Demmings v. State

Full title: ROBERT JOE DEMMINGS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Apr 14, 2009

Nos. 05-08-00495-CR, 05-08-00496-CR (Tex. App. Apr. 14, 2009)

Opinion

Nos. 05-08-00495-CR, 05-08-00496-CR

Opinion Filed April 14, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.

On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F07-53562-N F07-53563-HN.

Before Justices RICHTER, LANG, and MURPHY.

OPINION

MARY MURPHY, Justice.

A jury convicted Robert Joe Demmings of possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, in an amount less than one gram and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury found two enhancements to be true in each case and sentenced appellant to seventeen years' imprisonment on the possession of cocaine offense and fifty years' imprisonment on the unlawful possession of a firearm offense. In five points of error, appellant contends (1) the evidence is factually insufficient to support each conviction; (2) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the extraneous offense instruction in the charge; (3) the trial court erred by submitting the extraneous offense instruction in the charge; and (4) the trial court erred by overruling appellant's objection that the State's punishment phase closing argument was an improper "community demands" argument. We affirm the trial court's judgments.

Background

Dallas police detective Jacob Alanis is assigned to the narcotics division. After Alanis received complaints about possible drug activity at 3411 Nomas Street, he used a third party to purchase marijuana at the house. Based on that purchase, Alanis obtained a search warrant for the house. Prior to executing the warrant, Alanis drove by the house and saw several people, including appellant, in the yard. Dallas S.W.A.T. officers executed the warrant. Officer Larry Gordon was the first person to enter the house. The first thing Gordon noticed was appellant on his knees with his hands inside the cushion of one of the two couches in the living room. Gordon yelled several times for appellant to "get his hands out of the couch," but appellant did not respond to the order. Gordon yanked appellant from the couch, pushed him onto the floor, and held him at gunpoint until the rest of the house was secured. Gordon then looked under the cushion of the couch and saw crack cocaine where appellant's hands had been located. Elaine Williams was on the other couch in the living room. In all, there were four people in the house and several people in the yard. Alanis confirmed there were nine people total in the house and the yard. Dallas S.W.A.T. officer Mark Pippens participated in the execution of the search warrant. When Pippens entered the house, he heard Gordon repeatedly telling a person on the left couch to show his hands. Pippen confronted Williams, who appeared to be asleep on the other couch. Pippens estimated the couches were two to three feet apart. Officers J. Darst and Gregory Garcia of the narcotics division participated in the search of the house. Darst found crack cocaine and a crack pipe in plain view on the couch where Williams was sleeping and crack cocaine under the cushions of the other couch. Garcia found a shotgun under the couch on which Williams was sleeping. The gun was barely under the couch and was in reach of someone in the room who knew it was there. Garcia estimated the couches were four to five feet apart. According to Garcia, a person on one couch would have no difficulty reaching the gun under the other couch. Alanis described the house as very small. The two couches in the living room were no more than three feet apart. There was very little room to walk around, with clothes, luggage, and personal items between the two couches. The shotgun was found in the living room. According to Alanis, everything in the living room was in arm's reach. Although it was not loaded when seized, the shotgun was in working order and is a firearm. Tim Willis owned the Nomas house on June 14, 2007 when the search warrant was executed. He leased the house to Robert Demmings. However, Willis never met Demmings and knew him only by name. Demmings first leased the house on April 1, 2004 and signed a new lease with increased rent on November 1, 2006. The second lease ran through October 31, 2007. In Alanis's opinion, appellant allowed the house to be used as a "smoke house" where individuals came to use drugs. Alanis charged Williams with possession of the cocaine seized from the couch where she was sleeping and charged appellant with possession of the cocaine found under the cushion of the other couch. Appellant was also charged with possession of the shotgun because it was found at his address, appellant was in care, custody, and control of the house, and the shotgun was within appellant's reach. Alanis admitted the shotgun was also within Williams's reach. But, in Alanis's experience, it would be uncommon for a drug user, such as Williams, to bring a shotgun into a smoke house. Richard Hamb classifies and compares fingerprints in the intake identification section of the Dallas County Sheriff's Office. Hamb took appellant's fingerprints on the day of trial and compared them to a certified judgment and sentence for possession of cocaine entered on December 7, 2005 against Robert Joe Demmings. The conviction was a state jail felony offense. In Hamb's opinion, the fingerprints on the 2005 judgment are appellant's fingerprints. The address on the judicial confession signed by "Robert Demmings" relating to the 2005 judgment was 3411 Nomas Street. The jury found appellant guilty of both offenses. In the punishment phase, Hamb testified he reviewed the judgments relating to the enhancement paragraphs for each offense and those judgments contained appellant's fingerprints. The jury found the enhancements to be true and sentenced appellant to seventeen years' imprisonment for the possession of cocaine and fifty years' imprisonment for the unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the convictions. Specifically, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to establish he possessed either the cocaine or the shotgun.

Standard of Review

When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 282 (2007). We will set aside the verdict only if the evidence supporting the conviction is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or when the evidence supporting the conviction is outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705; Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524. Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact finder's determination concerning what weight to give contradictory testimony. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704-05; Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 87 (2007). "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); see King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The standard of review is the same for cases based on direct and circumstantial evidence. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; King, 29 S.W.3d at 565.

Unauthorized Possession of Contraband

For both alleged offenses, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant voluntarily possessed the prohibited item. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.01(a) (Vernon 2003). Possession is the "actual care, custody, control, or management" of the contraband. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon 2003). Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.01(b). The evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, must establish to the requisite level of confidence that appellant's connection with the contraband was more than just fortuitous. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405-06 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Smith v. State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 916 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd). In this case, appellant was not in exclusive possession of the place where the cocaine and the firearm were found. Accordingly, we cannot conclude he had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless other direct or circumstantial evidence establishes appellant's possession of the contraband beyond a reasonable doubt. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161-62 n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Smith; 176 S.W.3d at 916. The number of factors linking appellant to the contraband is less important than the logical force with which all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, connects appellant to the contraband. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162; Smith, 176 S.W.3d at 916. Possible links recognized by Texas courts include (1) the defendant's presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant's proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the contraband was found; (12) whether the place where the contraband was found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n. 12; Smith, 176 S.W.3d at 916; Bates v. State, 155 S.W.3d 212, 216-17 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). In deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to link appellant to the contraband, the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406.

Application to Cocaine

To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State must establish (1) the defendant exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) the defendant knew the matter possessed was contraband. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161. Here, appellant was present in the Nomas house when the officers executed the search warrant. Appellant was found with his hands under the cushion of the couch where the cocaine was later discovered and appeared to be trying to conceal the cocaine. Crack cocaine and a crack pipe were found within close proximity to appellant on the couch where Williams was asleep. Willis testified "Robert Demmings" leased the Nomas house and Alanis testified appellant was in control of the premises. Appellant points out that Willis testified he never met the "Robert Demmings" who leased the Nomas house and argues it was not definitely shown appellant was the lessee of the house. However, Hamb testified appellant's fingerprints were on the 2005 judgment for possession of cocaine. The Nomas address was on the judicial confession signed by "Robert Demmings" relating to that judgment. While admitting a conviction can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence, appellant asserts there is no evidence, such as DNA or fingerprints, "tending to forensically link Appellant to the contraband." The State was not required, however, to provide any direct evidence as long as the circumstantial evidence was factually sufficient to link appellant to the cocaine. Beall v. State, 237 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (affirmative links established by totality of circumstances). After considering all the evidence, we conclude the evidence sufficiently connected appellant to the cocaine.

Application to Firearm

To prove unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, the State must show the defendant was previously convicted of a felony offense and possessed a firearm after the conviction and before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement or from community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Appellant contends the evidence does not sufficiently link him to the shotgun found in the Nomas house, he was charged with possession of the firearm based on a profile or stereotype, and "law enforcement's story regarding the gun changed in the telling." Again, appellant was present in the house when the search warrant was executed. The shotgun was found barely under the couch on which Williams was sleeping. The couch was in arm's reach of appellant's location and the shotgun was readily available to appellant. The house was leased to "Robert Demmings" and the Nomas house was listed as appellant's address on the 2005 judicial confession for possession of cocaine. Alanis testified he charged appellant with possession of the shotgun because it was appellant's house, appellant was in control of the premises, and the shotgun was within appellant's reach. Alanis also testified that, in his opinion, appellant allowed individuals, such as Williams, to smoke drugs in the house and it would be unusual for a drug user to bring a shotgun into a smoke house. The jury was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406. We conclude the evidence sufficiently linked appellant to the shotgun.

Reasonable Alternate Hypothesis

In both points of error, appellant also argues there were multiple people in the house and Williams was in the living room with appellant. Appellant asserts the contraband could have belonged to any of these individuals and "the record is devoid of a refutation of this alternative reasonable hypothesis." However, the former standard of review requiring reversal of circumstantial evidence cases unless the defendant's guilt is the only reasonable hypothesis has been overruled. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 160-61 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (overruling Geesa's requirement that "reasonable doubt" be defined in jury charge); Manivanh v. State, No. 05-07-00921-CR, 2008 WL 4952837, at *4 (Tex.App.-Dallas Nov. 21, 2008, pet. filed). The jury, not the reviewing court, "accepts or rejects reasonably equal competing theories of causation." Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).

Conclusion

In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we have the "ability to second-guess the jury to a limited degree." Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524. But our review should still be deferential and we must have a "high level of skepticism" about the jury's verdict before we can reverse based on factual insufficiency of the evidence. Id. In this case, we are unable to reach the high level of skepticism necessary to reverse the jury's verdict. The evidence is factually sufficient to support both convictions. We overrule appellant's first two points of error.

Jury Instruction

In his third and fourth points of error, appellant asserts trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to an extraneous offense instruction in the jury charge that improperly placed appellant's credibility in issue and that the trial court erred by submitting the improper jury instruction. The trial court instructed the jury:

[I]f there is any testimony before you in this case regarding the defendant's having committed offenses other than the offense alleged against him in the indictment of this case, you cannot consider that testimony for any purpose unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those other offenses, if any were committed, and even then you may only consider them in determining the credibility of the defendant, if any, in connection with the offense alleged against him in the indictment in this case, and for no other purpose.

Appellant argues he did not testify and, therefore, his credibility was not at issue. He claims the instruction that the extraneous prior drug possession case was relevant only to appellant's credibility assumed the State had proved the felon-status element of the possession of a firearm offense, reducing the State's burden of proof. Further, appellant contends, the instruction erroneously informed the jury that his credibility was in issue and "allowed the jury to conclude that based upon his status as a felon Appellant was untruthful when he plead not guilty."

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of his counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. Accordingly, allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). With regard to allegations of deficient performance, "trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective." Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003)). "Absent such an opportunity, an appellate court should not find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was `so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.'" Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001)). Appellant did not raise his complaint by motion for new trial. Because the record is silent regarding any explanation for trial counsel's actions, we conclude appellant has not met his burden to overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. See Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506-07 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) ("The record in this case is insufficient to support the conclusion [that appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel] because appellant did not develop a record in the trial court for the purpose of establishing this claim."); Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (appellate court is not required to indulge in speculation concerning counsel's decision-making processes or to imagine reasons why counsel acted or failed to act in particular manner). We overrule point of error three.

Jury Charge Error

In his fourth point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred by submitting the extraneous offense instruction to the jury. Our review of alleged jury charge error is a two step process. Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). First, we determine whether error exists. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim App. 2005); Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 731. If we find error, we analyze that error for actual, rather than merely theoretical, harm to the defendant. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750; Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (op. on reh'g); see Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). When, as in this case, the defendant fails to object or states he has no objection to the charge, we will not reverse for jury charge error unless the record shows "egregious harm" to the defendant. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743-44; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Egregious errors affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affect a defensive theory. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750. Whether the error was so egregious that a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial requires us to consider: (1) the entire jury charge; (2) the state of the evidence; (3) the arguments of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information in the record. Id. at 750 n. 48; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Appellant first argues the trial court erred by submitting the extraneous offense instruction in the unlawful possession of a firearm case because "[b]y instructing the jury that any extraneous possession case was relevant only to Appellant's credibility the charge assumed the State had proven the felon-status element of the charge because the only extraneous evidence was that of the prior possession conviction." Appellant asserts the instruction was, therefore, an erroneous comment on the weight of the evidence. We disagree with appellant's premise that the extraneous offense instruction addressed the 2005 conviction for possession of cocaine. Proof of a prior conviction, in this case the 2005 conviction for possession of cocaine, was an element of the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon that the State was required to prove. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.04(a); State v. Mason, 982 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); McIlroy v. State, 188 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). The jury was properly instructed that it could find appellant guilty of unlawful possession of the firearm by a felon if the jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed the shotgun after appellant was "duly and legally convicted on the 7th day of December, 2005, of the offense of possession of a controlled substance." The extraneous offense instruction in the unlawful possession of a firearm charge referred to any evidence regarding the possession of cocaine on June 14, 2007. As such, the instruction in no way assumed the felon-status element of the possession of a firearm charge or constituted an erroneous comment on the weight of the evidence. Appellant next contends the extraneous offense instruction erroneously informed the jury "Appellant's credibility was in issue and allowed the jury to conclude that based upon his status as a felon Appellant was untruthful when he plead not guilty." Appellant asserts he was egregiously harmed by the instruction because it allowed the jury to determine his guilt "not upon the elements of the offense but upon its belief about his credibility, an issue upon which the only evidence was his prior conviction." Appellant did not testify at trial and, therefore, his credibility was not a contested issue. The trial court, therefore, erred by giving the jury an instruction that limited the extraneous offenses to an improper purpose — passing on appellant's credibility. Rivera v. State, 233 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007, pet ref'd). We must next determine whether the error in the instruction caused appellant egregious harm. We first consider the entire jury charge. In both cases, the jury was properly instructed regarding the elements of each offense. The jury was further instructed the State was required to prove appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and, if the State failed to do so, the jury should find appellant not guilty. The trial court instructed the jury that it was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Further, the jury was instructed appellant was presumed innocent and the jury could not consider appellant's decision not to testify against him. On appeal, we generally presume the jury followed the trial court's instructions as presented in the charge. Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). To rebut this presumption, appellant is required to point to evidence the jury failed to do so. Id. Appellant has failed to point to anything in the record to rebut the presumption the jury followed the trial court's instructions — including the instruction not to consider appellant's failure to testify. Nothing in the record indicates the jury was confused by the extraneous offense instruction or failed to require the State to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We next review the state of the evidence. The primary dispute at trial concerned whether appellant possessed the cocaine or the shotgun. As discussed above, the evidence was factually sufficient to support a finding appellant possessed both items beyond a reasonable doubt. Turning to the argument of counsel, both the prosecutor and defense counsel focused on whether the State had proved appellant possessed the cocaine and the shotgun. Defense counsel also argued inconsistencies or "mistakes" in the State's evidence and that these inconsistencies amounted to reasonable doubt. Neither side mentioned the extraneous offense instruction. The only mention of appellant's failure to testify came from defense counsel, who stated, "When the State doesn't prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no need for the defendant to testify. Why?" The trial sustained the State's objection to defense counsel's "commenting on the defendant's silence." There is nothing in either side's closing argument that would lead the jury to believe it could find appellant guilty based on anything other than finding each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. After a comprehensive review of the record, we conclude the extraneous offense instruction was an inconsistency that created a null instruction to the jury in light of the entire charge. It did not affect the very basis of appellant's case, i.e., his guilt or innocence in light of all the evidence. It did not deprive appellant of a valuable right or affect any defensive theory. Therefore, though the instruction was error, it did not cause the egregious harm that would require reversal. See Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 731; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. We overrule appellant's fourth point of error.

Improper Closing Argument

In his fifth point of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by overruling appellant's objection to the State's closing argument in the punishment phase as an improper "community demands" argument. In the State's closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "somebody has to stand up for your neighbors, for your community, for the people you work with, for the other people who work in Dallas County." After the trial court overruled appellant's objection to the argument, the prosecutor continued: You have an obligation to speak on behalf of the community to tell him and all the people he's going to talk to when he gets down to the penitentiary what the citizens of Dallas County think about this life-style. I'm not telling you it's an easy thing to do, but we always hear people saying what are we going to do about crime. It's rampant and we all know it. I wish we had every man like Robert Demmings in this court today and would he could [sic] sentence all of them to life in prison. We would have a better community, I submit to you. But we don't. Today we have Robert Demmings. Robert Demmings goes down to the penitentiary and he talks about what happened in this courtroom today, he talks about where that life led him. Maybe somebody will get the message and not come to Dallas County and do this. Permissible jury argument generally falls into one of four areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) an answer to the argument of counsel; or (4) a plea for law enforcement. Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009), pet. for cert. filed, (No. 08-8922, Feb. 23, 2009). A proper plea for law enforcement may include arguing the relationship between the jury's verdict and the deterrence of crime in general, arguing that juries should deter specific crimes by their verdicts, and arguing the impact of the jury's verdict on the community. Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 55-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (per curiam); Rodriguez v. State, 90 S.W.3d 340, 365 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, pet. ref'd). The State is not permitted to argue that the community demands or expects a certain verdict or a specific punishment. Borjan, 787 S.W.2d at 56; Rodriguez, 90 S.W.3d at 365. The State may, however, request the jury to represent or be the voice of the community when reaching its verdict. Cortez v. State, 683 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (explaining that argument constitutes proper plea for law enforcement if urges jury to be "voice" of community, rather than asking jury to lend ear to community); Harris v. State, 122 S.W.3d 871, 888 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd). Although appellant maintains that the prosecutor's argument implies the community demanded protection and a lengthy sentence, we disagree. The prosecutor's argument does not refer to the expectations or demands of the community. Rather, the argument informed the jury that it was the voice of the community and, as a representative of the citizens of Dallas County, it could consider the impact of its verdict on the community. See Cortez, 683 S.W.2d at 421); Hawkins v. State, No. 11-06-00309-CR, 2008 WL 4070269, at *7 (Tex.App.-Eastland Sept. 4, 2008, no pet.). We conclude the prosecutor's argument constituted a proper plea for law enforcement. See Borjan, 787 S.W.2d at 53. We overrule appellant's fifth point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgments.