CHASANOW, Judge.

The Defendant, David Davis, was found guilty of distribution of cocaine and heroin by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Following his sentencing, Davis appealed his conviction, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court. This Court granted certiorari. Davis contends that the circuit court erred in improperly restricting the scope of voir dire during jury selection and in permitting the State to make a missing witness argument to the jury during closing arguments. We find that the circuit court did not err in either respect and affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.

I.

On September 25, 1990, Officer Andrew Bratcher of the Baltimore City Police responded to a call regarding an individual selling narcotics in the 2100 block of Barclay Street. Shortly after his arrival, Officer Bratcher observed from his cruiser the Defendant, David Davis, carrying a small white bag in his hand. Davis placed the white bag beside a set of stairs and approached a car. Officer Bratcher then observed Davis hand the car's driver a small white object. Believing that he had just witnessed a drug transaction, Officer Bratcher exited his cruiser and instructed Davis to place his hands on the top of the purchaser's car. Davis fled, with Officer Bratcher giving pursuit. After apprehending Davis, Officer Bratcher returned to the location of the suspected sale and recovered the white bag that Davis had concealed along the side of the stairs. The white bag contained 48 capsules of cocaine and 18 wax-paper bags of heroin. Davis was subsequently charged with two counts of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute, and two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance.

Davis pled not guilty to the charges and requested a trial by jury before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. During voir dire, Judge David Ross asked the entire venire panel six questions and dismissed several prospective jurors on the basis of their replies. The six questions were as follows:

"1) . . . whether any of the prospective jurors had any knowledge or information about this particular case[;]

2) . . . whether any of the jurors knew a) the [Defendant], b) defense counsel, c) the assistant state's attorney, d) Officer Andrew Bratcher, the chief police investigator and only State's witness; or e) Mary Easley, a witness for the defense[;]

3) . . . whether any of the jurors 'has been or . . . has a close relative who has either been the victim of or has been charged with or convicted of a drug related crime[;]'

4) . . . whether any of the jurors is 'likely to give more or less weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because that person is a police officer[;]'

5) . . . whether any of the jurors 'knows of anything that would keep him or her from giving a fair and impartial verdict in this case[;]'

6) . . . whether any of the jurors 'knows of any reason why he or she should not sit on the jury in this case.'"

Davis v. State, 93 Md. App. 89, 92, 611 A.2d 1008, 1009 (1992) (quoting State v. Davis, No. 591032032, R. at 3-9 (May 29, 1991)).

Thereafter, Davis requested that the trial judge ask the jury panel "whether anyone on the jury has been a member or is a member of the law enforcement community or whether they have a close relative or friend who is such a member. . . ." Davis argued that the judge's prior "omnibus" questions, pertaining only to whether any member of the panel knew of any reason why they should not sit on the jury, were insufficient. Davis contended that such questions were "unrealistic" and posited for "[w]hat other reason would I get ten peremptory challenges if I cannot make a halfway intelligent decision to strike or not to strike." The trial judge denied Davis's request.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Davis guilty of the two counts of distribution of controlled dangerous substances. Davis appealed and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction. Davis v. State, 93 Md. App. 89, 611 A.2d 1008 (1992). Dissatisfied with the intermediate appellate court's holding, Davis filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. Davis v. State, 329 Md. 22, 616 A.2d 1286 (1992).

II.

Davis's principal contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask whether any of the jurors were, or were associated with, law enforcement personnel. Davis argues that he was entitled to such a question since it may have led to the disqualification for cause of one or more of the prospective jurors or, at the very least, would have allowed him to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. For the reasons stated below, we disagree.

The principles governing jury voir dire are well established in Maryland. As we have noted on several occasions, there is no statute in Maryland prescribing the manner in which voir dire is to be conducted or regulating the objects of inquiry during voir dire. See Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 116-17 (1989). Absent any statutory guidance from the General Assembly, this Court has consistently looked to Maryland's common law for guidance. The common law of this State vests trial judges with discretion to regulate voir dire. The trial judge typically questions the prospective jurors, although he or she has discretion to permit counsel to conduct the inquiry. Moore v. State, 7 Md. App. 495, 503, 256 A.2d 337, 341-42, cert. denied, 256 Md. 746, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 913, 90 S.Ct. 1714, 26 L.Ed.2d 76 (1970); Maryland Rule 4-312(d). Additionally, the scope of voir dire and the form of the questions propounded rests firmly within the discretion of the trial judge. Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 605, 143 A.2d 627, 631 (1958). The trial judge's discretion regarding the scope of a proposed avenue of voir dire is governed by one primary principle: the purpose of "the inquiry is to ascertain 'the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose.'" McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959) (quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952) (citations omitted)). Where parties to the litigation direct their inquiries concerning a specific cause for disqualification, they have "a right to have questions propounded to prospective jurors" during voir dire. Casey, 217 Md. at 605, 143 A.2d at 631 (emphasis in original); see Bedford, 317 Md. at 670, 566 A.2d at 116 ("Maryland Declaration of Rights Article XXI guarantees a defendant the right to examine prospective jurors to determine whether any cause exists for a juror's disqualification."). "Questions not directed to a specific ground for disqualification but which are speculative, inquisitorial, catechising or 'fishing', asked in the aid of deciding on peremptory challenges, may be refused in the discretion of the court, even though it would not have been error to have asked them." McGee, 219 Md. at 58-59, 146 A.2d at 196; see also Kujawa v. Baltimore Trans. Co., 224 Md. 195, 201, 167 A.2d 96, 98 (1961) (stating that trial court's denial of voir dire question, in the nature of a "fishing" expedition, was clearly not an abuse of discretion). We must view Davis's challenge in the context of this framework.

A.

Davis first contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to ask his proposed question because, in a case where "the sole issue . . . is the credibility of the police officer as [o]pposed to [the defendant], a voir dire question concerning law enforcement employment or association may well lead to the disqualification for cause of one or more of the prospective jurors." We must reject Davis's argument.

As the Court noted in Langley v. State, a fundamental tenet underlying the practice of trial by jury is that each juror, as far as possible, be "impartial and unbiased." Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 340, 378 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1977) (citing Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879)). The objective of this tenet is to assemble a group of jurors capable of deciding the matter before them based solely upon the facts presented, "'uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations. . . .'" Id. The function of voir dire is closely related to this fundamental tenet of trial by jury and, thus, the mandatory scope of voir dire in Maryland only extends to those areas of inquiry reasonably likely to reveal cause for disqualification. There are two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1) an examination to determine whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service, see Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol., 1992 Cum. Supp.), Courts Judicial Proceedings Article, § 8-207; or (2) "'an examination of a juror . . . conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.'" Bedford, 317 Md. at 671, 566 A.2d at 117 (quoting Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343 (1946) (emphasis added)).

In addition, this Court has identified several areas of inquiry where, if reasonably related to the case at hand, a trial judge must question prospective jurors. See Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 15, 595 A.2d 448, 455 (1991) (holding trial judge erred in failing during voir dire to inquire into prospective jurors' possible racial bias); Casey, 217 Md. at 606-07, 143 A.2d at 632 (trial judge erred in failing to inquire about religious bias); Corens, 185 Md. at 564, 45 A.2d at 343-44 (holding that State has a right to challenge prospective juror for cause based upon juror's unwillingness to convict founded upon circumstantial evidence in death penalty case); Langley, 281 Md. at 349, 378 A.2d at 1344 (holding that where a principal part of the State's case hinges upon the credibility of a police officer's testimony versus the credibility of the defendant, court must ask whether prospective juror would give more weight to police officer's testimony solely because of his or her official status). These areas entail potential biases or predispositions that prospective jurors may hold which, if present, would hinder their ability to objectively resolve the matter before them.

Davis's proposed voir dire inquiry does not relate to cause for disqualification. Davis merely sought to discover whether any prospective juror was either a law enforcement officer or was related to or associated with any law enforcement officers. Assuming that the court would have allowed such an inquiry, an affirmative answer would not have established cause for disqualification. First, the fact that a prospective juror is or was a member of a law enforcement body does not automatically disqualify that venire person. See Harris v. State, 82 Md. App. 450, 470, 572 A.2d 573, 583 (trial judge did not err when he failed to strike former state trooper for cause where trooper indicated that he was able to render fair and impartial judgment despite earlier employment), cert. denied, 320 Md. 800, 580 A.2d 218 (1990). Likewise, the mere fact that a prospective juror is related to or associated with members of the law enforcement community does not constitute cause for disqualification. Goldstein v. State, 220 Md. 39, 45, 150 A.2d 900, 904 (1959); Shifflett v. State, 80 Md. App. 151, 156, 560 A.2d 587, 589 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 319 Md. 275, 572 A.2d 167 (1990); Baker v. State, 3 Md. App. 251, 254, 238 A.2d 561, 564 (1968). In general, the professional, vocational, or social status of a prospective juror is not a dispositive factor establishing cause to disqualify. Rather, the proper focus is on the venire person's state of mind, and whether there is some bias, prejudice, or preconception. Short of those instances where there is a demonstrably strong correlation between the status in question and a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification, mere status or acquaintance is insufficient to establish cause for disqualification of a prospective juror. The fact that a prospective juror is employed as, related to, or associated with a law enforcement officer does not establish that the prospective juror has any undue bias or prejudice that will prevent that person from fairly and impartially determining the matter before them. See Goldstein, 220 Md. at 44-45, 150 A.2d at 904. The inquiry must instead focus on the venire person's ability to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented. We believe the Court of Special Appeals accurately stated this principle in Borman v. State:

"The purpose of the voir dire examination is to ascertain the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose. Neither mere acquaintance with an individual or group, nor mere relationship to witnesses, other than parties, is sufficient basis for challenging a prospective juror for cause. Bias on the part of prospective jurors will never be presumed, and the challenging party bears the burden of presenting facts, in addition to mere relationship or association, which would give rise to a showing of actual prejudice." (Citations omitted).

Borman v. State, 1 Md. App. 276, 279, 229 A.2d 440, 441-42 (1967).

Davis next argues that, "[w]hile an affirmative answer to the proposed question may not, as a matter of law, result in disqualification of the prospective juror for cause, the answer, by itself or together with the juror's manner and demeanor, may persuade the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to excuse the juror for cause." He asserts that such "follow-up questioning may reveal facts, predilections, or unacknowledged prejudices. . . ." Davis's suggested approach to voir dire, however, finds no support in the law of Maryland. Davis suggests that a party be allowed to incrementally question prospective jurors in a piecemeal fashion until the party can uncover grounds for a challenge for cause. We see no difference between this approach and the practice in some other states that permit parties to use voir dire as a means to more effectively exercise peremptory challenges — a practice that this Court has long since rejected. Where parties do not direct their questions to grounds for disqualification but such questions are "speculative, inquisitorial, catechising or 'fishing', asked in aid of deciding on peremptory challenges," a trial judge has the discretion to refuse to ask them. McGee, 219 Md. at 58-59, 146 A.2d at 196. We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to ask a question not addressing a potential ground for disqualification. Although the trial judge possessed the discretion to allow Davis's proposed line of inquiry, he was not required to do so.

B.

Perhaps sensing the impending demise of his initial contention, Davis next requests that this Court reconsider the framework in which Maryland courts conduct voir dire. Davis recognizes that "[u]nder current Maryland law, voir dire examination . . . not aimed at exposing the existence of cause for disqualification, but which may aid the parties in exercising their right of peremptory challenge . . . may be refused in the discretion of the court even though it would not be error to ask them." Davis, however, points to what he considers an "overwhelming majority" of states that have adopted the position that a criminal defendant is "entitled to make reasonable inquiries of prospective jurors so that he may intelligently exercise his right of peremptory challenge." Not surprisingly, Davis urges us to reconsider the long settled law of this State and adopt this alternative system of voir dire.

Davis correctly recognizes that there exist two schools of thought among the various courts throughout the country with regard to the scope of voir dire. See J. Alexander Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo.L.Rev. 627, 638-40 (1986). These two camps differ largely in the mandatory scope of examination of prospective jurors. The Maryland system requires that the trial judge allow inquiries reasonably likely to disclose cause for disqualification with all other inquiries subject to the trial judge's discretion. In stark contrast is the system that Davis wishes us to adopt. This alternative system requires that a trial judge inquire about any topic or subject matter which may be reasonably related to the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.

While the extent of questioning under either system of voir dire may differ, the desire to obtain a fair and impartial jury is at the heart of both. Likewise, the constitutional imperative that the criminal defendant receive a fair trial remains constant. There is no constitutionally protected right to exercise peremptory challenges. See Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n. 11, 69 S.Ct. 201, 206 n. 11, 93 L.Ed. 187, 195 n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145, 57 S.Ct. 177, 185, 81 L.Ed. 78, 88 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586, 40 S.Ct. 28, 30, 63 L.Ed. 1154, 1156 (1919); see also Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 Temple L.Rev. 369, 374-75 (1992) (examining evolution of Sixth Amendment and indicating that drafters of Bill of Rights considered an express guaranty of peremptory challenges in Sixth Amendment but abandoned the idea). The concept of a fair trial only entitles a defendant to a jury composed of impartial and unbiased jurors, not a jury composed of what a litigant views as ideal or model jurors predisposed to accept his or her theory of the case. See Whittemore v. State, 151 Md. 309, 315, 134 A. 322, 324 (1926) (stating that "the law does not aid a party in an effort to select jurymen in hope of favor from them, for that is contrary to the object sought by the law"). In the absence of a rigid constitutional requirement concerning the scope of voir dire, states have had to make a policy determination with respect to which method of voir dire best fits the needs of their justice system. In setting this policy, courts and legislatures have had to balance the parties' desires for extensive voir dire and the justice system's obligation to provide litigants with both an impartial as well as efficient method of administering justice.

Nearly ninety years ago this Court, in Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 60 A. 452 (1905), struck such a policy balance and established the general principles governing the scope of voir dire in Maryland. In Handy, this Court considered whether a trial judge was bound to ask a prospective juror a voir dire question submitted for the purpose of enlightening a party as to the propriety of exercising peremptory challenges. In the absence of any statute, the Court acknowledged that the common law provided a trial judge with the discretion to ask such questions but the Court rejected the defendant's contention that the trial judge was obligated to propound such questions to the jury. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated "[w]e are aware that there are decisions to the contrary in other courts of equal authority and reputation, but such knowledge as we possess of the experience in practice under those decisions does not commend them to our adoption." 101 Md. at 43, 60 A. at 453.

Twenty-one years later, in Whittemore, 151 Md. 309, 134 A. 322, this Court once again had an opportunity to reassess the policy choice made in Handy concerning the scope of voir dire. In Whittemore, the defendant sought to question a prospective juror concerning that juror's age and prior occupation without specifying any potential cause for disqualification. The trial judge, relying on Handy, refused to allow the inquiry, reasoning that "he would be glad to have them submit other questions that would affect the eligibility of the juror and not for the purpose of enlightening counsel as to whether there should be a peremptory challenge." 151 Md. at 312, 134 A. at 322. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial judge's interpretation of Handy. This Court affirmed the trial judge and crystallized the principles that had been implicit in Handy. The Court held:

"The rule is, then, that questions, not directed to a specific reason for disqualification and exclusion by the court, may be refused in the court's discretion. . . .

The questions excluded in this case were for no specified purpose, and apparently with no question of disqualification in mind, but were merely beginning a process of examining at large, in order to form impressions and preferences, which, while they might properly be made the ground for peremptory challenges, would not test the eligibility of the jurymen."

151 Md. at 315-16, 134 A. at 324.

In addition to clarifying the holding of Handy, the Court in Whittemore reexamined the policy underlying the adoption of a rule mandating voir dire in only those areas relating to a specific cause of disqualification. The Court noted the following:

"Judge Pearce writing the [ Handy] opinion for the Court said, 'we are aware that there are decisions to the contrary in other courts of equal authority and reputation, but such knowledge as we possess of the experience in practice under those decisions does not commend them to our adoption' — in this referring, presumably, to reports from other jurisdictions of seemingly unreasonable encumbering and prolongation of the work of securing a jury to proceed with the trial."

151 Md. at 314, 134 A. at 323 (quoting Handy, 101 Md. at 43, 60 A. at 454).

This Court initially adopted the rules concerning the scope of voir dire because allowing more extensive inquiry would unduly tax the efficiency of Maryland's judicial system. Although some litigants might benefit from broader mandatory voir dire, a greater number of citizens would be hindered due to the accompanying decline in their ability to gain prompt resolution of their litigation. In Handy and Whittemore, this Court decided that any such detrimental effects outweighed the marginal gains springing from unlimited voir dire. Writing for the Court of Special Appeals in the instant case, Judge Moylan vividly captured the essence of this policy choice. In comparing Davis's proposed system of expanded voir dire with Maryland's current system, Judge Moylan wrote the following:

"There is, however, an opposing school of thought that looks upon such indulgence as errant, if not grotesque, foolishness. . . . In terms of the profligate waste of precious courtroom and human resources, it looks upon any fractional gain from unlimited voir dire as a minimally incremental benefit that soon passes the point of diminishing returns. In a world of finite resources, if the fabled 'day in court' is permitted casually to multiply into twenty days in court, the inevitable consequence is that, by the inexorable law of mathematics, nineteen other litigants are denied any time in court at all. . . ."

Davis v. State, 93 Md. App. 89, 94, 611 A.2d 1008, 1010 (1992).

Davis cites numerous other states that hold a contrary view to Maryland's and invites this Court to reverse the policy decision it made nearly a century ago. We must, however, decline any such invitation. Several considerations underpin our decision to remain faithful to the Handy rule and maintain this State's present course. First, the present-day need for judicial efficiency is even greater than it was at the turn of the century; crowded dockets abound with little chance of adequately expanding judicial resources in the near future.

Furthermore, the trend for expansive voir dire appears to be waning. For example, prior to 1981, California followed a rule which limited the scope of voir dire to questions reasonably likely to uncover cause for disqualification and excluded those asked to aid the use of peremptory challenges. See People v. Edwards, 163 Cal. 752, 127 P. 58, 58-60 (1912) and citations therein. In People v. Edwards, 163 Cal. at 753, 127 P. at 58, the California Supreme Court limited the scope of voir dire in criminal cases to avoid what it perceived of as a growing trend of unnecessarily prolonging court proceedings by unlimited and tedious examination of prospective jurors.

In 1981, however, the California Supreme Court reassessed its prior rule and abandoned the Edwards line of cases, thereby expanding the scope of permissible voir dire questioning. People v. Williams, 29 Cal.3d 392, 403-04, 174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 322, 628 P.2d 869, 871 (1981). In People v. Williams, the court found that the Edwards rule was too restrictive, and it did not effectively uncover juror partiality. 29 Cal.3d at 401, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 321, 628 P.2d at 873. The Williams court reasoned that people are governed by subconscious biases that are only discoverable upon more extensive voir dire questioning. 29 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 322-23, 628 P.2d at 873. Thus, the California Supreme Court adopted a new rule that voir dire should include reasonable inquiries made to assist counsel in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. 29 Cal.3d at 398, 174 Cal.Rptr. at 319, 628 P.2d at 871.

When the California Supreme Court discarded the Edwards rule, which had limited voir dire to grounds for cause, the court failed to foresee the effects that broadened voir dire would cause. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction with the newly expanded right of voir dire, because of the additional burdens that the Williams rule placed upon California's criminal justice system. As one distraught trial judge wrote in the aftermath of the Williams decision:

"Many trial judges have decided that if exclusion of such a question [to aid in the use of peremptory challenges, no matter how ridiculous] is grounds for reversal, it is too risky to rule out almost any line of inquiry. . . . In the large municipal court where I recently completed 11 years' service, voir dire in driving-under-the-influence cases now routinely consumes a minimum of two days, frequently three. Young lawyers recite their questions from dog-eared sets of Xeroxed inquiries, sometimes hardly glancing up to the faces of the prospective jurors. When voir dire is finally over, the evidence can normally be presented in a little over a day."

Roderic Duncan, Putting a Cap on Voir Dire, 7 Cal. Lawyer 14, 58 (March 1987).

In response to the apparent waste of judicial resources in the criminal arena, due to extensive voir dire required under Williams, the voters of California passed Proposition 115. People v. Boulerice, 5 Cal.App.4th 463, 474-76, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 285-86 (1992). The California voters decided that the Williams decision and the existing statutes had "'unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused criminals far beyond that which is required by the United States Constitution, thereby unnecessarily adding to the costs of criminal cases, and diverting the judicial process from its function as a quest for truth.'" 5 Cal.App.4th at 474-75, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d at 286 (quoting Ballot Pamphlet, Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const., at 33 (June 5, 1990)). Proposition 115 was enacted "'in order to restore balance and fairness to [the] criminal justice system.'" 5 Cal.App.4th at 474, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d at 285-86. As a result, Proposition 115 established two separate voir dire provisions for criminal and civil trials. See Cal.Civ.Proc. Code §§ 222.5, 223 (Supp. 1993). While retaining the Williams rule for civil proceedings in § 222.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Proposition 115 returned to the Edwards rule of limited voir dire for criminal trials. Id. § 223 (entitled "Criminal cases; voir dire examination by court and counsel"). Section 223 of the California Code provides the following:

"In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors. However, the court may permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors upon such a showing, such additional questions by the parties as it deems proper. . . .

Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted only in the aid of the exercise of challenges for cause."

Thus, California experimented with both forms of jury voir dire and ultimately returned to a more limited form of voir dire questioning in the criminal context. The populace clearly decided, as a matter of state law and policy, that any potential benefits to criminal defendants due to expansive questioning of prospective jurors was outweighed by the burdens imposed upon their State's system of justice. California's reaction to expanded voir dire reinforces our view that we should not change Maryland's current voir dire practices.

Finally, we note that a litigant's unbridled use of peremptory challenges has come under intense scrutiny and is the subject of some criticism. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1728, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 94 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system."); Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md. App. 55, 78, 627 A.2d 44, 55 (1993) (Wilner, C.J., concurring) (stating that, in light of Batson, peremptory challenges should be eliminated as a matter of public policy due to the fact that "precious judicial time and resources are being sidetracked . . ."); People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 326, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 956, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (1992) (Bellacosa, Titone, JJ., Wachter, C.J., concurring) (Where several judges invited the legislature to abolish peremptory challenges, stating "[p]eremptories have outlived their usefulness and, ironically, appear to be disguising discrimination — not minimizing it. . . ."). Peremptory challenges have even been abolished in England, the birthplace of the peremptory challenge. See generally Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 Temple L.Rev. 369 (1992). Peremptory challenges have also been criticized for allowing jury selection based on stereotypes. An example of these stereotypes, which might be considered offensive today, can be found in Clarence Darrow's approach to jury selection:

"'Never take a German; they are bullheaded. Rarely take a Swede; they are stubborn. Always take an Irishman or a Jew; they are the easiest to move to emotional sympathy. Old men are generally more charitable and kindly disposed than young men; they have seen more of the world and understand it.'"

Robert F. Hanley, Getting to Know You, 40 Am.U.L.Rev. 865, 865-66 (1991) (quoting The Oxford Book of Legal Anecdotes 101 (M. Gilbert 1986)).

The number of peremptory challenges available to litigants is regulated by the legislature. See Md. Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 8-301. The future of peremptory challenges is a legislative question. If the General Assembly wishes to expand or contract those statutory rights or the manner in which they are exercised, it may do so. Until such time, we will continue to follow the principles adopted in Handy and Whittemore and applied consistently for the greater part of this century. See Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 595 A.2d 448 (1991); Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 566 A.2d 111 (1989); Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 383 A.2d 389, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 158, 58 L.Ed.2d 156 (1978); Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 378 A.2d 1338 (1977); Kujawa v. Baltimore Trans. Co., 224 Md. 195, 167 A.2d 96 (1961); McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 146 A.2d 194 (1959); Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 45 A.2d 340 (1946). Accordingly, we must reject Davis's contention and affirm the circuit court. Although it was within the trial judge's discretion to allow the line of questioning, he was not required to do so. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to propound Davis's question to the prospective jurors.

We hasten to add, however, that where the parties identify an area of potential bias and properly request voir dire questions designed to ascertain jurors whose bias could interfere with their ability to fairly and impartially decide the issues, then the trial judge has an obligation to ask those questions of the venire panel. Merely asking general questions, such as, "is there any reason why you could not render a fair and impartial verdict," is not an adequate substitute for properly framed questions designed to highlight specific areas where potential jurors may have biases that could hinder their ability to fairly and impartially decide the case. Those voir dire questions, however, should be framed so as to identify potential jurors with biases which are cause for disqualification, rather than merely identifying potential jurors with attitudes or associations which might facilitate the exercise of peremptory challenges.

III.

Davis's final contention focuses upon the propriety of a portion of the State's closing argument. At trial, Davis presented both his own testimony and the testimony of Mary Easley that he was only in the vicinity of the alleged drug sale because he was on his way to get food for his children. Easley testified that a woman identified only by her forename, Lakeesha, whom Easley stated was Davis's wife and mother of his children, gave Davis $10 in food stamps in order to buy food for their children. No food stamps were found on Davis's person at the time of his arrest. Although Davis did not call Lakeesha to testify in his defense, she sat in the courtroom throughout the entire trial.

In closing argument, the prosecuting attorney stated:

"Now, I think you would find something interesting in this case.

Defendant's wife, or girlfriend, came outside and saw him with the police. Allegedly the Defendant had been given food stamps by her via Ms. Easley. She was in the house when Deon allegedly came in and said that [the] Defendant had been arrested. Now this woman sat in the courtroom everyday the entire trial; she was clearly in a better position to know what happened other than Defendant. She was never called to testify.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

COURT: Overruled.

[The Prosecutor continued:] She could have told you that she gave the food stamps to the Defendant. She could have told you where exactly he was when she went outside to see where he was. . . .

Why didn't she come in and tell you that that's where he was as opposed to Ms. Easley who didn't even see anything [and] stayed in the house? Doesn't make sense."

Davis argues that the State's reference to his failure to call Lakeesha was improper and the trial judge erred in overruling his objection to it.

In 1975, this Court approved the general statement of the missing witness rule in the context of criminal trials. Christensen v. State, 274 Md. 133, 134-35, 333 A.2d 45, 46 (1975). We stated the following:

"'The failure to call a material witness raises a presumption or inference that the testimony of such person would be unfavorable to the party failing to call him, but there is no such presumption or inference where the witness is not available, or where the testimony is unimportant or cumulative, or where he is equally available to both sides.'"

Id. (quoting 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 45 (rev. 6th ed. P. Herrick, 1973)). This Court revisited the issue in Robinson v. State, 315 Md. 309, 554 A.2d 395 (1989). Writing for the Robinson Court, Judge McAuliffe explained the function and operation of the missing witness rule in the context of a jury instruction:

"There is nothing mysterious about the use of inferences in the fact-finding process. Jurors routinely apply their common sense, powers of logic, and accumulated experiences in life to arrive at conclusions from demonstrated sets of facts. Even had there been no instruction concerning the availability of this inference, we think it likely that among the first questions posed in the deliberation of this case would have been, 'Why didn't the defendant produce [the missing witness]?' Only if, as a matter of law, the unfavorable inference could not have been drawn by the jurors would the trial judge have been authorized to prohibit the prosecutor from posing that same question in argument."

315 Md. at 318-19, 554 A.2d at 399.

In addressing this issue below, the Court of Special Appeals, relying upon Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 729-31, 569 A.2d 1254, 1266-67 (1990), rejected Davis's contention and found that since Lakeesha was the "common-law" wife and mother of Davis's child she was peculiarly within his power to produce. Davis contends that both the intermediate appellate court and the trial court erred. Davis reasons that, since Lakeesha sat in the courtroom throughout the trial and was subject to subpoena, she was equally available to both sides, and thus the use of the missing witness argument was improper. We disagree.

We find the trial judge did not err in permitting the State to make a missing witness argument in the instant case. Although the State could have called Lakeesha as a witness, this fact is not dispositive. As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals noted, the "'availability' of a witness to the Government must be judged 'practically as well as physically.' . . . And whether a person is to be regarded as equally available to both sides may depend not only on physical availability but on his 'relationship' to the parties." U.S. v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted) (citing Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Stewart v. United States, 418 F.2d 1110, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).

The very close relationship that existed between the Defendant and the potential witness was significant in satisfying the requirement that the witness not be equally available to both sides. As this Court noted when setting out the missing witness rule in both Christensen and Robinson: "'The presumption or inference that the testimony of a missing witness would be unfavorable is applied most frequently when there is a relationship between the party and the witness, such as a family relationship, an employer-employee relationship, and, sometimes, a professional relationship.'" Robinson, 315 Md. at 314-15, 554 A.2d at 397 (citing Christensen, 274 Md. at 134-35, 333 A.2d at 46, in turn quoting 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 45 (rev. 6th ed. P. Herrick, 1973)). Underlying this principle is the realization that despite a party's theoretical ability to subpoena the witness's testimony, there is a practical concern that certain relationships may engender a very strong bias which would undermine the utility of that witness's testimony. See State v. Michaels, 454 So.2d 560, 562 (Fla. 1984); State v. Karnes, 608 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Mo. App. 1981).

Whether labeled as husband-wife or domestic partners, the existent relationship between Davis and Lakeesha was sufficiently close that as a practical matter Lakeesha was not equally available to the State. See Hale v. United States, 361 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C. 1976). Lakeesha was the mother of Davis's children. Davis, Lakeesha, and the children lived together as a family, and Davis provided support for the children. Their relationship was at least the functional equivalent of marriage and family — relationships that would substantially hinder the State's access to accurate testimony from the witnesses. Cf. Michaels, 454 So.2d at 562; State v. Reid, 193 Conn. 646, 480 A.2d 463, 473 (1984).

Our holding here is in accord with our decision in Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 729-31, 569 A.2d 1254, 1267 (1990). There we indicated that, at least in the context of the State's closing argument, the existence of a girlfriend-boyfriend relationship was sufficient to satisfy the missing witness rule. In Bruce, the defendant and several companions murdered a number of persons in a drug-related transaction. Bruce and his companions then fled the State. Among this group was Bruce's girlfriend. At trial, Bruce testified that he had not fled the jurisdiction but that he and his girlfriend simply traveled out of the State pursuant to their prior plans. Additionally, one of the issues during the trial was Bruce's incriminating actions in one of the out-of-state hotel rooms while his girlfriend was present. Bruce failed to call his girlfriend to testify and the State made a missing witness argument during its closing remarks.

On appeal, Bruce challenged the State's closing argument as improper. Bruce contended that the missing witness argument was inappropriate since the testimony of his girlfriend would have been cumulative. We affirmed the trial court, finding that the proposed subject matter of the girlfriend's testimony, "coupled with the testimony about her close relationship to [the defendant]," was sufficient to engender a missing witness argument. 318 Md. at 730-31, 569 A.2d at 1267.

In light of Bruce, Christensen, and Robinson, the judge did not err in permitting the State to make a missing witness argument to the jury in the instant case. There was a sufficient factual basis to support the inference that Davis failed to call Lakeesha because her testimony would have been harmful. Davis made her testimony material when he testified that he was only in the area because Lakeesha sent him to the store with food stamps to get food for their children. Lakeesha could have buttressed Davis's defense of mistaken identity. Additionally, the relationship between Davis and Lakeesha was sufficient to indicate that she was not equally available to the State. There was a sufficient factual predicate to permit the State to argue the missing witness inference to the jury. Robinson, 315 Md. at 318-19, 554 A.2d at 400.

We should also point out that the missing witness rule was raised by the State's closing argument rather than the judge's instruction to the jury which may have been a factor in the trial judge's decision. The missing witness inference may arise in one of two contexts. A party may request that a trial judge instruct the jury on the operation and availability of the inference where all the elements of the rule are present. See Christensen v. State, 274 Md. 133, 333 A.2d 45 (1975). Additionally, a party may wish to call the jury's attention to this inference directly during closing arguments. See Bruce, 318 Md. at 729-31, 569 A.2d at 1266-67. As a matter of necessity, the requirements of the missing witness rule must be more rigidly applied where the inference is used in the former context. Where a party raises the missing witness rule during closing argument, its use is just that — an argument. Trial judges typically instruct the jury, as in this case, that the parties' arguments do not constitute evidence. Furthermore, the opposing side also has an opportunity to refute the argument and counter with reasons why the inference is inappropriate.

In contrast to the argument context is the trial judge's instruction to the jury. In the latter case, the inference is communicated to the jury as part of the judge's binding jury instructions, creating the danger that the jury may give the inference undue weight. At the very least, a trial judge's jury instruction on the missing witness inference may have the effect of overemphasizing just one of the many proper inferences that a jury may draw. As a result, where the jury instruction is the vehicle by which the missing witness inference is brought to the jury's attention, the trial court should be especially cautious and closely abide by the requirements set out in Christensen. A trial judge has discretion to deny a missing witness instruction, leaving the matter to closing arguments, even when the facts would support the inference. Robinson, 315 Md. at 319 n. 7, 554 A.2d at 399-400 n. 7. In the instant case, the trial judge properly permitted the State to argue the missing witness inference to the jury. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER .