Opinion
00 Civ. 5137 (SWK)
December 30, 2002
OPINION
Plaintiffs Maria DeJesus and Vincente Delgado move for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). In the alternative, Plaintiffs move for an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) precluding defendants Gil Raphael and Luis Padilla from offering testimony at the time of trial in this matter based upon their failure to appear and give testimony at depositions. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted; Plaintiffs' motion to preclude Defendants from testifying at trial is denied.
I. FACTS
On January 23, 2000, Plaintiff DeJesus was driving a vehicle in Bronx, New York in which Plaintiff Delgado was a passenger. DeJesus stopped her vehicle at a red light at the intersection of East Gunhill Road and Boston Road and was subsequently struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Defendant Raphael and owned by Defendant Padilla. It had rained earlier that day and the roads were wet at the time of the accident. Raphael allegedly attempted to brake but skidded on the wet road into the back of Dejesus' car.
The Defendants have failed to appear for their depositions as noticed by Plaintiffs and have not been located by counsel for either party.
II. DISCUSSION
A. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party must initially satisfy a burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which can be done merely by pointing to an absence of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, (1986). The nonmoving party must then come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), by "a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
The court "must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party defending against the motion." Eastway Constr. Corg. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1988); Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986). But the Court is to inquire whether "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), and to grant summary judgment where the nonmovant's evidence is merely colorable, conclusory, speculative or not significantly probative. See id. at 249-50; Knight, 804 F.2d at 12, 15;Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986)
To determine whether the nonmoving party has met his or her burden, the court must focus on both the materiality and the genuineness of the factual issues raised by the nonmovant. As to materiality, "it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude summary judgment,see id., but the presence of unresolved factual issues that are material to the outcome of the litigation mandates a denial of the summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Knight, 804 F.2d at 11-12. In sum, if the court determines that "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial."' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corg., 475 U.S. 574, 587, (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1969)).
B. ANALYSIS
Under New York law, a rear-end collision with a stopped automobile establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty of explanation on the operator of that vehicle. See Mascitti v. Greene, 250 A.D.2d 821, 673 N.Y.S.2d 206 (N.Y.App.Div. 1998); Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392, 393, 638 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996). Accordingly, "[t]he operator of the moving vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence created by an unexplained rear-end collision." Leal, 224 A.D.2d at 393, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (internal citations omitted). "If the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiff may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law." Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635, 636, 635 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (N.Y.App.Div. 1995). If, however, the offending driver provides a non-negligent explanation for the collision, the inference of negligence is overcome and a motion for summary judgment is precluded. See Riley v. County of Broome, 256 A.D.2d 899, 681 N.Y.S.2d 851, 851-852 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999). Such a non-negligent explanation may include mechanical failure, unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, or any other reasonable cause. See Leal, 224 A.D.2d at 393, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 111; Barile, 222 A.D.2d at 636, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
Through counsel, Defendants allege that the wet conditions on the roadway caused their car to skid into Plaintiffs' vehicle. The police report also notes that "Vehicle #2 [Defendant] states that while traveling west on East Gunhill Road he slid into Vehicle #2 at the light." Affirmation of Jonathan A. Rapport, Esq., dated March 6, 2002 at ¶ 5, Ex. A. Defendants also assert that the testimony of Plaintiff DeJesus establishes that she "stopped short," thereby causing Defendants to slide on the wet pavement. See Mem. of Law in Opp. at 7-8.
The Court notes that although the Police Report states that "Vehicle #2 . . . slid into Vehicle #2 at the light," this likely should have read "Vehicle #2 . . . slid into Vehicle #1 at the light."
Even assuming, however, that the skid was caused by the wet roadway, it is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. See e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzalez, 269 A.D.2d 250, 251, 703 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126 (N.Y.App.Div. 2000) (finding that driver's claim that he failed to stop because of wet roadway is insufficient to rebut presumption of negligence in a rear-end collision); Schmidt v. Edelman, 263 A.D.2d 502, 692 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. A.D. 1999) (holding that a defense which only alleges that the defendant saw the plaintiff's vehicle lawfully stopped and applied the brakes but the vehicle nonetheless slid or skidded into the plaintiff's vehicle as insufficient to rebut the inference of negligence created by the unexplained rear-end accident); Pincus v. Cohen, 198 A.D.2d 405, 604 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y.App.Div. 1993) (stating that braking but nevertheless skidding on a wet roadway is not a "sudden or unavoidable circumstance" that would rebut a presumption of negligence). Moreover, "[a] driver is expected to drive at a sufficiently safe speed and to maintain enough distance between himself and cars ahead of him so as to avoid collisions with stopped vehicles, taking into account the weather and road conditions." Mitchell, 269 A.D.2d at 251, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
The Court finds that Defendants have not offered an explanation for the collision sufficient to rebut the inference of negligence created by a rear-end collision. As a result, Plaintiffs DeJesus and Delgado are entitled to partial summary judgment on the question of the liability of Defendants Rafael and Padilla. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion is granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, DeJesus and Delgado's motion for partial summary judgment on liability is granted. Further, Plaintiffs' motion to preclude the testimony of Defendants at trial is hereby denied. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to enter judgment for Plaintiffs in accordance with the rulings in this Opinion.
SO ORDERED.