Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-180-S
August 15, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion will be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This action stems from a March 22, 2000 incident at the Kentucky State Reformatory ("KSR"). Plaintiff, a KSR inmate, knocked a cup of tea out of a Correctional Officer's ("CO") hand thereby splashing two other officers with tea. The unit administrator, defendant Jack Wood, granted the unit supervisor, defendant Lt. Marcus Harris, permission to place plaintiff in restraints. A "move team" consisting of defendants Lt. Harris, Sgt. Lois Lyle, CO Anibal Agosto, CO Richard Kent, and CO Andrew Rasmussen was assembled.
At this point, the parties' factual interpretations diverge. However, the incident was videotaped and the tape submitted to the court. We are therefore able to give an accurate factual account despite the parties' disagreement.
The videotape reveals that the move team approached plaintiff's cell. Lt. Harris ordered plaintiff to back up to the cell door and plaintiff refused. Lt. Harris repeated the order and was again refused. Sgt. Lyle discharged pepper spray into the cell but plaintiff continued to be uncooperative.
At this point the team readied themselves and Lt. Harris began to open plaintiff's cell door. Plaintiff pushed his way out of the cell and appeared to lose his balance. He grabbed Lt. Harris and pulled him to the ground, holding him in a headlock. Two members of the team, identified in defendants' Memorandum as COs Kent and Agosto, began to strike plaintiff with their batons. When plaintiff freed Lt. Harris, COs Kent and Agosto ceased striking him. They used their batons to immobilize plaintiff while he was restrained.
During the struggle, plaintiff sustained two cuts to his head. A nurse was called and an officer, identified in defendants' Memorandum as CO Agosto, applied a towel to plaintiff's wounds. The nurse determined plaintiff needed sutures and he was transported to the infirmary.
At the infirmary, a staff member, identified in defendants' Memorandum as defendant Jim Morse, examined plaintiff and asked him if he could suture his wounds. Plaintiff agreed. Prior to suturing, Morse again asked plaintiff for permission and told him he could refuse treatment. Plaintiff, apparently previously unaware that he could refuse treatment, stated he did not want sutures and requested to return to his cell. Morse, expressing doubt that the wounds should be left open, called for defendant Dr. Steve Hiland. Dr. Hiland examined the wounds and decided they had to be sutured. Morse inserted fifteen staples and plaintiff was escorted back to his cell.
Plaintiff filed suit against Lt. Harris, Sgt. Lyle, Wood, Morse, Dr. Hiland and COs Agosto, Kent, and Rasmussen in their individual capacities. He also sued Mike McCarty and William Henderson, neither of whom are identified in the parties' memoranda, in their individual capacities. Additionally, he sued Warden Phil Parker in his official capacity and the Kentucky Department of Corrections ("KDOC").
Plaintiff's suit alleges violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under Sections Two, Eleven, and Seventeen of the Kentucky Constitution. He also brings claims against KDOC and Parker under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He further claims assault and battery, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment under Kentucky law.
DISCUSSION
In order to support a motion for summary judgment, a moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court's role is not to weigh the evidence or determine its truth, but to determine if a genuine question of fact exists. Id. at 249. In making these determinations, the court is to view all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1990).
The individual defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's claims. We agree. "Government officials performing discretionary functions are afforded qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages, as long as their conduct `does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Poe v. Hayden, 853 F.2d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2735, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Thus, "the first step is to determine whether plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right. If the answer is yes, then the second step is to determine whether the right is so `clearly established' that a `reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Brennan v. Township of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1154 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).
Plaintiff first argues this court should follow the Eleventh Circuit in refusing to recognize a qualified immunity defense to an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Skritch v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). However, the Sixth Circuit has not adopted such a position and we decline to do so here. See Gravely v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding officer entitled to qualified immunity against inmate's excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment).
Plaintiff next contends the individual defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by using excessive force against him and administering medical treatment against his will.
First, "when authorities use force to put down a prison disturbance . . . . the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998, 17 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here force was applied in order to free Lt. Harris from plaintiff's grasp and was ceased as soon as this was accomplished. Thus, it is clear the motivation behind the force was "to maintain or restore discipline" rather than merely to cause plaintiff harm. The minor extent of plaintiff's injuries also indicates the force was not sadistically applied. See Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700-01 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding it proper to consider the extent of plaintiff's injuries in applying Eighth Amendment analysis).
Second, plaintiff's claims arising from the individual defendants' failure to obtain his informed consent prior to administering medical treatment do not establish a constitutional violation. "Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend `evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Here, there is no allegation of deliberate indifference. In fact, plaintiff alleges the opposite in claiming he was treated against his will. Therefore, the individual defendants did not violate plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights and are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Accordingly, their Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
As we have found plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of a constitutionally protected right, we need not move on to the second step of the qualified immunity analysis.
Plaintiff also alleges defendants KDOC and Parker violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in failing to adopt and train prison employees in procedures for using force against and administering medical treatment to mentally ill persons. "To establish liability under a failure to train theory, `the plaintiff must prove that the training program is inadequate to the tasks that officers must perform; that the inadequacy is the result of the city's deliberate indifference; and that the inadequacy is `closely related' to or `actually caused' the plaintiff's injury.'" Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1346 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1989)).
First, we cannot find defendants' training program is inadequate. Plaintiff claims the current program does not adequately train prison employees to use force against or administer medical treatment to mentally ill inmates. However, there is no support for the claim's premise that mentally ill inmates require different treatment than the general prison population with regard to such conduct. Further, plaintiff presents no evidence regarding what training did exist and how it was inadequate.
Plaintiff argues he should be allowed to conduct discovery regarding his failure to train claims prior to our granting summary judgment. However, it is well established that "the party moving for summary judgment may simply rely upon the failure of the nonmoving party to present evidence which would create a genuine dispute for the jury, essentially challenging him to `put up or shut up.'" Adkins v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 97-1429 (6th Cir. June 9, 1998) (citing Cox v. Kentucky Dept. of Transportation, 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989).
Additionally, plaintiff has not established the claimed inadequacy caused his injury. There is no evidence "the injury [would] have been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197 1206, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will therefore be granted.
In light of our disposition of the federal claims in this action, we decline to address the pendent state law claims under the authority of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) and its progeny.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted and plaintiff's claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion entered this date and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.