Opinion
SC 19527
08-08-2017
Ivan DIAZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
Michael J. Proto, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was John C. Smriga, state's attorney, for the appellant (respondent). James E. Mortimer, with whom, on the brief, was Michael D. Day, for the appellee (petitioner).
Michael J. Proto, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was John C. Smriga, state's attorney, for the appellant (respondent).
James E. Mortimer, with whom, on the brief, was Michael D. Day, for the appellee (petitioner).
Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.
The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
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PER CURIAM.The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appeals, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the habeas court, which dismissed, sua sponte, the habeas petition of the petitioner, Ivan Diaz. The habeas court concluded that the petitioner had procedurally defaulted his claims by way of deliberate bypass, thus depriving that court of subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. The Appellate Court grounded its decision to reverse and remand for further proceedings on its conclusion that the habeas court improperly had acted sua sponte on the basis of that court's incorrect conclusion that the deliberate bypass standard implicates subject matter jurisdiction. Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction , 157 Conn.App. 701, 705, 707, 117 A.3d 1003 (2015). We granted the respondent's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following question: "Did the Appellate Court properly determine that it was improper, based on the record of this habeas petition, for the trial court to sua sponte dismiss the petition on procedural default grounds?" Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction , 318 Conn. 903, 122 A.3d 632 (2015).
After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.
The appeal is dismissed.