Opinion
Submitted February 21, 2001.
March 26, 2001.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Burke, J.), dated July 24, 2000, which denied their motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Rubin Licatesi, P.C., Garden City, N.Y. (Jason S. Firestein of counsel), for appellants.
Williamson Williamson, New York, N.Y. (Joseph M. Glatstein of counsel), for respondent.
Before: CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, J.P., WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is granted.
A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes prima facie that the driver of the moving vehicle was negligent and imposes a duty on him or her to explain how the accident occurred (see, Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392; Gambino v. City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 583). If the operator of the moving vehicle cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the driver of the lead vehicle may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law. A claim that the driver of the lead vehicle made a sudden stop is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence (see, Levine v. Taylor, 268 A.D.2d 566; Leal v. Wolff, supra; Silberman v. Surrey Cadillac Limousine Serv., 109 A.D.2d 833).
The Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, as the defendant's only claim was that the driver of the lead vehicle stopped short in heavy traffic (see, Cacace v. DiStefano, 276 A.D.2d 457; Leal v. Wolff, supra).