Summary
holding hospital was not vicariously liable for employee’s sexual assault on 96-year-old patient suffering from dementia
Summary of this case from Our Lady of Peace, Inc. v. MorganOpinion
No. FST CV 06-5001340 S
March 6, 2007
Memorandum of Decision
Defendant, Stamford Health Systems, Inc. has filed a motion to strike each of the twelve counts directed against it in the plaintiffs' complaint. The action arises out of injuries sustained by Plaintiff, Santina DiTeresi ("Santina"), while she was a patient at Stamford Hospital. The plaintiffs are Santina and her daughter Virginia DiTeresi ("Virginia"). The defendants are Stamford Hospital its corporate parent, Stamford Health System, Inc. (hereinafter collectively, the "Hospital"), and Robert E. Mayes, a certified nurse's assistant formerly employed by the Hospital ("Mayes"). The plaintiffs allege that on March 9, 2004 Santina, a 96-year-old woman, was admitted to the Hospital as a "total care patient" for treatment of pneumonia and diabetes. The complaint claims that the plaintiff suffered from dementia and was unable to care for herself or communicate effectively. It is alleged that on March 23, 2004 she was sexually assaulted by Mayes in her hospital room.
The first count of the plaintiffs' complaint, labeled "Premises Liability" alleges liability based on the alleged failure of the Hospital to implement or enforce policies designed to eliminate the ability of hospital employees or third parties from sexually assaulting patients.
The second count of the complaint labeled "Vicarious Liability" alleges liability of the Hospital for permitting Mayes to have free access to Santina's room and the opportunity to draw curtains around her bed and sexually assault her without being seen by other patients, visitors or other hospital employees.
The third count of the complaint labeled "Negligent Supervision" alleges that the Hospital should have had a policy in place requiring that certified nurse's assistants attend to the cleaning, bathing or dressing of female patients only with the assistance of and under the supervision of a registered nurse.
The fourth count of the complaint labeled "Violation of Connecticut's Patient's Bill of Rights, General Statutes § 19a-550" alleges that the Hospital, upon discovering Mayes' misconduct, nevertheless permitted him to clean Santina and dispose of her gown and bed linens. It is further alleged that the Hospital did not notify Santina's physician of the assault for over six hours and did not report the assault to the police for ten hours in violation of Santina's rights under General Statutes § 19a-550.
The fifth count of the complaint labeled "Violation of Connecticut's Patient's Bill of Rights, General Statutes § 17a-540 through 17a-550" alleges that Santina was "a person with psychiatric disabilities" under General Statutes § 17a-540(c) and that Hospital's actions or inactions upon discovering Mayes' misconduct, violated Santina's rights under General Statutes § 17a-540 through 17a-550.
The seventh count of the complaint labeled "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress — Virginia Di Teresi" alleges that on the day of the assault Virginia was at the Hospital "expressing her concern about the health and wellbeing of her mother," but that the Hospital delayed providing Santina with medical attention following Mayes' assault knowing that knowledge of the delay would cause Virginia severe emotional distress.
The eighth count of the complaint labeled "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress — Santina Di Teresi" alleges that on the day of the assault the Hospital delayed providing Santina with medical attention following Mayes' assault knowing that knowledge of the delay would cause Santina severe emotional distress.
The ninth count of the complaint labeled "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress — Virginia Di Teresi" alleges that on the day of the assault Virginia was at the Hospital "expressing her concern about the health and well-being of her mother," but that the Hospital negligently delayed providing Santina with medical attention following Mayes' assault creating an unreasonable risk that the delay would cause Virginia severe emotional distress.
The tenth count of the complaint labeled "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress — Santina Di Teresi" alleges that on the day of the assault the Hospital negligently delayed providing Santina with medical attention following Mayes' assault creating an unreasonable risk that the delay would cause Santina severe emotional distress.
The twelfth and thirteenth counts labeled "CUTPA-SHS by Santina Di Teresi" and "CUTPA-SHS by Virginia Di Teresi" allege that the Hospital's conduct constitutes violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110 ("CUTPA").
The fourteenth count labeled "Medical Malpractice" alleges that the Hospital committed professional negligence by failing to protect Santina while she was a patient at the Hospital.
The fifteenth count labeled "Bystander Emotional Distress" alleges that Virginia suffered bystander emotional distress because of her presence while Santina was subjected to a "rape exam."
Two other counts, six and eleven are addressed against Mayes and are not included in the Hospital's motion to strike.
In reviewing a motion to strike, the court "must read the allegations of the complaint generously to sustain its viability, if possible . . . [and] must, therefore, construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 252 Conn. 193, 212, 746 A.2d 730 (2000).
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 815 A.2d 118 (2003) "For the purpose of ruling upon a motion to strike the facts alleged in a complaint though not the legal conclusions it may contain are deemed to be admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Ass'n., Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 476, 823 A.2d 1202 (2003).
The role of a trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. The court must "construe the facts alleged in the complaint in a light most favorable to the pleader." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). The court must examine the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient cause of action. Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).
The trial court is limited to a consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint. A speaking motion to strike, that is one imparting facts outside of the complaint must be denied. Liliedahl Bros., Inc., v. Grigsby, 215 Conn. 345, 348, 576 A.2d 149 (1990). While consideration of a motion to strike requires that the court accept all well pleaded facts as admitted, the same is not so of legal conclusions and a motion to strike may be granted if a complaint alleges "mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992), Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 285, 449 A.2d 986 (1982), Myra v. Aetna Life Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn.App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).
FIRST COUNT — PREMISES LIABILITY
The Hospital's motion to strike the first count claims that, as a matter of law, it has "no duty to protect a business invitee from the unforeseeable criminal acts of a third party." In its brief the Hospital claims that, with respect to premises liability, Mayes should be considered a "third party" whose intentional criminal acts could not be foreseen by the Hospital. Even assuming Mayes' status as a "third party," the owner of premises can be held civilly responsible for the criminal acts of others when the risks were or should have been apparent to the owner. Steward v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 608 (1995); Monk v. Temple Garage, 273 Conn. 108 (2005) 114 F.3d 646. In this case the question of whether Mayes' conduct was foreseeable raises factual issues which cannot be resolved on a motion to strike.
Moreover, although the first count is labeled "premises liability," allegations are so broadly worded as to include a potential cause of action for negligent supervision. The Hospital did not file a request to revise the complaint under Practice Book § 10-35(3) requesting the plaintiffs to separate the causes of action alleged in the first count.
For the foregoing reasons, the Hospital's motion to strike the first count must be denied.
SECOND COUNT — VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The Hospital's motion to strike the second count claims that while Mayes' sexual assault on Santina took place at Mayes' place of employment and during working hours, his actions were clearly outside the scope of his employment and in no way served to further any interest of the Hospital. In Gutierrez v. Thorne, 13 Conn.App. 493 (1988) the court upheld the actions of the trial court determining that an employer (the Department of Mental Retardation) could not be held responsible for a sexual assault perpetrated by an employee (a mental retardation aide assigned to visit the plaintiff's home) under the theory of respondeat superior. The court pointed out that when an employee is acting to further his own personal interests rather than that of the employer, the employer cannot be held responsible merely because of the employer-employee relationship.
In their brief opposing the motion to strike the plaintiff urge that the Hospital "empowered defendant Mayes" to sexually assault Santina by providing him with unsupervised access to her and privacy which facilitated his actions. However, this argument is in reality a claim of responsibility based on the Hospital's own negligent conduct, not that imposed on the basis of respondeat superior.
In their brief the plaintiff relies upon West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1997). In that case the plaintiff was a thirteen-year-old girl who was subjected to a sexual assault by a police officer who was on duty at the time. The court upheld the district court determination that the town which employed the police officer could not be held liable for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1971, 42 USC § 1983, on the principle of respondeat superior. Nevertheless the court commented, apparently referring to pending state law claims:
[W]hen the employee is a male police officer whose employer has invested him with intimidating authority to deal in private with troubled teenaged girls, his taking advantage of the opportunity that authority and proximity and privacy give him to extract sexual favors from these girls should be sufficiently within the orbit of his employer-conferred powers to bring the doctrine of respondeat superior into play, even though he is not acting to further the employer's goals but instead is on a frolic of his own. We want the police department to supervise its officers in this domain with especial care, and so we do not impose on the plaintiff the burden of establishing negligent supervision. The application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in these circumstances is nourished by the same considerations of policy that impose strict liability, or a nondelegable duty of care, on enterprises engaged in especially hazardous activities. (Internal citations omitted) 114 F.3d at 649
The plaintiffs do not cite any Connecticut authority either for the proposition that strict liability is imposed for the on-duty intentional torts of police officers. In addition, the plaintiffs fail to present authority from any court extending the analysis of West to include hospital employees. The court agrees with the Hospital that the second count must be stricken.
THIRD COUNT — NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION
The Hospital's motion to strike the third count claims that the Hospital cannot be held responsible for the unforeseen criminal actions of Mayes. The Hospital concedes, as it must, that under Connecticut law an employer can be held responsible for the negligent supervision of employees. Seguro v. Cummiskey, 82 Conn.App. 166 (2004). However, the Hospital claims that as a matter of law the criminal conduct of Mayes was not foreseeable.
"The test that is often applied in determining whether there exists a duty to use care is the foreseeability of harm. `Would the ordinarily prudent man in the position of the defendant, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result?' This does not mean foreseeability of any harm whatsoever or foreseeability that the particular injury which resulted would occur. It is, in short, the foreseeability or anticipation that harm of the general nature of that suffered would be likely to result, which gives rise to a duty to use due care, breach of which might constitute negligence." (Footnotes omitted.) D. Wright J. Fitzgerald, Connecticut Law of Torts (2d Ed.) 29.
The matter of foreseeability is a question of proximate cause; Burns v. Gleason Plant Security, Inc., 10 Conn.App. 480, 485 (1987); and "the question of proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact." Id. "`Conclusions of proximate cause are to be drawn by the jury and not by the court.' Fox v. Mason, 189 Conn. 484, 489 (1983). `It becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable man could reach only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.'" Trzcinski v. Richey, 190 Conn. 285, 295 (1983).
In this case the plaintiffs allege in their third count that the Hospital had a duty to supervise Mayes. There is no direct allegation that the harm of the type suffered by Santina was foreseeable, nor does the third count allege facts from which such foreseeability could reasonably be inferred. Accordingly, the courts finds that the Hospital's motion to strike the third count, as pleaded, must be granted.
FOURTH COUNT — PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS GENERAL STATUTES § 19a-550
The defendant Hospital moves to strike the fourth count of the complaint claiming violations of Santina's rights under the Patient's Bill of Rights, General Statutes § 19a-550 claiming that Hospital is not a "nursing home facility" or a "chronic disease hospital" covered by the provisions of that statute. Paragraph 24 of fourth count of the complaint alleges that the Hospital was, at all relevant times, a "`chronic disease hospital' as that term is defined in General Statutes § 19a-550(a)(1)(B)."As it is directed to the fourth count, the Hospital's motion to strike presents a classic "speaking motion" which must be denied. Liliedahl Bros, Inc., v. Grigsby, supra.
FIFTH COUNT — PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS GENERAL STATUTES § 17a-540 THROUGH 17a-550
The defendant Hospital moves to strike the fifth count of the complaint claiming violations of Santina's rights under the Patient's Bill of Rights, General Statutes § 17a-540 through 17a-550 claiming that Santina was not a person "with psychiatric disabilities" under General Statutes § 17a-540(3) and accordingly not covered by the provisions of the statute. Paragraph 25 of the fifth count of the complaint alleges that Santina was, at all relevant times, a "`a person with psychiatric disabilities' as that term is defined in General Statutes 17a-540(a)."
As it is directed to the fifth count, the Hospital's motion to strike once again presents a classic "speaking motion" which must be denied. Liliedahl Bros., Inc., v. Grigsby, supra.
SEVENTH COUNT — INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS-VIRGINIA
The Hospital's motion to strike asserts that Virginia's claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress fails to state a legally sufficient claim. In the seventh count the plaintiffs allege that the Hospital intentionally withheld information from Virginia regarding the assault which had been perpetrated on her mother, Santina, delayed reporting the assault to the authorities, failed to provide Santina with medical care following the assault and thereby intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Virginia causing her damages.
For purposes of its motion to strike the seventh count the Hospital does not claim that, as a matter of law, the conduct alleged in those counts was not extreme or outrageous or that such conduct would be likely to cause severe emotional distress to Virginia.
Instead the Hospital attacks the plaintiffs' seventh count by pointing out that it is not alleged that Virginia was present at the time of the sexual assault on Santina. The Hospital reasons that Virginia is precluded from asserting a claim of intentional infliction of emotional harm both under 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46(1)(1965) and under the Connecticut standard for liability for bystander emotional distress first annunciated in Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 52-54(1996).
The relevant provisions of 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46(1)(1965) reads as follows:
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress . . . to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm . . .
The court in Clohessy, supra, adopted a four-part test for liability. First, a close relationship between the victim and the plaintiff. Second, the distress must be caused by "contemporaneous sensory perception of the event or conduct that causes the injury." Third, injury to the victim must be substantial. Finally, the plaintiff must prove serious emotional injury.
The Hospital disputes that Virginia satisfies the requirements of the Restatement or of the second part of Clohessy test because she was not present when the sexual assault occurred. In making this argument the Hospital ignores the fact the misconduct which Virginia complains of in the seventh count was not the sexual assault on her mother perpetrated by Mayes, but rather the Hospital's conduct upon discovering the assault. Virginia is claiming that the Hospital intentionally engaged in a course of conduct which persisted for hours after the assault. In paragraph 37 of the seventh count she alleges that while the Hospital delayed reporting the rape and withheld treatment from Santina, Virginia "was at Stamford Hospital expressing her concern about the health and well-being of her mother."
It is not clear that Virginia's claims, as set forth in the seventh count, relate solely to "conduct directed at a third person" and thus within the terms of the Restatement. The complaint alleges that Virginia held her mother's power of attorney that Santina suffered from dementia and was unable to communicate effectively. The operative allegations of the seventh count include conduct which might be considered to be directed against Virginia (covering up the assault and allowing spoilation of evidence) rather than against Santina alone.
Even assuming that Virginia's presence was required under the Restatement or Clohessy, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that Virginia's alleged presence at the Hospital during the Hospital's misconduct, if proven, would not satisfy that second part of the Clohessy test. Accordingly, the motion to strike the seventh count is denied.
EIGHTH COUNT and TENTH COUNT-INTENTIONAL and NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS — SANTINA
The Hospital's motion to strike asserts that the claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress set forth in the plaintiffs' eighth and tenth counts, respectively, fail to state legally viable claims. In those counts the plaintiffs allege that the Hospital intentionally withheld information from Santina and her attorney-in-fact, Virginia regarding the assault which had been perpetrated on Santina, delayed reporting the assault to the authorities, failed to provide Santina with medical care following the assault and thereby intentionally and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress on Santina causing her damages.
In moving to strike the eighth and the tenth counts the Hospital claims that, as a matter of law, the conduct alleged in those counts was not either extreme or outrageous and that such conduct would be likely to cause severe emotional distress to Santina. Incredibly, the Hospital claims that it was not foreseeable that Santina would become distressed by the actions allegedly taken by the Hospital. The allegations include the claim that, following the discovery of the sexual assault on Santina the Hospital permitted the perpetrator of the assault to bath Santina, change her gown and destroy evidence of his misconduct. The eighth and tenth counts further allege that the Hospital withheld medical care from Santina after the sexual assault.
The court concludes that the conduct alleged in the eighth counts meets the standards set forth in Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205 (2000) for intentional infliction of emotional distress. "Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 205 Conn. at 210.
The court further concludes that the same conduct also furnishes a basis for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional harm. Whether Santina was emotionally harmed by the Hospital's conduct is a question of fact, not of law. Under the facts alleged, it is certainly foreseeable that a reasonable person might well experience emotional distress when subjected to the post-assault conduct alleged in the tenth count.
In its brief the Hospital asserts that the actions complained of in the eighth count were taken "in furtherance of the mental stability and physical status of Santina." This factual allegation is not appropriate to a motion to strike and must be ignored by the court. Liliedahl Bros., Inc., v. Grigsby, supra.
For the reasons set forth above, the motions to strike the eighth and tenth counts of the complaint are denied.
NINTH COUNT — NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS — VIRGINIA
The Hospital's motion to strike asserts that Virgina's claim of negligent infliction of emotion distress fails to state a claim. In that count the plaintiffs allege that the Hospital negligently withheld information from Virginia regarding the assault which had been perpetrated on her mother, Santina, delayed reporting the assault to the authorities, failed to provide Santina with medical care following the assault and thereby negligently inflicted emotional distress on Virginia causing her damages.
The Hospital attacks the plaintiffs' ninth count on the same grounds asserted in its motion to strike the seventh count. Once again the Hospital points out that it is not alleged that Virginia was present at the time of the sexual assault on Santina. The Hospital claims that Virginia is precluded from asserting a claim of negligent infliction of emotional harm both under 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46(1) (1965) and Clohessy v. Bachelor, supra. For the reasons set forth in its discussion of the seventh count, the court finds the Hospital's attack on the ninth count to be equally unavailing.
In its brief submitted in support of its motion to strike the ninth count the Hospital also claims that its conduct did not, as a matter or law, create a foreseeable risk of emotional harm to Virginia. The court disagrees. The allegations of the plaintiffs' ninth count sufficiently allege conduct which any reasonable person would conclude violated the Hospital's duties to both Santina and Virginia. The plaintiffs have a right to present evidence proving their factual claims and establishing the causal connection between the Hospital's conduct and the alleged damages. Accordingly, the motion to strike the ninth count is denied.
TWELFTH COUNT and THIRTEENTH COUNT — CUTPA
In the twelfth and thirteenth counts the plaintiff alleges that the Hospital's alleged conduct violates the rights of Santina and Virginia respectively and gives rise to claims under General Statutes § 42-110g, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA").
In its motion to strike the Hospital claims that the plaintiffs' twelfth and thirteenth counts fail to adequately allege CUTPA causes of action. The Hospital relies on Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 252 Conn. 193 (2000) in which the court rejected a CUTPA claim stating "Violations predicated on negligence or malpractice, whether legal or medical, are not covered because those claims address only competence." 252 Conn. at 213
The court disagrees. The twelfth and thirteenth counts are not premised solely on negligence or malpractice claims. The allegations of the both counts include allegations of the Hospital's intentional misconduct following the sexual assault perpetrated on Santina. Such allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to strike a CUTPA claim
FOURTEENTH COUNT-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The plaintiffs' fourteenth count alleges that the Hospital was guilty of medical malpractice in the care and treatment of Santina. The Hospital moves to strike the fourteenth count claiming that it fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a claim of professional negligence. In support of its motion the Hospital cites several Superior Court cases purported establishing the rule that "a health care provider's sexual relationship with a patient is not substantially related to medical diagnosis or treatment, and therefore is not actionable as malpractice." The court finds this assertion troubling. Nothing in the complaint suggests that either plaintiff had a "sexual relationship" with Mayes. On the contrary, the factual allegations of the complaint clearly allege criminal conduct constituting a vicious sexual assault.
The pertinent allegations of the fourteenth count include the Hospital professional negligence in the manner in which it assigned and supervised Mayes in the performance of his duties, and in providing adequate security for her safety and well being. Certification of good faith along with a report of a similar health care provider was attached to the complaint as required by General Statutes § 52-190a. The court finds that allegations of the fourteenth count are sufficient to withstand the Hospital's motion to strike.
FIFTEENTH COUNT — BYSTANDER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS — VIRGINIA
The fifteenth count of the complaint alleges that on the evening following the sexual assault on Santina, Virginia was present while Santina was subjected to a "rape exam." It is alleged that the exam caused Santina pain, discomfort and emotional upset which were witnessed by Virginia and caused her serious emotional injury and distress. The Hospital claims that Connecticut does not allow recovery of bystander emotional distress suffered by relatives of victims of medical malpractice. The Hospital correctly cites the rule set forth in Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 (1988)
To allow recovery by one . . . who has been more or less consistently `at the bedside' of the malpractice victim during the period of treatment is likely to cause hospitals and other medical treatment facilities to curtail substantially the extent of visitation of patients that is presently permitted. Such a response by providers of medical care to the risk of liability to visitors whose sensitivity and relationship to the patient may result in emotional disturbances from observing treatment of loved ones that they view as improper would seem inevitable if such claims were to become more frequent.
In addition, to the extent that the emotional distress claimed by Virginia as the result of witnessing her mother's "rape exam" arises from the Hospital misconduct other than medical malpractice, the Hospital asserts that such claim is not viable under the law as set forth in Clohessy, supra. The court agrees.
The court notes once more that the four-part Clohessy test requires: First, a close relationship between the victim and the plaintiff. Second, the distress must be caused by "contemporaneous sensory perception of the event or conduct that causes the injury." Third, injury to the victim must be substantial. Finally, the plaintiff must prove serious emotional injury.
With respect to the fifteenth count, neither the close relationship between Santina and Virginia nor the fact Virginia claims to have suffered serious emotional injury is at issue. However, the fifteenth count does not allege that Virginia was in a position to perceive the event or conduct which caused the injury to her mother. In the seventh count Virginia claims to have been at the hospital in close proximity to Santina, inquiring as to her welfare, during the time that the Hospital was wrongfully allowing Mayes access to Santina and denying her medical care.
In contrast, the fifteenth count is founded on Virginia's alleged presence at her mother's "rape exam." There is no allegation that the "rape exam" itself was performed in a negligent manner or that it was otherwise wrongful. It is simply alleged that the exam caused Santina pain and discomfort which in turn resulted in Virginia's emotional distress. Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action in such situations. Loss of consortium claims are limited to spouses and do not extend to claims for loss of parental or filial consortium. Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456 (1998); Suffield Development Assoc. v. National Loan Investors, 260 Conn. 766 (2002). There is no principal recognized in Connecticut law which permits even a close relative to recover damages for emotional distress resulting from the experience of seeing a loved one suffer from the injuries caused by the misconduct of a tortfeasor.
In addition, the allegations of the fifteenth count do not satisfy the fourth requirement of Clohessy, supra. That count fails to allege that the injuries sustained by Santina as a result of the rape exam were substantial. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike the fifteenth count is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant Hospital's motions to strikes the first, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth counts are denied. The motions to strike the second, third and fifteenth counts are granted.