Opinion
No. CV07-4027999S
February 11, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS #103 105
The question presented by the defendants' motions to dismiss is whether absolute judicial immunity, common-law sovereign immunity, statutory immunity and federal qualified immunity deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's action against a state corrections officer and the state claims commissioner, wherein the plaintiff alleges various due process and equal protection violations and seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief. Because the court concludes that the defendants are shielded by sovereign and statutory immunity for the alleged violations of state law, and are safeguarded by federal qualified immunity for the alleged violations of federal law, the court holds that it is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case, and, therefore, grants the defendants' respective motions to dismiss.
I FACTS
Pursuant to state constitutional law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the pro se inmate plaintiff, Jason M. Day, filed a four-count complaint on July 25, 2007, alleging that the defendants, Connecticut corrections officer Antonio Martins (Martins) and Connecticut claims commissioner James R. Smith (Smith), violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that (1) unidentified corrections officers "unlawfully" disposed of his property without first providing adequate due process, (2) the defendants did not authorize him to bring a suit against the state for this lost property, which further denied him sufficient due process, (3) the plaintiff's inability to seek redress for his lost property in two previous suits filed independently in state and federal court has denied him equal protection of the law, and (4) the defendants' compensation of a similarly situated prisoner for that inmate's lost property while not remunerating the plaintiff for his lost property offends his right to equal protection of the law. To redress these alleged violations, the plaintiff seeks both money damages and equitable relief.
Although the two defendants have filed separate motions to dismiss (numbers 103 and 105 on the docket) both motions advance nearly identical legal arguments and involve the same operative facts. Accordingly, this memorandum will decide both motions to dismiss.
In view of the plaintiff's pro se status, and the nebulousness of his complaint, it is appropriate at this time to provide some additional detail concerning the factual allegations giving rise to this action. The plaintiff essentially contends that on three separate occasions his property was lost, damaged or destroyed by correction officers, and that his numerous acarpous attempts to seek redress for these losses has resulted in the deprivation of his procedural due process and equal protection rights. In connection with his lost or damaged property, the plaintiff first alleges that between December 22, 2003, and January 6, 2004, he purchased $82 worth of food and cosmetic items from the prison commissary, which was not among the property returned to him after his transfer from Cheshire Correctional Institute (CCI) to Northern Correctional Institute (NCI) on January 13, 2004. The plaintiff next contends that upon his arrival at NCI on January 13, 2004, correction officers confiscated as contraband a "religious" necklace, which he believes he should have been allowed to send home for safekeeping during his incarceration. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that in March of 2004, a pair of headphones was damaged by correction officers during a "routine facility shakedown."
Where a layman appears pro se, the court follows a liberal policy and carefully considers a pro se party's claims as far as they are fairly presented upon the record to ensure that no injustice has been done to him under the law. See Goldstein v. Fischer, 200 Conn. 197, 198, 510 A.2d 184 (1986). Nevertheless, while the plaintiff is afforded this latitude, the court is equally cognizant that "the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedure and substantive law." New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 498, 863 A.2d 680 (2004); see also Rodriguez v. Mallory Battery Co., 188 Conn. 145, 149 n. 8, 448 A.2d 829 (1982) (notwithstanding leniency accorded pro se litigants, "we cannot, and will not, entirely disregard the established rules of procedure").
The plaintiff's prosecution of these perceived misdeeds has been indefatigable. On March 31, 2004, the plaintiff filed an inmate grievance form seeking the return of or remuneration for his missing property, which was denied on April 6, 2004, because, according to NCI, commissary purchases of food and cosmetics are not inventoried items and it is, therefore, impossible for the department of correction to ascertain which items the prisoner may have consumed or discarded on his own. NCI personnel further explained in denying the plaintiff's request that pursuant to the relevant department of correction directives, inmate property is retained at the inmate's own risk. The plaintiff filed another inmate grievance form on April 9, 2004, this time seeking a legal explanation as to why he was responsible for his property during an interfacility transfer, and was again directed by the department of correction to the relevant administrative directives explaining its policy that it is not responsible for inmate property in its possession unless that property has been inventoried. Subsequently, NCI personnel also denied the plaintiff's request to have his necklace sent home because it was contraband and declined to compensate the plaintiff for the damage done to his headphones because that type of personal property is kept at the inmate's risk. At that time, the plaintiff appealed his claims to Martins in the department of corrections claims liaison office, who, after further investigation, recommended to Smith that the claims be denied. Smith then conducted an independent investigation of the plaintiff's claims, and subsequently denied all claims on the grounds that (1) the department of corrections cannot be found liable for lost property unless it is demonstrated that the department of corrections had control over the items through appropriate inventory documents, which the plaintiff had not provided; and (2) the department of corrections is not responsible for personal property kept in the inmate's possession or cell because such items are kept at the inmate's own risk.
See department of correction administrative directive 6.10 (Inmate Property), § 7 ("An inmate's property is retained at the inmate's own risk. The Department shall not be responsible for any property, personally retained by the inmate which is lost, stolen, damaged, consumed or discarded while in the inmate's possession (e.g., living quarters or on person). An inmate shall not loan, trade, sell, give or transfer property to another inmate.)."
See department of corrections administrative directive 6.10 (Contraband), § 9 ("Any property found in the inmate's possession which is improperly marked, has been altered or has altered markings or cannot be verified as belonging to the inmate shall be considered contraband and disposed of in accordance with Section 28.").
In addition to pursuing his claims through the administrative process described above, the plaintiff has also sought redress through both a habeas corpus petition in state Superior Court and a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. In each case, the plaintiff essentially set forth the same causes of action as in this case, namely that he had been deprived of his personal property without due process of the law. With respect to the claims brought in state court, the case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction pursuant to Practice Book § 23-24(a)(1); his claims in federal court failed to advance because he was barred from proceeding without paying the filing fee under the three strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Day v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Somers, Docket No. CV 07 4001491; Day v. Lantz, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:05CV1581 (D.Conn.).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides in relevant part: "In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury."
Having failed to achieve his desired result in the past four years of litigating these claims, the plaintiff now brings the present suit, seeking both monetary damages and equitable relief. Specifically, the plaintiff requests that the defendants be required to (1) articulate their respective decisions to allegedly provide preferential treatment to the claims made by a similarly situated inmate, (2) each pay $500 in damages to the plaintiff for his lost property, as well as for his emotional pain and suffering, and (3) pay the $250 filing fee necessary for the plaintiff to move forward with his civil suit in federal court. Additionally, while the department of correction is not a defendant in this suit, the plaintiff nevertheless asks this court to "order the Conn. Dept. Of Corrections to reimburse all the cosmetic and commissary items including the plaintiff's necklace and `Koss' large headphones."
On November 6, 2007, the defendants moved to dismiss this suit on the grounds that Smith is entitled to absolute immunity, Smith and Martins are both entitled to sovereign immunity and statutory immunity and that this court is, consequently, without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The defendants' motions to dismiss were supported by separate memoranda of law. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motions to dismiss on November 14, 2007. Subsequently, Smith filed an addendum to his motion to dismiss on November 23, 2007, to which the plaintiff responded on December 4, 2007.
II DISCUSSION
Prior to reaching the substantive legal issues presented, it is first necessary to set forth the appropriate standard of review. "A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . When a court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). Moreover, "[t]he motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone . . . Where, however . . . the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346-47, 766 A.2d 400 (2001). Finally, because the doctrines of sovereign immunity, statutory immunity and federal qualified immunity each implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction, they are appropriate grounds for granting a motion to dismiss. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery"); Cox v. Aiken, supra, 278 Conn. 211 ("sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss"); Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 376, 802 A.2d 814 (2002) ("[T]he doctrine of [statutory] immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction"); Mulligan v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 716, 736 n. 23, 643 A.2d 1226 (1994) (noting qualified immunity construed as immunity from suit, not merely defense to liability); see also Bradley v. Central Naugatuck Valley Help, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district at Waterbury, Docket No. CV 95 0126436 (February 10, 1997, Vertefeuille, J.) (19 Conn. L. Rptr. 34) (qualified immunity raised in motion to dismiss § 1983 claim).
Mindful of these standards, the court notes that, while the plaintiff offers a myriad of claims, the precise legal theories on which these causes of action are grounded remain unclear. Although the plaintiff claims aggrievement under both the state and federal constitutions, he purports to couch his suit against both defendants in their official and individual capacities as a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is problematic for two reasons. First, it is well settled that a "claim under § 1983 must be based on an alleged violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right." (Emphasis in original.) ATC Partnership v. Windham, 251 Conn. 597, 605 n. 7, 741 A.2d 305 (1999), citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). Second, while § 1983 authorizes actions against state officers for damages arising from official acts, if sued in their individual capacities; see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons' under § 1983." Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 140, 913 A.2d 415 (2007), quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Accordingly, viewing the complaint in a light most favorable to the pleader, the court concludes that the plaintiff predicates his § 1983 claim against the defendants in their individual capacities on the alleged violations of the federal constitution and grounds his state constitutional claims against the defendants in their official capacities upon the principles articulated in Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 48, 710 A.2d 688 (1998) (articulating multifactor analysis used by courts determining whether to recognize state constitutional cause of action). It is with these important distinctions in mind that the court considers the defendants' respective claims of absolute, sovereign, statutory and federal qualified immunity.
Although a threshold question is presented in this case as to whether Binette v. Sabo, supra, 244 Conn. 23, would animate a private cause of action for violation of the right to procedural due process or equal protection safeguarded by our state's constitution, the court declines to reach this question because it concludes that the plaintiff has failed to clearly plead the essential elements necessary to sustain such a case of action were it even available. See Part II B, infra. Indeed, courts are "disinclined to enforce [state constitutional) mandates at the expense of sovereign immunity unless the plaintiff clearly has alleged facts that, if proven, would distinguish his claim for relief from standard claims of police misconduct." Martin v. Brady, 64 Conn.App. 433, 439, 780 A.2d 961 (2001), aff'd., 261 Conn. 372, 802 A.2d 814 (2002). Thus, because the court concludes in part II B that the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a constitutional trespass, that same analysis obviates the need to decide whether Binette might provide a private cause of action for violation of the state constitutional imperatives at issue in this case.
While the defendants' respective counsel did not raise federal qualified immunity in connection with the § 1983 actions brought against the defendants in their individual capacities, the court considers this defense sua sponte because it implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774, 792 A.2d 66 (2002) ("the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time").
A Absolute Judicial Immunity
The court first entertains Smith's contention that, as the Connecticut claims commissioner, he is entitled to absolute immunity from both state and federal suit when properly exercising his adjudicative powers, and that this court is, therefore, without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the present case against him. It is indeed well established that judges and other officials conducting quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely immune from civil suit "for malice or corruption in their action whilst exercising their judicial functions within the general scope of their jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); see also Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 630, 749 A.2d 630 (2000) ("It is a long-standing doctrine that a judge [and those intimately involved in the judicial process] may not be civilly sued for judicial acts he undertakes in his capacity as a judge"). However, before considering whether the claims commissioner falls within the constellation of judicial officers protected by absolute immunity, the court must first decide the threshold question of whether absolute immunity involves a jurisdictional question that is appropriately raised in a motion to dismiss.
Although our appellate courts have not yet affirmatively decided whether absolute immunity bears upon a court's subject matter jurisdiction, our Supreme Court's decision in Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005), supports a conclusion that it does. In that case, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a motion for summary judgment granted on the basis of absolute immunity is a final judgment for purposes of appeal because "the purpose of the absolute immunity afforded participants in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is the same as the purpose of the sovereign immunity [conferred upon states] . . . that is, to protect against the threat of suit." (Emphasis added.) Id., 787; see also Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 343, 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (noting that in context of quasi-judicial proceeding, absolute immunity is bar to certain types of suits, rather than immunity from liability alone, because purpose is same as sovereign immunity). Accordingly, because the doctrine of absolute immunity shares with sovereign immunity the same purpose of protection against "having to litigate at all," and because the doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction, this court joins the other Superior Courts that have held absolute immunity to be properly considered in a motion to dismiss. Rioux v. Barry, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4007375 (January 3, 2006, Licari, J.) [40 Conn. L. Rptr. 537], rev'd in part on other grounds, 283 Conn. 338, 927 A.2d 304 (2007); see also Kalman v. Papapietro, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 04 4000984 (May 23, 2006, Aurigemma, J.) [41 Conn. L. Rptr. 426]; Mattera v. Sienkiewicz, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 05 4011301 (April 28, 2006, Tanzer, J.).
It is additionally noteworthy that our Supreme Court has focused on absolute immunity as being a bar to certain suits, rather than as a bar to liability alone, because it is a claimant's right to bring suit that confers jurisdiction upon a court. Kalman v. Carre, 352 F.Sup.2d 205, 207 (D.Conn. 2005) ("where a defendant is immune from suit, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction"). Indeed, it is the waiver of suit immunity that "establishes a remedy by which a claimant may enforce a valid claim against the state and subjects the state to the jurisdiction of the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 79, 818 A.2d 758 (2003) (additionally noting that "immunity from suit should be construed as implicitly waiving immunity from liability").
Having concluded that a claim of absolute immunity is properly before this court, it is next necessary to ascertain whether the claims commissioner enjoys the protections afforded by this doctrine. Although a judge's absolute immunity from suit applies "however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff"; Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985); it may nevertheless be overcome for "actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity" and for "actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mireles v. Waco, 50 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). The need for such robust immunity is "to promote principled and fearless decision-making by removing a judge's fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533, 540, 877 A.2d 773 (2005). Courts have noted, however, that absolute immunity is "strong medicine," which is why "the presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., supra, 252 Conn. 631. Accordingly, only officials deemed integral to the judicial process are afforded absolute immunity, reflecting an "[awareness] of the salutary effects that the threat of liability can have . . . as well as the undeniable tension between official immunities and the ideal of the rule of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In balancing these competing policy imperatives, absolute immunity has been cautiously extended to a variety of judicial and quasi-judicial officers through a "functional approach" that ensures "[i]mmunities are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 631-32. To this end, our Supreme Court has adopted three guideposts that inform a court's evaluation of whether officials sued in connection with alleged civil rights violations should be accorded absolute immunity. This analysis inquires "[1] whether the official in question perform[s] functions sufficiently comparable to those of officials who have traditionally been afforded absolute immunity at common law . . . [2] whether the likelihood of harassment or intimidation by personal liability [is] sufficiently great to interfere with the official's performance of his or her duties . . . [and 3] whether procedural safeguards [exist] in the system that would adequately protect against [improper] conduct by the official." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 274 Conn. 542-43, citing Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S. 513-17.
Applying these standards to the present case, it is clear that the claims commissioner falls within the limited spectrum of quasi-judicial officials who enjoy absolute immunity. It is observed at the outset that absolute immunity has been extended to various administrative agency officials who share enough of the characteristics of the judicial process to warrant such protection. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S. 513-17 (imbuing Department of Agriculture hearing examiner with absolute immunity); Gyadu v. Workers' Compensation Commission, 930 F.Sup. 738, 748-49 (D.Conn. 1996) (extending absolute immunity to workers' compensation commissioner). Moreover, the District Court of Connecticut has previously applied this test to the claims commissioner to hold "that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is available to the Claims Commissioner." Reed v. State, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:98CV517 (D.Conn. September 24, 2001); see also Little v. Claims Commissioner, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 04 4000265 (January 25, 2005, Eveleigh, J.) (relying on analysis in Reed v. State, supra, Connecticut District Court, Docket No. 3:98CV517, to hold claims commissioner shielded by absolute immunity). Accordingly, the fact that the office of the claims commissioner is situated within an administrative agency rather than within the judicial branch, is not itself dispositive of whether judicial immunity may attach.
Notwithstanding the holding of Reed v. State, supra, Connecticut District Court, Docket No. 3:98CV517, this court undertakes an independent analysis of the claims commissioner's entitlement to absolute immunity. Indeed, without deciding the issue itself, the federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has previously remanded a case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for more comprehensive analysis of whether the claims commissioner enjoys absolute immunity. See Moriarty v. Brooks, 111 Fed.Appx. 30 (2d Cir. 2004).
See General Statutes § 4-142a(b) ("Claims Commissioner shall be within the office of the Comptroller for administrative purposes only.").
With respect to the first inquiry, whether the claims commissioner performs functions sufficiently comparable to those of officials who have traditionally been afforded absolute immunity at common law, the facts support an affirmative answer. By statute the claims commissioner is required to determine whether the state should pay damages sought against it, as well as to determine whether a suit against the state should be authorized. General Statutes §§ 4-141, 4-142, 4-154, 4-160. Indeed, the claims commissioner is charged with ascertaining whether claims brought against the state are ones "which in equity and justice the state should pay." General Statutes § 4-141; see also § 4-154. Additionally, the claims commissioner "may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable." General Statutes § 4-160. In making these determinations, the claims commissioner finds facts and applies legal principles, which are appealable to the legislature if the amount sought is greater than $7,500. See General Statutes §§ 4-141, 4-154, 4-158, 4-159, 4-160. Moreover, a claimant before the claims commissioner is entitled to be represented by legal counsel, a record of all claims is maintained, and hearing transcripts are recorded. General Statutes §§ 4-151, 4-153; Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 4-157-10 through 4-157-17. Consequently, this court agrees that the claims commissioner performs adjudicative functions that are sufficiently similar to those of a judge to qualify for absolute immunity.
Similarly, the court resolves the second question, whether the likelihood of harassment or intimidation by personal liability is sufficiently great as to interfere with the official's performance of his or her duties, in the affirmative as well. It is plain that in any adjudicative process involving substantial pecuniary interests "[t]he disappointment occasioned by an adverse decision often finds vent in imputations of malice" against the judicial authority rendering such decisions. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S. 513. Moreover, in claims against the state, it is the claims commissioner alone who has the authority to authorize such suits, making him a primary target of those unsuccessful claimants seeking damages from the state. See Cooper v. Delta Chi Housing Corp. of Connecticut, 41 Conn.App. 61, 64, 674 A.2d 858 (1996) ("[t]he entire scheme which authorizes claims against the state makes clear that the claims commissioner, and not the court, can waive sovereign immunity"). Accordingly, the court concludes that there is sufficient likelihood of harassment or intimidation such that the claims commissioner's adjudicative performance would likely be negatively influenced without absolute immunity.
Finally, the court is additionally persuaded that procedural safeguards exist in the system to protect adequately against improper conduct by the claims commissioner. Similar to Connecticut judges, the claims commissioner is appointed for a set term by the governor and requires the advice and consent of the legislature. General Statutes §§ 4-142a(a). Moreover, hearings before the claims commissioner are also like a judicial proceedings in that they are transparent and adversarial in nature, allowing for parties to be represented by counsel, documentary evidence to be submitted, witnesses to be called and cross-examined and records of each hearing to be maintained. See General Statutes §§ 4-149, 4-151, 4-153; Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 4-157-10 through 4-157-17. The potential for abuse of office is further reduced by the provisions allowing the governor and attorney general to fully investigate and remove the claims commissioner from office if suspected of "misconduct, material neglect of duty or incompetence in the conduct of his office." See General Statutes § 4-12. Finally, all decisions by the claims commissioner regarding claims greater than $7,500 are appealable to the General Assembly; see General Statutes §§ 4-158, 4-159; and "[e]ven the proceedings of a legislative commission may come within the jurisdiction of a court acting under the judicial power of article fifth of the [state] constitution . . . if . . . egregious and otherwise irreparable violations of state or federal constitutional guarantees are being or have been committed by such proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, 195 Conn. 534, 542-43, 489 A.2d 363 (1985). Accordingly, the transparent and adversarial nature of the hearings, the availability of an appeal to a higher authority, and the potential for disciplinary intervention by the governor and attorney general all confirm the presence of existing systemic safeguards and counsel in favor of extending absolute judicial immunity to the claims commissioner.
In view of these considerations, the court holds that the claims commissioner is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for those actions undertaken in the performance of his adjudicative role because (1) the claims commissioner performs a quasi-judicial function that is directly analogous to those duties performed by the judicial officials afforded absolute immunity, (2) the likelihood of harassment from dissatisfied claimants is sufficiently great that the claims commissioner's adjudicative performance would likely be impugned without absolute immunity, and (3) the potential for abuse by the claims commissioner of his office is sufficiently diminished by the procedural safeguards already in place. Consequently, because the plaintiff fails to allege that Smith acted outside his judicial capacity or without jurisdiction, the court grants Smith's motion to dismiss on the ground that, as the claims commissioner, he is entitled to absolute immunity, and that this court is, therefore, without subject matter jurisdiction to hear either the state or federal law claims alleged against him. The court additionally finds that it is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted against Smith for the reasons set forth below.
Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiff's suit can also be read as a tacit appeal of the decision by the claims commissioner to reject his previous claims, this court is likewise unable to entertain such a case due to the "Superior Court's ongoing lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals from the claims commissioner." Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, supra, 195 Conn. 541.
B Sovereign Immunity
Both defendants next argue that this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted against them on the basis of state law because they are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is indeed axiomatic "that the state cannot be sued without its consent." C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, 284 Conn. 250, 258, 932 A.2d 1053 (2007); see also Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). Moreover, in addition to suits against the state as a discrete entity, the courts have also recognized "that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, supra, 284 Conn. 258. "This rule had its origin in the ancient common law, predicated on the principle that the king, being the fountainhead of justice, could not be sued in his own courts . . . While the principle of sovereign immunity is deeply rooted in our common law, it has, nevertheless, been modified and adapted to the American concept of constitutional government where the source of governmental power and authority is not vested by divine right in a ruler but rests in the people themselves who have adopted constitutions creating governments with defined and limited powers and courts to interpret these basic laws." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 623. Applying this rationale to our constitutional form of government, Justice Holmes famously explained: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 314.
Nevertheless, the bar presented by this rule of law and its principled underpinnings is not impenetrable. Our Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff seeking to surmount the doctrine of sovereign immunity can do so by demonstrating the applicability of one of three exceptions. "These are: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity; Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 85-86, 818 A.2d 758 (2003); (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987); and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority. Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 497, 642 A.2d 699 (1994), overruled in part, Miller v. Egan, [ supra, 265 Conn. 325]." Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 753, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). Thus, state-law claims seeking to overcome sovereign immunity are first categorized by the type of relief sought and are then analyzed according to the exceptions available for that type of relief. See, e.g., Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 60-61, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988) (treating plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and money damages separately); Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 553, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984) (treating claims for monetary damages and declaratory relief separately).
Our Supreme Court has explained the significance of the remedy distinction by noting:
In the absence of legislative authority . . . we have declined to permit any monetary award against the state or its officials . . . We have excepted declaratory and injunctive relief from the sovereign immunity doctrine on the ground that a court may fashion these remedies in such a manner as to minimize disruption of government and to afford an opportunity for voluntary compliance with the judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 316-17.
Turning first to the plaintiff's prayer for monetary damages, which he seeks against both defendants, the court is persuaded that sovereign immunity bars this claim for want of subject matter jurisdiction. For reasons that remain unclear, the plaintiff requests that each defendant be required to pay $500 in damages for his lost property and emotional distress or, in the alternative, to pay the $250 filing fee necessary for the plaintiff to move forward with his civil suit in federal court. The court is, therefore, obliged to inquire whether "the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity" for the actions of a state correction officer or of the claims commissioner in the performance of their official duties. Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, supra, 263 Conn. 86. Also pertinent to this analysis, our General Assembly has delegated to the claims commissioner the sole authority to waive sovereign immunity and allow suits to be brought against the state and its agents. General Statutes § 4-141 ("[t]here shall be a claims commissioner who shall hear and determine all claims against the state"); see also Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 317 (the legislature has "expressly bar[red] suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize"); Cooper v. Delta Chi Housing Corp. of Connecticut, supra, 41 Conn.App. 64 (it is the claims commissioner "who is vested with sole authority to authorize a suit against the state"). In this case, the plaintiff fails to allege that either the claims commissioner or legislature has countenanced a suit providing money damages against the state or its agents for the allegations advanced in this case. While the plaintiff asserts that he did seek approval from the claims commissioner to bring suit against Martins, he concedes that this assent was never granted. Accordingly, because neither the legislature nor the claims commissioner has authorized suit against the defendants, this court is without jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's state law claim for monetary damages.
As a preliminary matter, the court notes that both the claims commissioner and corrections officer are agents of the state entitled to sovereign immunity. See Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 415, 562 A.2d 1080 (1989) (claim against department of corrections dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity) Reilly v. Smith, 84 Conn.App. 849, 856, 855 A.2d 1000 (2004), quoting Cooper v. Delta Chi Housing Corp. of Connecticut, supra, 41 Conn.App. 64 (describing claims commissioner as agent of legislature because "[t]he question whether the principles of governmental immunity from suit and liability are waived is a matter [solely) for legislative . . . determination").
The plaintiff does not allege that either defendant personally participated in the alleged loss of his commissary goods, confiscation as contraband of his necklace or damage to his headphones, but instead appears to assert that Martins' primary transgression was to recommend to Smith that the plaintiff's claims be denied, and that Smith, in turn, injured the plaintiff by actually denying those claims. It, therefore, remains unclear as to what cause of action the plaintiff alleges to ground his monetary damages claims against the defendants.
The plaintiff appears to seek a declaratory judgment that finds the defendants responsible for his lost and damaged property and requires the defendants to pay the $250 filing fee necessary for him to proceed with his suit in the District Court of Connecticut. Thus, because the defendants are agents of the state, the plaintiff is actually seeking to have the state pay $250 to the clerk of the District Court of Connecticut as damages for the actions of its agents. See General Statute § 5-141d (state to indemnify officials acting in official capacity). However, requests that a court order the state to pay a third party for the benefit of the plaintiff are tantamount to a prayer for monetary damages and are not treated as a request for declaratory relief. See St. George v. Gordon, 264 Coon. 538, 550 n. 12, 825 A.2d 90 (2003), overruled on other grounds, 100 Conn.App. 255, 917 A.2d 1047 (2007) (estate executor seeking declaratory judgment to establish estate entitled to state indemnification and order comptroller to authorize payment to third party with judgment against estate actually prayer for monetary damages). Accordingly, the plaintiff's request is properly treated as a prayer for monetary damages and not as a request for declaratory relief.
The plaintiff additionally seeks injunctive relief, requesting that this court order the defendants to further elucidate their reasons for allegedly treating his claim differently from a similarly situated inmate. In pursuing this remedy, the plaintiff avers that sovereign immunity is not a bar because the defendants have trespassed upon the rights to due process and equal protection of the law safeguarded by our state constitution; see Sentner v. Board of Trustees, supra, 184 Conn. 343-45; and because both defendants acted outside the scope of their statutory authority. See Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 327. Although the plaintiff attempts to avail himself of these exceptions to sovereign immunity, the court is not persuaded that he has alleged "a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions." Tuchman v. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. 754.
With respect to the plaintiff's allegations that his state constitutional liberties were impugned, the defendants argue that he fails to support those allegations with sufficiently convincing facts so as to overcome sovereign immunity. Indeed, where constitutional encroachment is asserted for purposes of overcoming sovereign immunity, the plaintiff cannot plead amorphous allegations that evoke the mere phantasm of a constitutional trespass, but must "clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests." Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 64, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988); see also Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622, 626, 461 A.2d 991 (1983) ("[w]ere we to adopt the plaintiff's argument, the mere allegation . . . of constitutional violation would be sufficient to preclude an inquiry concerning . . . sovereign immunity"). Consequently, for the court to have jurisdiction in this case under the sovereign immunity exception for unconstitutional acts, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating that the defendants' actions ran afoul of his equal protection or due process rights.
The plaintiff's first claim of state constitutional infringement stems from his allegation that Martins recommended to Smith that another similarly situated inmate, Jason Goode, be reimbursed for lost property while contemporaneously recommending that the plaintiff's claim be denied, which he avers is a violation of the equal protection clause enshrined in article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut. Although it is correct that the equal protection clause of the state constitution "mandates nothing less than that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Barde v. Board of Trustees, supra, 207 Conn. 65; our courts have also observed that "an equal protection challenge cannot be supported on [the basis of disparate impact] alone. Intentional or purposeful discrimination must be shown to make a successful equal protection challenge." Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn.App. 656, 685, 757 A.2d 1225, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 918, 763 A.2d 1044 (2000). In this case, the plaintiff fails to allege that the property for which the other inmate was reimbursed was of the same type at issue in this case (i.e., commissary goods that are not routinely inventoried, items confiscated as contraband, or items kept at the inmate's risk of loss), thereby failing to allege the facts necessary to support a claim that the two inmates were actually similarly situated. Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants' independent decisions to deny his claim were the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination, which is additionally fatal to his equal protection claim. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not "clearly demonstrate[d] an incursion upon [his] constitutionally protected" right to equal protection of the law. Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 64.
Article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin."
While the plaintiff also alleges that his inability to pursue either his habeas corpus claim in Superior Court or his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut further chills his right to equal protection of the law, his complaint and supporting memoranda are barren of any explication as to why this would be the case. "It is well settled that essential allegations in a pleading may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication"; Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 236, 502 A.2d 410 (1985); and this court declines to supplement the plaintiff's petition by speculating as to the possible equal protection imperatives implicated by these prior judicial decisions.
In connection with the procedural due process violations that he asserts contravened article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut, the plaintiff appears to allege that the defendants have denied him an impartial hearing, access to judicial review of their decisions regarding his property claims and the right to bring suit against the state. More specifically, the plaintiff first argues that because Martins works for the state and makes recommendations to Smith, who also works for the state, he has not received an impartial tribunal in which to prosecute his property claims. Such an argument is utterly unavailing. "In order to prevail on his due process claim, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) he has been deprived of a property interest cognizable under the due process clause; and (2) the deprivation of the property interest has occurred without due process of law." Johnson v. Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 546, 626 A.2d 244 (1993).
Article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut provides in relevant part: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
In this case, the plaintiff's allegations that he has a property interest in the commissary goods, necklace and headphones are anemic, and his claims of insufficient process to protect his alleged property interests are equally fruitless. Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the plaintiff enjoys an interest in the lost or damaged property at issue, his assertion that Martins and Smith are incapable of acting impartially because they are both agents of the state is without legal foundation. The plaintiff cites no case, and this court is unable to locate any precedent, to support the proposition that due process is offended when independent state actors perform related work on an adjudicative matter. Moreover, the plaintiff's acknowledgment that Martins and Smith have separately provided for the reimbursement of lawfully held inmate property in the past belies his argument that the established grievance process is fundamentally unfair due to the defendants' concomitant participation. Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was denied an impartial hearing because both Martins and Smith work for the state.
Although the claims commissioner's findings of law and fact are final and this court is without jurisdiction to review the decisions of the claims commissioner, the court assumes the plaintiff can plead allegations that directly contradict those facts already found in this case by the claims commissioner. See General Statutes § 4-164(b) ("[t]he action of the claims commissioner in approving or rejecting payment of any claim or part thereof shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact and shall not be subject to review except by the general assembly"); Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, supra, 195 Conn. 541 (Superior Court without jurisdiction to review decision of claims commissioner). Ergo, while the court notes the claims commissioner's prior adjudicative decision holding that the plaintiff was unable to prove he had a property interest in the commissary items and dismissed the plaintiff's claim related to his headphones for failure to prosecute, the court nevertheless assumes without deciding that the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a valid property interest.
Also unavailing is the plaintiff's argument that he was denied due process of the law because he was deprived of his property prior to an adjudicative hearing. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the unauthorized negligent or intentional "deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process clause . . . if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (alleged intentional destruction of inmate property by correction officer during facility shakedown not violative of due process because such intentional acts not authorized by state and post-deprivation remedy was available); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (alleged negligent loss by prison officials of inmate's property while prisoner in segregation not violative of due process because such negligent acts were not authorized by state and post-deprivation remedy was available). The rationale underlying this policy is that when "deprivations of property are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply `impracticable' since the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur." Hudson v. Palmer, supra, 468 U.S. 533. In this case, the plaintiff has not alleged that there is an official department of correction policy that authorizes correction officers to negligently or intentionally deprive the plaintiff of commissary goods or destroy his headphones. Moreover, the department of correction affords inmates a post-deprivation remedy for lost or damaged property through a grievance procedure that includes an appeal to the state claims commissioner, of which the plaintiff has availed himself, albeit unsuccessfully. Accordingly, the court concludes that even if the plaintiff could establish an interest in the property he claims to have lost, the process accorded to remedy those deprivations of property are conterminous with all due process imperatives.
The court likewise rejects the plaintiff's argument that due process is violated because the defendants did not allow judicial review of their decision. Indeed, the courts in this state have remained resolute and steadfast in their determination that an unsuccessful claimant before the claims commissioner is not entitled to judicial review of the commissioner's decisions, and that this lack of judicial review does not offend state or federal constitutional prerogatives. See Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, supra, 263 Conn. 86 ("we find no authority, and we know of none, standing for the proposition that recourse to the claims commissioner is an inadequate remedy as a matter of law"); see also Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, supra, 195 Conn. 542 ("sovereign immunity furnishes a constitutionally rational basis for disallowance of judicial review of the decisions of claims commissions"); Cooper v. Delta Chi Housing Corp. of Connecticut, supra, 41 Conn.App. 64 ("[d]ecisions of the claims commissioner are not subject to judicial review").
Moreover, parties to an administrative hearing are not constitutionally entitled to judicial review of that agency's decisions unless fundamental liberties are at issue because the right to such appeals can only be granted by the legislature. See Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, supra, 195 Conn. 542 ("there is no federal constitutional right to an administrative appeal when the claimant has been afforded an adequate administrative hearing and the administrative decision does not implicate a fundamental constitutional right or a constitutionally suspect classification such as race, nationality or alienage"); see also Norwich Land Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 170 Conn. 1, 6, 363 A.2d 1386 (1975) ("[a]ppeals to courts from administrative agencies exist only under statutory authority").
In this case, the plaintiff has (1) filed three separate grievances with the department of corrections, (2) appealed all three of those grievances to the small claims liaison, who investigated their respective merits and made a recommendation to the claims commissioner, (3) made his case directly to the claims commissioner, who then considered the evidence and rendered an independent decision, and (4) filed two separate lawsuits (excluding the present case) in state and federal courts. Furthermore, the issues presented to the claims commissioner by the plaintiff involved a simple property dispute that did not implicate a fundamental right, and he makes no allegation that he was discriminated against on the basis of a suspect classification. The plaintiff's property claims have been reviewed by all three branches of government, thereby further ensuring their transparent, independent and impartial adjudication, and rendering his inadequate due process assertion nugatory. Accordingly, the court finds the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate clearly that his constitutionally enshrined right to due process was affronted.
Although the plaintiff was denied permission to proceed in forma pauperis with his case in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see footnote 5; that is not the same as being denied access to the courts altogether. See In Re Amendment To Rule 39, 500 U.S. 12, 13 (1991) (amending the Supreme Court's rules to mirror § 1915 because "it is vital that the right to file in forma pauperis not be encumbered by those who would abuse the integrity of our process by frivolous filings").
Indeed, "[t]he separation of powers doctrine serves a dual function: it limits the exercise of power within each branch, yet ensures the independent exercise of that power"). (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wooten v. Commissioner of Correction, 104 Conn.App. 793, 804, 936 A.2d 263 (2007).
In view of this analysis, the court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that either his equal protection right or due process right was impaired by the defendants. Accordingly, "due to the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of the [constitutional violation exception]," the court holds that the exception to sovereign immunity occasioned by an agent of the state violating constitutional imperatives is inapplicable in this case. Tuchman v. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. 754.
Having decided that the plaintiff is unable to avail himself of the sovereign immunity exception for constitutional trespass, the court next considers whether jurisdiction is conferred because the defendants acted beyond their statutory authority. See Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 327. The plaintiff argues that Martins acted beyond his statutory authority because he failed to apply various department of corrections administrative directives to the plaintiff's property claims and because Martins' communications with Smith were impermissible political activity. For claims "alleging that an officer acted in excess of statutory authority, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants' conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. 754. Thus, the court now considers whether the plaintiff has alleged facts to support a conclusion that either defendant was without legal authority to act as they did.
Although the plaintiff does not appear to allege in the context of sovereign immunity that the defendants lacked statutory authority because they resolved his property claims out of malevolence or for personal benefit, the court nevertheless finds that such an argument would be foreclosed by the rationale explained in part II C.
With respect to Martins' alleged non-compliance with department of corrections directives, the plaintiff appears to confuse having statutory authority to make a determination in the first instance with being bound to draw the same conclusions as a claimant from the application of various directives to a particular case. While the plaintiff does not dispute that Martins, as the department of corrections' liaison to the claims commissioner, has the legal authority to review inmate claims and make recommendations to the claims commissioner on behalf of the department of correction, he does take issue with the inferences that Martins drew from the application of department directives to his property claims. By way of example, the plaintiff points to the fact that one such administrative directive requires that an officer transporting prisoners between facilities must first search all inmates, allowing only authorized jewelry and clothing to remain with the prisoners during transport. The plaintiff then suggests that a proper conclusion to draw from this directive is that his necklace was not deemed contraband by the transporting officer, and was not, therefore, actually contraband when it was later confiscated by NCI personnel. Thus, the plaintiff argues, because Martins failed to reach that same conclusion, he was not acting within the scope of his authority and has, consequently, "forfeited" his right to sovereign immunity. The court is not persuaded by this argument.
See department of correction administrative directive 6.4 (Searches), § 12(b) ("(p)rior to transport, an inmate shall be searched by a facility officer . . . when restraints are required . . . all personal property, except clothing and authorized jewelry shall be secured separately from the inmate prior to transport").
In this case, the plaintiff's own pleadings assert that it was Martins' job to investigate an inmate's grievances and to make recommendations to the claims commissioner, which belies any assertion that Martins was without legal authority to undertake the actions now at issue. Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's asseverations, Martins is not required to draw the same inferences as the plaintiff from the application of various department of corrections administrative directives to the property claims in this case. By way of illustration, it is perfectly plausible that the necklace could have been altered from permissible inmate property to contraband while the prisoner was transported from CCI to NCI. Accordingly, because the plaintiff concedes that Martins was obligated to investigate his property claims and make recommendations to the claims commissioner, he has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a conclusion that Martins acted beyond the scope of his statutory authority.
To suggest otherwise would be analogous to arguing that a judge had to draw the same conclusions as a defendant with respect to how the law is applied to a particular set of facts.
The plaintiff next argues that Martins engaged in political activity by sending to the claims commissioner his recommendations concerning the plaintiff's property claims. According to the plaintiff, because the claims commissioner performs a legislative function, and a corrections officer is barred from engaging in political activity, Martins violated department regulations by corresponding with the claims commissioner, and is, therefore, deprived of sovereign immunity. This argument must fail. Martins does not engage in political activity by sending his claims recommendations to the claims commissioner. Not only is Martins required by department of corrections policy to "provide information to elected and appointed public officials, as well as representatives of other government agencies"; department of corrections administrative directive 1.4, § 6; but this type of inter-departmental cooperation is not political activity. See department of administrative services General Letter No. 214-D (state employee cannot use "official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a nomination for office"). The plaintiff does not allege facts to demonstrate that either defendant's decision with respect to his property claims were influenced by political activity or that the defendants were without statutory authority to communicate with one another during the adjudicative resolution of his property claims.
Consequently, the court concludes that the plaintiff is unable to avail himself of either exception to sovereign immunity potentially available for claimants seeking equitable relief because he has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a finding that his constitutional rights were violated or that the defendants acted beyond their statutory authority. "In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." Tuchman v. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. 754. The court, therefore, concludes that it is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims against the defendants for the actions they respectively undertook in their official capacities due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
C Statutory Immunity
The court next considers the plaintiff's alleged violations of state law against both defendants in their individual capacities. Before doing so, however, it is first necessary to address the defendants' argument that this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear these allegations because they are entitled to statutory immunity under General Statutes § 4-165. "[T]he doctrine of [statutory] immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss . . . When a [trial] court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . Because this case comes to us on a threshold [statutory] immunity issue, pursuant to a motion to dismiss . . . we do not pass on whether the complaint was legally sufficient to state a cause of action . . . In the posture of this case, we examine the pleadings to decide if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts . . . with respect to personal immunity under § 4-165, to support a conclusion that the defendant[s] [were] acting outside the scope of [their] employment or wilfully or maliciously." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. 376. The question before the court, therefore, is whether the facts alleged in the pleadings, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to conclude that the defendants were acting outside the scope of their employment or acted wilfully or maliciously.
General Statute § 4-165 states in relevant part, "[n]o state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment."
To determine if a person has acted outside the scope of their employment, courts have been usefully guided by inquiring whether the defendant's "alleged actions were motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to his employer's interest"; Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 499, 642 A.2d 699 (1994); or whether they acted "solely . . . to justify their own prior unjustified conduct, and not to carry out the government policy with which they were entrusted." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 174, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000). In this case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants had reason to deny his property claim because it would require him to purchase additional goods from the commissary, thereby increasing revenue for the state. The plaintiff does not allege, however, that either defendant was actually motivated by this incentive, that either defendant in any way gained personally from such a scheme, or that such actions were undertaken to conceal prior unjustified conduct. To the contrary, the plaintiff alleges that both defendants were carrying out responsibilities entrusted to their care by virtue of their employment. Consequently, the court concludes that the plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to conclude the defendants were operating outside the scope of their employment when adjudicating his property claim.
It is next incumbent upon the court to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to conclude the defendants acted wilfully or maliciously. While the courts have not yet articulated a specific standard for assessing such claims in the context of § 4-165, they have suggested looking to common-law precedent for guidance. "In order to establish that the defendants' conduct was wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . [I]n order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action . . . [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. 379. In the present case, the plaintiff fails to allege any facts to suggest either defendant engaged in highly unreasonable conduct. Indeed, the plaintiff fails to allege any departure from departmental procedure or the law. The court, therefore, concludes that the plaintiff has failed to allege either that the defendants were operating outside the scope of their employment or that they acted wilfully or maliciously. Consequently, the court holds that it is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the state claims alleged against the defendants in their individual capacities because they are cloaked in the immunity afforded by § 4-165.
D Federal Qualified Immunity
Having concluded that the plaintiff's state constitutional trespass claims against the defendants in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity and that the plaintiff's state constitutional trespass claims against the defendants in their individual capacities are barred by statutory immunity, the court now resolves whether it has jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's federal constitutional trespass claims against the defendants in their individual capacities. The plaintiff asserts in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action that the defendants' official conduct violated his right to due process and equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The fourteenth amendment, § 1, to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
While "[s]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983 . . . [c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under [§ 1983] . . . cannot be immunized by state law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 133-34. Moreover, while § 1983 authorizes actions against state officers for damages arising from official acts, if sued in their individual capacities; see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); "neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons' under § 1983" due to the precepts of federal sovereign immunity. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 140. Consequently, the court understands the plaintiff's § 1983 claims for trespass of his federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection to be against the defendants in their individual capacities both because his complaint states that his suit is brought against the defendants in their individual and official capacities and because a § 1983 action against a state or its agent is barred by federal sovereign immunity.
Indeed, "[a] state, as an entity having immunity under the eleventh amendment to the United States constitution, is not a `person' within the meaning of § 1983 and thus is not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court . . . This rule also extends to state officers sued in their official capacities." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 311.
Turning to the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." In view of these textual requirements, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed that "[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Tuchman v. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. 762, quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
Nevertheless, even when these elements have been alleged, a court must ensure it has not been stripped of its jurisdiction to hear such a case by the doctrine of federal qualified immunity. "Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 81 Conn.App. 382, 395, 840 A.2d 557 (2004), aff'd, 274 Conn. 533, 877 A.2d 773 (2005). Our Supreme Court has explained that determining "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 519-20, 729 A.2d 740, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929, 79 S.Ct. 326, 145 L.Ed.2d 254 (1999). Thus, the dispositive question in this case is whether, in light of the legal rules established at the time of incident, it is objectively reasonable to conclude that (1) the defendants' respective conduct clearly violated the plaintiff's federal rights to due process and equal protection, and that (2) the defendants should have known their respective actions were unconstitutional.
The plaintiff has not met his burden of alleging facts sufficient to establish either that the rights of due process and equal protection guaranteed to him by the federal constitution were clearly violated or that the defendants should have reasonably known of these violations. With respect to the question of whether the plaintiff's federal rights were abridged, the analysis provided in part II B of this opinion regarding the absence of a clear state constitutional violation provides ample justification for reaching this decision. This is true notwithstanding the fact that the previous analysis was undertaken in the context of state constitutional law. See Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 639 ("[t]his court has many times noted that equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions have a like meaning and impose similar constitutional limitations"); Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 64 ("[a]rticle one, section eight of our state constitution contains the same prohibition and is given the same effect as the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution"); State v. Lineras, 232 Conn. 345, 379, 655 A.2d 737 (1999) ("federal constitutional law sets minimum national standards for individual rights . . . [and] the protections afforded to the citizens of this state by our own constitution go beyond those provided by the federal constitution"). Thus, because the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to allege a violation of our state constitution, that same analysis also confirms the dearth of sufficient allegations to plead a constitutional trespass under the more narrowly construed federal constitution. Moreover, because the court concludes that there was not a violation of the plaintiff's federal constitutional liberties, it also concludes that the defendants could not have reasonably believed their conduct was constitutionally impermissible.
Accordingly, the court holds that the defendants are shielded by the doctrine of federal qualified immunity, and that the court is, therefore, without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
III CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing analysis, the court grants the defendants' motions to dismiss. Specifically, the court GRANTS motion to dismiss No. 103 because this court is without jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims against Martins on the grounds that he is protected by sovereign immunity for his official conduct, enjoys statutory immunity for the claims against him individually and enjoys qualified immunity for the federal claims against him. The court also GRANTS motion to dismiss No. 105 because this court is without jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims against Smith on the grounds that the claims commissioner is protected by absolute judicial immunity for his adjudicative responsibilities, shielded by sovereign immunity for his official conduct, enjoys statutory immunity for the claims against him individually and enjoys qualified immunity for the federal claims against him.
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