Opinion
No. CV 03-0824527S
April 8, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Joan Doe is the mother of plaintiff Jane Doe, who at all material times was a student at Suffield High School. Jane Doe alleges that over a period of more than one year she was subjected to repeated acts of sexual harassment and intimidation by a male student, one Jamal Lawrence, and that despite her numerous complaints to school administrators and other school employees, she was not protected from Lawrence's conduct. Plaintiffs allege that this pattern of conduct by Lawrence and failures to act by the defendants culminated in Lawrence's September 30, 2002 sexual assault of Jane Doe, during school hours, in the school hallway.
Because of the nature of this matter, the Court, Beach, J., ordered on April 14, 2003 that all references to the plaintiffs in any nonsealed documents filed with the Court, shall be to Joan Doe and Jane Doe.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that 1.) "there is no duty to supervise high school students" and 2.) the defendants are entitled to immunity from suit in their performance of governmental duties.
The defendants are the Board of Education of the Town of Suffield and Edward Garvey the Assistant Vice Principal at Suffield High School in charge of discipline.
It cannot reasonably be disputed that the duties of the employees of a board of education, in supervising and disciplining students, are inherently discretionary, involving the use of judgment and the choice between alternative courses of action. Heigl v. Board of Education. 218 Conn. 1, 5-6 (1991). Plaintiffs do not maintain that the duties that the defendants allegedly breached were not discretionary. They maintain that Lawrence's misconduct occurred under circumstances where the defendants should have known that a failure on their part to take appropriate action would subject Jane Doe, an identifiable person to foreseeable, imminent harm.
If the plaintiffs' case is to survive this Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must find, from the documents submitted by the parties, that there is an issue of material fact as to whether the defendants' alleged failure to act subjected Jane Doe to imminent harm. A review of the documentation submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to the Motion indicates that they have clearly demonstrated that this case involves material issues of fact, which will have to be resolved at trial. Plaintiffs allege that Jane Doe had on several occasions complained to school personnel, including defendant Garvey, about Jamal Lawrence's behavior toward her, including acts that a jury could find to have been sexual harassment. School records indicate that Lawrence was a serious disciplinary problem with a propensity toward both sexual harassment and violence.
Plaintiffs' contentions with respect to the date of the alleged sexual assault are of particular significance. Jane Doe has stated that defendant Garvey witnessed a confrontation between Jamal Lawrence, Justin Rink and herself, which, if she is found credible, could be considered a strong indicator of violent behavior. Garvey, allegedly, chose to do no more than tell the participants to sit down and be quiet. The alleged sexual assault by Lawrence against Jane Doe occurred shortly after the confrontation allegedly witnessed by Garvey.
While the Court certainly does not pass judgment on the credibility of plaintiffs' evidence at this stage in the case, it is clear that if a jury believed the plaintiffs' version of what occurred on September 30, 2002, it could conclude that defendant Garvey witnessed a confrontation involving three students, one of whom had a documented history of severe disciplinary problems, which confrontation had the potential to become violent, and that it would have been appropriate for Garvey to impose immediate, meaningful discipline on one or more of the participants. A jury would, under these circumstances, be entitled to find that Garvey's handling of the situation subjected Jane Doe, an identifiable victim, to the risk of imminent harm. Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640 (1994); Sestito v. Groton 178 Conn. 520, 527-28 (1979).
The Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore denied.
Miller, J.