Opinion
ACTION NO. 4:21cv44
2021-11-09
Teyonnda DE JESUS-ISRAEL, Plaintiff, v. U-HAUL CO. OF VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants.
Teyonnda de Jesus-Israel, Pro Se. William Ryan Waddell, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC (Richmond), Riverfront Plaza – West Tower, 901 East Byrd Street, Suite 1300, Richmond, VA 23219, for Defendant.
Teyonnda de Jesus-Israel, Pro Se.
William Ryan Waddell, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC (Richmond), Riverfront Plaza – West Tower, 901 East Byrd Street, Suite 1300, Richmond, VA 23219, for Defendant.
DISMISSAL ORDER
REBECCA BEACH SMITH, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Teyonnda de Jesus-Israel ("Plaintiff"), appearing pro se, filed this action against her current employer, Defendant U-Haul Co. of Virginia ("U-Haul"). This matter is before the court on U-Haul's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration. Mot. Dismiss & Compel Arbitration, ECF No. 9. For the reasons set forth below, U-Haul's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED , and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to its submission to binding arbitration.
The Complaint also identifies Robert Barras ("Mr. Barras") as a named Defendant in this action; however, Mr. Barras was dismissed from this action in an Order dated July 14, 2021, leaving U-Haul as the sole remaining Defendant. Order at 1-2, ECF No. 12.
I. Relevant Procedural Background
On July 6, 2021, U-Haul filed a Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration and provided pro se Plaintiff with a proper Roseboro Notice pursuant to Rule 7(K) of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Mot. Dismiss & Compel Arbitration at 1-2, ECF No. 9; see E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7 (K). Plaintiff filed an Opposition to U-Haul's motion, and U-Haul filed a Reply. Opp'n, ECF No. 11; Reply, ECF No. 13. Accordingly, U-Haul's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration is ripe for adjudication.
II. Factual Background
A. Plaintiff's Complaint
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from "Tennis Elbow /Carpal Tunnel" syndrome, and experiences "lack of mobility and use of her right hand, wrist, and arm." Compl. at 4-5, ECF No. 3. Plaintiff alleges that she requested, and received, authorization to take a "Personal Leave of Absence" on two occasions to "deal with her ailment." Id. at 5. Upon her return to work, Plaintiff asked if her "work schedule of up to 32 hours per week [could] be cut to 20 hours;" however, her request was denied because U-Haul was "moving into busy season." Id. Plaintiff alleges that when she "began to experience pain" in her hand, wrist, and arm, she "began to swap long shifts with peers or cut her workday short." Id. Plaintiff alleges that she "requested to take personal leave again," but her request was denied. Id. Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts a claim against U-Haul under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") for failing to accommodate Plaintiff's disability. Id. at 4-5.
B. The Arbitration Agreement
When Plaintiff began her employment with U-Haul, Plaintiff received a document titled, "Notice to Employees About U-Haul's Employment Dispute Resolution Policy" ("Arbitration Agreement"). Arbitration Agreement at 1-3, ECF No. 10-2. The Arbitration Agreement states, in relevant part:
Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the Arbitration Agreement to her Complaint; however, U-Haul attached a copy of the document to its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, and Plaintiff has not challenged its authenticity. Arbitration Agreement, ECF No. 10-2; see Opp'n at 1-5, ECF No. 11. As this court has recognized, when deciding motions to compel arbitration, it "is appropriate—indeed necessary—to consider materials outside the pleadings." Artis v. Lyon Shipyard, Inc., No. 2:17cv595, 2018 WL 2013073, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73704 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2018) (citation omitted). Thus, the court may consider the Arbitration Agreement in its analysis of U-Haul's motion.
Effective February 20, 2006, U-Haul International, Inc. adopted and implemented a new arbitration policy that requires mandatory, binding arbitration of disputes for all employees. This memorandum explains the procedures, as well as how the arbitration policy works as a whole. Please take the time to read this material. IT APPLIES TO YOU. It will govern all existing or future disputes between you and U-Haul International, Inc. or its parent, subsidiary, sister or affiliated companies or entities, and each of its and/or their employees, officers, directors or agents ("U-Haul") that are related in any way to your employment with U-Haul International, Inc. except for charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board.
Arbitration Procedures
U-Haul hopes that you will never have a dispute relating to your employment here. However, we recognize that disputes sometimes arise between an employer and its employees relating to the employment relationship. We also recognize that not every dispute can be successfully resolved informally. U-Haul believes that it is in the best interests of the employees and U-Haul to resolve those disputes in an arbitration forum which provides a fast, fair and cost-effective method for resolving them.... Therefore, U-Haul has adopted and implemented this Employment Dispute Resolution Policy ("EDR").
The EDR applies to all U-Haul International, Inc. employees regardless of length of service or status, and covers all disputes relating to or arising out of employment with U-Haul International, Inc. or the termination of that employment. Examples of the type of disputes or claims covered by the EDR include, but are not limited to, claims for ... employment discrimination, harassment or retaliation under the Americans With Disabilities Act ....
Your decision to accept employment or to continue employment with U-Haul International, Inc. constitutes your agreement to be bound by the EDR. Likewise, U-Haul agrees to be bound by the EDR. This mutual obligation to arbitrate claims means that both you and U-Haul are bound to use the EDR as the only means of resolving any employment-related disputes. This mutual agreement to arbitrate claims also means that both you and U-Haul forego any right either may have to a judge or jury trial on claims relating in any way to your employment.... No remedies that otherwise would be available to you individually or to U-Haul in a court of law, however, will be forfeited by virtue of this agreement to use and be bound by the EDR. The EDR changes the forum and process for resolving disputes, but does not change your potential legal remedies.
Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).
The Arbitration Agreement also includes a section titled, "U-HAUL EMPLOYEE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATION," which Plaintiff was required to acknowledge and sign. Id. at 3. This section states, in relevant part:
I acknowledge that I have been given the opportunity to receive and review a
copy of the U-Haul Employment Dispute Resolution Policy ("EDR"), and have been advised to consult a legal advisor of my own choice about the EDR. I agree that it is my obligation to make use of the EDR and to submit to final and binding arbitration any and all claims and disputes (except for charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board) that are related in any way to my employment or the termination of my employment with U-Haul International, Inc. I understand that, unless otherwise required by law or contract, final and binding arbitration will be the sole and exclusive remedy for any such claim or dispute against U-Haul International, Inc., or its parent, subsidiary, sister, or affiliated companies or entities, and each of its and/or their employees, officers, directors or agents ("U-Haul") and that, by agreeing to use arbitration to resolve my dispute, both U-Haul and I agree to forego any right we each may have had to a judge or jury trial on issues covered by the EDR....
Id. Plaintiff electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement on April 30, 2018. Id.
III. U-Haul's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), federal courts are required to "rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms." Fremeau v. Credit One Bank, N.A., No. 2:19cv254, 2020 WL 201046, at *2, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792 at *4 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2020) (quoting Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2013) ). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explained, "[t]he FAA reflects ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ " Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ).
Notably, in discussing the arbitrability of employment discrimination claims, the Fourth Circuit has explained:
It is settled that the provisions of the FAA, and its policy favoring the resolution of disputes through arbitration, apply to employment agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims brought pursuant to federal statutes.... Such an agreement is enforceable because "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum."
Murray v. UFCW Int'l, Local 400, 289 F.3d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
When a party seeks to compel the arbitration of a dispute pursuant to the FAA, the party must demonstrate:
(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect or refusal of the [opposing party] to arbitrate the dispute.
Galloway v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 819 F.3d 79, 84 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). If the party seeking to compel arbitration demonstrates the elements summarized above, "the party opposing arbitration must come forward with sufficient facts to place the entitlement to arbitration in dispute." Green v. Kline Chevrolet Sales Corp., No. 2:19cv127, 2019 WL 3728266, at *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133293 at *8 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2019) (citation omitted). "Determining whether the parties’ arbitration agreement is valid or whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute, is a question of state law governing contract formation." Id., 2019 WL 3728266 at *4, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133293 at *9-10.
Here, the parties agree that Virginia law applies for these purposes. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss & Compel Arbitration at 7-8, ECF No. 10 (applying Virginia law to U-Haul's arguments regarding the validity of the Arbitration Agreement); Opp'n at 3-4, ECF No. 11 (applying Virginia law to Plaintiff's arguments regarding the invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement).
"When parties have entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate their disputes and the dispute at issue falls within the scope of that agreement, the FAA requires federal courts to stay judicial proceedings, see 9 U.S.C.A. § 3, and compel arbitration in accordance with the agreement's terms." Murray, 289 F.3d at 301. "[I]f a court determines ‘that all of the issues presented are arbitrable, then it may dismiss the case.’ " Hawthorne v. BJ's Wholesale Club, No. 3:15cv572, 2016 WL 4500867, at *7, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114969 at *19 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2016) (quoting Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan for Emps. of Hazelhurst Mgmt. Co., 628 F. App'x 842, 845-46 (4th Cir. 2015) ); see Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001). "[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Murray, 289 F.3d at 301 (internal citations omitted).
B. Discussion
In its Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, U-Haul argues that the FAA requires the court to compel the arbitration of Plaintiff's claims because (i) "[t]he parties are in dispute over Plaintiff's alleged ADA failure to accommodate claims;" (ii) "the Arbitration Agreement indisputably covers Plaintiff's ADA claims;" (iii) the Arbitration Agreement "involves interstate commerce;" and (iv) Plaintiff has refused to arbitrate her disputes with U-Haul. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss & Compel Arbitration at 4, ECF No. 10. U-Haul further argues that the written Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable. Id. at 7-8.
In her Opposition, Plaintiff argues that (i) the Arbitration Agreement "is substantively unconscionable" because it "imposes unduly harsh or oppressive one-sided terms" and is "[a]gainst public policy;" (ii) U-Haul "waived the right to arbitration by failing to participate in [P]laintiff's attempt at arbitration that was made via the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")];" and (iii) Plaintiff's employment requires her to engage in "interstate commerce," thus Plaintiff should be "exempt from arbitration" under the provision of the FAA that provides an exemption for "contracts of employment with seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Opp'n at 2-4, ECF No. 11 (emphasis in original).
The court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's arguments. First, the court finds that the Arbitration Agreement is not "substantively unconscionable." Under Virginia law, unconscionability "is a narrow doctrine whereby the challenged contract must be one which no reasonable person would enter into, and the inequality must be so gross as to shock the conscience." Green, 2019 WL 3728266, at *5, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133293, at *16 (quoting Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 2001) ). As summarized above, the relevant terms of the Arbitration Agreement apply equally to both Plaintiff and U-Haul and do not eliminate any remedies that would otherwise be available to Plaintiff or U-Haul in a court of law. See Arbitration Agreement at 1-3, ECF No. 10-2. The Arbitration Agreement only "changes the forum and process for resolving disputes." Id. at 1. The court finds that Plaintiff has not identified any terms in the Arbitration Agreement that would support a finding of unconscionability. See Green, 2019 WL 3728266 at *6, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133293, at *16.
Further, the Virginia Supreme Court has explained that "the public policy of Virginia favors arbitration." TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., L.L.C., 263 Va. 116, 557 S.E.2d 199, 202 (2002) (noting Virginia's adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1986); see Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.01 (stating that in Virginia, "a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"). Thus, the court finds that the Arbitration Agreement between Plaintiff and U-Haul is not against public policy.
Next, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the court finds that U-Haul's alleged "fail[ure] to participate in [P]laintiff's attempt at arbitration that was made via the EEOC" does not affect the applicability or validity of the Arbitration Agreement or the parties’ arbitration-related obligations set forth therein. Opp'n at 3.
Finally, as Plaintiff correctly notes, the FAA provides an exemption for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Gibbs v. PFS Invs., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 n.3 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1 ). However, this exemption does not, as Plaintiff suggests, apply to all workers engaged in interstate commerce. The United States Supreme Court has explained that this exemption must be "afforded a narrow construction," and "exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001) (noting that "the location of the phrase ‘any other class of workers engaged in ... commerce’ in a residual provision, after specific categories of workers have been enumerated, undermines any attempt to give the provision a sweeping, open-ended construction" (alteration in original)). Here, the court finds that Plaintiff has not adequately established that her job responsibilities fall within the FAA's narrow exemption for transportation workers. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 118-19, 121 S.Ct. 1302.
Plaintiff does not provide a description of her job responsibilities in her Complaint; however, U-Haul states that Plaintiff works as a "remote sales and reservation agent." Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss & Compel Arbitration at 2, ECF No. 10.
The court notes that even if this narrow exemption applied to the case at hand, the parties’ Arbitration Agreement would nevertheless be enforceable under Virginia law. See Arbitration Agreement at 1, ECF No. 10-2 (stating that "[if] for any reason the FAA is deemed inapplicable, only then will the EDR be governed by the applicable state arbitration statutes"); see also Siperavage v. Uber Techs., Inc. No. 20-12265, 2021 WL 2680060, at *3-4, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122002 at *9-10 (D.N.J. June 30, 2021) (summarizing cases whereby federal courts (i) determined that an arbitration agreement was enforceable regardless of the applicability of the FAA, and (ii) compelled arbitration under state law).
Based on a thorough review of U-Haul's motion and the related briefs, the court finds that U-Haul has adequately demonstrated all of the elements necessary to compel the arbitration of the disputes raised by Plaintiff in this action. See Galloway, 819 F.3d at 84. The court also finds that Plaintiff has not "come forward with sufficient facts to place the entitlement to arbitration in dispute." Green, 2019 WL 3728266 at *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133293, at *8. Accordingly, U-Haul's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED .
Further, because all of the disputes raised by Plaintiff in her Complaint are subject to arbitration, the court finds that dismissal—as opposed to a stay of judicial proceedings—is appropriate. See Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 252 F.3d at 709-10 (explaining that "dismissal is a proper remedy when all of the issues presented in a lawsuit are arbitrable"); Green, 2019 WL 3728266 at *9, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133293, at *24 (dismissing a case without prejudice after granting a motion to compel the arbitration of all claims asserted therein). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to its submission to binding arbitration.
On November 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed a letter with the court ("Letter"), in which Plaintiff asks the court to waive "the fees associated with using the PACER service." Letter at 1, ECF No. 14. Because this Dismissal Order closes this case, Plaintiff's request to waive PACER fees is DISMISSED as moot .
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, U-Haul's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED , and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to its submission to binding arbitration.
Plaintiff may appeal this Dismissal Order by forwarding a written notice of appeal to the Clerk of the United States District Court, Newport News Division, 2400 West Avenue, Newport News, Virginia 23607. The written notice must be received by the Clerk within thirty days from the date of entry of this Dismissal Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED .