Summary
affirming the District Court's prior refusal to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a Title VII retaliation claim because "[n]either [plaintiff]'s proposed amended complaint nor his brief identifies any potentially meritorious claims"
Summary of this case from Digianni v. Pearson, Inc.Opinion
No. 06-3622-cv.
March 23, 2009.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Cogan, J.) is AFFIRMED.
For Plaintiff-Appellant: RAYMOND J. RIGAT, Clinton, Connecticut.
For Defendants-Appellees: RICHARD DEARING, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Michael S. Belohlavek, on the brief), for Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York.
Plaintiff-appellant William Digianni appeals from the judgment of the district court dismissing his claims against all defendants. Digianni proceeded pro se before the district court. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of this case, as well as with the issues raised on appeal.
We conclude that collateral estoppel bars Digianni's claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Digianni alleges that the defendants-appellees failed to ensure that National Evaluations Systems, Inc. ("NES"), a private company that administers the New York State Teacher Certification Exam, made reasonable testing accommodations for his learning disability. But Digianni already challenged NES's denial of his requested accommodations in a separate action against NES (the "NES action"), in which the district court granted summary judgment to NES and this Court dismissed Digianni's appeal. With respect to Digianni's claim in the instant case that NES should have permitted him to use a word processor and spell and grammar check, the district court in the NES action already held that offering Digianni a word processor and spell and grammar check was not a reasonable accommodation because it would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." Because (1) the issue of whether Digianni's request was a reasonable accommodation is identical in both actions, (2) the issue was actually litigated and actually decided, (3) Digianni had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in his action against NES, and (4) the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of whether Digianni had a right to use a word processor and spell checker as a reasonable accommodation for his disability. See Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim. With respect to Digianni's claims arising from his other accommodation requests, the district court in the NES action found that NES later granted these requests. We conclude that collateral estoppel bars relitigating this finding as well. See id. Because NES offered Digianni the other accommodations he requested and Digianni conceded in oral argument before this Court that he does not seek damages for any delay in the granting of these requests, Digianni has failed to assert a claim for which the district court could provide any relief. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Digianni's claims arising from the remaining accommodation requests as well.
Likewise, for the reasons stated by the district court, we affirm the dismissal of Digianni's Fourteenth Amendment claim as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Although Digianni argues that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint to seek damages against unspecified state officials, Digianni's proposed amended complaint failed to add any such parties. Moreover, Digianni's brief fails to identify any potentially meritorious claim that he would have against any state official. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Where disability discrimination is at issue, the Fourteenth Amendment only proscribes government conduct for which there is no rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose."). Similarly, we reject Digianni's argument that he should be permitted to amend his complaint to remedy defects in his claims under Title III and V of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Neither Digianni's proposed amended complaint nor his brief identifies any potentially meritorious claims under these statutes. See Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that leave to amend can be denied when the proposed amendments are futile).
For the reasons discussed, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.