Opinion
No. 2:19-CV-2072-DMC-P
06-25-2020
MICHAEL SCOTT DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT JONES, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff's second amended complaint (ECF No. 8).
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a ". . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff, Michael Scott Davis, is an inmate at Sacramento County Main Jail. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Scott Jones, Sheriff, (2) Doctor Robert Padilla, (3) J. Holt, Nurse Practitioner, and (4) Sacramento County Main Jail's Chief Medical Officer.
Plaintiff also makes various allegations against Sacramento County Main Jail, however, plaintiff does not name Sacramento County Main Jail as a defendant in his complaint.
Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him medical treatment after he was arrested. Plaintiff has a spinal cord disorder and suffers from severe chronic pain in his lower back and hips. Plaintiff also suffers from a chronic shoulder condition. Plaintiff claims that two men assaulted him on September 3, 2019 and exacerbated his injuries in his lower back and shoulder. Plaintiff sought treatment in an emergency room on September 4, 2019. Plaintiff alleges that the emergency room report stated that plaintiff should see his surgeon within three days and prescribed plaintiff a seven-day supply of Norco, a narcotic, for severe acute and chronic pain. Plaintiff was arrested and booked into Sacramento County Main Jail on September 5, 2019. Plaintiff claims he told an intake nurse about his medical conditions, and she told him he would be placed on the doctor's call list. Plaintiff alleges that his doctor's appointments on September 10th, 17th, and 24th of 2019 were cancelled without explanation. Plaintiff also claims that on September 30, 2019, a judge ordered that plaintiff see a doctor because plaintiff had not yet been to a surgeon per emergency room orders or received treatment for his pain condition. /// ///
Plaintiff alleges that he saw defendant Holt, a nurse practitioner, on October 1, 2019. Plaintiff claims defendant Holt also violated his Eighth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs and exacerbating plaintiff's existing medical injury. Plaintiff requested Norco from defendant Holt, who allegedly responded by explaining to plaintiff that Sacramento County Main Jail had a policy that prevented medical professionals from prescribing narcotic pain medication unless a patient is dying of cancer. Plaintiff also alleges that despite having knowledge of plaintiff's shoulder condition, defendant Holt forcibly pulled plaintiff's right arm forward until it was at a ninety-degree angle to plaintiff's torso. Plaintiff claims he started screaming for Holt to stop, but Holt nevertheless forcibly pushed plaintiff's arm backward behind his torso. Plaintiff alleges that he continued to scream while defendant Holt lifted plaintiff's arm high above his shoulder's range of motion and rotated it twice. Plaintiff claims he is in worse pain than ever before due to defendant Holt's actions. Plaintiff also alleges that his shoulder now clicks, pops, and glides whenever he tries to move it.
Plaintiff claims he saw Sacramento County Main Jail's orthopedic surgeon on or around October 26, 2019, who told plaintiff that he needed surgery. Plaintiff alleges that he did not see defendant Doctor Robert Padilla until November 6, 2019, which was 33 days after a superior court judge ordered that plaintiff immediately be seen by a doctor. Plaintiff claims Padilla told him that the Sacramento County Jail's Chief Medical Officer denied the surgeons' order for plaintiff to get an MRI. Plaintiff requested Norco from defendant Padilla, who reiterated the jail's policy that prevented prescribing narcotics unless the patient was dying from cancer. Plaintiff alleges that the policy violates his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection because it goes against the provisions set out in the Pain Patient's Bill of Rights. Plaintiff also claims that the delay in seeing Doctor Padilla caused him to suffer unnecessary severe pain in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. /// /// /// ///
Plaintiff requests all defendants be charged with misdemeanors for violating California Penal Code § 673 by inflicting cruel, corporal, and unusual punishment. Plaintiff also requests that defendant Holt be charged with battery causing serious injury, assault and battery with force to produce great bodily injury, gross negligence, medical malpractice, and cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff requests compensatory damages for his injury as well as his pain and suffering, with the exact amount to be determined after plaintiff has his right shoulder replaced. Plaintiff also requests punitive damages from defendant Holt due to Holt's alleged indifference to plaintiff's serious medical needs and exacerbation of plaintiff's existing medical injury.
II. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment medical mistreatment claim against defendant Holt in respect to Holt painfully manipulating the plaintiff's arm during a medical procedure. However, the Court finds that plaintiff's claim nevertheless suffers five defects. First, plaintiff has failed to establish a cognizable claim against defendant Sheriff Jones because plaintiff has not alleged any specific causal connection between Sheriff Jones and the alleged constitutional violations. Second, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against defendant Padilla because plaintiff fails to allege that Padilla's behavior amounted to the deliberate indifference required to successfully establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment medical treatment claim. Third, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against defendant Sacramento County Main Jail Chief Medical Officer because plaintiff did not establish a sufficient causal link between the CMO and any of the alleged constitutional violations. Fourth, plaintiff cannot allege a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim regarding the prison's anti-narcotics policy because the policy has a legitimate penological purpose. Fifth, plaintiff has failed to request appropriate damages for defendants' alleged constitutional violations. /// ///
A. Claims Against Sheriff Jones
Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the constitution." Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
Here, plaintiff has failed to allege any specific causal link between Sheriff Jones and the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff does not explain or even mention Sheriff Jones's role in the alleged events. As a result, plaintiff has failed to establish that Sheriff Jones condoned or directly participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff has also failed to establish that Sheriff Jones implemented a policy that caused the alleged constitutional violations to occur. Plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Jones's subordinates are not sufficient to /// /// establish a cognizable § 1983 against Sheriff Jones because supervisory personnel are only responsible for their own actions under § 1983. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable claim against Sheriff Jones.
B. Eighth Amendment Delay in Medical Treatment Claim Against Doctor Padilla
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment ". . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with "food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official's act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable mind." See id.
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury, or risks of serious injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ". . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see /// /// also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner's daily activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989). Delay in providing medical treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
Here, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Doctor Padilla because it is not clear from plaintiff's allegations that Doctor Padilla's behavior amounted to deliberate indifference. Plaintiff claims he did not see Doctor Padilla until 33 days after a judge ordered plaintiff be seen by a doctor. See ECF No. 1, p. 4. However, plaintiff does not allege that Doctor Padilla was responsible for that delay or knew that plaintiff had been waiting for 33 days. Doctor Padilla could not have shown deliberate indifference to plaintiff's needs if he was not responsible for the delay in seeing plaintiff or if he did not previously know of plaintiff's need for medical treatment. Therefore, plaintiff's allegation that he did not see Doctor Padilla until 33 days after a judge ordered plaintiff be seen by a doctor is not, in and of itself, sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Doctor Padilla. /// /// /// ///
C. Plaintiff's Claims Against Sacramento County Jail's CMO
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). "A person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant's causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
Here, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against Sacramento County Main Jail's CMO because plaintiff's allegations do not clearly explain the CMO's link to the causal events. Plaintiff's only reference to the CMO is that defendant Padilla told plaintiff that the CMO denied the orthopedic surgeon's MRI order for plaintiff. See ECF No. 1, p. 4. However, plaintiff does not explain if or why he believes this action amounted to a constitutional violation. Based on plaintiff's complaint, it is unclear whether plaintiff is attempting to sue the CMO for an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim based on the drug policy in Sacramento County Main Jail, or for other constitutional violations under a theory of respondeat superior similar to plaintiff's allegations against Sheriff Jones. Because plaintiff has not established a sufficient causal connection between the CMO and any constitutional violation, he has failed to allege a cognizable § 1983 complaint against the Sacramento County Main Jail CMO. /// /// /// ///
D. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the disabled do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Hightower v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 732555 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2008).
Error! Main Document Only.Strict scrutiny applies to equal protection claims alleging race-based or religious discrimination (i.e., where the plaintiff is member of a "protected class"); minimal scrutiny applies to all other equal protection claims. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001).
In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a "class of one"); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).
Here, plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because the prison's ban on narcotics prescriptions serves a legitimate penological purpose. The state has a legitimate interest in deterring substance abuse within the prison system. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003). Narcotics are among the most frequently abused substances. Therefore, a policy that strictly regulates the distribution of narcotics within the prison system has a legitimate penological interest. Plaintiff does not allege that Doctor Padilla refused to treat his pain condition. Rather, plaintiff alleges that defendants refused to provide him with his preferred treatment. See ECF No. 8, p. 4. Differences in medical opinion do not amount to constitutional violations. See Toguchi v. Young, 391 F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because the regulation in question serves a legitimate penological purpose.
E. Plaintiff's Damages Request
"Under § 1983, damages for violations of constitutional rights are determined according to principles derived from the common law or torts." Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Court acknowledges that plaintiff requests that defendants be criminally charged for their alleged treatment of plaintiff. However, the imposition of criminal charges on defendants is not an available form of relief for § 1983 actions or any other type of civil suit. Criminal charges can only be brought in a criminal proceeding. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A § 1983 action is not a criminal proceeding. Thus, plaintiff cannot recover damages in the form of criminal charges against defendants. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// ///
III. CONCLUSION
Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between each defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a third amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. Also, the Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket heading to reflect all named defendants. Dated: June 25, 2020
/s/_________
DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE