Summary
holding that thirteen days without shower, shave or recreation did not violate the Eighth Amendment
Summary of this case from Coleman v. HodgesOpinion
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-08-1448.
August 19, 2008
MEMORANDUM
Background
Sha P. Devon, an inmate presently confined at the State Correctional Institution, Dallas, Pennsylvania (SCI-Dallas), initiated this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff has submitted a request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, Devon's action will be dismissed, without prejudice, as legally frivolous pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Devon completed this Court's form application to proceed in forma pauperis and authorization to have funds deducted from his prison account. The Court then issued an Administrative Order directing the Warden of SCI-Dallas to commence deducting the full filing fee from Plaintiff's prison trust fund account.
Named as Defendants are the following officials at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institution, Frackville, Pennsylvania (SCI-Mahanoy): Warden; Captain Naumann, Sergeant Evans, and the correctional staff employed in the prison hospital on the 6-2 and 2-10 shifts. See Doc. 1, ¶ III.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was temporarily transferred to SCI-Mahanoy on May 22, 2008 for the purpose of undergoing a knee operation. Upon his entry into the prison, Devon was informed by Sergeant Evans "that I had a separation in the institution." Doc. 1, ¶ IV(1). As a result, he was assigned to a "hard cell" within the prison's Medical Department. Id.
His Complaint also describes the cell as being a suicide cell. See id. at ¶ (1).
Plaintiff states that despite making numerous requests and complaints, he remained in that cell for twenty-four (24) hours a day for a period of thirteen and a half (13 1/2) days without being permitted "to shower, or shave, or phone calls and recreation." Id. at (3). Devon seeks 3.5 million dollars in compensatory damages on the grounds that the conditions of his confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
It is unclear as to when Plaintiff underwent his knee surgery.
Discussion
28 U.S.C. § 1915 imposes obligations on prisoners who file civil actions in federal court and wish to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, e.g., that the full filing fee ultimately must be paid (at least in a non-habeas suit) § 1915(e)(2) provides:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
When considering a complaint accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a district court may rule that process should not be issued if the complaint is malicious, presents an indisputably meritless legal theory, or is predicated on clearly baseless factual contentions. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). Indisputably meritless legal theories are those "in which either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are clearly entitled to immunity from suit. . . ." Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 1990)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has added that "the plain meaning of `frivolous' authorizes the dismissal of in forma pauperis claims that . . . are of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995). It also has been determined that "the frivolousness determination is a discretionary one," and trial courts "are in the best position" to determine when an indigent litigant's complaint is appropriate for summary dismissal.Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.
Respondeat Superior
The SCI-Mahanoy Warden and Captain Naumann are two of the Defendants named in the Complaint. A plaintiff, in order to state an actionable civil rights claim, must plead two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law, and (2) that said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1990).
Civil rights claims brought cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, each named defendant must be shown, via the complaint's allegations, to have been personally involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976). As explained in Rode:
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
A review of the complaint establishes that there are no allegations of constitutional misconduct asserted against the Warden and Lieutenant Naumann. On the contrary, other than naming them as Defendants, the Complaint is completely silent with respect to the Warden and Naumann.
Based on the nature of Devon's allegations, it appears that he is attempting to establish liability against the SCI-Mahanoy Warden and Lieutenant Naumann solely based upon their supervisory roles. There are no claims that the alleged constitutional misconduct resulted from any actions, acquiescence, or omissions by those two Defendants. Thus, under the standards developed inRizzo and Rode, Plaintiff's Complaint to the extent that it is seeking to raise respondeat superior type assertions against those two officials is insufficient for purposes of establishing liability under § 1983.
Emotional Injury
Devon's Complaint seeks to recover 3.5 million dollars for cruel and unusual punishment. See Doc. 1, ¶ V(1). Although the absence of showering, shaving, telephone and recreation privileges for a period of approximately two (2) weeks may have created an uncomfortable situation for Devon, there is no allegation that he suffered any accompanying physical injury.
It is unclear as to whether Plaintiff is seeking to recover compensatory damages for emotional and psychological injuries sustained as a result of the Plaintiff's temporary detention in the SCI-Mahanoy isolation cell. For the reasons outlined below, Devon is not entitled to recover compensatory damages for mental anguish or emotional injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides that "[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." InAllah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247,250 (3d Cir. 2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that where a plaintiff fails to allege actual injury, Section 1997e(e) bars recovery of compensatory damages. However, the Court of Appeals added that an inmate alleging a violation of his constitutional rights may still pursue the action to recover nominal and/or punitive damages even in the absence of compensable harm. Under the standards announced in Allah, Devon's request for monetary relief to the extent that it seeks compensatory damages for emotional and psychological injuries caused by his confinement in an SCI-Mahanoy isolation cell is barred by Section 1997e(e).
Conditions of Confinement
The claims asserted by Plaintiff all regard his placement in an isolation cell within the SCI-Mahanoy Medical Department. Plaintiff indicates that he was kept in this cell for a period of thirteen and a half (13 1/2) days during which he was denied showering, shaving, telephone, and recreation privileges. Moreover, he was not permitted to leave his cell during that period.
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." This Amendment must be interpreted in accordance with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). However, a judge, when confronted with an Eighth Amendment claim, may not impose upon a prison his or her "notions of enlightened policy." Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 1988).
In order to implicate the Eighth Amendment, a condition of confinement must be so reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under contemporary standards or one that deprives an inmate of minimal civilized measure of the necessities of life. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). An Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official must meet two requirements: (1) "the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious;" and (2) the "prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In prison conditions cases, "that state of mind is one of `deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id.
Under Farmer, deliberate indifference is a subjective standard in that the prison official must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F. 3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). This requirement of actual knowledge means that "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held that while under certain circumstances, states may create liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause,
these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . ., nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.Id. at 484 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997), addressed an action initiated by a Pennsylvania state inmate who had been held in administrative custody for a prolonged period. The Court applied Sandin and concluded that placement without any type of due process hearing for a period of fifteen (15) months was not an atypical and significant hardship. Furthermore, the inmate's "commitment to and confinement in administrative custody did not deprive him of a liberty interest and that he was not entitled to procedural due process protection." Id. at 708. It added that prolonged confinement in administrative custody was not cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 709. Finally, an inmate placed in administrative custody pursuant to a legitimate penological reason could "be required to remain there as long as that need continues." Id.
Plaintiff acknowledges being placed in an isolation cell because it was determined that he "had a separation in the institution." Doc. 1, ¶ IV(1). In other words, there was a need to keep Devon separated from another prisoner or inmate faction within SCI-Mahanoy. This Court is satisfied that those undisputed circumstances provided a legitimate need for Plaintiff's initial temporary placement in a Medical Department isolation cell.
Second, the Court finds that the relatively short period of time spent by Devon in the Medical Department isolation cell prior to his transfer (approximately two (2) weeks) was not of such magnitude to constitute the atypical and significant hardship contemplated under Hudson, Sandin, and Farmer.
Specifically, it has been recognized that the denial of showers for two weeks is not a constitutional violation. See Briggs v. Heidlebaugh, 1997 WL 318081 *3 (E.D. Pa. 1997); DiFilippo v. Vaughn, 1996 WL 355336 at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Eighth Amendment does not require that prisoners be afforded frequent or comfortable showers); Veteto v. Miller, 829 F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (deprivation of showers during period of placement in administrative detention found not to be Eighth Amendment violation).
It is also unclear as to whether Plaintiff's knee condition/operation/recuperation negatively impacted his ability to shower or participate in recreation.
Likewise, the denial of recreation for thirteen days does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989). The halting of recreation during emergency lock downs "not objectively serious enough to warrant constitutional protection." Bacon v. Minner, 2007 WL 1157138 *2 (3d Cir. April 19, 2007).
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit inLopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1983), stated that prisoners enjoy no right to unlimited telephone use. See also Benzel v. Grammar, 869 F.2d 1105, 1110 (8th Cir. 1989) (a prison policy which denied phone privileges to inmates housed in administrative detention did not violate the Constitution since the policy furthered internal security and rehabilitation concerns); von Vital v. Dragovich, Civil No. 99-1669, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1999) (Conaboy, J.) (an inmate should reasonably expect that his placement in administrative detention would cause curtailment of telephone privileges).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously established that in order to assert a viable claim of telephone deprivation, an inmate must make some showing of prejudice or actual injury. Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1041 (3d Cir. 1989). More recent decisions by courts within this circuit have concluded that where an inmate has available, alternative means of communicating with the outside world, i.e., mail privileges, a § 1983 action alleging improper denial of telephone access was subject to dismissal. Acosta v. Bradley, 1999 WL 158471 *7 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (a prisoner has a constitutional right to use a telephone only if no other reasonable means of communication are available); Ingalls v. Florio, 968 F. Supp. 193, 203 (D.N.J. 1997).
Devon does not allege that he lacked alternative means as required under Acosta. Plaintiff has also not satisfied thePeterkin requirement of alleging actual injury. Based on an
Devon does not allege that he lacked alternative means as required under Acosta. Plaintiff has also not satisfied thePeterkin requirement of alleging actual injury. Based on an application of the standards announced in those decisions, Devon's assertion of being deprived telephone privileges for approximately two (2) weeks likewise does not rise to the level of a viable constitutional claim.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the temporary placement of Devon in an isolation cell within the SCI-Mahanoy Medical Department (where Plaintiff was apparently undergoing, awaiting, and/or recuperating from a knee operation) to protect his safety from a previously identified safety risk was appropriate. Moreover, the deprivation of privileges, including showering, telephone, and recreation during that limited two (2) week period does not rise to the level of a viable constitutional claim.
Since Plaintiff's complaint is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" it will be dismissed, without prejudice, as legally frivolous. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774. An appropriate Order will enter.
ORDER
AND NOW, THEREFORE, THIS 19th DAY OF AUGUST, 2008, in accordance with the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff's in forma pauperis motion is construed as a motion to proceed without full prepayment of fees and costs and the motion is granted.
2. Plaintiff's action is dismissed without prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
4. Any appeal from this Order will be deemed frivolous, without probable cause and not taken in good faith.