Opinion
No. CO3-4046-MWB
August 7, 2003
ORDER
This matter is before the court on a Motion to Sever (Doc. No. 20) filed on July 17, 2003, by the defendant Mike Schmitz. The plaintiff filed a resistance on July 21, 2003. (Doc. No. 21) Although Schmitz quoted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21, upon which he relies, the plaintiff notes, correctly, that Schmitz failed to file a brief in support of his motion as required by Local Rule 7.1(d). Nevertheless, the court will proceed to consider the motion on its merits.
Schmitz seeks to sever the plaintiff's claim against him from the claims against the other defendants. In this case, the plaintiff alleges each of the defendants bought a device to intercept the plaintiff's satellite transmissions without subscribing to the plaintiff's satellite service. The plaintiff claims all of the devices were similar or identical, all were purchased between March 2, 2001, and April 16, 2001, and all were shipped through the same distribution center in California. There is no claim that the defendants knew each other, and no claim that they used their devices in concert with each other. Schmitz argues that although the plaintiff's claims against the defendants "involve similar issues and facts, the facts surrounding each Defendant are unique." (Doc. No. 20, p. 2) He concludes the plaintiff's' allegations against the defendants "do not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences," and therefore, he argues his case should be severed. (Id.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) provides, in pertinent part:
All persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
In addition, the court has the authority, under Rules 20(b), 21, and 42(b), to sever and order separate trials of any claims against any party. "In this manner, the scope of the civil action is made a matter for the discretion of the district court, and a determination on the question of joinder of parties will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion." Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing Chicago, R.I. P.R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir. 1957)).
In Mosley, a case frequently cited on this issue by courts throughout the United States, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the purpose of Rule 20 and the requirements for joinder of parties, as follows:
The purpose of the rule is to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits. 7 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1652 at 265 (1972). Single trials generally tend to lessen the delay, expense and inconvenience to all concerned. Reflecting this policy, the Supreme Court has said:
Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L. Ed.2d 218 (1966).
Permissive joinder is not, however, applicable in all cases. The rule imposes two specific requisites to the joinder of parties: (1) a right to relief must be asserted by, or against, each plaintiff or defendant relating to or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) some question of law or fact common to all the parties must arise in the action.
In ascertaining whether a particular factual situation constitutes a single transaction or occurrence for purposes of Rule 20, a case by case approach is generally pursued. 7 C. Wright Federal Practice and Procedure § 1653 at 270 (1972). No hard and fast rules have been established under the rule. However, construction of the terms `transaction or occurrence' as used in the context of Rule 13(a) counterclaims offers some guide to the application of this test. For the purposes of the latter rule,
`Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610, 46 S.Ct. 367, 371, 70 L.Ed. 750 (1926). Accordingly, all `logically related' events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence. 7 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1653 at 270 (1972). The analogous interpretation of the terms as used in Rule 20 would permit all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties to be tried in a single proceeding. Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1332-33.
As one court has noted, although the test for permissive joinder under Rule 20 is easy to articulate, it often is difficult to apply and it "does not lend itself to bright line rules." Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11C Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 232 (M.D. Tenn. 2001). While it is an easy matter to identify common questions of law and fact, it often is more difficult to apply the transactional test. See id., 202 F.R.D. at 231.
In the present case, the court finds the plaintiff's claims against these defendants are reasonably related to an extent sufficient to support joinder. The court further finds severance "would deter the efficient and orderly pursuit of this litigation," and result in a duplication of efforts by the court and the parties. See Magnavox Co. v. APF Electronics, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 29, 34 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (refusing to sever a misjoined defendant).
Notably, even if the court were to find Schmitz was misjoined as a defendant in this action, the plaintiff's cases against these defendants could be consolidated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) based on the common questions of fact and law, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. See MLR, LLC v. U.S. Robotics Corp., — F. Supp.2d — 2003 WL 685504 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2003) (mem.).
For these reasons, Schmitz's motion to sever is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.