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holding that a plaintiff was not a prevailing party where the agency voluntarily granted her relief
Summary of this case from Rashid v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.Opinion
No. 09-2285-cv.
February 22, 2011.
Appeal from a March 26, 2009, order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Richard J. Holwell, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be AFFIRMED.
Eamonn Dornan, Dornan Assocs., PLLC, Long Island City, NY, for plaintiff-appellant.
Christopher Connolly, Assistant United States Attorney (Preet Bharara, United States Attorney, on the brief; and Benjamin H. Torrance, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for defendants-appellees.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant, Rosaleen Bernadette Doherty, seeks review of a District Court order denying her request for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 ("EAJA") following the dismissal of her underlying claim, which sought to compel the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS") to adjudicate her application for naturalization or, in the alternative, to enter an order naturalizing her pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). The District Court determined that Doherty was not a "prevailing party" under the EAJA as determined by the Supreme Court in Buckhannon Board Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). Doherty v. Thompson, 603 F.Supp.2d 745, 747-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Doherty brought a timely appeal. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history.
Whether Doherty is a "prevailing party" under the EAJA is a question of law, which we review de novo. Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 672 (2d Cir. 2005). Undertaking that review, we affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its ruling of March 26, 2008, the denial of attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Doherty, 603 F.Supp.2d at 747-48. Specifically, we agree with the District Court that when a plaintiff achieves the result it sought "because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct," Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600, 121 S.Ct. 1835, it is not a "prevailing party." See Ma v. Chertoff, 547 F.3d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 2008). Indeed, we agree with the District Court that, contrary to Doherty's claims, a court order setting the case for trial does not "result[] in a change in the legal relationship between the parties sufficient to confer prevailing party status." Doherty, 603 F.Supp.2d at 748. Here, as in Ma, "[CIS] voluntarily gave [Doherty] the relief [s]he sought . . . [and] thus, [Doherty] clearly does not fit the definition of a `prevailing party' . . . and is therefore ineligible for an award of attorney's fees and costs under the EAJA." Ma, 547 F.3d at 344.
Indeed, even if the District Court had remanded the matter for a stipulated resolution following independent action by CIS, see Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 404 (2d Cir. 2009), instead of dismissing for want of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(h)(3), Doherty would still not be a "prevailing party." See Pres. Coalition of Erie Cnty. v. Fed. Transit Auth., 356 F.3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 2004). Whether or not the District Court erred with regard to the dismissal of this case is therefore irrelevant to our review of its denial of a request for attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
We have considered each of Doherty's arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.