Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-6825.
June 2, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of June, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No. 22), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is DENIED.
Defendants move for reconsideration of this Court's May 20, 2004 Order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment in part. "`The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.'" Rosenbaum v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, Civ. A. No. 01-6758, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15652, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 8, 2003) (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1986)). "Generally, a motion for reconsideration will only be granted on one of the following three grounds: (1) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence, which was not previously available, has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice." Blue Mt. Mushroom, Co. v. Monterey Mushroom, 246 F. Supp.2d 394, 398 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). Reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources. Moyer v. Italwork, Civ. A. No. 95-2264, 1997 WL 312178, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1997).
Defendants do not assert that this Court's May 20, 2004 Order should be reconsidered based on an intervening change in controlling law or newly available evidence. Instead, Defendants argue only that reconsideration of this Court's Order is necessary to correct clear errors of law and to prevent manifest injustice. Defendants argue that they were not given sufficient time to file a supplemental brief addressing misstatements of fact contained in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. However, none of alleged misstatements of fact cited by Defendants in connection with the instant Motion were material to the Court's May 20, 2004 Order. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant relief from its May 20, 2004 Order on this ground.
Defendants also argue that this action is barred by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that in order to recover damages for harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must first prove that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Id. at 486-87. Defendants note that Plaintiff recently pleaded guilty to the state criminal charges underlying the instant action and that Plaintiff has not challenged the validity of his guilty plea. Defendants argument is misplaced, however, as Heck made clear that a § 1983 action may proceed where "the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff." Id. at 487 (emphasis in original). The instant action, which challenges only the constitutionality of the Defendants' stop and frisk of Plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment and the Pennsylvania constitution, does not necessarily implicate the validity of Plaintiff's underlying conviction. Indeed, the Heck Court expressly acknowledged that a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even where the § 1983 plaintiff's conviction is still outstanding. See id. at 487 n. 7. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant relief from its May 20, 2004 Order on this ground.
Defendants also argue that the Court incorrectly analyzed the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim as a stop and frisk under the "reasonable suspicion" standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Defendants appear to argue that they have satisfied the more stringent "probable cause" standard applicable to the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, Defendants contend that they had probable cause to search Plaintiff based on their prior encounters with Plaintiff and their receipt of a radio call advising that he was a suspect in a car theft. However, it is undisputed that Defendants did not arrest Plaintiff prior to searching his pockets. While the Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of [plaintiff's] person, [it is not] particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa," Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980), there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff at the time of the search. See, e.g., Boyce v. Woodruff, 979 F. Supp. 817, 825 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (finding genuine issue of material fact as to probable cause for arrest where officer knew only that plaintiff was a criminal suspect based on police radio call and citing relevant case law). Accordingly, the Court declines to grant relief from its May 20, 2004 Order on this ground.
Defendants finally argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that he suffered actual injury as a result of Defendants' actions. However, nominal damages are still available when a plaintiff is unable to prove that the deprivation of a constitutional right resulted in actual injury. Memphis County Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11 (1986). Accordingly, the Court declines to grant relief from its May 20, 2004 Order on this ground.
Accordingly, the instant Motion is denied in its entirety.