Opinion
21-CV-5849 (LTS)
07-26-2021
ANDRE DIGGS, Plaintiff, v. POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE, ARRESTING OFFICER ID #959808; POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE, ARRESTING OFFICER ID #953007, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated in Five Points Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. By order dated July 12, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On August 7, 2020, or August 17, 2020, at 7:52 a.m., Plaintiff was “falsely arrested” in Manhattan for aggravated harassment in the second degree by Defendant John Doe Police Officer #959808. (ECF 2, at 4.) On August 17, 2020, at 8:30 a.m., Plaintiff was “re-arrested falsely” for aggravated harassment in the second degree by John Doe Police Officer #953007. (Id.) The cases against Plaintiff continued until they were dismissed on March 9, 2021. Plaintiff maintains that the cases are a “direct violation” of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
The complaint states that this first event occurred on August 7, 2020, but in the “facts” section of the complaint, Plaintiff states that both events occurred on August 17, 2020. (See ECF 2, at 4.)
Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages.
Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a “Certificate of Disposition” from the New York Criminal Court showing that Plaintiff was arrested on August 17, 2020, and listing the March 9, 2021 disposition of the charges as “Dismissed (Motion to Dismiss Granted, Sealed 160.50).” (ECF 3, at 3.)
The attached certificate was docketed as part of Plaintiff's prisoner authorization.
DISCUSSION
The Court construes Plaintiff's allegations as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution. To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
A. False Arrest
For the elements of a section 1983 false-arrest claim, the Court first looks to state law. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S.Ct. 911, 925 (2017) (“[T]o flesh out the elements of this constitutional tort, we must look for ‘tort analogies.'”); see also Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that common law principles are meant simply to guide rather than to control the definition of section 1983 claims and courts should not “mechanically apply” the law of New York State).
To establish a false-arrest claim under New York law, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2012). An arrest is privileged if it is based on probable cause. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.”) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Officers have probable cause to arrest when they “have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis and citation omitted). “Probable cause can exist even where it is based on mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on that information.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (1994); Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a police officer is “not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.”).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest him on January 15, 2020. In fact, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts regarding the circumstances of either of the arrests he challenges here. He merely asserts that he was “falsely arrested, ” which is a legal conclusion that the Court need not accept as true under Rule 8. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a section 1983 claim for false arrest.
B. Malicious Prosecution
The tort of malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 38990 (2007). To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting: (1) that the defendant initiated or continued a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant lacked probable cause to commence the proceeding or believe the proceeding could succeed; (3) that the defendant acted with malice; and (4) that the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002).
Federal and state standards differ on what a plaintiff must show to prove a favorable termination. For a federal malicious prosecution claim to have terminated favorably to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must show that “the underlying criminal proceeding ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence.” Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2018). The disposition cannot “le[ave] the question of question of guilt or innocence unanswered.” Id. at 28. However, “neither an acquittal nor a finding of actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence is necessary.” Hincapie v City of New York, 434 F.Supp.3d 61, 71-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Rather, “termination must be measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Dismissal of charges does not automatically demonstrate favorable termination. A plaintiff must instead “give a specific reason for the dismissal that affirmatively demonstrates his innocence.” Abuskin v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-4582, 2021 WL 930349, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2021) (citing Thompson v. Clark, 794 Fed.Appx. 140, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2020)); see also Foy v. City of New York, No. 7 Civ. 406, 2019 WL 3717317, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2019) (finding insufficient a termination where the plaintiff did not know why her charges were dismissed).
It is not clear that the dismissal of Plaintiff's criminal charges qualifies as a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. Documents attached to the complaint show that the charges were dismissed under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 160.50, but that statute merely provides for the sealing of court and police records upon dismissal of criminal charges. See Lino v. City of N.Y., 101 A.D.3d 552, 553-57 (1st Dep't 2012) (discussing the scope and purpose of § 160.50). Moreover, section 160.50 allows for termination and sealing based on dismissal on grounds that do not affirmatively indicate innocence, such as jurisdiction. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 160.50(3)(b). Federal courts have rejected the contention that sealing under section 160.50 affirmatively indicates a plaintiff's innocence. See Falls v. Rivera, No. 19-CV-3525, 2019 WL 5260720, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2019).
Without other facts explaining the circumstances under which Plaintiff's case was dismissed, termination under section 160.50 is insufficient to suggest that the dismissal affirmatively indicates Plaintiff's innocence. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.
C. Claims against the City of New York
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting that the City of New York has a policy, custom, or practice that has caused a violation of his constitutional rights.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid section 1983 claim, the Court grants Plaintiff sixty days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims. First, Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint, ” and label the document with docket number 21-CV-5849 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.