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Diaz v. Dickhaut

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Jan 12, 2016
15-P-115 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 12, 2016)

Opinion

15-P-115

01-12-2016

JOHN DIAZ v. THOMAS DICKHAUT & another.


NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff, John Diaz, appeals from the judgment entered after the defendant's successful motion to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff also challenges the denial of his motion to amend the complaint. We affirm.

Three other plaintiffs, Tony B. Gaskins, Lorenzo Beechman, and Vandell Mason, were in the case as well. However, they are not part of this appeal.

Background. On May 21, 2010, the plaintiff was placed in the L2 housing unit at SBCC. The L2 unit was known as the "Transition Unit" and was operated in accordance with the "Transition Unit Handbook." Inmates in the L2 housing unit utilize a privilege system different from that of other general population units.

The plaintiff also sought a declaration that while housed in the L2 unit, he should be afforded privileges that may be afforded to inmates in different housing units.

The plaintiff, in his complaint, asserted two similar causes of action. First, that while in the L2 housing unit the plaintiff was deprived of various things that similarly situated inmates were afforded. Second, that while the plaintiff was placed on awaiting action (AA) status in the L2 unit, he was deprived of privileges afforded other similarly situated inmates, "in violation of 103 CMR 430.21(3), et seq., G. L. c. 127, § 32, Article 12, 14th Amendment, and 42 USC § 1983." The plaintiff also maintains that the defendant "set up" the L2 unit in order to deprive inmates of privileges and therefore should be liable for damages.

Discussion. The plaintiff argues that the judge erred in dismissing the complaint. We disagree. The complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the plaintiff did not allege specific acts of the defendant. However, even if we assume this defect did not exist, the complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss because of the Supreme Judicial Court decision in LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012). In LaChance, the Supreme Judicial Court held that an inmate could not be held on AA status in segregated confinement for longer than ninety days without a hearing. Id. at 776-777. Additionally, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not reasonably clear before the decision in LaChance that their behavior violated a prisoner's due process rights. Id. at 777-778. Likewise, even if one accepts the allegations in the complaint as true, the defendant would have qualified immunity from the plaintiff's claims. See ibid. The LaChance decision also makes the declarative judgment sought by the plaintiff unnecessary.

Although the plaintiff failed to provide a sufficient record appendix to support his appeal, we will consider the merits of his appeal because the defendant's supplemental appendix provides us with a sufficient record to address the plaintiff's challenges.

The plaintiff does not say how long he was in AA status.

There is no merit to the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's motion to dismiss was "not properly before" the second motion judge on reconsideration of the earlier denial by a different judge who did not have the benefit of the LaChance opinion.

The judge did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. The plaintiff's motion to amend sought to add Harold Clarke, the former Commissioner of Correction, as a defendant. As this amendment to the complaint would not have cured any deficiencies, it was properly denied. See Castellucci v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 372 Mass. 288, 289-290 (1977).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Cohen, Trainor & Katzmann, JJ.),

The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------

/s/

Clerk Entered: January 12, 2016.


Summaries of

Diaz v. Dickhaut

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Jan 12, 2016
15-P-115 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 12, 2016)
Case details for

Diaz v. Dickhaut

Case Details

Full title:JOHN DIAZ v. THOMAS DICKHAUT & another.

Court:COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT

Date published: Jan 12, 2016

Citations

15-P-115 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 12, 2016)