Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-0292 (JBS).
January 9, 2004
Mr. Joshua Davis, #423216, Kintock Group, Bridgeton, NJ, Plaintiff pro se.
Philip R. Lezenby, Jr., Esq., Lezenby Zane, P.A., Cherry Hill, NJ, Attorney for Defendants.
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Sgt. Nunn, Officer Charles Palmer, Burlington County Corrections, Warden of Burlington County Corrections, Burlington County Sheriff, and the Warden of Burlington County on behalf of CO Jane/John Doe pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b). For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
This is a pro se action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate at a New Jersey state prison against Mount Holly township, its police department and three officers; against Memorial Hospital of Burlington County and unnamed doctors and nurses; and against Burlington County, the Warden of the County jail, the Sheriff and two corrections officers.
On June 30, 2001, Plaintiff was brought to the Burlington County Detention Facility and held there on charges filed by the Mount Holly Township and Burlington City authorities. Prior to being brought to the jail, Plaintiff was taken into the custody of the Mount Holly police and brought, handcuffed, to Memorial Hospital of Burlington County. Hospital records describe Plaintiff as being belligerent and agitated with the staff. (See Def. Exhibit B).
Plaintiff had been treated previously at Memorial Hospital on February 10, 2001 for a badly damaged right upper molar, facial swelling and an abscess from a decaying tooth on the left side. (Def. Exhibit C). On June 30, 2001, having been brought to the hospital by the Mount Holly police, Plaintiff was treated for a laceration to the lip. X-rays and a CT Scan showed there was no facial or skull fractures. (Def. Exhibit B).
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Burlington County Detention Facility from June 30 until his transfer to Southern State Correction Facility/South Woods State Prison. (Def. Exhibits A, H). While at the Burlington County facility, Plaintiff was charged with two disciplinary violations arising out of his conduct on June 30, 2001. (Def. Exhibits D, E, F). First, Plaintiff was charged by Corrections Sergeant William Nunn with conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the facility. This charge was filed when Plaintiff kicked his cell door and was escorted by officers to a pre-hearing detention section, where he refused to cooperate and comply voluntarily with a mandatory search. (Def. Exhibit E). A hearing on this charge was held on July 2, 2001, before an independent hearing officer, Dale Wolfrom. Plaintiff was found guilty of the charges. (Def. Exhibits D, E).
Second, Plaintiff was charged by Corrections Officer Charles Palmer with threatening another person, namely Palmer, with bodily harm. (Def. Exhibit F). On July 2, 2001, Mr. Wolfrom also conducted a hearing on this charge and found Plaintiff guilty. (Def. Exhibits D, F). As the hearing officer found an issue as to Plaintiff's conscious awareness of his conduct because of medications administered to him at the hospital, he suspended the imposition of the sentence imposed for these charges. (Def. Exhibits D, E, F).
While Plaintiff was at the County Detention Facility, he received dental treatment. He was never, however, anesthetized and the extraction of his fractured teeth was postponed. (Exhibit G).
After being transferred to state prison, Plaintiff received dental treatment as well as treatment for his lip. Plaintiff frequently declined treatment or cancelled appointments, however. (Exhibit G).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Mount Holly police assaulted him and used excessive force in arresting him. In addition, he contends that the hospital committed medical negligence in treatment when he was brought there by the police. Plaintiff further alleges that the Burlington County defendants failed in their duty to provide appropriate medical care to him during his incarceration at the County Detention Facility. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Corrections Sergeant Nunn and Corrections Officer Palmer filed false disciplinary charges against him. All other claims of Plaintiff were dismissed by Order of this Court on June 26, 2002, leaving no pending claims against the Sheriff of Burlington County.
No answer has been filed on behalf of the Mount Holly Defendants. Though the hospital is represented, the docket reflects that the hospital has not been served with the Complaint and no answer has been filed.
Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, dismissing the Complaint and any potential cross-claims against all the Burlington County Defendants. Plaintiff has submitted no opposition in response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable rule of law. Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id.
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party; in other words, "[T]he nonmoving party's evidence `is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.'" Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
The moving party always bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, regardless of which party ultimately would have the burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Country Floors v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061-63 (3d Cir. 1991) (reviewing district court's grant of summary judgment in a trademark action); Lucent Info. Manage. v. Lucent Tech., 986 F. Supp. 253, 257 (D.N.J. 1997) (granting summary judgment in favor of telecommunications provider in trademark action), aff'd, 186 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 1999); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990). However, where the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, as Plaintiff does in the present case, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of" its pleading in order to show the existence of a genuine issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiff must do more than rely only "upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions." Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985),cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985) (citation omitted); see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Thus, if the plaintiff's evidence is a mere scintilla or is "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Country Floors, 930 F.2d at 1061-62.
Plaintiff's Due Process Claim — Disciplinary Charges
Plaintiff claims violation of his due process rights arising out of the disciplinary charges filed against him by Defendants Nunn and Palmer. First, Officers Nunn and Palmer are not liable, as a matter of law, to the Plaintiff on the claim of deprivation of protected rights based on Plaintiff's allegation that they filed false disciplinary charges against him. The act of filing allegedly false disciplinary charges does not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights as long as prison officials provide the prisoner with a hearing and an opportunity to contest the charges. Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988); White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 319 (D.N.J. 1998). Where procedural due process protections are present, allegations that charges were false fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.See Hanrahan v. Lane, 742 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff must, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, be given the benefit of assuming that the disciplinary charges filed against him were indeed false. Assuming this to be the case, Plaintiff was nevertheless afforded a hearing before an independent officer on both charges. In addition, Plaintiff had the opportunity to defend himself against the charges. Thus, Plaintiff was afforded all of the protections that due process requires.
Furthermore, despite the fact that Plaintiff was found guilty on both charges, the hearing officer found extenuating circumstances and suspended the imposition of the disciplinary sentence. Plaintiff therefore sustained no detriment because of the charges.
Second, there can be no liability against the Warden or the Burlington County Corrections Department for the claims that the disciplinary charges filed against Plaintiff were false. Local governmental units and supervisors are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694 (1978). Entity or supervisor liability only attaches when the execution of a government's policy or custom inflicts the injury of which the moving party complains. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Here, there is no allegation that the Warden or institution had a practice or policy of encouraging corrections officers to file false disciplinary charges. Absent such a claim or any factual support for such a claim, there is no basis for institutional or supervisor liability on this claim.
Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate for Defendants on the due process claims arising out of the disciplinary charges filed by Defendants Nunn and Palmer.
Plaintiff's Due Process Claim — Adequate Medical Care
Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated because he failed to receive adequate medical care from the Burlington County Corrections Defendants. Prison officials are required to provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). To establish a claim for a violation of this right, Plaintiff must show (1) a serious medical need; and (2) action by the prison officials that constitutes "deliberate indifference" to that need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court defined "deliberate indifference" as requiring a showing that the official was "subjectively aware" of the risk: "a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 827.
Plaintiff was admitted to the Burlington County Detention Facility on June 30, 2001 from the Memorial Hospital of Burlington County. Plaintiff's hospital records do not contain any medical recommendations about necessary follow-up procedures for his teeth or cuts of the lip. Furthermore, Plaintiff had substantial dental problems pre-dating the June 30, 2001 incident. (Def. Exhibit C).
According to the record, Plaintiff was seen by a dentist on August 8, 2001 while he was still at the County Facility. (Def. Exhibit G). At that time, the dentist proposed to start the course of treatment of removing Plaintiff's fractured teeth. However, anesthetization was not achieved and the first extraction was not accomplished. Upon Plaintiff's transfer to state prison in early September, this course of treatment commenced and treatment was also given to his lip lacerations.
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Plaintiff's dental or facial injuries were made worse by treatment or lack of treatment while he was at the Burlington County Detention Facility. Furthermore, and more importantly, the record contains no facts, standing alone or giving rise to any inferences, from which the trier of fact could find that Burlington County exercised deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical or dental needs. Consequently, summary judgment is appropriately entered in favor of Defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Sgt. Nunn, Officer Charles Palmer, Burlington County Corrections, Warden of Burlington County Corrections, Burlington County Sheriff, and the Warden of Burlington County on behalf of CO Jane/John Doe is granted. The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the motion for summary judgment [Docket Item No. 33-1] by Defendants Sgt. Nunn, Officer Charles Palmer, Burlington County Corrections, Warden of Burlington County Corrections, Burlington County Sheriff, and the Warden of Burlington County on behalf of CO Jane/John Doe pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b); and the Court having considered the parties' submissions; and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion of today's date;IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Docket Item No. 33-1] be, and hereby is GRANTED.