Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-3639
July 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM/ORDER
On July 19, 2001, an anonymous plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as "John Doe," filed a complaint before this court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from provisions of Pennsylvania's "Megan's Law," codified at 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9791-9799.4. In the complaint, John Doe alleges that he is a resident of Pennsylvania who was convicted in New Jersey of an offense that is, in his words, "equivalent to the offense of indecent assault in Pennsylvania." After a New Jersey court sentenced him to five years probation and life supervision, John Doe requested that his supervision be transferred to Pennsylvania.
After making his request for transfer, the plaintiff was informed by Pennsylvania parole authorities that he would probably be required to submit to "community notification" under Pennsylvania's Megan's Law. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9798. Under that provision, the chief law enforcement officer of John Doe's community would provide written notice to neighbors and local school officers of his name, address, and the offense for which he was convicted. See id. at § 9798(a)(1). The notice would include John Doe's photograph and a statement that he has been determined to be a sexually violent predator. See id.
A sex offender convicted within the Commonwealth is entitled by law to a hearing at which the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is a "sexually violent predator" before imposing community notification. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9795.4. John Doe alleges, however, that Pennsylvania law requires all out-of-state sex offenders who seek to transfer their parole to Pennsylvania to submit to community notification, denying them the procedural safeguard of an adversarial hearing. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9795.2(b)(1)-(3); 61 P.S. § 331.33(d)(3)(i)-(iii). He further alleges that, by treating in-state and out-of-state sex offenders differently, Pennsylvania's Megan's Law violates provisions of the state and federal constitutions and the Interstate Compact Concerning Parole (the "Parole Compact"), 61 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 321.
Both parties recognize that a court of the Western District of Pennsylvania has previously granted relief in a case that appears at least superficially similar to the one before this court. In that case, Doe v. Ward, 124 F. Supp.2d 900 (W.D.Pa. 2000), the plaintiff raised the same constitutional challenges that are now asserted in this court, but did not raise the issue of the potential conflict with the Parole Compact. Citing the "strong preference for avoiding premature constitutional decisions," id. at 911 n. 16, Judge Robert J. Cindrich raised the Parole Compact issue sua sponte, and held that Pennsylvania's Megan's Law violated a section of that compact providing:
That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation of, and supervision over, probationers or parolees of any sending state, and, in the exercise of those duties, will be governed by the same standards that prevail for its own probationers and parolees.61 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 321(2) (emphasis added).
Judge Cindrich issued his decision in the procedural context of cross-motions for summary judgment and a limited factual record to which the parties stipulated. See 124 F. Supp.2d at 902, 906 n. 10. This allowed the court to resolve the Parole Compact issue as a matter of law. The procedural posture of the case before this court is somewhat different: the court has received a motion by the defendants entitled "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings," a response to that motion by the plaintiff, and a reply by the defendants. There has been no agreement regarding several alleged facts that might be relevant to the Parole Compact issue. For example, while John Doe has alleged in his complaint that he "at all times mentioned is and was, a resident of Philadelphia, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania," the defendants have denied that allegation in their answer.
Like the Ward court, this court would prefer to resolve the plaintiff's claim relating to the Parole Compact before reaching his constitutional claims. To that end, the court will at this time deny the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and invite the submission by both parties of cross-motions for summary judgment limited to the plaintiff's claim that Pennsylvania's Megan's Law conflicts impermissibly with the Interstate Compact Concerning Parole. If the court finds that summary judgment is inappropriate on that claim, the court will then invite defendants to re-file their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the remaining claims in the plaintiff's complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, the parties are hereby ORDERED to submit cross-motions for summary judgment within 30 days of this order and to submit response briefs, if necessary, within 60 days of this order. It is further ORDERED that the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED without prejudice to refiling with leave of the court.