Summary
In Davis v. Maynard, 215 Va. 407, 408, 211 S.E.2d 32, 32-33 (1975), we held that it was error not to grant a mistrial when plaintiff's counsel asked a prospective juror on voir dire whether his employment by the compensation department of an insurance company would affect his impartiality.
Summary of this case from Forsberg v. HarrisOpinion
43136 Record No. 740053.
January 20, 1975
Present, All the Justices.
Automobiles — Pleading and Practice — Mistrial — Insurance Coverage Injection.
Obvious purpose and effect of detailed voir dire examination of member of jury panel by plaintiff's counsel was to inform members of panel that defendant was insured. Since action was deliberate, mistrial should have been granted.
Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County. Hon. Glyn R. Phillips, judge presiding.
Reversed and remanded.
Robert T. Winston, for plaintiff in error.
Edwin C. Gillenwater (Carl E. McAfee; Cline, McAfee, Adkins Gillenwater, on brief), for defendant in error.
The question presented on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial in an action for personal injuries when plaintiff's counsel, during his voir dire examination of a juror, indicated to the jury that the defendant had insurance coverage.
The record shows that counsel for Joyce Annette Maynard, plaintiff, in examining the jury on their voir dire asked if any of them knew defendant's counsel. He then singled out juror Gomer Evans, who was well known to him, and asked the extent of his acquaintance with defendant's counsel. Evans stated that he knew defendant's counsel because he was associated with the law firm that represented the compensation company for whom Evans used to work. Plaintiff's counsel pursued the matter and established that Evans had worked in the compensation department of an underwriting company eight years earlier and that defendant's counsel was associated with a law firm which represented insurance carriers.
Evans was asked if his "employment with that company of underwriters" would affect his partiality in the case, to which he responded that it would not. Finally, under continuous questioning by plaintiff's counsel, Evans stated that a member of plaintiff's counsel's law firm had represented him on a personal matter, and plaintiff's counsel remarked, "I am sure we never did represent [insurance] underwriters."
In actions to recover damages for personal injuries we have held that an inadvertent reference to insurance coverage is harmless error if it appears that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been done. Simmons v. Boyd, 199 Va. 806, 812-13, 102 S.E.2d 292, 296-97 (1958); Irvine v. Carr, 163 Va. 662, 667, 177 S.E. 208, 211 (1934). In contrast, we have held that it is reversible error not to grant a mistrial where the reference to insurance is deliberate and for improper purposes. Travelers v. Lobello, 212 Va. 534, 535, 186 S.E.2d 80, 82 (1972); Hope Windows v. Snyder 208 Va. 489, 493, 158 S.E.2d 722, 725 (1968).
The obvious purpose and effect of the detailed examination of Evans by plaintiff's counsel were to inform the members of the jury panel that the defendant had insurance coverage. Since this action was deliberate, the motion for a mistrial should have been granted.
The judgment entered for the plaintiff is reversed, the jury's verdict is set aside, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.