Opinion
No. CV-07-473-PHX-DGC.
December 3, 2007
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Victor Dema filed an amended complaint against Defendants Snell Wilmer, L.L.P. and attorneys Robert Feinberg and Michael Yates on August 8, 2007. Dkt. #10. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. #11. Plaintiff has responded and Defendants have replied. Dkt. ##12, 13. The Court will grant the motion.
I. Background.
Beginning on September 22, 2005, Defendants represented Banner Medical Center in a state court civil defamation action brought by Plaintiff ("Banner Case"). During discovery in the Banner Case, Defendants obtained and disclosed documents relating to Plaintiff's past criminal proceedings regarding an alleged sham marriage. Plaintiff alleges that these records were improperly created and obtained. Plaintiff asserts that the court in the Banner Case disallowed one of his exhibits as evidence, that Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on behalf of Banner that was granted, and that the state court judge signed the order ninety days after choosing to grant the motion.
After receiving an adverse judgment in the Banner Case, Plaintiff sued Defendants in this Court. Dkt. #1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. #6. Before this Court could rule on the motion, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint to remedy deficiencies in the first complaint. The amended complaint asserts federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and numerous state law claims. Dkt. #10. Defendants then filed this motion to dismiss. Dkt. #11.
The complaint's caption lists "defamation of character in course of judicial process, conspiracy to discriminate, racially motivated discrimination, false light invasion of privacy, spoliation of evidence, invasion of privacy, abusive discovery tactics intended to invade plaintiff's legal rights, and intentional infliction of emotional distress." Dkt. #10.
II. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim, "[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's § 1981 claim fails because it does not establish a contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Section 1981 guarantees the "right . . . to make and enforce contracts[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1981. "Any claim brought under [§] 1981 . . . must initially identify an impaired `contractual relationship,' under which the plaintiff has rights." Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). Plaintiff alleges no contractual relationship. Plaintiff and Defendants were opponents in the Banner Case. He had no contract with Defendants. The Court accordingly will dismiss Plaintiff's § 1981 claim.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for persons deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and federal law by those acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acting under color of state law must exercise power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." West, 487 U.S. at 49. Courts give "careful adherence to the `state action' requirement." Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 708 (1991). Mere "conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts," are "insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act." Id.
Private actors associated with a winning party in a court proceeding usually have not acted under color of state law. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (private attorney representing opposing party was not acting under color of state law, despite plaintiff's claims that the attorney conspired with state officers to deny due process); Price, 939 F.2d at 707-08 (private landowners who sought court approval before taking actions regarding real property did not act under color of state law simply by resorting to the courts); Phillips v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural Ornamental Iron Workers, 556 F.2d 939, 940 (9th Cir. 1977) (union officials who brought allegedly meritless suits against members did not act under color of state law simply by resorting to the court system).
Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that Defendants acted under color of state law, but his factual allegations do not support the claim. Defendants were private attorneys representing a private party in a civil lawsuit, not state actors. Plaintiff discusses various events in the Banner case — alleged defamation by Defendants based on publication of various records, the judge's denial of Plaintiff's request to present certain evidence, an alleged racial connection between the judge and Defendants, and the grant of summary judgment against Plaintiff — but these allegations, even construed liberally, fail to support any reasonable inference that Defendants were acting under color of state law. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Plaintiff's complaint does not specify which of three subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 he pleads. Subsection (1) addresses conspiracy to prevent federal officials from discharging their duties — a provision that clearly does not apply here. Subsection (2) deals with conspiracy to obstruct justice by force, intimidation, or threat, but Plaintiff alleges no such facts. Subsection (3), prohibiting conspiracy to deprive a person of rights or privileges, is the only plausible subsection.
To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove (1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person of equal protection of the law, or of equal privileges and immunities under the law, (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) that the plaintiff was injured in his person or property, or that the plaintiff was deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Further, the plaintiff must prove that the deprivation of a protected right was motivated by some racial, or otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus. Id. Mere conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are not sufficient. A valid claim must be supported by specific factual allegations. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988); Gillepsie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1988) (pro se plaintiff who claimed merely that he was a black prisoner who was denied medical care failed to allege specific facts suggesting a conspiracy or motivation by racial animus, and thus did not state a § 1985(3) claim); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff who showed only that an alleged coconspirator deceived the plaintiff, but not that an agreement between the coconspirator and the defendant existed, did not state a claim for conspiracy).
Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to present evidence in court because it was "missing," that the state court judge ruled against him on several motions, that a bias of racial identity existed, and that defendants met with state court officials to form a conspiracy. Plaintiff does not explain how his inability to produce evidence or the judge's decisions showed any action by Defendants at all, much less a conspiracy between Defendants and the judge. Furthermore, Plaintiff supports his claim of racial bias only by indicating that he is African-American and Defendants are Caucasian. This fact alone does not show racial bias or a conspiracy based on race. Finally, all of Plaintiff's allegations appear to be facts necessarily connected with Defendants' responsibility to represent Banner and the state judge's legal decisions based on that representation. Nothing suggests action outside of Defendants' typical professional activity. Such professional activities do not state a claim for civil conspiracy. The Court will grant Defendants' motion regarding the section 1985(3) claim.
III. State Law Claims.
Because the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court has discretion to dismiss the remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "To decline jurisdiction under section 1367(c)(3), the district court must first identify the dismissal that triggers the exercise of discretion and then explain how declining jurisdiction serves the objectives of economy, convenience and fairness to the parties, and comity." Tr. of Constr. Indus. Laborers Health Welfare Trust v. Desert Valley Landscape Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003).
The foregoing discussion identifies the dismissal of federal claims that triggers the Court's discretion under § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiff's remaining state law claims are most properly addressed by the courts of Arizona — courts charged with administering the laws of Arizona and more familiar with state-law claims. Courts have recognized that when all federal claims are eliminated early in a case and only state claims remain, the district court has "a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 348-51 (1988); see Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002) (declining supplemental jurisdiction after granting summary judgment against plaintiffs' federal claims); Oye v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining supplemental jurisdiction after granting defendants' motion to dismiss federal claims). Given that this case is only at the pleading stage, additional resources dedicated to resolving state law claims should occur in state court. The Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining claims.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. #11) is granted.
2. Plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed.
3. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims.
4. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.