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denying enforcement of a foreign support order under RURESA (predecessor to UIFSA) where the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction
Summary of this case from In re Request for Jud. Ass. From Dist. Ct. in SvitavyOpinion
Record No. 0718-93-3
Decided: June 14, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEGHANY COUNTY, Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge
Affirmed.
(J. Chris Alderson, Commonwealth's Attorney, on brief), for appellants. Appellants submitting on brief.
No brief or argument for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Coleman and Koontz
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Karen Forbes (Mrs. Forbes) and the Division of Child Support Enforcement appeal the denial of an award for arrearage of child support in an action brought under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) to enforce a child support order from the state of Delaware. The appellant contend that the circuit court lacked authority to consider the validity of the initiating state's order in response to a claim by Hampton Forbes, III (Mr. Forbes), the obligor father, that the Delaware court lacked personal jurisdiction over him at the time the order was entered. The appellants further contend that the circuit court erred in declaring that the Delaware support order was void and unenforceable and erred in refusing to reopen the record to consider additional evidence. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
Mrs. Forbes initially sought enforcement of a child support order entered by the New Castle County, Delaware Family Court on November 11, 1985, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Alleghany County. The record of the proceedings in the juvenile court reflects a finding of current support owed in the amount of forty-seven dollars per week, medical insurance to be provided by Mr. Forbes, and an arrearage of seventeen thousand nine hundred and eighty dollars. Documents in the record, which are either part of the juvenile record or were received in the circuit court, allege an arrearage of twenty-four thousand and eight hundred dollars.
Mr. Forbes appealed the decision of the juvenile court to the circuit court. Additional documents and oral testimony were apparently received at that time. In a letter opinion and decree, the circuit court found that the Delaware court lacked personal jurisdiction over the father with respect to determining child support, and that its order was therefore "void" with respect to the award of an arrearage. The letter refers to a record "replete with findings that attempts to serve Mr. Forbes failed." The circuit court's decree affirmed the order of the juvenile court awarding current child support in the amount of forty-seven dollars per week and requiring provision of medical insurance by the father, but reversed the finding of arrearage based on the Delaware order.
The record of the ore tenus hearings in this matter was submitted by written statement of facts. Rule 5A:8. However, the statement submitted does not comport with the requirements of Rule 5A:8 because it does not contain a recitation of the "facts, testimony, and other incidents of the case." Accordingly, certain aspects of the record are unclear. Nonetheless, the record as a whole is sufficient to determine the merits of the appeal.
Mrs. Forbes filed a motion for a rehearing on the ground that additional evidence relating to the jurisdictional issue had been obtained from the Delaware court. Although denying the motion for rehearing, the circuit court stated in a letter opinion that it would "allow the Commonwealth to vouch the record with additional documentary evidence." Appended to the circuit court's decree are various documents supplied to the court after the denial of the motion for rehearing. In sum, these records show that an attempt was made to obtain service on Mr. Forbes by mail, that the attempt failed, and that the Delaware court proceeded with the divorce on the ground that jurisdiction was obtained by mailing and publication.
Under well established principles of appellate review "the judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct; its findings will not be overturned by this Court except in cases of manifest error. The burden is upon the party alleging trial court error to show by the record that the judgment was erroneous." Steinberg v. Steinberg, 11 Va. App. 323, 326, 398 S.E.2d 507, 508 (1990).
Prior to sending a RURESA petition to a responding state, the initiating state court must review the underlying order for sufficiency of the facts alleging the duty of the obligor to pay support. Dickens v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 72, 74, 341 S.E.2d 392, 393 (1986) (citing Code Sections 20-88.21 and 20-88.22). The appellants contend that a responding state court must accept the determination of the initiating state as conclusive evidence of the obligor's duty to pay and accord to that determination full faith and credit. We disagree.
In Dickens, we stated that "[u]pon receipt of the transmitted [RURESA] petition, the trial court of the responding state reviews the petition and determines whether it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the laws of the responding state." Dickens v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. at 74, 341 S.E.2d at 393. Furthermore, the Virginia RURESA provisions appearing in Code Sec. 20-88.30:6 state in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Upon registration, the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this State. It has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a support order of this State and may be enforced and satisfied in like manner . . . .
A support order issued by a court of this Commonwealth may be challenged on the ground that the issuing court lacked personal jurisdiction over the obligor. Accordingly, the circuit court had the authority to consider Mr. Forbes's claim that the Delaware court lacked personal jurisdiction over him at the time the original support order was entered.
The appellants further contend that the circuit court erred in declaring the Delaware order void. However, the record shows that the court did not declare the entire order to be void. Rather, the court determined that "with respect to the matter of a claim of arrearage in child support" the order was void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction of the Delaware court to order Mr. Forbes to pay child support. Accordingly, we consider only whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the applicable Delaware law with respect to personal jurisdiction in support matters ancillary to a divorce petition in that state.
Although we do not know the content of the ore tenus hearing concerning this matter, we are able to discern from the record as a whole the following facts concerning Mrs. Forbes's attempt to obtain jurisdiction over Mr. Forbes. The initial petition for divorce was filed on August 21, 1984. In that petition, Mrs. Forbes alleged that her husband was receiving mail at the marital address in Delaware. Approximately eight weeks later, the petition was amended to state that Mr. Forbes had "recently" moved out of state and that he was most likely to receive mail at the Delaware address of his parents. An order of the Delaware court shows that a certified letter sent to an address in Covington, Virginia was returned undelivered and that attempted service at Mr. Forbes's parent's address was also unsuccessful.
The Delaware Family Court's jurisdiction over divorce proceedings depends solely upon the statutes conferring such jurisdiction. M.T.L. v. T.P.L., 414 A.2d 510, 511 (Del. 1980). Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, Sec. 1504(a) "confers subject matter jurisdiction on the Court over actions for divorce . . . where either petitioner or respondent 'actually resided' in Delaware at the commencement of the action and such party otherwise meets the requirements of Sec. 1504." Id. It is uncontested that at the time the divorce petition was filed Mrs. Forbes resided in Delaware.
Subject matter jurisdiction of the Family Court as to the marriage of the parties having been established by Mrs. Forbes under Sec. 1504, it was then necessary for personal jurisdiction to be obtained over Mr. Forbes in compliance with Del. Code. Ann. tit. 13 Sec. 1508. Section 1508 provides two methods for securing personal jurisdiction over a respondent: either through personal service (or voluntary appearance) as provided under Sec. 1508(a); or by mailing and/or publication as to either a resident or a nonresident who neither appears nor can be served personally, as provided under Sec. 1508(d). Sections 1508(b) and (c) provide alternate "avenues" for invoking Sec. 1508(d). It appears that the former was the "avenue" in this case. Section 1508(b) provides as follows:
If the petition avers that it is unlikely that jurisdiction can be acquired over respondent except by mailing and publication, or by publication only, whether respondent is a resident or a nonresident of this State, jurisdiction may be acquired over respondent by mailing and publication, or by publication only, under subsection (d) of this section.
Section 1508(d) provides as follows:
When service is to be made upon respondent by mailing and publication, the Clerk of the Family Court shall: (1) Send a copy of the summons, petition and any affidavit to respondent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address that petitioner had averred it is most likely that mail will be received by respondent;
In M.T.L., the Delaware Supreme Court discussed the application of Sec. 1508(d):
We must disagree both with [a Delaware trial court's] interpretation of Sec. 1508(d) as a constructive notice statute and with its finding that the statute was complied with by the [undelivered] letter-notice given respondent. [footnote omitted]
* * * * * * *
The concept that constructive notice may continue to serve as legal notice is no longer viable as to a divorce respondent having a known out-of-state mailing address. That this should be so seems particularly appropriate in view of the increasing mobility of parties and the relative ease with which a petitioner . . . may establish subject matter jurisdiction within Delaware . . . .
M.T.L., 414 A.2d at 512-514.
On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, granting that party all inferences fairly deducible therefrom. McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). Without a complete record of the ore tenus hearing, we must assume that the record of this case shows precisely what the trial court found-that Mr. Forbes was never served with notice of the divorce proceeding. Delaware case law contains instances in which a court has allowed personal jurisdiction over a non-resident spouse to be obtained through a less than perfect attempt of service by mail and publication. See, e.g., Massey v. Ball, 595 A.2d 390, 394 (Del. 1991) (although husband instructed attorney to make "special appearance" only, the submission of a settlement agreement to the court constituted a waiver of personal jurisdiction requirements); Prybolsky v. Prybolsky, 430 A.2d 804, 806 (Del.Fam.Ct. 1981) (where service under Sec. 1508(d) failed, service could be obtained under "long-arm statute" because matrimonial domicile in state constituted "doing business"). However, the majority of Delaware cases strictly construe the personal jurisdiction requirements of that state's domestic relations code. See, e.g., Villarroel v. Villarroel, 562 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Del. 1989) ("Before the Family Court can properly exercise its ancillary subject matter jurisdiction in a Delaware divorce proceeding, the requirements of due process which are necessary for it to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the respondent must also have been satisfied"); Cottone v. Cottone, 547 A.2d 625, 628 (Del.Fam.Ct. 1988) (distinguishing Prybolsky on the ground that wife served by mail in Pennsylvania had no "minimum contacts" with state, invalidating husband's claim of long-arm jurisdiction); E.A.S. v. E.J.S., 415 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1980) (where petitioner did not comply with "the literal requirements" of Sec. 1508, the court did not properly acquire jurisdiction and the order of divorce was vacated despite petitioner's remarriage).
Appellants, citing Prybolsky, assert that jurisdiction could have been obtained over Mr. Forbes under the long-arm statute. We disagree. Service under Delaware's long-arm statute requires proof of receipt or affirmative refusal of the service by mail. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3104(e). As noted above, the record does not support a finding that Mr. Forbes received or affirmatively refused the notice mailed to the address in Covington.
On these facts and in light of the approach of the courts of Delaware, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in finding that the Delaware court never obtained personal jurisdiction over Mr. Forbes in order to award and enforce child support.
Finally, the appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the matter in order to consider additional evidence. Contrary to appellants' assertion on brief, this evidence could have been obtained prior to the trial court's rendering its decision. Continuances are mandatory under RURESA where either party seeks to develop evidence concerning an obligor's defense. Code Sec. 20-88.23:2. Moreover, as the additional materials proffered with the motion did not establish that the Delaware court obtained personal jurisdiction over Mr. Forbes, it was not error for the circuit court to refuse to reconsider the matter in light of the new evidence.
For these reasons, the action of the circuit court denying an award of arrearage based upon the Delaware order is affirmed.
Affirmed.