Opinion
Argued December 22, 1885
Decided January 19, 1886
John S. Morgan for appellant. Stephen K. Williams for respondent.
In October, 1861, Elbertia Van Allen made her will in which she gave to Christina Amelia Davis a certain bond and mortgage made and executed by her husband, James Davis; to Helen Stephenson, a certain bond and mortgage executed by John Stephenson; to J. Elbert Davis "the sum of $243.92, a portion of the debt due me from the said James Davis secured by his notes;" to James Van Allen Davis "the sum of $243.92, another portion of the debt due me from the said James Davis and secured by his notes." At the time of making the will the testatrix held a single note against James Davis for the amount of the two sums thus bequeathed. Thereafter, in 1863, she died, leaving the note among her assets unpaid. The defendant was named executor in her will and took upon himself the execution thereof. James Van Allen Davis, the plaintiff, and J. Elbert Davis were minor sons of the maker of the note, and at the time of the death of the testatrix the plaintiff was about five years old. About four years after her death, the defendant surrendered to James Davis the note left by her, and took in lieu thereof, from him, a note for one-half the amount thereof, payable to the plaintiff or bearer on demand with interest, and for the other half thereof, a note payable to J. Elbert Davis on demand with interest. A few days after taking these notes, he applied to the surrogate of Wayne county for a settlement of his accounts, and in his petition, among other things, stated that the plaintiff, one of the legatees named in the will, was an infant under the age of twenty-one years, having no guardian. No citation for the accounting was served upon the plaintiff who was then about nine years old, but it was served upon his mother who, as a legatee, was also interested in the accounting. Upon the return day of the citation, an attorney was appointed his special guardian for the accounting, and the defendant presented his account to the surrogate, in which he charged himself with having received May 5, 1865, upon the note of James Davis, two items of $203.87 each, and under the same date he credited himself with having paid to J. Elbert Davis and to the plaintiff each the sum of $203.87. No mention was made in the account of the surrender of the note of James Davis left by the testatrix, or of the taking of the two notes in the place of it; nor was any mention made in the account, or in the decree of the surrogate thereon, of the two notes, and there was no adjudication in reference to such notes. Upon the accounting, no action whatever was had in reference to the note which had been taken for the plaintiff. Thereafter the defendant tendered the note to the plaintiff's mother, but she refused to receive it, and requested him to keep it until the plaintiff should come of age, and the defendant thereafter retained the note in his possession until after the plaintiff became of age and commenced this action. During many years after the defendant took the note from Davis, he was perfectly responsible and the note could have been collected. But two or three years before the plaintiff arrived at his majority, Davis became wholly irresponsible and insolvent and unable to pay the note. The plaintiff, having become of age, brought this action against the defendant to recover of him the amount of the note with interest thereon.
At the Special Term it was held that the decree of the surrogate was final and conclusive against the plaintiff and protected the defendant against any claim in this action. Upon appeal by the plaintiff to the General Term, the judgment of the Special Term was reversed, and then the defendant appealed to this court.
We are of opinion that the legacy of the plaintiff was a specific legacy of one-half of the note which the testatrix held against his father. Whether a legacy shall be considered specific depends upon the intention of the testator or testatrix, to be derived from the language used in the bequest, construed in the light thrown upon it by all the other provisions of the will. Here there were specific bequests of the two bonds and mortgages to Mrs. Davis and to Mrs. Stephenson, and it is entirely clear that the precise bonds and mortgages named were to go to the legatees. So in the bequests immediately following to the plaintiff and to J. Elbert Davis, it was clearly the intention that the one-half of the note held by the testatrix should go to each of the legatees named. If that note had been paid during the life-time of the testatrix or otherwise canceled or destroyed, so that no obligation at her death rested upon James Davis to pay it, the two legatees would have taken nothing.
As this was a specific legacy and not needed for the payment of debts or any other purpose of administration, it was the duty of the defendant, after the expiration of one year from the granting of letters testamentary, to discharge it by delivery to the legatee. If the two legatees of this note had been adults, the executor would have discharged his duty by delivering it to them jointly, if they were willing to take it in that way. If they had refused to take it, or for any reason could not take it in that way, it would undoubtedly have been proper for him to do as he did — divide the note by taking two notes each for one-half — payable to each of the legatees upon demand, with interest. In this case the defendant so far discharged his duty by taking the two notes, and that act imposed no new or additional obligation upon him.
As the plaintiff was a minor, the defendant could not discharge himself by delivering the note to him, nor by delivering it to his mother, Mrs. Davis. She was not his legal, nor while his father lived, his natural guardian. A delivery to her would not have been an effectual delivery to the plaintiff so as to discharge the defendant.
As the plaintiff was a minor, the note should have been delivered to his guardian. It furnishes the defendant no defense that the plaintiff did not have a guardian at the time, for it was in his power to procure the appointment of one, as it is provided by section 5 of title 3, chapter 8, part 2 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by section 44 of chapter 460 of the Laws of 1837, that if a minor be under the age of fourteen years, the application for the appointment of a guardian may be made by any relative or other person in his behalf. Therefore, in this case, if the defendant desired to discharge himself from responsibility as to this specific legacy, he should have procured the appointment of a guardian, and then have delivered the note to such guardian. He could not hold the note for more than fifteen years, until the maker thereof became wholly insolvent and the note wholly worthless, and escape liability by then tendering the note to the legatee. It does not avail the defendant to say that the relatives of the plaintiff could have procured the appointment of a guardian. They had no duty to discharge which required the appointment of a guardian. But if the defendant desired to be relieved of responsibility in reference to the note, the duty rested upon him to make a valid delivery thereof to the legatee, and for that purpose it was incumbent upon him to have a guardian appointed.
But if we should assume that the defendant was under no obligation to have a guardian appointed for the plaintiff, and that after the accounting, he owed him no duty as executor in reference to the note, the same result would still follow. He took and retained possession and control of the note, and, upon the assumption made, thus became trustee thereof for the plaintiff, charged with substantially the same duty in reference thereto as would have devolved upon him if he had been formally constituted trustee. Having the possession and control of the property of an infant who is supposed in law incapable of taking care of his own property and looking after his own interests, he was bound to exercise some care and diligence in preserving and protecting the same; and he could not carelessly permit the same to be destroyed or become worthless without incurring liability. He should have used efforts to secure the note, or to collect it either in his own name or that of the infant. ( Cromwell v. Kirk, 1 Dem. 599; VanEpps v. Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 64; Mason v. Roosevelt, 5 Johns. Ch: 534.)
The decree of the surrogate upon the final accounting furnishes the defendant no defense, because it was not binding upon the plaintiff. He was not served with a citation for the final accounting as required by the statute. (2 R.S. 93, § 61; Kellett v. Rathbun, 4 Paige, 102.) Therefore as there was no service of a citation upon him, the court had no jurisdiction to appoint a special guardian for him, and the appointment of such guardian and his appearance did not give the court jurisdiction of him, and for this reason that accounting and the decree made thereon do not bind the plaintiff. ( Ingersoll v. Mangam, 84 N.Y. 622.) But farther, upon that accounting there was no adjudication whatever in reference to this note or the specific legacy. The note representing the plaintiff's specific legacy was then held by the defendant. He did not claim that he had delivered it to the plaintiff, and had thus discharged the legacy, and no reference whatever was made to it in the account or in the decree; and hence as there was no adjudication about it, the accounting furnishes the defendant no defense.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the order of the General Term is right and should be affirmed, and judgment absolute should be ordered against the defendant, with costs.
All concur.
Order affirmed and judgment accordingly.