Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-2393-M.
February 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed on November 12, 2004, and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Pleadings, filed on December 2, 2004. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
Background
Plaintiff Stephanie Davis ("Davis") is a former employee of Defendant Blockbuster, Inc. ("Blockbuster"). In February of 2004, Davis was diagnosed with Guillain Barre Syndrome, a neurological disorder. Because of her illness, Davis was forced to miss several weeks of work. Davis returned to work on March 9, 2004, at which time she was confined to a wheelchair and was restricted, by her doctor, to a limited work schedule.
Davis claims that upon her return to work, her supervisor repeatedly questioned her about her medical condition. She alleges her supervisor demanded private information of her, attempted to reassign her to another cubicle, suggested she go on disability until she fully recovered, and engaged in "a campaign of retaliatory harassment" that culminated in her termination. Davis claims her supervisor's conduct aggravated her medical condition.
Davis was terminated on June 22, 2004. According to Davis, her supervisor informed her that Blockbuster was no longer able to accommodate her modified work schedule. Davis brought suit in state court against Blockbuster under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). She also asserts claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination, and attorneys' fees. Blockbuster removed Davis's suit to this Court, and now moves the Court to dismiss Davis's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful termination.
By Order dated December 2, 2004, the Court Dismissed Davis's claims against Defendants Viacom, Inc. and Henry Alva.
Analysis
I. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is axiomatic that a claim should only be dismissed when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1976). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true, and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). However, conclusory allegations are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Id.
Blockbuster argues Davis is unable, as a matter of law, to assert a claim against it for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To prevail on claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993). Under the second element of the cause of action, conduct qualifies as extreme and outrageous only if it exceeds all possible bounds of decency, and can be regarded as "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Danawala v. Houston Lighting Power Co., 14 F.3d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1993). Texas courts have adopted a strict approach to employment-related emotional distress claims, excluding from liability all but the most unusual and offensive methods of employee discipline, criticism, and termination. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999) (supervisor threatened employees' physical safety, publicly humiliated them, threatened their jobs, and subjected them to frequent outbursts of vulgarity).
The Court must dismiss a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress if it determines that the conduct alleged of the defendant cannot, as a matter of law, satisfy the test for extreme and outrageous conduct. Danawala, 14 F.3d at 256. Here, Davis alleges, at most, that her supervisor repeatedly asked her inappropriate questions about her medical condition, pressured her to go on disability, attempted to move her desk, and terminated her without cause. Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Davis, the Court concludes that there is no set of circumstances under which the alleged conduct could qualify as extreme and outrageous. See, e.g., Cook v. Fidelity Investments, 908 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (plaintiff's allegations that he was unjustifiably demoted, subjected to "embarrassing and humiliating yelling scenes", subjected to racial epithets, and discriminated against were insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Burden v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995) (employer's public ostracism and demotion of employee, which caused the employee humiliation and health problems, were not extreme and outrageous). Accordingly, Davis's Petition does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Court DISMISSES that claim with prejudice.
Davis's common-law wrongful termination claim is also insufficient to survive Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Under Texas law, an employment relationship is presumed to be at-will, which means that an employer may terminate its employees "for good cause, for bad cause, or no cause." Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied). To assert a claim for wrongful termination, an employee must allege that her employer violated the terms of an employment contract, violated a statute, or terminated her due to her refusal to commit an illegal act. Id.
Davis's wrongful termination claim is based on her vague assertion that she was terminated in violation of the "employment policies under which she was hired". She does not explain the nature of the employment policies, and she does not allege that the policies were contractually binding on either party. In Texas, an employer does not automatically alter the at-will nature of an employment relationship by merely distributing a list of employment policies. Id. at 638-39. Therefore, alleged violations by Blockbuster of its employment policies are not viable, without allegations that the policies constituted an express agreement limiting the conditions under which Blockbuster could lawfully discharge her. Id. at 638-39, citing Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). Since Davis has not made such an allegation, she has not disturbed the presumption that her employment with Blockbuster was at-will. Therefore, her wrongful termination claim must be DISMISSED, but without prejudice to being reasserted if Davis can satisfy the legal requirements for such a claim. II. Motion for Leave to Amend
Elsewhere in her Petition, Davis alleges she was terminated in violation of the TCHRA. The Court does not address Davis's wrongful termination claim under the TCHRA because Blockbuster did not address Davis's TCHRA claims in its Motion to Dismiss.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), a party may amend a pleading after a responsive pleading has been served if the party seeking amendment obtains leave of Court. The Court has discretion in deciding whether leave is appropriate, and leave should be freely given "when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see also Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). In deciding whether to grant leave, the Court considers such factors as undue delay, bad faith, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by prior amendment, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of the amendment. Schiller v. Physicians Resource Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003).
Blockbuster does not allege that Davis's Motion to Amend is the product of undue delay or bad faith, and it does not allege it will be prejudiced by her amending the Petition she filed in state court. Blockbuster resists Davis's Motion to Amend on grounds that her efforts to amend would be futile. The Court need not reach Blockbuster's argument. Subsequent to Blockbuster's filing of its Motion to Dismiss and Davis's filing of her Motion for Leave to Amend, the Court issued its Scheduling Order, which authorizes the parties to file amended pleadings, without leave of Court, until October 31, 2005. In light of the Scheduling Order, and the approach of the Federal Rules generally favoring early leave to amend, the Court GRANTS Davis's Motion to Amend with respect to any claims that the Court has not heretofore dismissed with prejudice. See Stripling v. Jordan Production Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) evidences a liberal federal policy for amending pleadings).
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim with prejudice, and DISMISSES her wrongful termination claim without prejudice. Davis may file another Amended Complaint on or before October 31, 2005.