Opinion
June 23, 1950. Rehearing Denied July 24, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, L.L. Parks, J.
Hugh L. McArthur, Tampa, and Carl C. Durrance, Tampa, for appellants.
Knight, Thompson, Knight Bell, Tampa, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment on demurrer to the amended declaration of the appellants alleging the breach by appellee of a contract of employment. It was averred by the individual appellants that their services were discontinued 1 August 1946, despite the fact that the contract between them on the one part and the appellee on the other did not expire until midnight 31 October 1946.
The individual appellants, ninety-six in number, sought wages for three months, while the appellant-union, of which they are members, asked for $1,000,000.
Of course this claim presupposes an undertaking on the part of the employer actually to hire the men and pay them for a designated term, but when we turn to the instrument we find no such obligation. In it the employer recognized the appellant-association as the representative of the appellant-employees and agreed to deal with it "with respect to the various conditions and phases of their employment." Then, in elaboration of this general purpose, such matters as discrimination, intimidation, and coercion as regards union and nonunion members, consideration of grievances, review of suspensions and dismissals, disciplinary action growing out of violation of rules, arbitration of disputes, seniority of workmen, procurement of uniforms, vacations, overtime service, strikes, absences, jury service, and so on were dealt with in detail, but there is nothing in the contract binding the employer to provide work for any employees, such as those who are here complaining, for any specified period. On the contrary, the agreement, executed 29 November 1944, is obviously one designed to regulate the relationship of employer and employee "until October 31, 1945, and from year to year thereafter until either party" should give certain notice of desired changes in the arrangement. It contained the positive stipulation that "the right to hire and discharge employees * * * shall be invested exclusively in the Company, and the Company shall have the right to determine how many men it will employ or retain in the operation and maintenance of its street cars * * *." (Italics supplied.)
The pleaders not only attempted to charge that the defendant undertook to employ them for a definite period, a claim which we have said could not be supported by the provisions of the contract, but also averred that they had been dismissed "without just cause," apparently having in mind the provisions of the contract that any employee suspended or discharged should have the right to a review of his case after proper notice, and if found not to be at fault, to be reinstated and paid all the wages to which he would have been entitled had his services not been interrupted.
If it was the purpose of the pleaders to show a breach of this part of the contract, they failed because of the familiar rule that the allegations of a pleading will be construed more strongly against the pleader.
So far as the issues in this case are concerned the instrument defined two situations where the employee might be relieved, one because of lack of work and the other because of some misdeed on the part of the employee. Indulging the presumption against the pleaders, we have no difficulty in concluding that the reason for the discharge of the individual appellants was that there was no further need for their services, and we are confirmed in this view by the statement in the appellants' brief that "this suit may be best described as one * * * against the Tampa Electric Company, because the Tampa Electric Company did August 1, 1946 without prior notice to its employees abandon its streetcar operations * * *."
In the state of the record we cannot assume that the men now appearing as appellants were dismissed for reasons of discipline, but rather that they were dismissed in accordance with the provisions of the contract, immediately following those dealing with suspensions and dismissals on account of misconduct, expressly providing that "nothing herein shall abridge the right of the Company to relieve or discharge employees because of lack of work."
The contract here involved is a collective bargaining agreement, and there is no contention that there was a violation of it as such. It was not a contract of employment. The company was not obligated to employ a particular person for a stated time, nor was any individual required to serve for a definite term. Once the relationship was established, independent of the contract, the contract then governed the terms of the relationship so long as the relationship lasted. J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762.
Inasmuch as the cause of action is planted squarely on this agreement and no provision can be found within it which the company is successfully charged with violating, we consider it useless to prolong our comment.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
ADAMS, C.J., and TERRELL and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.