Opinion
No. 14-08-00036-CR
Opinion filed May 12, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 338th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1104026.
Panel consists of Justices FROST, BROWN, and BOYCE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Don Warren Davis challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for sexual assault. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant worked as a caregiver for the twenty-two-year-old complainant, who is diagnosed with mild mental retardation, cerebral palsy, and other disabilities that affect her vision and mobility. By contractual obligation, appellant worked in the complainant's home each week. One of appellant's duties included assisting the complainant in and out of bed. The complainant attended special-education classes and complained to a school nurse of itching in her genital area, which she reported after using the restroom. When the nurse inquired further, the complainant pointed between her legs and explained that her caregiver "put his thing in my thing." The complainant indicated that her mother and appellant told her not to tell anyone. The complainant told the nurse that the incident occurred on a Saturday. The nurse notified authorities. The complainant told a forensic nurse, who performed a sexual-assault examination, that appellant "put his penis in me." The nurse noted that complainant said her "vagina part was swollen." However, when asked directly about penetration in the forensic exam, the complainant denied that any penetration occurred. Appellant was charged by indictment with sexual assault of the complainant to which he pleaded, "not guilty." At trial, the complainant used anatomically correct dolls to identify male and female genitalia and describe the incident. She explained that she was in bed, on her stomach, when appellant came into the room, removed her panties, and "went in between the legs and stick himself up in me." She described seeing "little white lines" between her legs. She did not want this to happen; it did not feel good to her. She testified that she first told her school nurse about the incident. She testified that appellant told her not to tell her mother. She explained that when she told her mother about the incident, her mother became upset. The complainant admitted on cross-examination that she wore a diaper, instead of panties, that appellant removed during the incident. The complainant's mother testified that she and appellant shared a sexual relationship. The complainant's mother, at first, denied seeing appellant enter the complainant's bedroom on October 21, 2006, the date the incident was alleged to have occurred. She claimed that appellant was never alone with the complainant. However, on cross-examination, she testified to seeing appellant put the complainant to bed that night. She denied that the complainant told her of the incident. The mother recalled that the complainant told her that her "bottom" itched. The mother attributed the itching to chafing, noting that the complainant wore a diaper to bed and was wearing the same diaper the next morning, and that the complainant chafed when she had her period. The jury found appellant guilty as charged. In finding an enhancement paragraph "true" as to a prior conviction for indecency with a child, the trial court assessed appellant's punishment at confinement for life.II. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY
In a single issue, appellant asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Specifically, appellant complains of the following:• The State's evidence consisted entirely of the complainant's testimony.
• The complainant's testimony was vague, "undetailed," and had "serious problems" because the complainant did not seem to know what it meant to tell the truth and she offered contradictory information to the forensic nurse about penetration.
• The complainant's mother testified that the complainant was not honest or truthful.
• Evidence indicated that the complainant wore the same diaper the morning after the assault, but there was no explanation of how the complainant put it on after the assault.
• The complainant's mother testified that appellant was never alone with the complainant.
• No physical evidence supported the complainant's account.When evaluating a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and inquire whether we are able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that a conviction is "clearly wrong" or "manifestly unjust" because the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury's verdict. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-17 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). It is not enough that this court harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to overturn a conviction that is founded on legally sufficient evidence, and this court cannot declare that a conflict in the evidence justifies a new trial simply because it disagrees with the jury's resolution of that conflict. Id. at 417. If this court determines the evidence is factually insufficient, it must explain in exactly what way it perceives the conflicting evidence greatly to preponderate against conviction. Id. at 414-17. Our evaluation should not intrude upon the fact finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any witness's testimony. See Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Except in cases in which the court issues a memorandum opinion, in conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we must discuss the evidence appellant claims is most important in allegedly undermining the jury's verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). A person commits the offense of sexual assault if that person intentionally or knowingly "causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another person, without that person's consent." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(1)(A) (Vernon 2003). A sexual assault without the consent of the other person, as specified in subsection 22.011(a)(1), occurs if "the actor knows that as a result of mental disease or defect the other person is at the time of the sexual assault incapable either of appraising the nature of the act or of resisting it" or if "the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by use of physical force or violence." Id. §§ 22.011(b)(1), (4). The State's evidence included testimony from the complainant, the school nurse, the forensic nurse, and the complainant's mother. Although appellant contends the complainant's testimony was "vague" and "undetailed," the jury was free to believe or disbelieve the complainant's account of the incident. See Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 271; Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Rider v. State, 735 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.) (providing that a jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve some witnesses in case involving sexual assault of a resident of a facility for mentally retarded adults). Evidence in the record reveals that the complainant told the school nurse and the forensic nurse that appellant put his penis inside her sexual organ. The complainant, herself, testified that appellant "went in between the legs and st[u]ck himself up in me." To the extent that the complainant offered inconsistent information as to penetration to the forensic nurse, the jury, as trier of fact, held the ultimate authority to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and the testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Rider, 735 S.W.2d at 293; see also Green v. State, No. 14-06-005350CR, 2007 WL 2265787, at *6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding evidence was sufficient even in light of other evidence that may impeach the complainant's credibility). Likewise, even though the complainant's mother testified that the complainant sometimes was not honest or truthful or that appellant was never alone with the complainant, the jury was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to witness testimony. See Rider, 735 S.W.2d at 293. On cross-examination, the mother recalled that appellant put the complainant to bed on the date of the incident. Evidence also suggests that the mother told investigating officers that the complainant reported the incident to her. The jury could have accepted or rejected any or all of the evidence on either side. See id.; see also Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *6. Appellant points to evidence that the complainant wore a diaper on the morning after the incident and contends that no evidence explains how the complainant put it back on after the incident. However, this evidence does not render the verdict clearly wrong or manifestly unjust or show that it is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See generally Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-17; see also Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *4. This evidence does not even contradict the verdict. See Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *4. The jury could have believed this evidence and still reasonably believed that appellant committed a sexual assault against the complainant in which the complainant was unable to appraise the nature of the sexual act or resist due to mental disease or disability. See generally Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-17; see also Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *4 (concluding evidence was sufficient to support conviction despite other evidence indicating the complainant might be able to resist the sexual act). Appellant contends that no physical evidence supported the complainant's account. Even if unsupported by any other evidence, the complainant's account of the events in question is sufficient to support appellant's conviction for sexual assault. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b)(3) (Vernon 2005) (providing that a conviction under section 22.011 is supportable by the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of a sexual offense); Garcia v. State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); see also Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *6 ("The complainant herself testified to the sexual assault."). Furthermore, the forensic nurse testified that she would not expect to find physical evidence in her examination of the complainant in light of how much time had passed after the incident and the fact that the complainant had bathed and urinated after the incident. See, e.g., Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *6 (deferring to jury's findings based on the weight of the evidence). Appellant does not contest whether the complainant had capacity to consent, as contemplated by subsection 22.011(b)(4); however, the record contains evidence of the complainant's disabilities and supports a finding that she was incapable of appraising the nature of the act or of resisting it. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(4); Rider, 735 S.W.2d at 293 (involving a defendant who worked at a facility for mentally retarded adults and who challenged the sufficiency of evidence for consent). In this case, members of the jury heard the complainant's testimony and could judge for themselves, from her manner of speech and demeanor, whether she was capable of appraising the nature of the sexual act. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(4); Rider, 735 S.W.2d at 293. Given the evidence presented at trial of the complainant's mental capacity, her disabilities, and her need for a caregiver, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the complainant could not appraise the nature of the sexual act or resist it. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(4); Rider, 735 S.W.2d at 293 (finding evidence sufficient after jury viewed the complainant's demeanor on the witness stand); see also Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *3-4 (same). Although appellant has pointed to evidence in the record that he claims fails to support the jury's verdict, appellant's arguments go to the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *7. The jury judged the credibility of the witnesses, reconciled any conflicts in the testimony, and could have accepted or rejected any or all of the evidence on either side. See Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 271; Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614; Rider, 735 S.W.2d at 293. When viewed in a neutral light, we cannot say, with some objective basis in the record, that appellant's conviction is "clearly wrong" or "manifestly unjust" because the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury's verdict. See generally Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-17; see Rider, 735 S.W.2d at 293 (holding evidence was sufficient to support jury's determination that the complainant, by reason of mental defect, was incapable of appraising nature of deviate sexual intercourse or resisting it); see also Green, 2007 WL 2265787, at *7. Therefore, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction, and we overrule appellant's sole issue on appeal. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.