Opinion
No. 90-1711
Submitted October 17, 1990 —
Decided March 27, 1991.
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Disbarment — Convictions for criminal damaging and assault — Handling a legal matter without adequate preparation — Neglect of a legal matter entrusted — Failure to carry out a contract of employment — Prejudice or damage to client — Neglect or refusal to assist in disciplinary proceeding — Failure to zealously represent a client — Failure to promptly return property of a client — Taking legal action merely to harass or maliciously injure another — Commingling funds.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 41-87-B.
On November 23, 1987, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint charging thirteen violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and a violation of the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio against respondent, Lawrence Virgil Cox. After receiving two extensions of time, respondent filed his answer on May 5, 1988. A hearing was held on the first four counts of the original complaint on November 4, 1988 before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court. The hearing terminated with the agreement that respondent undergo psychiatric testing. Subsequently, three amended complaints were filed adding a total of three counts and five violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and one violation of the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio. A second hearing on three remaining counts of the third amended complaint was held on April 27, 1990.
Count I charged respondent with violating DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), and 1-102(A)(6) (any other conduct adversely reflecting on one's fitness to practice law). The charges were based on respondent's convictions in the Cleveland Municipal Court for criminal damaging and assault and respondent's post-conviction conduct. Respondent appealed his conviction, but neglected to file a brief, and the case was dismissed. Respondent appealed to this court, and that appeal was also dismissed. In an answer to the second amended complaint, respondent substantially admitted to Count I, but stated that his actions were caused by the prosecuting witness's having driven his car over respondent's foot.
Count II charged that respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without adequate preparation), 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of a legal matter entrusted), 7-101(A)(2) (failure to carry out a contract of employment), 7-101(A)(3) (prejudice or damage to client), and Gov. Bar R. V(5) (neglect or refusal to assist in disciplinary proceeding). These charges were based on respondent's failure to file an appeal for Charles E. Mangus concerning an alleged misunderstanding of the plea entered at Mangus' trial. Count II also alleged that respondent erroneously filed a motion for shock probation before the time his client was eligible for it, and that respondent received repeated requests by relator to reply to the Mangus allegations, but failed to respond. In his answer to the second amended complaint, respondent admitted filing no appeal for defendant, but stated that his agreement with Mangus was to do whatever was necessary, not just to appeal. He also stated that the erroneous shock probation motion was a mistake and not intentional, thus not warranting sanctions. Finally, respondent alleged that, unbeknownst to him, his ex-wife and then current secretary signed and returned the receipts from correspondence sent to him from relator, and thus he had no notice of the second count against him.
Count III charged respondent with violating DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1) (failure to zealously represent a client), and 7-101(A)(3). These charges were based on respondent's agreement to represent Jaroslav Prazak in an appeal and his subsequent failure to file the appeal or inform the client that the case had been dismissed. Respondent admitted these allegations, but stated in his defense that he did handle the administrative appeal of the case and did orally inform Prazak that the case had been dismissed and that he needed a $50 filing fee before he could appeal the case.
Count IV charged respondent with violating DR 6-101(A)(2), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), and 7-101(A)(3). These charges were based on respondent's representation of Daniel Bader in a domestic relations case and charging Bader for services that were not performed. It was also alleged that respondent wrongfully advised Bader to withhold temporary alimony payments ordered by the court and that respondent did not keep his client informed of the status of his case. Respondent denied these allegations in his answer and submitted as evidence the results of an arbitration proceeding in which Bader's claim against respondent was not upheld.
Count V charged respondent with violating DR 9-102(B)(4) (failure to promptly return property of a client), 7-101(A)(2), 6-101(A)(3), and Gov. Bar R. V(5). These charges were based on respondent's acceptance of a $150 retainer to represent Elijah Lyons in a negligence action, his agreement to incorporate Lyons' business, and his subsequent failure to pursue either action. The complaint also alleged that respondent retained evidence Lyons needed to pursue his negligence claim and failed to communicate with Lyons, and that both the Cleveland Bar Association and relator attempted to resolve the matter, but were unable to secure respondent's cooperation.
On cross-examination of Lyons, respondent attempted to elicit testimony that the fault for not pursuing these matters lay with Lyons. Respondent also called his ex-wife and sometime secretary as a witness. She testified she did not show respondent the letters from relator attempting to resolve this matter.
Count VI charged respondent with violating DR 7-102(A)(1) (taking legal action merely to harass or maliciously injure another). This charge was based on respondent's having filed a counter-claim in the amount of $5,600,000 for Michael Burke, in response to a claim brought in small claims court by Burke's dentist, Robert Crowe, D.D.S., for services performed, and then proceeding no further with the case. The complainant received summary judgment in his favor and sanctions under Civ. R. 11 in the amount of $1,000 against respondent, which were not paid. Respondent denied knowledge of any of the motions made by plaintiff in the action.
Count VII charged respondent with commingling funds in violation of DR 9-102(A)(2) by failure to maintain a trust account. Respondent admitted this violation.
The panel reviewed the psychiatric report on respondent, which report noted that respondent was found to have superior intelligence and that his cognitive abilities were functioning well. No formal psychiatric diagnosis was made.
The panel found the allegations in Counts I through VII to be true. It emphasized that respondent failed to cooperate with the agreement respondent and relator reached at the end of the second hearing, which was for respondent to turn over all of his numerous case files, except for one or two, to the relator. The panel reiterated its concern, voiced at the end of the first hearing, that respondent's arrogant attitude was totally inappropriate to the serious nature of the charges against him. Considering all the evidence and testimony before it, the panel recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. The board adopted the recommendations of the panel, and also recommended that costs of the proceeding be taxed to the respondent.
J. Warren Bettis, disciplinary counsel, for relator.
Lawrence Virgil Cox, pro se.
We adopt the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the board. Respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs taxed to the respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.