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finding physician's opinion, standing alone, to be "so vague as to render it useless," but the "facts underlying the opinion and other medical opinions . . . lend it a more concrete meaning"
Summary of this case from Williams v. ColvinOpinion
00 Civ. 4330 (SHS)
November 27, 2001
OPINION ORDER
Roxanne Davis brings this action pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to challenge a final determination by Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, denying her Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits. Both parties have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). As set forth below, judgment shall enter in the Commissioner's favor because his determination is free of legal error and is supported by substantial evidence.
BACKGROUND
I. Administrative Proceedings
On May 12, 1995, Davis filed an application for SSI benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Act. (R. 85-87.) She claimed that a back problem, hand pain, and a gynecological condition prevented her from working. (R. 61.) The application was denied both initially (R. 58-61) and on reconsideration (R. 64-67). Upon Davis's request, administrative law judge Robin J. Arzt (the "ALJ") held a de novo hearing on January 6, 1998, to determine whether Davis was entitled to benefits. (R. 26-54.) The ALJ subsequently denied Davis's claim. (R. 13-24.) Davis then asked the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration to review the ALJ's determination. (R. 11-12.) The Appeals Council denied Davis's request for review, and, as a result, the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision. (R. 5-6.)
References to "R.___" are to the relevant pages of the record of proceedings prepared by the Commissioner.
II. Factual Background
Davis, who was 44 years old at the time of the ALJ's hearing, lives in the Bronx with her son. (R. 34.) She had completed three years of college before family problems forced her to quit in 1988. (R. 36.) For approximately eighteen months starting in 1989, she worked five days a week as an office aide at the New York City Department of Personnel. (R. 40, 128.) Davis did not work at all in 1992 or 1993. (R. 37.) In 1994, she began working three days a week as an administrative assistant at another city agency. (R. 38, 128.) The jobs, which she performed while alternately sitting and standing, involved paperwork, typing, answering phones, and collecting job applications. (R. 3 9-40, 128.) No lifting or carrying was required. (R. 39-40.) In 1995, the city laid Davis off. (R. 40-41.)
On February 17, 1995, prior to being laid off, Davis slipped and fell at work. (R. 41.) She claims that she landed on her back, head, left arm, and left hand (R. 209), that the fall disabled her, and that she is therefore entitled to SSI benefits.
A. Davis's Testimony
Davis testified before the ALJ that ever since her accident she has suffered from "a lot of pain and spasm[s]" in her neck and "down to the back and [her] left hip." (R. 42.) To deal with this disorder, she wears a back brace for lumbar support three time a week. (R. 16.) Moreover, she uses a cane three to four times a week, "when in a lot of pain, as when going up and down the stairs on the train or getting on a bus." (R. 44.) Methocarbamol, which Davis takes three to four times a week to relieve the pain, "helps a lot." (R. 45, 51.) She also takes Tylenol, but "not too much" because she does not like "being too medicated." (R. 45.) She does not take any other pain medications because she is allergic to them. (R. 52.)
Davis also testified that, occasionally, "pain shoots through my [right] hand" for "about 15 minutes to half an hour" or up to "three days." (R. 47-48.)
Davis also testified that she has asthma, and that its severity depends on her anxiety level, the weather, what she eats, and the amount of dust in the air. (R. 50, 247.) To control it, she uses an albuterol pump three times every day. (R. 48-49.) She does not remember the last time a doctor treated her for an asthma attack or if she has ever been to the emergency room because of asthma. (R. 49.)
With respect to her residual functional capacity, Davis testified that she can walk four to five blocks at a time, stand for two hours, and sit for three hours. (R. 45-46.) However, it hurts her to squat, and, if she drops something on the floor, she gets someone else to pick it up for her. (R. 46-47.) She claims that she is unable to carry a one-gallon container of milk a distance of one block. (R. 48.) On a good day, she can "move around" in her apartment, fix her own food, and do her own laundry. (R. 50-51.) On a bad day, however, she cannot get out of bed and her children prepare her food and clean her laundry. (R. 50-51.)
B. The Medical Evidence
X-rays of Davis's cervical spine taken the week following the fall revealed no fractures or dislocation. (R. 220.) There was, however, "straightening with reversal of the normal lordotic curve," "osteophytes anteriorally at C3-C6," and "degenerative arthritic changes at C3-C6." (R. 220.) X-rays of the lumbosacral spine taken on the same day revealed "hyperextension of the normal lordotic curve," "disc space narrowing of the entire disc at L5-S1," and "scoliosis convex to the left." (R. 220.)
One month later, doctors gave Davis a "segmental somatosensory evoked potentials response" test of her lower extremities. (R. 240.) The results were "normal." (R. 240.)
Orthopedist Joseph Ha examined Davis in August of 1995. (R. 204.) Although Davis walked very slowly into the examining room with a walking cane, and climbed on and off the examining table with very slow motions, the examination of her neck, shoulder, and upper extremities showed "full range of motion" and no muscular atrophy or dystrophy. (R. 204.) She had "fine" hand and finger dexterity, and could perform repetitive rotational motions. (R. 204.) Examination of her hips and lower extremities also showed "full range of motion" and, again, no muscular atrophy or dystrophy. (R. 205.) Dr. Ha diagnosed a "blunt injury to [the] low spine with low back pain." (R. 205.) His prognosis with respect to the low back injury was "fair." (R. 205.) Davis, he wrote, retained the "functional capacity to do work related activities," including "walking, sitting, [or] standing up to six hours," and faced only "minimal restrictions" on her ability to carry ten pounds and lift twenty pounds. (R. 205.) Finally, Dr. Ha took x-rays of Davis's lumbosacral spine and left hand. (R. 206.) Both came back negative. (R. 206.)
Davis's treating chiropractor, Phillip Nadler, evaluated her in October 1995. Nadler found no significant abnormality in Davis's gait. (R. 216.) She did not require an assistive device to walk. (R. 216.) Moreover, there were "no limitations" on her ability to stand, walk, or sit, each of which Nadler thought she could do for up to 8 hours daily. (R. 216.) Her ability to lift and carry, however, was limited to 20-50 lbs for less than an hour. (R. 216.)
One year later, in October 1996, a CAT scan of Davis's cervical spine revealed a "bulging disc at the C3-4 level flattening the thecal sac" and "anterior osteophytes . . . at C5, C6, and C7." (R. 219.) A CAT scan of her lumbar spine indicated "minimal bilateral facet hypertrophy" at the L5/S1 level, but "no evidence of disc herniation or bulging." (R. 218.) Considering these results, Dr. Steven Hershowitz, a neuroradiologist, reported to a state agency that Davis's injury would neither cause "total [n]or partial loss of function" nor disable her from "regular duties or work." (R. 238.) At the same time, however, the chiropractor, Nadler, contradicted the evaluation he had given in 1995 by informing the state agency that Davis was "totally disabled." (R. 216, 239.)
Later that month, Dr. Ebenezer Kolade examined and treated Davis in connection with rectal bleeding and chest pain. (R. 228.) Dr. Kolade made notes concerning the ailments which are now in dispute. Davis did not exhibit shortness of breath. (R. 228.) Moreover, although a chest x-ray on October 28 revealed no pulmonary pathology, it did reveal "degenerative changes [in] the dorsal spine." (R. 231.)
In November 1996, Nadler evaluated Davis once again. (R. 242-46.) He wrote that Davis could lift no more than 30 pounds, and then only infrequently. (R. 244.) "Walking five blocks" caused her "pain in [her] left ankle and right foot," but she could sit up to six hours in a row before she needed to "move around." (R. 244.) Due to her recent hysterectomy, Davis was told not to push or pull at all. (R. 244.) Finally, the chiropractor noted that Davis's neck and low back restrictions "release[d] with adjustment." (R. 246.)
Davis presented to Dr. Kolade a second time in January 1997. (R. 269.) She complained of "intermittent chest pains" and "intermittent wheezing." (R. 269.) Dr. Kolade diagnosed hypertension, atypical chest pain, hemorrhoids, chronic back ache, and asthma. (R. 269.) He refused, however, to evaluate Davis's residual functional capacity. (R. 27 1-72.)
Davis also visited Dr. Howard Finger in January 1997. Dr. Finger noted that Davis's gait was "slow and stiff," but also that she was able to ambulate without a cane and get on and off the examination table without assistance, albeit slowly. (R. 249.) The doctor found no cyanosis, clubbing or edema in Davis's extremities. (R. 248.) Davis did suffer from "moderate to severe diffuse mid and low back pains," but "[n]o paravertebral muscle spasms." (R. 249.) There was "normal [range of movement] of the cervical spine" and "[n]ormal sidebending and extension of the US spine." (R. 249.) A chest x-ray revealed "thoracic spondylosis" and "left pleural efflusion." (R. 251.) An x-ray of the lumbosacral spine revealed "sclerosis of the facet joints," but no "compression deformity or paraspinal mass" nor "evidence for spondylolisthesis or spondylolysis." (R. 251.)
Davis's "breath sounds [were] mildly diminished bilaterally," and she had "mild bilateral expiratory wheezes." (R. 248.) A pulmonary function test revealed mild chest restriction. (R. 249, 252-65.) Considering all of this, Dr. Finger diagnosed, among other things, "chronic low back disorder," "arthralgias in the hands and knees," and "chronic asthma/bronchitis, with mild symptoms." (R. 249.) He concluded that Davis "may be mildly limited in the length of time she can sit" and "moderately limited in the duration or time she can stand, in the distance she can walk, and in her ability to lift and carry." (R. 249.)
The following month, Davis underwent a treadmill stress test, the results of which were negative. (R. 277.)
C. Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council
At the Appeals Council, Davis's attorney submitted a report from the Sleep Wake Disorders Center of Uong Island Jewish Medical Center that noted that prior to treatment, Davis exhibited "sleep disordered breathing . . . comprised predominantly of obstructive apneas and hypopneas," but that continuous positive airway pressure reduced Davis's apnea frequency to within normal limits. (R. 306.)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
In reviewing a denial of SSDI benefits, a court may reverse the Commissioner's finding only if that finding is "based upon legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence" in the record. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); see 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g);Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Rosa, 168 F.3d at 77. "The substantial evidence test applies not only to findings of basic evidentiary facts but also to inferences and conclusions drawn from such facts." Tillery v. Callahan, No. 97 Civ. 0438, 1997 WU 767561, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997) (citation omitted). Moreover, a court" "may not substitute its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review.'" Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Valente v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984)).
II. The Definition of Disability
In order to establish disability pursuant to the Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that . . . had lasted or could have been expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A); see Rosa, 168 F.3d at 77. The impairment must be demonstrated by "medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(3). Moreover, it must be "of such severity that [the plaintiff] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A); see Rosa, 168 F.3d at 77.
The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step procedure for evaluating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The Second Circuit articulates the doctrine as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience. . . . Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.Rosa, 168 F.3d at 77 (quoting Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam)).
If the claimant fulfills his burden of proving the first four steps, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to determine the fifth step — whether there is alternative substantial gainful work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See id. The Commissioner must consider four factors: (1) the objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability testified to by the claimant or others; and (4) the claimant's educational background, age, and work experience.Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999).
III. The Commissioner's Determination Is Not Based on Legal Error and Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Applying that five-step procedure, the ALJ determined that Davis, who has not performed any substantial gainful activity since the onset of her putative disability, suffers from three severe, but non-listed, impairments: (1) a lower back disorder, (2) a neck disorder, and (3) asthma. (R. 22.) At the fourth step of analysis, however, the ALJ concluded that Davis maintains the residual functional capacity to perform her past jobs, which were exertionally light jobs performed in clean air environments free of temperature and humidity extremes. (R. 23.) Davis challenges this last conclusion on three grounds. As explained below, none require reversal of the ALJ's determination.
A. The ALJ's Discounting of Davis's Subjective Statements of Back Pain
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner must consider subjective evidence of pain or disability testified to by the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (a). In this case, Davis has complained of disabling pain in her upper and lower back, legs, neck, and hand. (R. 42-43, 124.) The ALJ, however, discounted all of these subjective complaints. (R. 20.) Davis now contends that the ALJ improperly discounted her complaints about one particular ailment — back pain — which, if credited, would have established a level of impairment inconsistent with performance of her past work.
Statements about a claimant's pain cannot alone establish disability; there must be medical evidence that shows that the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. See Kojac v. Apfel, No. 97 Civ. 5049, 1999 WU 461776, *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (a). If there is such a medically determinable impairment, then, in order to determine the extent of any resulting functional limitations, the Commissioner must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant's symptoms, considering the claimaint's credibility in light "all of the available evidence," including the objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 (c)(1); see also Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WU 374186, at *2.
Narrowly construed, Davis's argument is that the ALJ committed "legal error" by "categorically omitt[ing] from consideration" certain x-rays which constitute objective medical evidence substantiating her complaints of disabling upper and lower back pain. (Pl.'s Mem. at 11; R. 220, 231, 251.) However, the ALJ did not, as Davis contends, "categorically exclude" these x-ray's from consideration. Rather, the ALJ decided to give "greater weight" to CAT scans than x-rays because the CAT scans had "significantly greater resolution." (R. 19.) As the Commissioner points out, medical literature supports that decision. See, e.g, The Merck Manual 1490 (17th ed. 1999); 2 Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine 1983 (15th ed. 2001). Differential evaluation of the x-rays and CAT scans was within the discretion of the ALJ and does not constitute legal error.
Broadly construed, Davis's argument is a challenge to the sufficiency of the ALJ's evidence. However, substantial evidence supports a determination that the x-ray's, in conjunction with all the other evidence, do not corroborate Davis's account of the disabling nature of her back pain. See Aponte v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 728 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1984). In fact, the Commissioner contends that the "excluded" x-ray's actually support the ALJ's conclusion that Davis suffers from only non-disabling impairments. Even if that is not true, Davis herself does not dispute that the CAT scans relied upon by the ALJ may support the ALJ's determination (R. 218); that at least some x-rays may support the ALJ's determination (R. 206, 251); that a nerve test was essentially negative for lower back problems (R. 240); that Dr. Ha found full range of motion and a lack of muscular dystrophy or atrophy in both upper and lower extremities (R. 204-05); or that Dr. Finger found normal range of movement of the cervical spine and normal sidebending and extension of the lumbosacral spine (R. 249). See Id. ("genuine conflicts in the medical evidence are for the [Commissioner] to resolve"). Despite the fact that it is Davis's burden to show that she cannot perform her past work, she does not point to any medical opinion in the record which interprets the results of the disputed x-ray's in accord with her allegations of totally debilitating pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 (c)(1); see also Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The Secretary is entitled to rely not only on what the record says, but also on what it does not say.").
In addition, Davis's own testimony indicates that muscle relaxants provide significant relief from her asserted pain and allow her to have a "good day" in terms of the exertion required for her daily activities. (R. 45, 51.) See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 (c)(3)(i), (iv). Likewise, the treating chiropractor reported that he was able to "release" the restrictions caused by Davis's neck and lower back disorders through his chiropractic manipulations. (R. 246.) See id. § 416.929(c)(3)(v). In addition, both Nadler and Dr. Finger reported that Davis did not need her cane to ambulate. (R. 216, 243, 249.) Taken together, that evidence constitutes "substantial evidence" in support of the ALJ's decision to discount Davis's account of the disabling effects of her back pain.
B. The ALJ's Determination that Davis Can Perform Her Past Light Work
The parties agree that Davis's past work consisted of exertionally light work. Davis contests the ALJ's determination that functional assessments made by treating and consulting doctors establish her continuing ability to perform that work in spite of her impairments. However, because the ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm it.
Generally, light work requires the ability to lift no more than 20 pounds at a time and frequently lift and carry objects weighing up to 10 pounds. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). "Frequent" lifting and carrying can entail "standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday." Social Security Ruling 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6. "Sitting may occur intermittently during the remaining time." Id. In this case, Davis has described her past work as involving one hour of walking, four hours of standing, and four hours of sitting, all in an eight hour day. (R. 155.) She typed, processed data, and answered the phone. (R. 40, 157.) She was never required to lift more than ten pounds, and was not required to frequently lift or carry anything. (R. 39-40, 157.)
In deciding that Davis remains capable of performing her past work, the ALJ explicitly relied on the findings and opinions of Dr. Ha, Dr. Kolade, Dr. Finger, and Nadler. (R. 20-21.) In August 1995, Dr. Ha found "minimal restrictions" on Davis's ability to lift twenty pounds and carry ten pounds. (R. 205.) Moreover, he found that Davis had the "functional capacity to do work related activities," including "walking, sitting, [or] standing up to six hours." (R. 205.) In October 1995, Nadler found Davis capable of lifting and carrying, for a short time, up to fifty pounds; in November 1996, he found her capable of infrequent lifting and carrying of thirty pounds. (R. 244.) In January 1997, Dr. Finger concluded that Davis "may be mildly limited in the length of time she can sit," and "moderately limited in the duration of time she can stand, in the distance she can walk, and in her ability to lift and carry." (R. 249.) Additionally, in October 1996, Dr. Hershowitz (on whom the ALJ did not rely in her decision, but whose findings are in the record) examined Davis in light of CAT scans of her cervical and lumbar spines and opined that she was not "disabled from regular duties or work." (R. 238.) These medical opinions, and the medical facts upon which they are based, constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's conclusion that Davis retains the ability to perform her past light work as a typistlreceptionist or an administrative assistant.
Davis contends that the opinion in Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2000), dictates a contrary conclusion. She is not correct. In that case, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Commissioner's determination that Curry retained the capacity to perform sedentary work because the "only evidence" supporting it was a single consultative doctor's opinion that Curry's impairment was "`[l]ifting and carrying moderate; standing and walking, pushing and pulling and sitting mild.'" Id. at 123. That opinion, the court found, was "so vague as to render it useless in evaluating whether Curry can perform sedentary work." Id. While Davis is correct that Dr. Finger's summary assessment — that Davis may be "mildly" or "moderately" limited in her work-related activities — might, by itself, be "so vague as to render it useless," the facts underlying that opinion and the other medical opinions in the record lend it a more concrete meaning. In any event, those other medical opinions — without regard to Dr. Finger's opinion — provide more than a mere scintilla of evidence to sustain the ALJ's determination that Davis can perform her past work.
C. The ALJ's Finding that Davis Can Work in an Office Setting Despite Asthma
Finally, Davis challenges the ALJ's conclusion that asthma would not prevent her from performing her past clerical and administrative work. Davis's argument is not that the ALJ underestimated the severity of her asthma. Rather, Davis contends that the ALJ improperly relied on her own lay opinion, rather than a vocational expert's opinion or a treatise, in assuming that Davis's past office work was in a clean air environment free of temperature and humidity extremes.
Davis provides no relevant legal authority for the proposition that an ALJ must, as a matter of law, rely on a vocational expert to conclude that the office work at issue was performed in a clean air environment free of temperature and humidity extremes. See Carter v. Shalala, No. 94 Civ. 4064, 1995 WU 505509, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1995) ("The services of a vocational specialist are necessary only `where the adjudicator does not have a clear understanding of the effects of additional limitations on the job base.'") (quoting Social Security Ruling 83-14, 1983 WL 31254, at *6). Moreover, at this fourth stage of analysis, the burden remains on Davis to demonstrate that she cannot perform her past work.See Rosa 168 F.3d at 77 (quoting Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1986)). Yet, Davis has failed to provide any evidence that her past office work was not in a clean air environment free of temperature and humidity extremes. Davis's argument fails for these reasons alone.
Even if the burden of proof were to shift to the Commissioner to prove that there is alternative work in the national economy that Davis can perform, the law would still not require the Commissioner to call upon a vocational expert. In determining whether a claimant is unable to perform certain work because of a non-exertional impairment like asthma, there is no such obligation unless the ALJ first determines that the nonexertional limitation "significantly diminishe[s] [the claimaint's work capacity] beyond that caused by his exertional impairment." Bapp, 802 F.2d at 605-06. In other words, the use of a vocational expert is not mandatory unless the ALJ first finds that the nonexertional impairment "`so narrows a claimant's possible range of work as to deprive him of a meaningful employment opportunity.'" Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Bapp, 802 F.2d at 606); Sapienza v. Shalala, 894 F. Supp. 728, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
In this case, however, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's alternative, fifthstep determination (R. 21) that Davis's asthmatic limitations do not "significantly diminish" her capacity for exertionally light work. See Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Bapp, 802 F.2d at 605-06). While it is true that "where a person can tolerate very little noise, dust, etc., the impact on [her] ability to work would be considerable," Social Security Ruling 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *8, there is no objective evidence in the record that Davis has an unusual aversion to dust or other irritants. There is, however, much evidence to the contrary. X-rays of Davis's chest have been consistently normal, reporting no infiltrates, masses, effusion or pulmonary pathology. (R. 187, 191, 198, 231.) A pulmonary test revealed only mild chest restriction. (R. 249, 264.) Davis does not remember ever having to go to the hospital on account of her asthma, and does not remember the last time she was treated by a doctor for an asthma attack. (R. 48-49.) An albuterol pump appears to control adequately the problem. (R. 48-49.) Finally, Davis has reported that she engages in routime household activities, and that she travels on public transportation. (R. 127, 204.) In light of this substantial evidence, the ALJ was justified in finding that Davis's asthma does not, over and above her exertional impairments, "so narrow her possible range of work as to deprive her of a meaningful employment opportunity." Bapp, 802 F.2d at 606; see also Pickering v. Chater, 951 F. Supp. 418, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Thus, the ALJ was not required to resort to a vocational expert when she found that Davis's past work was conducted in a clean air environment free of temperature and humidity extremes, or, alternatively, that Davis retains the residual functional capacity to perform other exertionally light work in such an environment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, and Davis's motion is denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.