Opinion
No. 9029SC1158
Filed 16 July 1991
Landlord and Tenant 8.4 (NCI3d) — dangerous condition of stairs — knowledge by tenant — contributory negligence Plaintiff tenant's action to recover for injuries received in a fall on a stairway based on defendant landlords' alleged negligent construction and maintenance of the stairs was barred by plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law where plaintiff knew of the dangerous condition of the stairs but failed for six months to take any action to correct it or to notify the landlords of the condition.
Am Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant 761, 771; Premises Liability 68, 583, 815.
APPEAL by plaintiff from judgment entered 30 August 1990 in HENDERSON County Superior Court by Judge Marvin K. Gray. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 May 1991.
Morris, Bell Morris, by William C. Morris, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
Roberts, Stevens Cogburn, P.A., by Frank P. Graham, for defendants-appellees.
Judge GREENE dissenting.
On 13 July 1985 Katharine N. Diorio and her husband leased a two-story house, owned by the defendants, in Henderson County. The house contained a staircase which did not have a handrail and consisted of twelve to fifteen steps varying from four to nine inches in height. At the time plaintiff signed the lease the staircase was covered by carpeting which extended unsupported approximately two inches beyond each step before continuing down the riser to the next step. Before leasing the house plaintiff and her husband viewed the interior of the house and walked up and down the staircase. Upon moving into the house plaintiff and her husband used one of the upstairs rooms as their bedroom. Prior to 20 January 1986, the plaintiff had slipped on the stairs on more than one occasion. She was never injured because she would always catch herself on the wall. Furthermore, prior to 20 January 1986, the plaintiff's daughter had slipped and fallen down the stairs but was not injured. Neither the plaintiff nor any member of her family complained to the defendants about the condition of the stairs at any time.
On 20 January 1986 in the evening the plaintiff walked down the stairs, slipped on the overhanging carpet on one of the steps, tumbled down the remaining stairs and broke her right arm. On 30 April 1987 she filed suit against the defendants. Having voluntarily dismissed that claim on 30 April 1990, she subsequently filed another complaint alleging that the defendants had negligently constructed and maintained the stairs. The defendants filed an answer to the complaint on 29 May 1990 denying negligence and alleging contributory negligence as a defense. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted on 31 August 1990. Plaintiff appeals.
"On motion for summary judgment, the question before the Court is whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Gregory v. Perdue, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 655, 656, 267 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1980). While issues of negligence and contributory negligence are rarely appropriate for summary judgment, Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 54, 247 S.E.2d 287, 291 (1978), the trial court will grant summary judgment in such matters where the evidence is uncontroverted that a party failed to use ordinary care and that want of ordinary care was at least one of the proximate causes of the injury. Bogle v. Duke Power Co., 27 N.C. App. 318, 321-22, 219 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 296, 222 S.E.2d 695 (1976).
The uncontroverted evidence in this case indicates that the plaintiff, who had used the stairs at least twice a day for nearly six months, by her own admission was aware that the stairs posed a danger to the extent that she more than once had to "catch herself" on the wall while descending. The plaintiff also admits that she had not notified the landlord of the danger and had not taken any other step to correct the condition of the stairs. This Court has previously stated that, "[t]he law imposes upon a person the duty to exercise ordinary care to protect himself from injury and to avoid a known danger; and that where there is such knowledge and there is an opportunity to avoid such a known danger, failure to take such opportunity is contributory negligence." Lenz v. Ridgewood Associates, 55 N.C. App. 115, 122, 284 S.E.2d 702, 706-07 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 290 S.E.2d 702 (1982). Where the plaintiff knew the danger of the stairs and in the course of six months failed to undertake any action whatsoever to correct it or to notify the landlord of the condition, the plaintiff, in our judgment, has violated the standard of ordinary care and is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. We distinguish this case from the holding in Lenz v. Ridgewood Associates, id., where this Court vacated a directed verdict for the defendant. There we held that it was for the jury to decide whether a reasonable person would have stayed at home instead of exposing himself to a known danger, i.e., an icy walkway outside his home. Though Mrs. Diorio had no alternative route to the first floor of the house and while one could not reasonably expect her to remain on entirely the second floor, by her own admission she, unlike the plaintiff in Lenz, was not confronted with the danger for the first time on the date of her injury. She had experienced six months of close exposure to a known condition and failed to notify the landlord or take reasonable corrective measures. A plaintiff who knowingly exposes herself to a risk of which she has had long-term prior notice, has a reasonable choice or option to seek to avoid that danger and fails to exercise that option, is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See Brooks v. Francis, 57 N.C. App. 556, 291 S.E.2d 889 (1982).
Since we have determined that plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of law, we decline to address the issue of whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of negligence sufficient to take the case to the jury.
The judgment of the trial court is therefore
Affirmed.
Judge EAGLES concurs.
Judge GREENE dissents.