoway promptly reported the incident. Instead, it avers that Donoway told his supervisor, Cameau, that someone threw a piece of wood at his head and that he was leaving because he could no longer work under existing conditions. When Cameau tried to have Donoway remain on the premises to speak with him and another supervisor, Donoway refused. The CBA requires that all accidents and any injuries received be immediately reported to the employer. Donoway returned to work on or about July 14, 1997.
Roadway also denies that Donoway was actually injured on the job. It reported to its worker's compensation carrier that Donoway was not injured at work. Donoway has recently prevailed in an appeal of the denial of benefits in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.
Ostensibly, two co-workers, Bob Lowery and Glenn Harris, supported Donoway's assertion that he reported the incident to Cameau. Both individuals signed notarized statements to the effect that they heard Donoway tell Cameau that he had been injured at work and was leaving to have the injury treated. On deposition, however, Harris admitted that he never heard Donoway speak to Cameau; rather, he only witnessed Donoway go over and speak to Cameau, out of earshot. Moreover, Harris admitted he did not read the prepared statement before signing it. Lowery maintains, however, that he did hear Donoway make the statement to Cameau about his injury.
After this incident, Donoway met with Frank Imbragulio, the Local Union President to discuss his concerns about the work environment, the harassment, and his recent injury. Prior to this time, Imbragulio had not been aware of Donoway. Imbragulio told Donoway that if he needed union representation, Imbragulio would handle it, rather than requiring Donoway to go through McGronan and Connelly, the stewards, to pursue grievances. The CBA provides that any disputes should first be taken up with the union steward, who should meet with the company supervisor in order to attempt to resolve the dispute. If such informal efforts are unsuccessful, another meeting between a union business representative and a company agent should occur. If these efforts at resolution fail, the matter would then be submitted to the Maryland-District of Columbia Joint Area Committee for adjudication. Imbragulio also reminded Donoway that he could also bring another employee with him to any meetings with the company to resolve a dispute at the first level.
Donoway's father had also contacted Imbragulio after Donoway's injury, out of concern for his son's safety at Roadway. As a result of this phone call, Imbragulio and the union attempted to investigate the incident. According to Imbragulio, the union was unable to locate any employees at the terminal who witnessed the event.
"The Maryland-District of Columbia Joint Area Committee is a joint labor management panel on which representatives of both unions and companies who are parties to the freight agreement sit." Imbragulio Aff. ¶ 35.
On July 18, 1997, Roadway informed Donoway that it was suspending him for three days for failing to report his accident in a timely manner. The grievance process under the CBA provided Donoway with an opportunity to grieve the intended suspension within 14 days; thus, the actual suspension would not be awarded until that period, or the grievance procedures, had expired. Both Donoway and the Union sent letters to Roadway protesting the suspension. Such correspondence was insufficient, however, to trigger the grievance process — only an official grievance could suffice. Donoway alleges that Imbragulio told him not to file a grievance until he received the actual suspension dates from Roadway. Thus, Donoway did not file his grievance until August 8, 1997, more than 14 days after the notice of intention to suspend him.
Donoway completed an accident report on July 11, 1997 at Roadway's request.
Imbragulio denies making this statement.
Although the grievance was untimely, Imbragulio pursued the grievance on Donoway's behalf and Roadway agreed to permit the Committee to hear the issue, rather than dismiss it outright on the ground of untimeliness. Imbragulio forwarded the union's brief and accompanying information (provided by Donoway) to the Committee for adjudication. A hearing was held on November 25, 1997. The Committee dismissed the grievance because it was not filed within the requisite 14 day period.
The hearing was initially scheduled for September 24, 1997. After receiving the suspension, but before the hearing, Donoway was discharged for another offense. Because the discharge hearing took precedence over the suspension hearing, the suspension hearing was rescheduled for November.
Donoway alleges that he continued to receive harassing and threatening treatment from other employees, including the stewards. He also alleges that employees who associated with him were threatened as well. In early August, Donoway filed a grievance against McGronan and Connelly. The Union treated this as an intra-union charge and on September 12, 1997, the Union Executive Board held a hearing on the charges. After hearing testimony from various witnesses, the Board dismissed the charges. Donoway has appealed.
Bob Lowery, another employee, testified by affidavit that he resigned from the company because he was threatened over his relationship with Donoway. On deposition, however, Lowery admitted that he resigned from Roadway and moved to Hawaii for two additional, and more important reasons: (1) his mother, who resides in Hawaii, had cancer; and (2) he was separating from his wife. The threats allegedly made to him were the third and least important reason for his departure. These other reasons, however, were not mentioned in his affidavit.
In addition, on September 2, 1997, Donoway filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.
Donoway also received additional disciplinary sanctions from Roadway. On September 9, 1997, Donoway noticed that an employee seniority list posted in the dock manager's office was defaced. The portion of the list where Donoway's name and number traditionally appeared had been cut out and replaced with an offensive remark. Donoway removed the list and showed it to Mike Marshall, the on-duty supervisor. According to Donoway, Marshall refused to replace the list with a clean copy. Donoway wanted to keep the defaced list as evidence of the harassment he encountered at Roadway. Marshall offered to copy the list for Donoway; however, because Donoway did not trust Marshall to copy the list and return it to him, Donoway refused. Marshall then ordered Donoway to give him the list and Donoway refused. Donoway was sent home for the day and then discharged for dishonesty, due to the theft of the company property.
Roadway employees, as well as Dacheux, describe the Roadway environment as one permeated with gossip, rumors, and often child-like graffiti defacing company property. Thus, this was not the first time that company or union postings have been defaced. Donoway, as well as manager Dacheux, had been the subject of other graffiti. As a result of such graffiti, the bulletin boards were enclosed in glass in or about November 1997.
Donoway filed two grievances in response to his discharge. The first cited Article 21 of the CBA, which discusses discrimination against union officials; the second grievance cited Articles 4 and 7, which address Union stewards and the grievance procedures available. Concerned that Donoway had omitted grieving the "unjust discharge," Imbragulio filed an additional grievance on Donoway's behalf, citing Article 45, which discusses unjust discharges. The Committee held a hearing on September 24, 1997. The panel held that Donoway should serve a 30 day suspension (three weeks of which had already been served) and be reinstated.
After returning to work in October 1997, Donoway's work environment was permeated with threats and hostility. He alleges that Dacheux ordered the shop stewards not to speak to him. In addition, he claims that the union posted on its bulletin board that employee grievances must be signed by a steward or else they would not be processed. In addition, Donoway alleges that Dacheux and Imbragulio told other employees that grievances filed by Donoway would be ignored. Citing the continued harassment and negative work conditions, Donoway resigned on November 17, 1997. His last day of employment was November 28, 1997. After leaving the company, Donoway filed an additional grievance for vacation pay that he did not promptly receive.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the facts, as well as the inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 547, 587-88 (1986). A party moving for summary judgment is entitled to a grant of summary judgment only if no issues of material fact remain for the trier of fact to determine at trial. Id. at 587. A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment, if when applied to the substantive law, it affects the outcome of the litigation. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "Summary judgment is not appropriate when there is an issue of fact for a jury to determine at trial, which is the case when there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party upon which a jury can return a verdict for that party." Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991).
A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. The nonmovant "cannot create a genuine issue of fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 545 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 116 S.Ct. 1307 (1996). "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56] must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Shealy, 929 F.2d at 1012.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Hybrid Duty of Fair Representation
Donoway has brought a "hybrid" claim for breach of the duty of fair representation against the union and Roadway. To recover against either defendant, Donoway must demonstrate that Roadway breached the collective bargaining agreement and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Co., 424 U.S. 554, 570-571 (1976). Because Donoway has failed, as a matter of law, to establish a claim for breach of duty of fair representation, it is not necessary to determine whether Roadway has breached the CBA.
"[A]s the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees, . . . [a] Union ha[s] a statutory duty fairly to represent all of those employees." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176 (1967). A union, however, is granted a high degree of deference in pursuing its representation of employees, and thus, a union breaches its duty of fair representation only if its "conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190. Accordingly, mere negligence, poor judgment or inefficiency on the part of the union will not satisfy a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. See Smith v. United Steelworkers, 834 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Ash v. United Parcel Service, 800 F.2d 409, 411 (4th Cir. 1986)). There must be "substantial reason to believe that a union breach of duty contributed to an erroneous outcome in the contractual proceedings." Ash, 800 F.2d at 411(quoting Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Serv. Inc., 537 F.2d 1255, 1258 (4th Cir. 1976)).
These factors — arbitrariness, discrimination, and bad faith — have been interpreted in the context of a strong federal policy of granting unions a large measure of deference in representing employees. Thus, for example, a union's actions are considered arbitrary if "in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a `wide range of reasonableness,' so as to be irrational." Air Line Pilots Assoc. Int'l. (ALPA) v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (internal citation omitted). Similarly, a union's conduct is considered to be discriminatory if the union's actions are invidious. See in re ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 556, 563-64 (D. Md. 1997). See also Considine v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 43 F.3d 1349, 1359-60 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[D]iscrimination is invidious if based upon impermissible or immutable classifications such as race or other constitutionally protected categories, or arises from prejudice or animus."). Finally, bad faith can be established only "by a showing of fraud, or deceitful or dishonest action." Id. at 1361(quoting Aguinaga v. United Food Comm. Workers, 993 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993)). These standards create an extraordinarily high burden for a plaintiff to overcome, a hurdle created to ensure that a court does not "substitute its own view of the proper bargain for that reached by the union." ALPA, 499 U.S. at 78.
Donoway argues that the union acted arbitrarily and in bad faith in processing his grievances. Specifically, he alleges that the union breached its duty of fair representation in the handling of his (1) August suspension grievance; (2) September discharge grievance; and (3) December vacation pay grievance. I address each allegation below. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Donoway, Donoway's claim for breach of duty of fair representation fails. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the defendants.
In addition to the allegations discussed above, Donoway suggests that the union breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the intra-union charges against McGronan and Connelly. This argument is unavailing. Donoway filed this charge in August 1997 and the Executive Board held a hearing on September 12, 1997. That the Board dismissed the charges after a hearing does not give rise to a breach of the duty of fair representation claim.
1. The Suspension Grievance
Donoway's first contention is that the union breached its duty of fair representation because of the unsuccessful handling of his suspension grievance. Donoway alleges that upon receiving Roadway's notice of intention to suspend Donoway, Imbragulio told Donoway to file only a protest letter and to wait to file a grievance until receiving the actual suspension from Roadway. Donoway relied on this advice and consequently, his grievance was untimely and rejected by the Committee. Donoway asserts that Imbragulio deliberately gave him false information about the grievance process.
Imbragulio denies making such a statement to Donoway and the union further argues that it is an employee's responsibility to timely grieve an adverse employment action. The factual dispute between Donoway and Imbragulio, however, cannot be resolved at this summary judgment stage. I am bound to draw all inferences in favor of Donoway; issues of credibility are outside the scope of Rule 56. Nevertheless, even if Donoway's version is credited, he has failed to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation.
The Union further argues that given Donoway's previously expressed familiarity with the contract, Donoway should have known that a protest letter does not serve as a grievance and that grievances must be filed within 14 days of the notice of intention to suspend.
Imbragulio's alleged statement would constitute, at most, negligence. And, it is undisputed that negligence in a union's representation is insufficient to sustain a duty of fair representation claim. See Ash, 800 F.2d at 411; Shufford v. Truck Drivers, Helpers, et al., 954 F. Supp. 1080, 1090 (D. Md. 1996) (noting that the union's conduct in allowing the time to grieve to lapse was at most negligence and thus not a breach of duty). Donoway has not adduced a scintilla of evidence demonstrating that Imbragulio purposely gave him misinformation in order to defeat his grievance. Donoway's disagreements with McGronan and Connelly cannot be imputed to Imbragulio. See Hardee, 537 F.2d at 1258(stating that existence of bad feelings between the union and the employee was not enough to overturn the arbiter's award). See also Ash, 800 F.2d at 411 ("Although there is reason to suspect some union hostility towards Ash, there is no evidence that [the union lawyer representing him] shared this alleged ill-will. . . . [or] that animosity affected his representation of Ash.").
Donoway's wife testified by affidavit that Imbragulio told her that he could not be Donoway's babysitter. Imbragulio admits that he might have said that he could not babysit Donoway. This statement is insufficient to suggest bad faith on the part of Imbragulio's handling of the suspension grievance.
In fact, rather than demonstrating bad faith, Imbragulio's actions suggest that he actively pursued Donoway's grievance earnestly. For example, it was Imbragulio who told Donoway that he would handle his grievances, rather than require Donoway to deal with McGronan and Connelly, with whom he had battled in the past. Furthermore, the union did not refuse to process Donoway's grievance despite its untimely filing. Additionally, Imbragulio forwarded information about the incident to the Committee on Donoway's so that the Committee had the statements Donoway procured from Lowery and Harris at the time of the hearing. Because, at most, Imbragulio can be said to have given Donoway incorrect advice, absent any affirmative evidence that Imbragulio acted with the intent to undermine Donoway's right to grieve the adverse employment action, his mistaken advice does not amount to arbitrariness, discrimination, or bad faith.
2. The Discharge Grievance
Donoway alleges that the union breached its duty of fair representation in light of its perfunctory handling of his grievance challenging his discharge for failing to return the company's seniority list. Donoway maintains that the union (1) failed to investigate the grievance; (2) changed the basis for his grievance, which he claims had the effect of precluding him from raising certain issues at the Committee hearing; and (3) prohibited Donoway from offering certain evidence before the Committee. Essentially, Donoway argues that he should have received a more vigorous defense from the union.
Donoway's arguments are unavailing. Donoway has projected no evidence to support his allegation that the union breached its duty in its handling of Donoway's discharge grievance. First, Donoway's challenge to the union's investigation is misplaced. The facts of the incident were undisputed — Donoway refused to return company property to his employer in the face of a direct order that he do so. Thus, despite Donoway's firmly held belief that he was justified in retaining the defaced seniority list, further investigation by the union would not have changed the facts of the dispute.
Moreover, "failure to `present favorable evidence during the grievance process . . . may constitute a breach of the duty only if that evidence probably would have brought about a different decision.'" Garcia v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Black v. Ryder, 15 F.3d 573, 585 (6th Cir. 1994)); Williams v. Air Wisconsin, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 710, 716 (E.D. Va. 1995) (the union's failure to call certain witnesses at the hearing did not constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1235 (4th Cir. 1996) (table), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020 (1997). Since the facts of the incident were undisputed, it is unlikely that any additional presentation by the Union would have changed the outcome of the hearing.
Donoway's complaint that Imbragulio changed his grievance to his detriment is similarly unavailing. Imbragulio's action in adding an "unjust discharge" claim to Donoway's grievances actually preserved his grievance, as Donoway had incorrectly relied on a provision in the CBA that did not apply to him; it only applied to union stewards and union officials. Thus, this allegation is misplaced.
Finally, Donoway complains that he was not given the opportunity to present evidence that would have helped him. At the hearing, Donoway wanted to introduce evidence about his prior suspension, his charges against McGronan, and his injury. He was barred from introducing a statement from another employee, Lowery, about Donoway's injury in July 1997, because he did not provide the Committee with a copy within 48 hours of the hearing, as required by the Committee's Rules of Procedure.
The Committee's decision to prohibit the introduction of certain evidence at the hearing may not be attributed to the union. Imbragulio presented a short summary of the union's position, then turned the floor over to Donoway, who had requested that he be allowed to present his own evidence. That certain evidence was excluded by the Committee (not the union) cannot be the basis for a breach of the duty of fair representation claim.
Ultimately, of course, Donoway's discharge was actually overturned by the Committee and a suspension was substituted as an appropriate penalty. Moreover, Donoway admitted at the hearing that he was satisfied with the Union's representation. This "expression of satisfaction with union representation substantially undercut[s] his current allegations." Ash, 800 F.2d at 411. Accordingly, the evidence of the union's handling of the discharge grievance fails as a matter of law.
3. Vacation Pay Grievance
Donoway alleges that the union failed to pursue his grievance for vacation pay in bad faith. The CBA provides that an employee should receive the vacation pay owed to him or her "on the next regular payday for the week in which the resignation occurs." Art. 23. Donoway alleges that he did not receive his vacation pay in a timely manner and thus submitted a grievance claiming liquidated damages for the delay. The CBA provides for liquidated damages for such delay; however, it is unclear whether an employee who resigns is entitled to such compensation. Donoway submitted this grievance to Connelly. Connelly contacted Roadway and learned that Roadway had paid Donoway all the vacation pay that he was owed. Accordingly, he did not pursue the grievance.
The union has no duty to pursue a grievance that it believes lacks merit. See e.g., McClain v. Wilson, 591 F. Supp. 474, 478 (D. Md. 1984); Shufford, 954 F. Supp. at 1987 ("[A]n employee does not have an absolute right to have a grievance taken all the way through the arbitration process") (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191); Smith, 834 F.2d at 96 ("The Union, however, is entitled to refuse to process a grievance. . . ."). The union interprets the liquidated damages provision as applying only in situations where a terminal closes. Thus, it did not believe that Donoway's grievance had merit. With the exception of his bare allegation that Connelly was motivated by his animus against Donoway, Donoway has utterly failed to show that Connelly's decision not to pursue the grievance was arbitrary or in bad faith rather than for legitimate reasons. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in the defendants' favor as to this claim.
Roadway also argued that Donoway's claims were barred by a six month statute of limitations. Donoway's claims accrued at the earliest, however, in June 1997, which was within six months of the date he filed this lawsuit.
B. Constructive Discharge
In addition to his federal claim, Donoway purports to allege that he was forced to resign from Roadway because of the intolerable adverse working conditions, giving rise to a state law constructive discharge claim. Under certain federal statutes, "[c]onstructive discharge occurs when `an employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job.'" Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assoc. Inc, 852 F. Supp. 372, 397 (D. Md. 1994) (quoting Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985)). However, Donoway has cited no Maryland case suggesting that such a free-standing claim exists under state law, or any state case at all.
Donoway's constructive discharge allegations include: "Roadways' conduct in promoting and acquiescing with the harassment and threats of bodily injury directed at Donoway, failing to take disciplinary action against employee McGronan and Connelly for their threats of physical injury to coworkers, providing false and inaccurate information to Roadway's worker's compensation carrier thereby preventing Donoway from collecting worker's compensation payments, and allowing Dacheux to participate in the intimidation and harassment of Donoway's coworkers if any employee spoke or testified on Donoway's behalf, allowed Dacheux to intimidate and harass Donoway, . . . taking adverse employment action against Donoway without just cause, and allowing Dacheux to continuously state that he wanted Donoway fired." Pl.'s Compl. at 91.
Defendant Roadway argues that, assuming such a state law claim exists, Donoway's claim of constructive discharge is preempted by § 301. "To ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements and to protect the power of arbitrators, § 301 has been found to `displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.'" Davis v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)). Not all state law claims are preempted by § 301; only those that require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement for adjudication will be preempted by the federal law. See McCormick v. ATT Tech., Inc., 934 F.2d 531,534 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048 (1992).
Manifestly, because any state law constructive discharge claim would require an interpretation of the CBA, Donoway's ostensible constructive discharge claim is preempted by § 301. Donoway's allegations specifically refer to the Roadway's discharge of Donoway for "unjust cause." Determination of what constitutes "unjust cause" requires analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, many of the allegations in his constructive discharge claim were the subject of other grievances.
Various courts of appeals have concluded that state law wrongful discharge or constructive discharge claims are preempted. See e.g., Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 645(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiff's constructive/tortious discharge claim was preempted by § 301 because the claim "requires construction of the terms and conditions of employment set forth in the collective bargaining agreement"); Saunders v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 927 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that a claim for constructive discharge was preempted because the CBA contained arbitration and grievance procedures), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 894 (1991); Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottles, 772 F.2d 342, 346(7th Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff's constructive discharge claim "presented issues covered by the collective bargaining agreement") , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986). These cases are persuasive. Accordingly, since any constructive discharge claim cognizable under Maryland law necessarily invokes and refers to the CBA, it is preempted by § 301; therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Roadway as to this claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants' motions for summary judgment will be granted. An order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is this 24th day of August, 1999, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED
(1) That the defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED and JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS; and
(2) That Clerk of the Court CLOSE THIS CASE and TRANSMIT a copy of this Order and the foregoing Memorandum to counsel of record.