Opinion
CAUSE NO. 1:00-CV-468
March 27, 2002
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's March 26, 2002, motion for an extension of time to respond to the Plaintiff's motion to strike.
On February 6, 2002, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Plaintiff filed a response on March 1, 2002. Also on March 1, 2002, the Plaintiff filed a motion to strike "item no. 4" of the Defendants' designation of evidence. On March 18, 2002, the Defendants file a reply brief as well as a motion to strike Charles Braun as an expert witness. However, the Defendants inadvertently failed to file a response to the Plaintiff's March 1, 2002, motion to strike, and now seek an extension of time under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) to file it.
The Court has substantial discretion in granting or denying enlargements of time under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). Reales v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 84 F.3d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1996). If a request for an enlargement of time pursuant to Rule 6(b) is received within the period that has been prescribed for a response to a motion or pleading, the court "for cause may grant the request." Id. If, however, the motion for enlargement of time is made after the time for a response has expired, "the Court must be satisfied that the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2).
Here, the Defendant's motion for an enlargement of time was clearly filed after the prescribed response deadline; the Defendants' response to the Plaintiff's motion to strike was due on March 18, 2002, and this motion was filed on March 26, 2002. Thus, to grant the Defendants' motion, we must find that the Defendant's failure to timely file was the result of excusable neglect. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2).
"Excusable neglect" is somewhat of an "elastic concept," which "at bottom [is] an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc., Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 392, 395 (1993) (discussing the term "excusable neglect" as it exists in a similar Bankruptcy Rule). Thus, in assessing "excusable neglect" and the "relevant circumstances," the Court should consider "the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 380.
Here, the Defendants allege that their failure to timely file is simply due to attorney inadvertence, and that the Plaintiff's objection to their designation of evidence is largely — if not completely — remedied by their supplemental designation of evidence, which was timely filed. Indeed, in reviewing the relevant circumstances, it is clear that the length of the delay (eight days) was not excessive, and that they only seek a rather minimal extension of time — until April 1, 2002. Moreover, granting the motion would not unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice the Plaintiff. After all, the Defendants have filed a motion to strike which will still needs to finish briefing out. Finally, although the Defendants' failure to file the response to the Plaintiff's motion to strike was within their control, there is no indication that the Defendants have acted in anything other than good faith. Therefore, when taken on balance, the Defendants have established excusable neglect, and their motion for an enlargement of time will be granted.
Therefore, the Defendants' motion for an enlargement of time until April 1, 2002, to file their response to the Plaintiff's March 1, 2002, motion to strike is GRANTED. The Plaintiff is to file her reply brief by April 10, 2002. Additionally, the Plaintiff is to file her response to the Defendants' "Motion to Strike Charles Braun as an Expert Witness" by April 5, 2002. The Defendants are to file a reply brief by April 17, 2002.
SO ORDERED.