Opinion
[No. 361, September Term, 1966.]
Decided June 1, 1967.
EVIDENCE — Confidentiality Of State Tax Returns — Code (1957), Art. 81, § 300(1) Applied — Code Provision Barring Revelation Of Amount Of Income Or Particulars Of State Income Tax Returns Does Not Bar Use Of Return In Evidence Where Its Relevance Was Specifically Determined By The Judge After Being Produced By The Comptroller Without Objection And The Return Was Not Previously Disclosed By The Comptroller Except To The Judge — Court Ruling Allowing Admission In Evidence Of Return Was "Proper Judicial Order" Under Statute. pp. 737-738
EVIDENCE — Confidentiality Of State Tax Returns — Subpoena Issued As Of Course By Clerk Of Court, Over Signature Of Chief Judge Of Judicial Circuit, Assumed Not To Be A "Proper Judicial Order" Justifying Revelation Of Particulars Of State Income Tax Return. p. 738
CONTRACTS — Authorization Of Signature — Evidence That Son Of Defendant's Deceased Represented That Deceased Signed Contract, That Deceased Acknowledged That He Gave His Son Permission To Sign His Name, And That Deceased Claimed Depreciation On Truck Purchased By Contract On His Tax Returns, Justified Trier Of Fact In Concluding That Deceased Was Maker Of Note And Principal To Contract. The seller of a truck (as assignee of the finance company financing the truck on a tully guaranteed basis) sued the administrator of one Eli DonBullian on a note and conditional contract of purchase for the unpaid balance of the agreed purchase price. The contract was negotiated by the deceased's son, one Edward DonBullian, who was advised by the seller that his father's signature on the contract and note would be necessary. Edward DonBullian said that he would take the contract and note to be signed by his father. On being returned to the seller later, the documents bore the signature "E. DonBullian." The seller testified that Edward DonBullian represented to him that the signature was Eli DonBullian's signature, and a witness called by the seller testified that Eli DonBullian said to the witness "I did not sign this contract; I gave my son permission only to sign my name." State tax returns of Eli DonBullian and his wife admitted in evidence showed the purchase of the truck, and claimed the depreciation upon it. The Court of Appeals held that in light of these facts, the trier of fact was justified in concluding that Eli DonBullian was a maker of the note and a principal to the contract. p. 738
ASSIGNMENTS — Choses In Action Arising On Contract — New Jersey Law — Testimony That Assignee Of Conditional Sale Contract And Note Delivered Them For Value To Original Seller Held Sufficient To Establish A Valid Reassignment Of A Chose In Action Arising In Contract Under New Jersey Law. p. 737
G.W.L.
Decided June 1, 1967.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (PARKER, J.).
Joseph P DeLisa instituted a suit for the unpaid balance due on a note and conditional contract of purchase against Edward A. DonBullian, Administrator of the Estate of Eli DonBullian. From a revised judgment awarding plaintiff the sum of $8449.40 plus interest from March 8, 1962 and attorney's fees in the amount of $894.94, the defendant appeals.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
The cause was argued before HAMMOND, C.J., and MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER, McWILLIAMS and FINAN, JJ.
Abraham Chasanow, with whom was Howard S. Chasanow on the brief for appellant.
Leroy Pumphrey and Joseph B. Calandriello for appellee.
The appeal is from a judgment for the plaintiff, Joseph P. DeLisa, in his suit for the unpaid balance of the purchase price of an International ten-wheel tandem truck, represented by a note and the conditional contract of purchase. The defendant is the administrator of the estate of Eli DonBullian. Edward A. DonBullian, Eli's son, had arranged for the purchase of the truck from DeLisa in New Jersey on February 27 1961. Edward was advised that his father's signature would be necessary. He said he would take the contract and note to be signed by his father who lived in Maryland; later he brought them back to DeLisa. On each, under Edward's signature as buyer, was the signature "E. DonBullian," also on a line over the legend "signature of buyer." DeLisa says that Edward represented to him that the signature of E. DonBullian was his father's signature. The contract, fully guaranteed, was assigned to a finance company which assigned it to a bank. Several payments were made on the truck and then Edward returned the truck to DeLisa. The finance company conducted a foreclosure sale and recovered a judgment against DeLisa for the remaining unpaid balance of the agreed purchase price. DeLisa paid the judgment and the finance company assigned all claims it had against Eli and Edward to DeLisa. No payment to DeLisa has been made by Edward, Eli or Eli's estate.
Trial was had before Judge Loveless sitting without a jury. He rendered judgment for Eli's estate, apparently for the reason that Eli had not himself signed the note and contract, but granted a new trial and allowed the filing of an amended declaration "without the allegation that the deceased signed the note." An amended declaration was duly filed alleging "that the said contract and note were executed by [Edward] and with the deceased's [Eli's] consent; that the signature, on said instruments, was thereafter ratified by the deceased; that the deceased accepted benefits arising from the said instruments and his Administrator is estopped to deny the validity of the signature, E. DonBullian, which purports to be the signature of the deceased * * *."
A second trial was had before Judge Parker sitting without a jury. DeLisa offered testimony, which we find to be admissible and probative, contrary to the contention of the appellant, that Eli said to the witness that "I did not sign this contract; I gave my son permission only to sign my name." In response to a subpoena duces tecum a representative of the Comptroller of Maryland brought Eli's 1961 and 1962 Maryland income tax returns into court. DeLisa's lawyer asked to be allowed to examine them and was told: "I would have to present these to the judge, since they have been subpoenaed by the Court * * *."
The judge, after examining the 1962 return which was signed by Eli and his wife and finding that it showed that Eli had bought an International truck on February 28, 1961, for $23,500, had claimed $9,166.66 in depreciation for prior years and $5,972.20 in depreciation for 1962, held: "The Court determines that the tax form * * * filed by Eli and Mildred DonBullian for the year 1962 does reflect relevant material to the trial of this cause and therefore admits the same in evidence." DeLisa had given due notice of his intention to rely on the law of New Jersey and, although appellant urges that he did not, proved the valid assignment in that State of the note and contract from the finance company to him and the amount of his damages.
The administrator, Edward, testified that he was the owner of the truck, offering corroborative testimony on the point, and that he signed his father's name to the note and contract after having been advised by a salesman for DeLisa "* * * it's a very simple thing, it's common practice, you sign his name," and then rested.
The administrator makes two primary contentions: the income tax return was improperly admitted and the evidence did not permit a finding that Eli was a maker on the note and a principal on the contract. The argument as to the return is that Code (1957), Art. 81, § 300(1) prohibits the revelation of the amount of income or the particulars set forth or disclosed in any tax return "except in accordance with proper judicial or legislative order * * *," and that there was no proper judicial order in this case because although the subpoena is issued over the signature of the Chief Judge of the Circuit, the clerk performs a ministerial act when he issues it as a matter of course. We may assume that the subpoena was not a "judicial order" within the meaning of § 300 of Art. 81. Nevertheless, the Comptroller without objection produced the return in court and his representative, in obedience to the statute, would reveal the contents of the return only to the judge who, under the circumstances, was "an officer of the State having a right thereto in his official capacity." The judge's ruling which found the return relevant evidence and admitted it in evidence was a "proper * * * judicial order" under the statute. We find no error in the admission of the return.
The testimony that Eli authorized the signing of his name on the note and on the contract, buttressed by the inferences permissibly to be drawn from the income tax return, justified the trier of fact in concluding that Eli was a maker of the note and a principal to the contract.
We find it unnecessary to discuss the other contentions of appellant which are subsidiary and peripheral and in our view have no merit.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.