Summary
In Dickerson v. State, 202 Miss. 804, 807-808, 32 So.2d 881, 882 (1947), the appellant also offered to plead guilty and insisted that his plea be entered.
Summary of this case from Myers v. StateOpinion
No. 36651.
December 8, 1947.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
A trial judge cannot be compelled to accept a plea of guilty in capital cases and to pronounce a sentence less than a death sentence in view of statutes placing the death sentence in capital cases within the sole province of the jury.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
A trial judge may accept a plea of guilty in a capital case, but if he does so, he must see to it first that the plea is entirely voluntary and that the defendant fully realizes and is competent to know the consequences of such a plea, and judge must empanel a competent and impartial jury and have the material circumstances of the crime placed before the jury so that jury can determine whether it should adjudge the death sentence.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.
The trial judge in a capital case has the discretion to accept a plea of guilty or to decline the plea and put the case to trial on its full merits, and if the trial judge refuses to accept the plea of guilty, there is nothing of which the defendant may complain.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Lowndes county. HON. JOHN C. STENNIS, J.
John F. Frierson and W.H. Jolly, both of Columbus, for appellant.
It is the settled law of this State that a change of venue will be granted when it is shown that the accused cannot get a fair trial because of the case being prejudged.
The court was in error in refusing to accept the plea of guilty of appellant. In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, accused, even in a capital case, has a right to plead guilty, and the court must accept the plea and pronounce the proper judgment and sentence. The only instance where the court has the power to sentence an accused to death is where the jury finds the defendant guilty as charged and is silent as to the punishment. This being true, a trial court cannot sentence an accused to more severe punishment than life imprisonment upon a plea of guilty.
Nelson v. State, 47 Miss. 621; State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P.2d 1110; Code of 1942, Secs. 2217, 2504, 2536, 2564; 22 C.J.S. 651, Sec. 422.
Under the law of our State, a confession to be admitted in evidence must have been free and voluntary. In the case at bar the accused was a negro, accused of killing a white man. Prior to the date that the purported confession was signed, the officers talked to the accused on several occasions and the defendant was moved from one jail to another, having been incarcerated in the jails at Tupelo, Aberdeen and New Albany. Mr. Hub Brown, a witness for the State, admitted that he and the other officers were trying to get a confession out of the accused all during this time. In view of the fact that the accused was frightened, that he was hounded and questioned by officers of the law on several occasions, leading up to the date that the purported confession was signed, we submit that the records show conclusively that the confession was not free and voluntary on the part of the accused.
Greek L. Rice, Attorney General, by R.O. Arrington, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
It is not reversible error to overrule a motion for a change of venue where the evidence upon the motion is conflicting, where the voir dire examination of the jury is not shown, and where the defendant fails to exhaust his peremptory challenges.
Cummins v. State, 144 Miss. 634, 110 So. 206.
See also Richardson v. State, 153 Miss. 654, 121 So. 284; White v. State, 190 Miss. 672, 1 So.2d 500; Shimniok et al. v. State, 197 Miss. 179, 19 So.2d 760.
The jury shall prescribe the punishment in capital cases.
State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P.2d 1110; Code of 1942, Secs. 2217, 2536.
In any case in which the penalty prescribed by law upon the conviction of the accused is death, except in cases otherwise provided, the jury finding a verdict of guilty may fix the punishment at imprisonment for the natural life of the party; and thereupon the court shall sentence him accordingly; but if the jury shall not thus prescribe the punishment, the court shall sentence the party found guilty to suffer death, unless the jury by its verdict certify that it was unable to agree upon the punishment, in which case the court shall sentence the accused to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life.
The confession was admissible.
Ellis v. State, 65 Miss. 44, 3 So. 188; Wood v. State, 197 Miss. 657, 20 So.2d 661.
Appellant, herein called the defendant, was indicted for and convicted of murder and was sentenced to death. The crime was committed for the purpose of robbery, and was as cruel and cold-blooded as could well be imagined. The defendant's guilt was so conclusively proved as to leave him no possible avenue of escape so far as the facts were concerned.
He has assigned on his appeal three grounds for a reversal. None are maintainable but one of them calls for further mention. He offered to plead guilty and insisted that the plea be entered. The trial judge declined to accept it and ordered the entry of a plea of not guilty. Defendant says that the judge had no authority to do otherwise than to accept his plea as offered, since it was offered without reservation.
In some states the statutes permit pleas of guilty in capital cases, and authorize the trial judge to impose the death penalty if upon an examination of the facts such a penalty is deserved. We have no such statute in this state. Rather, all our statutes in capital cases place the death sentence within the sole province of the jury, and no such sentence can be imposed by any judge unless he has the authority of the jury therefor. The defendant concedes that this is true.
If, then, the trial judge were compelled to accept a plea of guilty in capital cases and could do no more than thereupon to pronounce sentence, as apparently the defendant contends, it would put it in the power of any defendant to abolish capital punishment so far as he is concerned — would enable him to make his own law in that respect. Manifestly this cannot be permitted. A case in point is Green v. United States, 40 App. D.C. 426, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1117.
We do not say that the trial judge may not accept a plea of guilty in a capital case, but if he does so he must see to it, first, that the plea is entirely voluntary and that the defendant fully realizes and is competent to know the consequences of such a plea, and second, a competent and impartial jury must be empanelled and the material circumstances of the crime must be placed before the jury with such fullness that the jury will be well advised on the issue whether they should adjudge the death sentence.
In view of these essential steps, we think it ought to be and is within the discretion of the trial judge whether he will accept a plea of guilty in a capital case or will decline it and put the case to trial on its full merits. If he takes the latter course nothing is thereby done of which the defendant may complain as being harmful to him, and it is the usual practice in this state to take that course.
Let it be distinctly understood that we are not discussing or considering a situation where the district attorney consents to a plea of guilty and agrees to a sentence less than capital. Such a case is not here before us.
Affirmed and Friday, January 23, 1948, is fixed as the date for the execution.