Opinion
No. NNI CV02 0279898S
November 15, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
The plaintiffs have filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict and for a new trial, dated June 3, 2005, alleging that the trial court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings that were consequential enough to have had a substantial effect on the jury verdict, which was rendered on May 25, 2005. See Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 555-56 (1954). In particular, the plaintiffs argue that the court erred in the following ways:
1. The trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the speeds at which other motorists customarily drive on Research Parkway in Meriden, Connecticut.
2. The trial court erred in allowing police officer Harris to testify that he would not ticket motorists for traveling up to 15 miles per hour over the posted speed limit on said Research Parkway.
3. The trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the design speed of Research Parkway.
4. The trial court erred in not allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence that the defendant Ollie Simmons tested positive for marijuana at the Midstate Medical Center immediately after the accident.
5. The trial court erred in not allowing the plaintiff to make an offer of proof relative to the defendant Ollie Simmons' familiarity with "420" a euphemism for marijuana and the tradition among marijuana users of smoking marijuana on April 20th.
The defendants have filed an objection to the plaintiffs' motion, said objection being dated July 15, 2005, and a hearing on the motion was held on July 18, 2005.
The case involved a motor vehicle accident which occurred on April 20, 2000 in Meriden, Connecticut. The plaintiff Paula Deegan, while operating a sports utility vehicle, was traveling on Murdock Avenue approaching its intersection with Research Parkway. The defendant Ollie Simons was operating a tractor trailer truck on Research Parkway. The truck was owned by the defendant Robert DeMagistris who employed Simmons. The accident occurred when Paula Deegan proceeded from a stop sign and attempted to take a left hand turn onto Research Parkway, traveling into the path of the truck operated by Simmons. The plaintiff Michael Deegan is the husband of Paula Deegan. He was not involved in the accident, but claimed bystander emotional distress upon his arrival at the accident scene and a loss of consortium. The plaintiffs claim that the accident was due to the negligence of the defendants. The defendants denied that they were negligent and in turn, alleged a special defense of contributory negligence by Paula Keegan.
The case was tried to the jury and following the conclusion of evidence this court charged the jury on the applicable law. Acting upon the agreement of counsel for the parties, the court provided the jury with verdict forms and interrogatories. Interrogatory 1 asked if the plaintiff Paula Keegan proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Simmons was negligent in the operation of the tractor trailer truck. The jury, after deliberating, answered "No" to Interrogatory 1 and returned a verdict for the defendants. In accordance with the instructions contained in the interrogatories, the jury, in entering a defendants' verdict was not required to proceed further and answer the remaining interrogatories.
I. Legal Standards Re Motion to Set Aside Jury Verdict
The trial court must view the evidence offered at trial in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 534 (1999). The ultimate test is whether given the evidence offered at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; Herb v. Kerr, 190 Conn. 136, 140 (1983); the jury reasonably could have concluded as it did . . . The facts, must be viewed in the light favorable to sustaining the verdicts. Id. The basic question is whether upon all of the evidence an injustice has been done. Burr v. Lichtenstein, 190 Conn. 351, 355 (1983).
"However it is the court's duty to set aside the verdict when it finds that it does manifest injustice, and is . . . palpably against the evidence . . ." Labbe v. Hartford Pension Commission, 239 Conn. 168, 192 (1996); State v. Chin Lung, 106 Conn. 701, 704 (1927). A verdict that is inconsistent or ambiguous should also be set aside. Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 425-26 (1993). It is also proper for a trial court, using due caution, and in the exercise of its discretion, to set aside a verdict when satisfied its rulings on evidence were erroneous and that those erroneous rulings were consequential enough to have had a substantial effect on the verdict. Ardoline v. Keegan, supra, 140 Conn. 555-56.
Plaintiffs in filing this motion claim that the trial court made several palpable errors in its rulings prior to trial and during trial that were consequential enough to have a substantial effect on the verdict. The court will address these claims, bearing in mind that a trial court's ruling on admissibility of evidence is entitled to great deference, and that the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., supra, 249 Conn. 523, 546-47. Rulings on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of clear abuse of the court's discretion. Id.
II. EVIDENCE OF SPEED
The plaintiff's first thee arguments concern the introduction of evidence of speed which other motorists drive on Research Parkway in Meriden, Connecticut. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in that it allowed:
1. Evidence concerning the speeds at which other motorists customarily drive on Research Parkway;
2. Testimony from police officer Harris that he would not ticket motorists for traveling up to 15 miles per hour over the 40 miles per hour posted speed limit on Research Parkway;
3. Evidence concerning the design speed of Research Parkway.
The plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant operator Simmons violated General Statutes § 14-218a. The plaintiffs also alleged among other things that Simmons (1) failed to keep a reasonable and proper lookout; (2) failed to keep his vehicle under reasonable and proper control and; (3) failed to properly steer the vehicle he was operating in such a manner so as to avoid colliding with the plaintiffs' vehicle. Based on these listed allegations regarding the claimed negligence of the defendant Simmons and those allegations of negligence against the plaintiff as set forth in the defendants' special defenses, the court charged the jury on statutory negligence and common-law negligence, including the definition of reasonable care and the reasonably prudent person. The court also charged the jury on the common-law allegations of unreasonable speed, as it might apply to either the plaintiff Paula Keegan or the defendant Simmons. Unreasonable speed is governed by the standard of reasonable care and the reasonably prudent person in view of the circumstances prevailing on the date of the accident and at the location of the accident. Neither party objected to the charge on common-law unreasonable speed. This charge on unreasonable speed as it might affect the actions of both drivers was in addition to a charge on Paula Keegan's allegations that Simmons violated General Statute § 14-218a.
Sec. 14-218a reads in relevant parts as follows:
(a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state . . . at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of highway, road or parking area, the intersection of streets and weather conditions. The State Traffic Commission may determine speed limits which are reasonable and safe on any state highway, bridge or parkway built or maintained by the state, and differing limits may be established for different types of vehicles, and may erect or cause to be erected signs indicating such speed limits . . . Any speed in excess of such limits, other than speeding as provided for in section 14-219, shall be prima facie evidence that such speed is not reasonable, but the fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than such limits shall not relieve the operator from the duty to decrease speed when a special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions . . .
Accordingly, the jury was thus charged on common-law negligence, including the definition of reasonable care and the reasonably prudent person. With respect to speed, the jury was charged that a reasonable speed is the speed a reasonable person would travel at under the circumstances which presented themselves to the parties, including the defendant Simmons, including evidence of posted speed. The jury was allowed to consider evidence of speed that other drivers on Research Parkway drove at in considering whether the defendant Simmons' speed on the date in question was reasonable. While common custom or practice cannot be shown for the purposes of establishing whether or not certain conduct was negligent, it can be used to assist the trier of fact in determining if the conduct of the person charged with negligence was that of a reasonably prudent person. DePaola v. Seamour, 163 Conn. 246, 251-52, 303 A.2d 737 (1972), citing Eamiello v. Piscitelli, 133 Conn. 360, 368-69, 51 A.2d 912 (1947).
The speed of other drivers was also introduced for the purposes of establishing whether the conduct of the plaintiff operator, in proceeding past the stop sign was that of a reasonably prudent person. In order to determine reasonableness under the prevailing circumstances, the jury was entitled to hear of the usual speed of other motorists through the area where this accident occurred.
The defendant had asserted special defenses addressing the plaintiff's own alleged negligent conduct. Evidence of common or frequently utilized speeds on Research Parkway is also evidence of what the plaintiff knew or should have known as she arrived at the subject intersection. The plaintiff lived in the area and testified that she was familiar with the roads and traffic at the subject intersection where the accident occurred. The evidence established that the plaintiff knew or should have known that vehicles frequently travel over the posted speed limit on Research Parkway, and that the plaintiff should have known that more diligence was required in her observations of oncoming traffic approaching her, before pulling out into the subject intersection.
Regarding evidence design speed for Research Parkway, this evidence was also within the context of establishing the reasonableness of the defendant operator's speed and the reasonableness of the plaintiff's operation of her vehicle, based upon the circumstances and conditions prevailing on the date of the accident.
III. Evidence Regarding Marijuana
The plaintiffs next claim that the court erred in not allowing the plaintiffs to introduce documentary evidence that the defendant operator Simmons allegedly tested positive for the presence of marijuana in his system on the date of the accident, and for not allowing an offer of proof during trial regarding whether Simmons had knowledge of an alleged tradition among marijuana users of smoking marijuana on April 20th.
The accident in this matter occurred on April 20, 2000.
The initial ruling by the court excluding this evidence was in response to a pretrial motion in limine filed by the defendants. The rulings excluding this evidence were issued prior to the commencement of evidence. The plaintiffs, as they do now, relied upon State v. Clark, 260 Conn. 813, 810 A.2d. 718 (2000). In Clark the witness testified to smoking five marijuana cigarettes shortly before the incident. [It is undisputed that impeachment of a witness by evidence of narcotics use near in time to the events about which the witness testifies is a proper area of inquiry. Id. at 820; See also, State v. Barbetta, 238 Conn. 313, 320-23, 680 A.2d 1284 (1996). In State v. Clark, supra, at 824-26, the Supreme Court found that expert testimony was not needed on the effect of smoking those cigarettes.
In the instant case, expert testimony would not be necessary on the effects of marijuana if there was evidence that the defendant operator had smoked or ingested marijuana within a relevant time period prior to the accident. Without this type of evidence, however, expert testimony was necessary to explain the significance of a lab result indicating an "abnormal result" for a cannabinoid screen.
There was no evidence that marijuana had been used and no evidence that the defendant operator was impaired in the operation of the truck he was driving. The lab results alone would not explain: (1) how long the cannabinoid substance stays in a person's system; (2) the amount of cannabinoid in the defendant operator's system; (3) the relationship between cannabinoid and marijuana; (4) how recently the cannabinoid came into the defendant's system; (5) what other products might cause a positive result for a cannabinoid substance; whether urine tests might produce a false positive result and, if so, how often; (7) the possibility for contamination of the sample: and (8) the chain of custody of any sample. These are not subject areas within the common knowledge of the jury. The plaintiffs needed expert testimony to interpret any lab results and to explain the significance of said results, which only indicated that the results of the test were "abnormal." The lab report did not indicate on its face that it was above any reliable level or indicators.
To simply allow a lab result without any evidence as to how it relevant would be highly prejudicial to the defendants. The prejudicial effect would far outweigh its probative value. The lab test only related that it was an "abnormal test result," and nothing further. This is an ambiguous finding. It did not indicate that the defendant operator was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the accident. There was no other evidence that would support a reasonable belief that the defendant operator was operating the truck while he was under the influence of any drug or controlled substance. No marijuana was found on his person or in his vehicle. No police officer, physician or other witness testified that he appeared impaired in any manner. There was no mention of any signs of impairment in any doctor or hospital notes from the emergency room, despite the results of the lab test.
Lastly, the plaintiff alleges that the court erred in not allowing an offer of proof regarding the defendant operator's knowledge of the term "420" and the alleged tradition among marijuana users of smoking marijuana on April 20th. If the court had allowed the offer of proof, even if the defendant operator did have knowledge of the term "420," it would not have been relevant to the issues. The court had already granted the motion in limine, excluding the laboratory report. To allow the plaintiff to inquire as to the defendant operator's knowledge of "420" would either confuse the jury or to allow it to enter into the realm of speculation. It would also allow the plaintiffs to bring the marijuana issue into evidence through an evidentiary "back door," after the court had already excluded the use of the lab test report.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the court denies the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial.