Opinion
3:95 CV 2518 (JGM)
November 16, 1998
John R. Williams and Angelica N. Papastavros, Williams Pattis, New Haven, CT; Peter Burgoyne Prestley, Madsen Prestley, Hartford, CT; Anthony Davis, Bridgeport, CT, pro se; Oliver B. Dickins, Jr., Simsbury, CT, for Anthony Davis, plaintiff.
James V. Minor, City of Stamford Office of Legal Affairs, Stamford, CT; Barry J. Boodman, Corporation Counsel, City of Stamford, Stamford, CT, for City of Stamford, defendant.
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
On November 22, 1995, plaintiff commenced this lawsuit against defendant City of Stamford, alleging that during his employment as a firefighter, from December 1979 until April 1995 (Dkt. #1, ¶¶ 7, 9(P)), he was subjected to "an ongoing pattern and practice of racial bias and discrimination, known to and condoned by the defendant." (Dkt. #1, ¶ 9). In its answer, filed June 23, 1997, defendant denied this allegation and raised five special defenses. (Dkt. #18). On June 27, 1997, this file was referred to this Magistrate Judge for all pretrial purposes. (Dkt. #19). In November 1997, the parties consented to a jury trial before this judicial officer. (Dkt. ##24-25, 27-28).
This case had been set for jury selection in November 1997, was postponed until January-February 1998 when plaintiff terminated his relationship with prior counsel, was postponed indefinitely while plaintiff searched for substitute counsel, and again was postponed when substitute counsel filed their appearance. (See Dkt. ##22, 24-27, 29-40).
Pending before the Court is plaintiff's Motion In Limine Regarding Statute of Limitations and plaintiff's brief in support, filed August 14, 1998. (Dkts. ##44-45). On September 3, 1998, defendant filed its brief in opposition (Dkt. #46), to which plaintiff filed a reply brief on September 18, 1998. (Dkt. # 47).
During a telephonic status conference held on November 4, 1997, plaintiffs previous counsel agreed that "the evidence presented at trial will be limited to events occurring within three years of the filing of the complaint." (Dkt. #25, at 1 ¶ 3). See supra note 1.
Attached as exhibits were copies of defendant's answer, dated February 21, 1996, to the State of Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, and of modified consent orders in Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Stamford, Civ. No. B75-299 (TFGD) and Gagne v. City of Stamford, Civ. No. B79-118 (TFGD).
Attached were copies of correspondence between plaintiff, the Stamford Fire Fighters Union, administrators within the Stamford Fire Department, and others, from April 8, 1983 to May 10, 1984, June 23, 1992 to December 21, 1995, as well as various medical and workers' compensation documents. (Exhs. 1, A-1 to A-19).
For the reasons stated below, this motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. DISCUSSION
The authority of district courts to render rulings on motions in limine flows from the courts' "inherent authority to manage the course of trials." U.S. v. 215.7 Acres of Land in Kent County, Del., 719 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D. Del. 1989). See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4 (1984). An in limine ruling "is subject to change when the case unfolds, . . . [and the] judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling." Id. at 41-42. Generally, in limine rulings are "confined to very specific evidentiary issues of an extremely prejudicial nature," U.S. v. Certain Land Situated in City of Detroit, 547 F. Supp. 680, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1982), and "[o]rders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be employed." Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975). A trial court's "discretion to make. rulings pre-trial [is] subject to review for abuse of such discretion."In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
In his Motion In Limine, plaintiff seeks to allow the introduction at trial of evidence with respect to matters that occurred more than three years prior to the filing of this action under the "continuing-violation" exception to the limitations period. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the continuing-violation exception does not apply here, because there is a sufficient gap between the alleged discriminatory acts to negate their continuous and connected nature, thereby precluding the introduction of such evidence.
"The continuing-violation exception `extends the limitations period for all claims of discriminatory acts committed under [an ongoing policy of discrimination] even if those acts, standing alone would have been barred by the statute of limitations.'"Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 907 (2d Cir. 1997)). "Discrete incidents of discrimination that are unrelated to an identifiable policy or practice . . . `will not ordinarily amount to a continuing violation,' unless such incidents are specifically related and are allowed to continue unremedied for `so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice.'" Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 907 (quoting Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 713 (2d Cir. 1996)). "[A] continuing violation may be found where . . . specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice." Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1994). The exception does not apply, however, when the continuous and connected nature of the discriminatory acts is negated by a sufficient gap between the acts. See Annis, 136 F.3d at 246. See also Hudson v. Delphi Energy Engine Management Systems, Inc., 10 F. Supp.2d 256, 258-60 (W.D.N Y 1998) (isolated incidents between 1983 and 1991 "do not make a continuous pattern of discrimination."); Johnson v. Delphi Energy Engine Management Systems, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 281, 283-85 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (plaintiff's allegations were "merely conclusory, unsupported by specific factual allegations which would lead the Court to concluded there existed a continuing violation [of racial discrimination] from 1967 to 1997.").
In Annis, the plaintiff-police officer alleged that she had been subjected to sex discrimination during four periods of time — from April 1977 to December 1980, January 1981 to July 1984, July 1984 to April 1990, and May 1990 to May 1993. 136 F.3d at 241-44. Plaintiff attempted, during trial, to establish a continuing violation of her rights. On appeal, the circuit court concluded that there was no continuing violation because, "as a matter of law, the actions from July 1984 to April 1990 of which Annis complain[ed] were not instances of gender-based discrimination." Id. at 246. Thus, even if the acts had been committed every single day, they would not constitute a continuing violation because the acts themselves were not discriminatory. The Second Circuit further held that this six year gap was sufficient to preclude the joining of discrimination plaintiff suffered before and after the gap as a continuing violation. Id.
In contrast, in Cornwell, the plaintiff-correctional officer had been employed at a juvenile offender facility from November 1981 through February 1983 and March-April 1986, during which time she alleged she was subjected to gender and racial discrimination. 23 F.3d at 697-99. She was on sick leave from February 1983 through March 1986, receiving workers' compensation benefits until November 1984. Id. at 699. She returned to work only for two months, in March-April 1986 and was terminated in May 1986. Id. at 699-700. In November 1983 and again in June 1986, plaintiff filed discrimination charges with the appropriate federal and state agencies; this action was commenced in June 1986. Id. at 700. The Second Circuit held that plaintiff had established a continuing violation, in that "the only reason the harassment had not continued in the interim between February 1983 and March 1986 was Cornwell's absence on account of the illness precipitated by the first set of incidents." Id. at 704.
In the instant case, plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that "[o]ver the years following 1984, the plaintiff's fellow firefighters harassed him by placing various items in the food he was cooking on the stove, such as sand, cleanser and disinfectant and by hiding the plaintiff's equipment." (Dkt. #1, ¶ 9(C)). Plaintiff also alleges that "[s]everal times the plaintiff complained to higher authorities in policy-setting positions with the defendant concerning the racial abuse he was experiencing, [and] the . . . defendant did nothing about it." (Id. ¶ 9 (D)). He also claims a number of specific incidents of alleged discrimination, from 1992 through August 1995. (Id. ¶¶ 9 (E-R)). Plaintiff further alleges that these actions "were motivated by the fact that the plaintiff is an African-American who had entered the defendant's employment by virtue of the . . . court['s] order." (Dkt. #1, ¶ 10).
Defendant correctly argues that because plaintiff did not allege specifically on what dates or how often these acts occurred over the eight years from 1984 to 1992, there is a gap between the acts that would be substantial enough to negate the contention that the acts were connected or continuous. (Dkt. #46, at 4). For purposes of this ruling, the Court is willing to assume that these acts were discriminatory. The issue here is whether the number and frequency of the alleged acts is sufficient to establish a continuing violation; that determination depends on the factual determination that the alleged acts were discriminatory and whether they were part of a discriminatory policy or practice. The exhibits attached to plaintiff's reply brief confirm that there was a cluster of complaints from April 1983 through May 1984, an eight-year gap, and then another cluster of events from June 1992 through December 1995. (Compare Dkt. #47, Exhs. A-1, A-2 (5/10/84, 4/19/83, 4/8/83 undated letters) with Dkt. #47, Exhs. 1, A-2 (9/9/92 Letter), A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12, A-13, A-15, A-16, A-19). Plaintiff's own statements similarly reflect only general accusations, without any specificity at all, during the eight-year period from 1984 until 1992. (See Exhs. A-14 A-19). Plaintiff's vague allegations regarding incidents from 1984 through 1992 are hardly "specific and related instances of discrimination."
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion In Limine Regarding Statute of Limitations (Dkt. #44) is denied with respect to allegations prior to 1992 but is granted with respect to any incidents commencing in 1992.
Counsel shall arrange a telephonic pretrial conference, in order to schedule the long-overdue jury trial here.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 16th day of November, 1998.