Opinion
No. 70-390 (Supreme Court No. 23455)
Decided November 10, 1970.
Action by five-year-old girl and her parents for personal injuries suffered by girl when she was bitten by zebra at zoo owned and operated by defendant city. From ruling that city was absolutely liable for injuries, defendant appealed.
Reversed
1. ANIMALS — General Rule — Harbors — Vicious and Unpredictable — Absolute Liability — Injuries. The general rule in Colorado is that one who harbors a wild animal, which by its very nature is vicious and unpredictable, does so at his peril, and liability for injuries inflicted by such animal is absolute.
2. General Rule — Absolute Liability — Not Extend — Municipal Zoo — Benefit of Public. The general rule as to absolute liability for one who harbors wild animals does not extend to a situation where a municipality maintains and operates a zoo for the benefit of the public and in response to the public's obvious desires.
3. NEGLIGENCE — City — Not Absolutely Liable — Wild Animals — Zoo. A city is not absolutely liable for injuries or harm inflicted by animals of wild heritage which are kept and exhibited in its city-owned zoo, and its liability, if it exists, must rest on proof of negligence.
4. Five-Year-Old — Not — Contributorily Negligent — No Imputation — Parent's Negligence. Five-year-old plaintiff, as a matter of law, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence nor is any possible negligence on the part of her parents imputable to her.
Error to the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Edward J. Keating, Judge.
Max P. Zall, City Attorney, Lloyd K. Shinsato, Assistant, Lee G. Rallis, Assistant, for plaintiff in error.
James G. Johnston and V. G. Seavy, Jr., for defendants in error.
This case was originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado and was subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals under the authority vested in the Supreme Court.
Denise Kennedy, a five-year-old girl, and her parents sued the City and County of Denver for personal injuries to Denise's hand suffered when she was bitten by a zebra at the zoo owned and operated by the City. The trial court ruled that the City was absolutely liable for such injuries and directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. An offer of proof was made by the City as to its lack of negligence and, impliedly, as to the contributory negligence of Denise and her parents. This was rejected by the trial court, and, following a jury award of damages and entry of judgment by the trial court, the defendant filed this appeal.
[1] This jurisdiction has adopted the general rule that "one who harbors a wild animal, which by its very nature is vicious and unpredictable, does so at his peril, and liability for injuries inflicted by such animal is absolute." Collins v. Otto, 149 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564.
The Collins case involved a situation where a coyote kept by the defendants on their property inflicted injury upon a four-year-old child. The rationale upon which absolute liability was predicated by our Supreme Court in that case was that, in keeping a vicious and dangerous animal, the defendants had acted wrongfully and unjustifiably. This is the rationale upon which the rule of absolute liability is imposed by most jurisdictions against one who harbors a wild animal. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 603. Under that rationale the act of keeping or harboring the animal is viewed, by itself, as an unreasonable act done in defiance of the safety and desires of the surrounding society, and consequently the one who performs it becomes an insurer as to that society.
[2] Considering such rationale, we do not think the rule in Collins extends to, nor was intended to extend to, a situation where a municipality maintains and operates a zoo for the benefit of the public and in response to the public's obvious desires. In such instance the keeping and displaying of animals which are commonly wild in nature is not an unreasonable or unjustified act.
Nor, in our opinion, does the rationale sometimes given for the rule in wild animal cases ( See W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 75) that one who exposes the public to the risk of a very dangerous thing is absolutely responsible make the rule applicable to a municipally owned and operated zoo. In the context of today's society and present zoological techniques, it would be unrealistic to hold as a matter of law, that the operation of a zoo by a municipality exposes the public to an inordinate risk. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 603.
[3] We hold that the City is not absolutely liable for injuries or harm inflicted by animals of wild heritage which are kept and exhibited in its city-owned zoo, and that its liability, if it exists, must rest on proof of negligence. Newman v. Cleveland Museum of Natural History, 143 Ohio St. 369, 55 N.E.2d 575.
[4] This case will be remanded for retrial, and for this reason we speak now concerning the City's affirmative defense of contributory negligence by Denise and her parents. Because of her age at the time of injury, Denise, as a matter of law, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence. Benallo v. Bare, 162 Colo. 22, 427 P.2d 323. Nor is any possible negligence on the part of her parents imputable to Denise. Denver City Tramway Co. v. Brown, 57 Colo. 484, 143 P. 364.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial on a basis consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE DWYER and JUDGE ENOCH concur.