Summary
In Slavens, the respondent's father had prepared several wills for the testator, but none of those wills provided any bequests to members of the respondent's family.
Summary of this case from Byron v. CarlinOpinion
No. 91-1741
Submitted November 5, 1991 —
Decided March 11, 1992.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 90-63.
In a complaint filed on December 11, 1990, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, charged that respondent, William S. Slavens, had violated, inter alia, DR 5-101(A) (accepting employment that may affect attorney's financial interests without client's consent after full disclosure), 1-102(A)(1) (violating a Disciplinary Rule), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on an attorney's fitness to practice law). Respondent filed his answer on February 6, 1991, denying the alleged misconduct. The matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court on May 10, 1991.
At the hearing, the parties submitted stipulations in which respondent acknowledged that he had prepared the Last Will and Testament of Florence F. Evans, who died in 1987, even though the will named him and his children as beneficiaries. According to the stipulations, respondent began representing Evans in 1977, after his father, Evans' former attorney, passed away. Respondent's father had prepared several wills for Evans, who never married and had no children, and none of those prior wills provided bequests for members of respondent's family. In 1984, however, after Evans had been diagnosed with senility and organic brain syndrome, respondent arranged for Evans to execute a new will under which respondent's three children would each receive $5,000 in bequests and respondent would receive thirty-five percent of Evans' approximate $1.5 million estate. The will also named respondent co-executor, along with First National Bank of Cincinnati (now, Star Bank), and attorney for the estate.
The stipulations further establish that respondent arranged for himself to be given power of attorney for Evans in 1983. During the period from July 1984 until April 1986, respondent used this authority to give himself "gifts" from Evans valued at $162,406.17. No gift tax returns were filed for these transfers, and respondent did not inform Evans' accountant that the transfers had been made. Moreover, from August 1985 until Evans' death, respondent charged Evans $26,805 for legal services, although his services mainly consisted of handling her bills, rental property, and other business interests.
Respondent stipulated to two violations of DR 5-101(A), and violations of DR 1-102(A)(1) and (6) based on the foregoing events. However, he denied that he had also violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by failing to disclose the existence of Evans' prior wills and the transfers he had made to himself from Evans. The record contains the testimony of two witnesses who said that they had met with respondent after Evans' death as representatives of Star Bank to obtain information about her estate and that respondent during this meeting did not disclose the "gifts" he had received from Evans. Moreover, the attorney who was appointed as special counsel for Evans' estate testified that respondent initially told him that Evans' previous wills had been destroyed, when, in fact, they had not. The panel credited this testimony over respondent's explanation and, therefore, found in addition to the stipulated violations that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
Having found this misconduct, the panel recommended the sanction proposed by both parties — an indefinite suspension with appropriate restitution to be made prior to any application respondent files for reinstatement to the practice of law. See Gov. Bar R. V(28). The board adopted the panel's findings and its recommendation.
J. Warren Bettis, Disciplinary Counsel, and Dianna L. Chesley, for relator.
William S. Slavens, pro se.
Our review of the record supports the board's findings and its recommendation. Therefore, we order that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio with appropriate restitution to be made prior to any application respondent files for reinstatement to the practice of law. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, DOUGLAS and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.
HOLMES, WRIGHT and RESNICK, JJ., dissent and would disbar respondent.