Opinion
Case No. 99 C 1432
January 2, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Alice Dise ("Dise" or "Plaintiff") has filed suit against Defendant, William J. Henderson ("Defendant"), Postmaster General, in his official capacity for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) et seq. (Compl. 1). Dise alleges that Defendant's employees continually harassed her because of her gender and retaliated against her by not rehiring her after she reported the harassment. (Compl. 2-7). Defendant William J. Henderson has moved for summary judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in part and DENIES it in part.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 150 (7th Cir. 1994). "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Thus, although the moving party on a motion for summary judgment is responsible for demonstrating to the Court why there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the face of the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file to demonstrate through specific evidence that there remains a genuine issue of material fact and show that a rational jury could return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-27; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994).
Disputed facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the suit. First Ind. Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1992). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a Court must view all inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48; Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1999). However, a metaphysical doubt will not suffice. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative or is no more than a scintilla, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250.
BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1(a) (b) statements of material facts (referred to herein as "Pl.'s 56.1" and "Def.'s 56.1") and exhibits are as follows.
Plaintiff does not deny the facts included in Defendant's Local Rule 56, 1(a) statement. (Pl. Res. 1). Likewise, because Defendant has not filed a response to Plaintiffs statement of additional facts, they are taken as true pursuant to LR56.1(a)(3)(B)("All material facts set forth in the statement filed pursuant to section (b)(3)(B) will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement of the moving party.").
Plaintiff Alice Dise was hired as a temporary employee of the U.S. Postal Service in June of 1995. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 1). Her position was to end after six months. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 2). Dise was hired through the main postal facility located in downtown Chicago. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 3). Dise was assigned to work at the Mt. Greenwood Station Post Office ("Office"), which is located on the south side of Chicago at 3349 W. 111th Street. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 3). There, she worked as a clerk, sorting and retrieving mail for delivery. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 4). Plaintiff was one of six temporary clerks working at the Office from June trough December of 1995. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 5). Dise was not guaranteed a full 40-hour work week as a temporary employee. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 6). She was guaranteed a four-hour day but would often work a full eight-hour day due to heavy postal demands, (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 6).
The manager of the Office was Thomas Nickel. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 9). Pierre Adams was the floor supervisor during the morning shift, from 4:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 7). Supervisor Mary Ellen Lockett worked from 6:30 A.M. until 3:00 P.M. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 8). Supervisor Willistein Spates worked from 9:00 A.M. until 5:30 P.M. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 8). Supervisor Bernard Sturden worked from 10:00 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 8).
Beginning in September of 1995, Plaintiffs co-worker, Dennis Watkins ("Watkins"), began verbally abusing and berating her on a daily basis. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 17). Watkins had treated other female employees similarly. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 12, Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 18). Watkins did not extend this same treatment to male employees. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 29). Watkins frequently referred to Plaintiff as a "bitch" and a "whore." (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 19). Watkins would also tell Plaintiff, "fuck you." (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 20). Watkins frequently told Plaintiff to "suck his dick." (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 21). Watkins threatened to hurt Plaintiff. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 22). Many employees witnessed Watkins' treatment of Plaintiff. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 23). After the first incident in September of 1995, Plaintiff complained to Pierre Adams, one of her supervisors. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 30, Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 13). In response to Plaintiffs complaints, Adams instructed Watkins to leave the female employees alone. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 14), Despite this instruction, Watkins continued his mistreatment of Plaintiff. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 15). Adams told Plaintiff to try and ignore Watkins and stay out of his way because she was a temporary employee and, therefore, expendable and that if she complained, she might not be retained. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 37, Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 16).
On one occasion, Adams actually observed Watkins fly into a rage around Dise and several other female workers and observed Watkins cursing at Dise during the encounter. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 17). After this incident, Adams ordered Watkins to leave the building. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 17).
Plaintiff eventually took the matter to Sturden. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 19). Initially. Sturden advised Dise to try and stay away from Watkins, but Watkins continued to harass her with verbal threats to "beat her ass" and hurt her. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 20). Ultimately, Sturden held a meeting with Dise and Watkins in his office, and placed a call to a labor relations specialist. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 21).
On December 11, 1995, Watkins tried to run Plaintiff down with a bulk mail container. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 24). Plaintiff told Sturden about this incident, but Sturden didn't do anything about it because it didn't happen on his shift. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 26). On another occasion, Watkins almost struck one of Plaintiffs female co-workers with a bulk mail container. He told Plaintiff, "I was trying to hit you." Supervisors Pierre Adams and Thomas Nickel knew of Plaintiffs complaints regarding Watkins. (Pl's 56.1 ¶ 34). Plaintiff went to Nickel's office on December 11, 1995 to complain about Watkins' behavior. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 23). Nickel called Watkins into the office with Dise and questioned him about the alleged behavior. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 25). Although Watkins tried to deny the behavior, Nickel told him he was aware of his behavior and that he did not believe Watkins' account of the events. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 26). Nickel also told Watkins that he wasn't going to tolerate his behavior and that he better "shape up . . . or else." (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 27). Nickel further ordered that Watkins not be scheduled for two days and that Plaintiffs work schedule be changed so that she would not come into contact with Watkins. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 28). On December 18, 1995, Watkins wrote to the Greenwood Postmaster insisting that he was being unfairly accused of harassment. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 29).
At one point, Plaintiff complained to Mary Lott, and was told she was a temporary employee and had no recourse. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 36). Lott then cut Plaintiffs hours by two. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 36). Two other female employees, Denise Newsom and Adrian Sybils, also complained about Watkins' behavior. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 40-43). Watkins was not suspended or fired for his behavior. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 44).
Additionally, during her tenure at the office, Bernard Sturden repeatedly made suggestive remarks to Plaintiff, asking her out and paying her numerous compliments. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 55). In July of 1995, Sturden told Dise he wanted her to deliver an express mailpackage. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 43). Dise drove the car and Sturden accompanied her. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 44). Sturden directed Plaintiff to stop the car in front of his home. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 45). He then asked Dise inside. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 46). When Plaintiff declined, Sturden asked her inside several more times and began to press the issue. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 47). After five minutes, Sturden ceased his requests and told Dise that he had to go inside the house but would be right back. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 48, Pl. Ex. A, at 44). Plaintiff waited in the car ten minutes before Sturden returned. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 49). Upon his return, Sturden told Plaintiff that he knew why she was scared to come inside of his home. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 50). When Plaintiff asked what Sturden meant, Sturden replied Plaintiff knew that he would have been "all over" Dise if she had come inside. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 51).
At other times before and after this incident, Sturden would accompany Dise to deliver express mail for the sole purpose of flirting with her and inquiring into her personal life. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 53). Dise continually rejected Sturden's overtures, making it clear that she wasn't interested in having a relationship wit him. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 56). When Dise protested "too much," Sturden became unfriendly and increased her work. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 56). Sturden would often have her drive around aimlessly in order to spend time with her. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 54). Sturden would point to a hotel and ask her to go in with him. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 54).
Dise did not report any of the incidents involving Sturden to management or to the Postal Service 13130 office until January 24, 1996 — after her contract was not renewed. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 57). Dise did not report Sturden's unwelcome overtures contemporaneously with these events because she felt that reporting a supervisor would jeopardize her job. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 58, Pl. Ex. A 45). Earlier, Plaintiff had reported another supervisor and was told that she was a temporary employee and should clock out early. (Pl. Ex. A, at 45). Supervisors had the authority to relieve temporary employees of their duties and cut their hours. (Pl. Ex. A, at 47).
During her tenure at the post office, Dise attended an all-employee meeting during which Station Manager Nickel informed employees that sexual harassment on the job would not be tolerated and gave them information about how to seek recourse on such matters. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 32). Signs were posted throughout the Mt. Greenwood Station informing employees of their rights in regards to discrimination and harassment. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 33). Additional signs setting forth the Postal Service's policy against sexual harassment and instructing employees about their recourse when faced with such a situation are posted around the facility. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 34).
The six-month term of all six temporary workers' employment contracts expired in December of 1995. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 35). In early December, the Office received an instruction from the department of personnel at the Main Post Office to reduce their temporary employee staff to one at the end of the June-December 1995 contract period. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 36). Nickel sought recommendations from his supervisors as to who should be retained. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 37).
Plaintiff was the senior temporary employee, in that she was the first of several hired in that capacity in 1995. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 5). She expressed her interest in being retained to her supervisors, Sturden, Adams, and Nickels. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 7) Plaintiff had been entrusted with "showing new employees the ropes." (Pl's 56.1 ¶ 12). Plaintiff was given a key to the facility. (Pl's 56.1 ¶ 13). None of Plaintiff's supervisors criticized her work. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 9, 10).
Based on a variety of factors, including attendance, work performance and attitude, the supervisors recommended that four of the six temporary employees be retained and that two (one of whom was Dise) not be retained. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 38). In the end, only one of the temporary employees was retained. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 38). This employee was Karen Bradley. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 54). Karen Bradley had been the only temporary employee not to complain of sexual harassment or submit a statement in support of Plaintiffs "informal" complaints of sexual harassment. (Pl.'s 56.1 6 54). Karen Bradley had missed two weeks of work and was junior in tenure to Plaintiff (Pl's 56.1 ¶ 55, 56). The station had an informal policy of retaining the most senior of the temporary employees. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 57). The final decision as to which employee was retained was made by the personnel department of the Main Post Office. (Def's 56.1 ¶ 40). Plaintiff was advised by mail from the Main Post Office that her contract would not be renewed for another six month period. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 41).
Watkins was finally fired but not for sexual harassment. (Pl's 56.1 ¶ 50).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff Alice Dise has sued Defendant, U.S. Postmaster General, William S. Henderson, for sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII based (1) on the conduct of Dennis Watkins, (2) the conduct of Bernard Sturden, and (3) that Defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints. The Court considers each claim individually for purposes of deciding Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Conduct of Dennis Watkins
Plaintiff claims that Watkins' behavior towards her constitutes sexual harassment actionable under Title VII. Defendant argues that Watkins' behavior does not constitute sexual harassment; and, even if it does, it is not actionable because Defendant took appropriate remedial action in response to Plaintiffs complaints. The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of showing that Watkins' behavior constituted sexual harassment, but Plaintiff cannot recover for this harassment since her employer took prompt remedial action.
"[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986). However, "isolated and/or trivial remarks of a sexual nature do not satisfy the definition of sexual harassment." Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993). "[F]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. "[W]hether an environment is `hostile' or `abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance . . . ." Harris it Forkift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 20-1, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
Dennis Watkins' behavior towards Plaintiff clearly constitutes harassment under Harris. Beginning in September of 1995, Watkins began verbally abusing and berating her on a daily basis. Watkins frequently referred to Plaintiff as a "bitch" and a "whore." Watkins also told Plaintiff, "fuck you." Watkins frequently told Plaintiff to "suck his dick." Watkins threatened Plaintiff, saying that he would "beat her ass" and hurt her. On one occasion, Watkins tried to run Plaintiff down with a bulk mail carrier. On another occasion, Watkins almost struck one of Plaintiffs female co-workers with a bulk mail container. He told Plaintiff, "I was trying to hit you." This behavior was observed by many of Plaintiffs co-workers. Additionally, Watkins' conduct was specifically targeted at Plaintiff and other female workers. Watkins did not extend this same treatment to male employees. Clearly, Watkins' conduct was directed at Plaintiff and other women based on their gender.
The Court is cognizant of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996), which stated that a co-worker's description of a female employee as a "sick bitch," his statement to her "if you don't want me, bitch, you won't have a damn thing," and his use of an obscene gesture while telling the female employee to "suck this bitch" was not sex or gender related conduct for purposes of Title VII, where the conduct arose out of a failed relationship and the female employee had been hospitalized for a psychiatric disorder. However, the Court views the facts in this case as different from those in Galloway. Here, Plaintiff was subjected to daily abuse from someone with whom she had not had a previous relationship. Not only was she made the target of harsh and sexually explicit language, she was also subject to threats of violence and at least one instance of assault. Once more, she was not alone, as the perpetrator of this behavior targeted other women as well, removing any doubt that this conduct was based on Plaintiffs gender.
Though Watkins' behavior was sufficient to constitute harassment, Plaintiff will not be able to recover for Watkins' conduct because Defendant took reasonable remedial measures in response to Plaintiffs complaints. "The employer's legal duty is thus discharged if it takes reasonable steps to discover and rectify acts of sexual harassment of its employees." Baskerville v. Culligan Intl. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995). When Plaintiff first reported this behavior to Adams, he spoke to Watkins and told him to leave the female employees alone. When Watkins' conduct continued, Sturden held a meeting with Dise and Watkins in his office and placed a conference call to the labor relations specialist. Finally, after Watkins tried to run Plaintiff down with a mail carrier, Nickels called Watkins into his office with Dise and told him that he wasn't going to tolerate his behavior and that Watkins better "shape up . . . or else." Nickel further ordered that Watkins not be scheduled for two days and that Plaintiffs work schedule be changed so that she would avoid contact with Watkins. Watkins' employment with the office was ultimately terminated for other reasons.
The Court finds that Defendant took appropriate steps to rectify the harassment. First, Defendant instructed the employee to stop the behavior, Then, a meeting was scheduled in an attempt to negotiate a solution. Finally, when the problem persisted, the harasser was told that he had to stop "or else," and work schedules were modified to avoid further contact between Watkins and Plaintiff. These remedial actions fulfilled Defendant's obligations under Title VII. See e.g. Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (transferring alleged victim to another unit rather than transferring offender constituted appropriate remedial action).
The Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII claim based on the conduct of Dennis Watkins.
The Court recognizes its obligation to abstain from granting summary judgment on a portion of one of Plaintiffs counts. See e.g. Arado v. General Fire Extinguisher, ¶ 26 F. Supp. 506, 508 (N.D.U.S 1985) (Shadur. J.). However, Plaintiff should not be able to shield individual counts from summary judgment by failing to identify them clearly in her Complaint. The Court notes that Plaintiffs original Complaint did not specifically identify how many counts of harassment or retaliation Plaintiff was asserting. However, Plaintiff has argued that both Watkins and Sturden's conduct would independently support a claim for sexual harassment. (Watkins' conduct was "more than sufficient to make a case of sexual harassment" . . . "Defendant has declined to argue that Sturden's behavior was not sexual harassment, as indeed he cannot." [Pl. Res. 7, 8]). Since Plaintiff has chosen to address Watkins and Sturden's conduct separately, the Court construes the Complaint as stating two separate counts of harassment. This construction is bolstered by Plaintiffs failure to identify her retaliation claim as a separate count, though sexual harassment and retaliation constitute separate claims under Title VII.
Conduct of Bernard Sturden
Plaintiff claims that her treatment by Bernard Sturden constitutes sexual harassment actionable under Title VII. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failure to "bring the alleged unwelcome overtures to the attention of management in a timely fashion should undermine her claim." (Def. Mot. 12). The Court rejects this argument and denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII claim based on the conduct of Bernard Sturden. Plaintiff has met her burden of showing that disputed issues of material fact exist as to whether Bernard Sturden sexually harassed her in violation of Title VII.First, the fact that Plaintiff did not complain of Sturden's conduct until after she was released does not prove fatal to this claim. Although the Seventh Circuit observed in Gleason v. Mesirow Financial, Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1145 (7th Cir. 1997), that a plaintiffs failure to report the offensive conduct to supervisors weighed against a finding that the plaintiff viewed her work environment as hostile and abusive, it noted that it was looking to the "totality of the circumstances" in its decision. Here, Plaintiff provides a logical explanation grounded in her own experience as to why she did not report Sturden's conduct. Plaintiff did not report Sturden because she did not think it would do any good and reporting the behavior would only result in the loss of her job. In her deposition, Plaintiff related an earlier instance when she had made a complaint about a supervisor. She stated:
Just prior to that, a supervisor and I had a problem. I can't remember what it was, and I went to another supervisor and reported her; and she came to me and explained that she was a supervisor and I was a temporary employee and told me to clock out early.
And it became clear at that point that you don't report your supervisors. You don't tell on your supervisors if you want employment because they kept telling you over and over, first of all, you aren't in the union, and you had [sic] no rights.
In Defendant's "Submission of Supplemental Authority," he has sought to assert an affirmative defense under Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 188 S.Ct. 2257 (1998). A defendant in a sexual harassment suit may succeed on the " Ellerth affirmative defense" when (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failure to notify management of Sturden's harassment is sufficient to sustain his affirmative defense. It is noted that Defendant has the burden of proving his affirmative defense. Defendant has not met the standard for Summary Judgment set out above regarding this affirmative defense.
The Court notes that this submission was filed the day before the Court was to announce its ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the Plaintiff was not given a chance to respond to this supplemental authority, she was not prejudiced since the Court rejects Defendant's assertion of an affirmative defense.
Defendant cites Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1999), in support of his affirmative defense. In Autozone, the Seventh Circuit found that a plaintiffs failure to complain about the harassment meant that Defendant had nothing to respond to, and therefore its behavior was reasonable under the first prong of the Ellerth affirmative defense. Id. at 812. Hence, Plaintiffs failure to report the Sturden's conduct establishes the first prong of the Ellerth defense.
However, in attempting to prove the second prong of the Ellerth defense, Defendant must show that Plaintiffs failure to complain was unreasonable under the circumstances. In Autozone, the Seventh Circuit concluded "that an employee's subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee's duty under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environment." Id. at 813. The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Autozone. Here, Plaintiffs fear of retaliation was anything but subjective. Given the overall conduct of various supervisors, a jury might conclude that Plaintiff was acting reasonably in her failure to report Supervisor Sturden's conduct. Furthermore, even if fear of retaliation was unreasonable in this case as a matter of law, a jury might alternatively conclude that it was reasonable to believe that complaining about a supervisor's behavior would not trigger any meaningful response. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff did not unreasonably fail to use the existing complaint procedures, and therefore rejects Defendant's affirmative defense.
Plaintiffs showing regarding Sturden's conduct, as outlined in the statements of undisputed material facts, is sufficient to withstand Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Admittedly, drawing the line between conduct which is harassment and that which is vulgar is not always easy. "On one side lie . . . uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene language or gestures. On the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers." Baskerville v. Culligan Intl. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). A jury might reasonably find that Sturden's treatment of Plaintiff constituted sexual harassment actionable under Title VII. See e.g. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 188 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998) (Employer might be held vicariously liable under Title VII for supervisor's making unwelcome and threatening sexual advances to employee). Although, Plaintiff repeatedly rejected Sturden's overtures, he continually made suggestive remarks to her at work, asking her out and paying her numerous compliments. Sturden would often accompany Dise to deliver express mail for the sole purpose of flirting with her and inquiring into her personal life. Sturden would often direct Plaintiff to drive around aimlessly in order to spend time with her. Sturden would point to a hotel and ask her to go in with him.
On one occasion, Sturden directed Plaintiff to drive to his home where he attempted to persuade her to come inside. When Plaintiff declined, Sturden asked her inside several more times and began to press the issue. Sturden told Plaintiff that he knew why she was scared to come inside of his home. When Plaintiff asked what Sturden meant, Sturden replied Plaintiff knew that he would have been "all over" Dise if she had come inside. When Dise protested "too much," Sturden became unfriendly and increased her work. For these reasons, the Court denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII claim based on the conduct of Bernard Sturden.
Retaliation
Plaintiff claims that Defendant's failure to rehire her constitutes retaliation for her complaints about sexual harassment. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to prove a causal connection between her complaint and the Post Office's failure to rehire her. The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of showing a causal link between her complaints about harassment and the Post Office's failure to rehire her.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because that employee has "made a charge" under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) she engaged in "statutorily protected expression," (i.e. reporting or otherwise opposing conduct prohibited by Title VII, such as sexual harassment); (2) she suffered an adverse, job-related action by her employer; (3) there is a causal link between her opposition to unlawful discrimination and the adverse employment action. Gleason v. Mesirow Financial, Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1146 (7th Cir. 1997). "In order to demonstrate the causal link," Plaintiff must show that Defendant would not have taken the adverse action "but for" the protected behavior. McKenzie v. Illinois Dept of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 1996). Defendant has chosen to limit his attack to the third element.
Plaintiff presents strong evidence of causation in this case. First, she offers the statements of Adams and Lott. When Plaintiff complained to Adams, he told her that if she complained, she might not be retained. When Plaintiff complained to Lott, Lott told her she had no recourse as a temporary employee and proceeded to cut her hours by two. Second, Plaintiff points out that the one temporary employee who was retained was also the only temporary employee not to complain of sexual harassment or submit a statement in support of Plaintiff's "informal complaints."
Defendant, in turn, argues that Plaintiffs attempt to show a connection between the "protected activity" and the "adverse employment action" fails because the decision whether to retain Plaintiff rested with the Main Post Office. However, it was Plaintiffs supervisors who made recommendations to the Main Post Office as to who should be retained.
Finally, Plaintiff points out the custom of the Office to retain the most senior temporary worker. In this case, she was more senior than the employee retained. Additionally, she points out that her superiors trusted her to train new employees or "show them the ropes."
For these reasons, the Court denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claim of retaliation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court makes no ruling herein regarding the admission of any evidence offered to prove the Plaintiffs claim based on the alleged conduct of Bernard Sturden or the claim based on the alleged retaliatory discharge by Defendant because of Plaintiffs complaints regarding sexual harassment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.