Opinion
C076165
04-30-2018
MARK DAVID DAVIS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STEVE MEIDINGER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 154988)
This case concerns a boundary dispute between appellant Steve Meidinger (Meidinger) and respondents Mark David Davis and Kristina Lynne Davis (collectively the Davises). Meidinger argues the trial court erred in settling the disputed boundary according to the agreed boundary doctrine because there had been no uncertainty regarding the location of the boundary line. The Davises counter that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding of uncertainty. The Davises have moved for sanctions against Meidinger and his counsel, arguing this appeal indisputably lacks merit and was brought to harass the Davises.
We affirm the judgment and deny the Davises's motion for sanctions.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
There is a lengthy and complex history to this dispute, but we can resolve this appeal by setting forth the procedural history and the facts as found by the trial court.
Meidinger and the Davises own land sharing a common boundary. A dispute concerning the correct location of that boundary resulted in this litigation.
The Davises's First Amended Complaint asserted four bases for relief: "1. Quiet Title on an Agreed Boundary Doctrine Argument; [¶] 2. Quiet Title on a Common Boundary by Predecessors in Interest/Estoppel Argument; [¶] 3. Quiet Title by Practical Location Argument; [and] [¶] 4. Reformation of Deeds per [Civil Code section] 3399." The Davises also asked for injunctive relief. Meidinger brought three counterclaims seeking to quiet title to the property, as well as to easements regarding a road and spring water.
The matter was tried without a jury, and the parties presented numerous witnesses and exhibits for the trial court's consideration.
The trial court's judgment after the bench trial made a number of factual findings, including a finding that government surveys carried out in the 1880s were actually flawed in representing that Lot 11 was 40 acres, when in fact is was approximately 33 acres. "This reduction in acreage left all legal descriptions and divisions of the property flawed, and therefore uncertain. The uncertainty of the true boundaries of the lot caused the instant dispute over the exact dividing boundary when Lot 11 was later divided into two parcels."
The trial court found that:
"By 1962, the property was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Berger. They divided the property into two parcels and left one parcel to each of their two children. Had Lot 11 been a 40-acre parcel, then the legal descriptions used by the Bergers when making this split would have provided exactly the same descriptions as to parcel size, which indicated an intent to leave each child one half of Lot 11. However, since Lot 11 is only 33 acres, the division left the Southern parcel at about 2/3 of Lot 11, and the Northern parcel at about 1/3 of Lot 11, instead of one half to each child.
"By 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson owned both parcels of Lot 11. They did not re-survey the property and determine the exact acreage of each parcel. However, Mr. Wilson walked the property often and realized there was a difference in the size of the two parcels.
"In 1984, the Wilsons sold the Northern Parcel to the Drapers. In order to equalize the size of the two parcels and to provide the Drapers with sufficient buildable space, the parties entered into a written boundary agreement. Apparently, this agreement was never recorded, nor was it notarized. Both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Draper testified at trial that they had signed the agreement. It appears that Mr. Wilson, who stood to lose acreage by the agreement, had a survey made of the dividing boundary line as agreed upon, and had that line marked. Unfortunately, the surveyor is not known, nor does it appear that the survey was ever recorded with the county, nor was any revised deed(s) prepared.
"The Drapers and the Wilsons built and used their respective lands according to their boundary agreement. The Drapers built various structures on the land which is in dispute in this case. The Wilsons honored this use. The parties both used the driveway from the Jordan Hill Road and the footpath to the spring which provided water to both properties.
"In approximately 1995, the Wilsons sold the Southern Parcel to Tom and Tabby MacDonald, who purchased the property through Tabby's mother, Marie Cook. Thus, while Ms. Cook came to be the Southern Parcel's legal owner, the MacDonalds came to be its beneficial or equitable owners. Prior to this purchase, Mr. MacDonald walked the dividing boundary with Mr. Wilson and was told that the boundary line was the '1984 Agreement' line. The 1984 survey markings were still visable by means of marks on trees, by a foundation marker near the upper pump house on the eastern end, and on the western end, by string lines at that point (i.e., the 'switchback') where the road traveling toward Lot 11's westerly boundary makes an approximately 90-degree angle turn into a foot path that travels down to the Concow Creek alongside Lot 11's westerly boundary.
"In approximately 1995 to 1996, Mr. and Mrs. Davis bought the Draper property. They walked the boundaries with Mr. Draper. . . . The Davises were also told the boundary line was the '1984 Agreement' line. The 1984 survey markings were still visable by means of marks on trees, by the foundation marker near the upper pump house on the eastern end, and on the western end, by strings at the 'switchback' referred to above. The Davises did not obtain a survey prior to their purchase of the property. Both the Davises and the MacDonalds enjoyed their respective parcels in conformity with the '1984 Agreement' line. Neither the Davises, the MacDonalds, nor any other person contested the '1984 Agreement' line during the period of 1995 to 2006.
"In 2005, the MacDonalds, through Ms. Cook, sold the Southern Parcel to Mr. Meidinger. In connection with this transaction, Mr. MacDonald walked the boundaries with Mr. Meidinger, including the footpath to the Spring and road to the marker at the eastern end of the '1984 Agreement' line near the upper pump house. Mr. Meidinger did not obtain a survey prior to his purchase of the property.
"Following his purchase, Mr. Meidinger abided by the usage of the disputed lands by the Davises until recently when this dispute began. Mr. Meidinger did not live on the property except for relatively short periods of time. In fact, the Davises rented from him for some time when their house experienced a fire."
Approximately two years before the trial court's opinion, a dispute arose between Meidinger and the Davises concerning the true property line, and "[t]he Davises were stunned to learn that the legal descriptions severely diminished the land and cut off virtually all of the improvements they thought they owned."
Based upon these factual findings, the trial court ruled the Davises "have shown by clear and convincing evidence that the boundary as agreed upon by the Wilsons and Drapers in 1984 should be applied to this land under the theories as pled by [the Davises] in their First Amended Complaint, including specifically the agreed boundary doctrine. . . . [[]] The Court consequently rules in favor of [the Davises], and against [Meidinger], on [the Davises's] First Amended Complaint, and each cause of action therein."
The judgment was executed on October 21, 2013. Meidinger's appeal is timely.
DISCUSSION
I
The Agreed Boundary Doctrine
Meidinger argues that "[t]he evidence at trial established that there was no uncertainty as to the location of the recorded boundary line" and that "the doctrine should not be applied broadly to resolve boundary disputes where the true boundary is ascertainable from the legal description set for [sic] in an existing deed or survey."
The trial court's decision is presumed correct. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Thus, Meidinger has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate error (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564), and issues not raised in appellant's opening brief are deemed abandoned. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6.) Therefore, we will uphold the judgement in this matter unless Meidinger affirmatively demonstrates the trial court's findings on the agreed boundary doctrine, specifically that there was uncertainty regarding the location of that boundary, was not supported by substantial evidence. (See Zachery v. McWilliams (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 57, 62 (Zachery).)
"The function of the reviewing court is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the [trial court's] findings; it may not substitute its own deductions for reasonable inferences drawn by the trial court." (Zachery, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d at p. 60.) The settled elements of the common boundary doctrine are "that there be an uncertainty as to the true boundary line, an agreement between coterminous owners fixing the line, and acceptance and acquiescence in the line so fixed for a period equal to the statute of limitations or under such circumstances that substantial loss would be caused by a change of its position." (Ibid. [quoting Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church (1959) 51 Cal.2d 702, 707-708 (Ernie)].)
Notably, "[i]t is not required that the true location be absolutely unascertainable [citation] . . . or that the uncertainty should appear from the deeds [citation]. The line may be founded on a mistake." (Zachery, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d at p. 60.) "[A] dispute or controversy [concerning the boundary] is not essential," nor is "the fact that an accurate survey is possible . . . conclusive of the question whether a doubt existed; the doubt may arise from a believed uncertainty proved either directly or inferred from the circumstances." (Id. at pp. 61-62 [citing Mello v. Weaver (1950) 36 Cal.2d 456, 460 (Mello)].) A court may infer an agreement resulting from uncertainty where there is a longstanding acceptance as to the boundary between "coterminous owners." (Ernie, 51 Cal.2d at p. 708 [acceptance of fence and other long-lasting improvements as allowing inference of uncertainty regarding boundary both at time of construction or alternatively arising after their construction].)
Here, the trial court found there was uncertainty as to the true boundary between the properties of Meidinger and the Davises. It appears the trial court reached this conclusion because the inaccuracy of the original government survey resulted in legal descriptions that did not, in fact, reflect the intent of the person who divided Lot 11 into two properties, apparently intending them to be equal in size. The Wilsons knew of the apparent discrepancy in the size of these parcels and the general inaccuracy of the government surveys. The Wilsons later agreed with the Drapers where the boundary should be marked. The predecessors of Meidinger and the Davises acted in accordance with that agreement from the time it was made in 1984 until at least Meidinger's purchase in 2005.
Meidinger has not provided authority demonstrating that these circumstances fail to establish uncertainty for purposes of the common boundary analysis, and we find substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding of uncertainty. Because the existence of uncertainty at the time the Wilsons came to an agreement with the Drapers is central to this analysis, we will limit our discussion to that evidence.
Mr. Wilson testified he originally understood he was purchasing two 20-acre parcels. This is consistent with his former wife's testimony that they had purchased 40-acres, comprised of two parcels which were more or less equal. However, Mr. Wilson learned within a few years that they had purchased less than 40-acres. That Lot 11 was less than 40-acres is consistent with the Butte County Assessor's maps introduced into evidence, identifying the two halves of Lot 11 as having 19.52 and 18 acres, respectively. A diagram associated with the sale to the Drapers reflected Lot 11 as being 33 acres total. This is consistent with Mrs. Wilson's recollection. Thus, the Davises introduced evidence at trial of uncertainty regarding the acreage of Lot 11 as a whole, as well as uncertainty as to the size of each of the parcels respective parts.
The purchase agreement between the Wilsons and the Drapers depicted the transfer of "approximately 16 acres more or less" and that the parties had agreed "to make a boundary line modification to correct deeding error on present deed . . . [that] will effect the northerly portion of the southerly 1/2 of Lot 11." Deposition testimony admitted at trial confirmed there were mistakes with prior surveys of the property and "the purpose here was to adjust the dividing boundary line separating the northern from southern parcel so that the northern parcel would become bigger in size and the southern portion . . . would become smaller." Both parcels were to be adjusted to be 16.51 acres each. That the agreement may have been meant to rectify the uncertainty caused by the discrepancy regarding the lot sizes is also supported by a diagram associated with the sale depicting both the division of the 33-acre parcel according to the Wilson/Draper agreement and the division of a 40-acre parcel into two equal 20-acre parcels, consistent with what the Wilsons understood when they purchased the property.
Meidinger boldly asserts "[i]f the legal description in any existing deed can locate the boundary line, the Doctrine does not apply" citing Martin v. Van Bergen (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 84. As is clear from the authorities referenced above, that is an overstatement of the law. (Mello, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 460 ["The fact that an accurate survey is possible is not conclusive of the question whether a doubt existed as to the location of a common boundary"].) The Supreme Court's rejection of the argument that the building of a fence standing alone supported application of the agreed boundary doctrine (see Bryant v. Blevins (1994) 9 Cal.4th 47, 58 [recognizing that something more was needed to establish uncertainty]) does not alter the continued viability of the doctrine in circumstances where there was uncertainty concerning the location of the boundary based upon mistake arising from a flawed survey conducted in the 1880s and perpetuated through deeds premised on the accuracy of that original survey.
Here, the Wilsons were aware of the problems associated with those government surveys and wanted to resolve the uncertainty it brought to the boundaries for Lot 11. In order to resolve that ambiguity, the Wilsons entered into an agreement with the Drapers fixing that line and that agreement was abided by for at least two decades. Bryant and its progeny do not prevent the application of the doctrine under these circumstances.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.) Respondents' motion for sanctions is denied.
HULL, Acting P. J. We concur: MURRAY, J. RENNER, J.