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Dillingham v. United States

U.S.
Dec 1, 1975
423 U.S. 64 (1975)
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Summary

holding that a speedy-trial right attaches upon a finding of probable cause regarding the instant charges

Summary of this case from Belcher v. State
See 25 Summaries

Opinion

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 74-6738.

Decided December 1, 1975.

A 22-month delay between petitioner's arrest and indictment for federal offenses held required to be counted in assessing his claim that he was denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, distinguished.

Certiorari granted; 502 F.2d 1233, reversed and remanded.

PER CURIAM.

An interval of 22 months elapsed between petitioner's arrest and indictment, and a further period of 12 months between his indictment and trial, upon charges of automobile theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 2312, and 2313. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied petitioner's motions — made immediately after arraignment and posttrial — to dismiss the indictment on the ground that petitioner had been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that under United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), the 22-month "pre-indictment delay . . . is not to be counted for the purposes of a Sixth Amendment motion absent a showing of actual prejudice." 502 F.2d 1233, 1235 (1974). This reading of Marion was incorrect. Marion presented the question whether in assessing a denial of speedy trial claim, there was to be counted a delay between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the indictment of a suspect not arrested or otherwise charged previous to the indictment. The Court held: "On its face, the protection of the [Sixth] Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been `accused' in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time." 404 U.S., at 313. In contrast, the Government constituted petitioner an "accused" when it arrested him and thereby commenced its prosecution of him. Marion made this clear, id., at 320-321, where the Court stated:

"To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. These considerations were substantial underpinnings for the decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina, [ 386 U.S. 213 (1967)]; see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-378 (1969). So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.

"Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge."

See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-520, 532-533 (1972).

The Memorandum for the United States in Opposition, p. 4, states that " Marion appears to leave little doubt . . . that [the Court] believed that the policies that inform the right to a speedy trial reach beyond the indictment stage of criminal proceedings and that the right consequently attaches either at the point at which a person is arrested and held to answer on a criminal charge or when he is formally charged by indictment or information, whichever occurs earlier . . . ." Accord, United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750 (CA7 1973); United States v. Cabral, 475 F.2d 715 (CA1 1973); Edmaiston v. Neil, 452 F.2d 494 (CA6 1971).

Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE dissents.

Summaries of

Dillingham v. United States

U.S.
Dec 1, 1975
423 U.S. 64 (1975)

holding that a speedy-trial right attaches upon a finding of probable cause regarding the instant charges

Summary of this case from Belcher v. State

holding that "invocation of the speedy trial provision ... need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge"

Summary of this case from Ussery v. State

holding that Marion's requirement of actual prejudice applies to claims of violation of due process and not to claims that delay between arrest and indictment violated right to speedy trial

Summary of this case from Cathey v. State

In Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (per curiam), we held that Marion does not require "actual prejudice" to invoke the speedy trial right for postarrest, preindictment delay.

Summary of this case from United States v. Loud Hawk

In Dillingham, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit when it calculated the speedy trial delay from the date the indictment was filed and thereby failed to account for the twenty-two months between the defendant’s arrest and the indictment.

Summary of this case from United States v. Black

measuring delay for Sixth Amendment claim from time of arrest and noting that "[i]nvocation of the speedy trial provision . . . need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge"

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Brown

In Dillingham, the defendants were arrested or "accused" on charges of automobile theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §(s) 371, 2312, and 2313. The defendants were indicted twenty-two months after the arrest on those same charges.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Derose

In Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975), the Supreme Court confirmed its holding in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), that the protection of the Sixth Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been "accused."

Summary of this case from United States v. Kopel

In Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975), however, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment is activated whenever the defendant becomes an accused, either through arrest or otherwise, whether or not an indictment has also been returned.

Summary of this case from United States v. Duke

In Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial protection attached when the defendant was arrested, arraigned, and released on bond, even though he was not indicted until 22 months later.

Summary of this case from Mann v. Beard

noting that the clock starts for speedy-trial purposes with “either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge”

Summary of this case from Silver v. United States

In Dillingham v. United States (1975) 423 U.S. 64, the court held that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial protection attached when the defendant was arrested and released on bond, even though he was not indicted until 22 months later.

Summary of this case from People v. Martinez

In Dillingham v. United States, supra, 423 U.S. 64 (Dillingham), the court held that the federal Constitution's speedy trial protection attached when the defendant was arrested and released on bond, even though he was not indicted until 22 months later.

Summary of this case from People v. Martinez

providing additional factual details

Summary of this case from People v. Martinez

clarifying United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468

Summary of this case from State v. Austin

In Dillingham, however, the defendant had been arrested, and so was formally accused by the Government, 22 months prior to indictment.

Summary of this case from State v. Crescenzo

In Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975), decided after the Appellate Division had rendered its decision in this case, the United States Supreme Court clearly held that preindictment delays, as well as delays between indictment and trial, are equally subject to limitations imposed under the sixth amendment.

Summary of this case from State v. Smith

noting that the right to a speedy trial is triggered by formal indictment or arrest

Summary of this case from Giles v. State

noting that the right to a speedy trial is triggered by formal indictment or arrest

Summary of this case from Foster v. State

In Dillingham the defendant was released on bond following his arrest, whereas in this case defendant did not post bond or live under any restrictions on his liberty after being arrested and released.

Summary of this case from State v. Sanchez

In Dillingham, the Court found the delay between arrest and indictment must be included in determining whether there was a Sixth Amendment violation.

Summary of this case from Ibarra v. Municipal Court

In Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 96 S Ct 303, 46 L Ed 2d 205 (1975), the defendant was arrested on a warrant, charged, released on bond, then indicted by a federal grand jury.

Summary of this case from State v. Harris

In Dillingham, the United States Supreme Court clarified their holding in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455 (1971) as to when the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attaches.

Summary of this case from State v. Ballack

In Dillingham, the United States Supreme Court was concerned with the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, not the right defined under a court rule such as CrR 3.3. Although CrR 3.3 is a means of effectuating the constitutional right to a speedy trial as defined in the Sixth Amendment and in article 1, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, different considerations apply in determining whether there has been a constitutional violation.

Summary of this case from State v. Ballack

In Dillingham the court was concerned with a case in which a defendant was continuously held subject to the restraints of arrest and pending prosecution for a 22-month period until an indictment was returned and a trial was commenced.

Summary of this case from People v. Staley
Case details for

Dillingham v. United States

Case Details

Full title:DILLINGHAM v . UNITED STATES

Court:U.S.

Date published: Dec 1, 1975

Citations

423 U.S. 64 (1975)
96 S. Ct. 303

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