Summary
In Davis v. State (1967), 33 Wis.2d 682, 684, 148 N.W.2d 53, it was said that Phillips v. State:, supra, "... related to so-called `sew-up' confessions wherein an accused has been interrogated for a long period of time before being brought before a magistrate."
Summary of this case from Klonowski v. StateOpinion
January 10, 1967. —
January 31, 1967.
ERROR to review a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: HERBERT J. STEFFES, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.
For the plaintiff in error there was a brief by Philip L. Padden, attorney, and Herbert S. Bratt of counsel, both of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Padden.
For the defendant in error the cause was argued by Robert E. Sutton, assistant district attorney of Milwaukee county, with whom on the brief were Bronson C. La Follette, attorney general, and Hugh R. O'Connell, district attorney.
On January 23, 1947, a criminal complaint was issued in Milwaukee county charging the defendant McKenzie Davis with first-degree murder, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Mr. Davis was not apprehended at that time, but on February 11, 1964, officials in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, placed him in custody for an event unrelated to the crime in question here. He was released upon bail until February 20, 1964, at which time the Pennsylvania authorities received a detainer from Milwaukee county and again placed the defendant in custody. The defendant waived extradition, and on March 13, 1964, a detective of the Milwaukee police department escorted Mr. Davis back to Milwaukee.
From March 13, 1964, until the time of his conviction, three statements tending to incriminate Mr. Davis were obtained from him, and these statements were received into evidence at the trial.
The first statement was obtained by the detective on the plane ride from Pittsburgh to Milwaukee on March 13th. The second statement was obtained the following morning, as the defendant was waiting to appear before a magistrate. On this occasion, the same detective removed the defendant from the bullpen of the courtroom at about 9:30 a. m. and took him to adjacent rooms, where he was questioned by detectives and completed a written statement. The defendant was returned to the courtroom of the magistrate between 11:45 a. m. and noon, where bail was set.
The third statement was taken on March 16th by a deputy district attorney in the deputy's office.
The trial court conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of the several statements into evidence. The record contains the trial court's analysis of the testimony regarding this constitutional question; the trial court concluded that the statements were untainted.
A jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder in violation of sec. 340.02, Stats. 1947, and on June 11, 1965, the trial court entered a judgment upon the jury verdict and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor in the state prison at Waupun.
Upon this appeal Mr. Davis argues that statements given by him were involuntarily induced at a time when he was without the benefit of counsel. The trial court took extensive testimony and determined that his admissions "were freely made by him, without threats, inducement of promises, or coercion of any kind whatsoever." The trial court also concluded that the defendant "had a right to counsel, that he knew of such right and that he had been generally advised of such right." We have carefully examined the record and find that the aforesaid conclusions are not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence and must therefore be affirmed. State v. Carter, ante, pp. 80, 90, 91, 146 N.W.2d 466.
Mr. Davis relies on Massiah v. United States (1964), 377 U.S. 201, 84 Sup. Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, to support his claim that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to counsel. In Massiah the accused was tricked or misled into confessing, but these factors are not present in the case at bar. See State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke (1965), 27 Wis.2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753.
The defendant also charges that there was a violation of due process under the doctrine of Phillips v. State (1966), 29 Wis.2d 521, 139 N.W.2d 41. The latter case related to so-called "sew-up" confessions wherein an accused has been interrogated for a long period of time before being brought before a magistrate. In State v. Carter, ante, pp. 80, 97, 146 N.W.2d 466, this court held that the rule of Phillips would apply only to cases in which the trial commenced after the date of that decision, which was January 7, 1966. The trial in the case at bar occurred before that date, and hence the Phillips Case is inapplicable.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.